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[2020] ZALAC 7
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Ukweza Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Nyondo and Others (PA2/19) [2020] ZALAC 7; [2020] 6 BLLR 544 (LAC); (2020) 41 ILJ 1354 (LAC) (4 March 2020)
IN THE LABOUR APPEAL
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, PORT ELIZABETH
Case no: PA2/19
In
the matter between:
UKWEZA HOLDINGS (PTY)
LTD Appellant
and
NYONDO
A NO
First Respondent
THE COMMISSION FOR
CONCILIATION
MEDIATION
AND
ARBITRATION Second
Respondent
OLIVER
MICHAEL
DAVID
Third Respondent
Heard:
18 February 2020
Delivered:
04 March 2020
Coram:
Waglay JP, Murphy and Savage AJJA
JUDGMENT
WAGLAY
JP
[1]
The appellant, with
leave of the Labour Court, appeals against the judgment and order of
that Court (Lallie J) which dismissed its
review application to set
aside the award of the first respondent (commissioner).
[2]
The facts relevant for
the determination of this appeal may be summari
sed
as follows: The appellant conducts a catering business that provides
service to a number of customers. One of those customers
is Life St
George Hospital. The appellant is required to have a project manager
on site to run its business at the Life St George
Hospital. Its
project manager resigned and the appellant appointed the third
respondent (employee) on a fixed-term contract from
11 December 2014
to 31 December 2014 to replace its resigned project manager. Although
the contract ended on 31 December 2014,
the employee continued to
render services to the appellant. It was only after the middle of
January 2015 that the appellant approached
the employee to extend the
fixed-term contract to 31 January 2015. The employee agreed.
[3]
The testimony of the
employee was that it is upon a query from a prospective candidate
that he became aware that the position he
occupied had been
advertised. The employee contacted Mr Bam his immediate superior to
enquire about the advertisement. Mr Bam testified
for the appellant.
Although the two testimonies differ on what was said to each other,
it is not disputed that Mr Bam informed
the employee that he would
also be considered for the post along other candidates. On 3 February
2015, the employee received a
notice of termination of his employment
which unequivocally reflected that his “fixed term contract
will end on the 13
th
February 2015”. This notice of termination of employment was
issued a day after the employer had emailed the employee notifying
him that he had been unsuccessful for the position of project
manager. The e-mail also intimated that the employee’s contract
would not be extended and would come to an end on the 13
th
of February 2015. The reason for the date of 13 February 2015 was
that the employer was under the mistaken belief that even though
the
fixed-term agreement had come to an end it was obliged to give two
weeks’ notice of termination in terms of the
Basic Conditions
of Employment Act 75 of 1997
.
[4]
The employee construed
the termination of his contract as a dismissal. He referred his
dismissal to the Commission for Conciliation,
Mediation and
Arbitration (CCMA). At the outset of the arbitration, the
commissioner was confronted with the question whether there
was any
dismissal as the appellant contended that the contract terminated by
effluxion of time. The commissioner made a ruling
that the employee
was dismissed and that the appellant had to prove the fairness of the
dismissal.
[5]
The employee testified
in essence that he had the expectation that he would be made
permanent once the appellant secured the contract
with Life St George
Hospital. He further said that the appellant knew that he had no
private hospital experience as he disclosed
that during the
interview. The employee further stated that a Ms Oosthuizen
apparently employed by the appellant assured him that
that his lack
of experience was not a problem because he was the right person for
the job as she knew him from a previous project.
As regards the
extension of his contract to 31 January 2015, the employee testified
that it was a temporary measure while awaiting
the service agreement
with Life St George Hospital at which time; his contract would have
been made permanent.
[6]
Mr Bam testified that
at the time of the appointment of the employee, the appellant had not
yet signed the service level agreement
with Life St George Hospital.
Hence the fixed-term contract was extended to 31 January 2019. He
further alluded to the fact that
because the appellant was on a
probationary period for three months, the appellant had to “up
his game” to secure the
service level agreement. This is why
the appellant needed to appoint an on-site project manager. Under
cross-examination, he stated
that the appellant did not know at the
time when it offered the fixed-term contracts that the employee had
no hospital experience
and it was for this reason that he was not
appointed to the post. He confirmed that the employee sought and was
considered for
the post and was not successful. In the circumstances,
averred the appellant that the employee could have had no expectation
of
being appointed otherwise he would have not have wanted to be
considered in competition to other applicants for the post.
[7]
The commissioner
reasoned that the employee continued working after the fixed-term
contract ended on 31 January 2015. Consequently,
the termination
letter of 03 February 2015 which incidentally was the next working
day after 31 January, was not terminating the
fixed-term contract
because that contract was no longer in operation as it had expired.
The commissioner thus found that the letter
of 03 February 2015
constituted a notice of termination of the employee’s contract
and a dismissal in terms of
section 186(1)(a)
of the
Labour Relations
Act 66 of 1995
. Having made a ruling that the matter was a dismissal
dispute, the commissioner analysed the evidence to determine the
fairness
of the dismissal, found the dismissal unfair and awarded the
employee compensation.
[8]
Dissatisfied with the
outcome of the arbitration, the appellant sought to review the award.
The Labour Court dismissed the review
application. The court reasoned
that the commissioner was correct in his finding that the CCMA had
jurisdiction. Further that the
commissioner could not be faulted to
find that the fixed-term contract had already expired at the time
that the appellant issued
the notice of termination of the
employment.
[9]
The appellant seeks to
reverse the decision of the Labour Court on three grounds. The
appellant first of all contends that the CCMA
had no jurisdiction to
entertain the dispute as it was not one of dismissal and that the
Labour Court applied the incorrect test
in dealing with the question
of jurisdiction. The appellant submits that because the review
application concerned an issue of jurisdiction,
the Labour Court was
obliged to determine the issue by determining
de
novo
whether the
commissioner’s decision was right or wrong. The appellant then
argued that by deferring to the commissioner’s
decision; the
Labour Court erred by applying the incorrect legal review principle.
[10]
The second contention
is that the commissioner determined the wrong dispute before him. The
appellant contends that the employee’s
evidence was to the
effect that he had an expectation that his contract would be renewed
and as such the commissioner had to decide
whether the employee had
established a reasonable expectation of a permanent employment.
[11]
The last contention
related to the quantum of compensation. The appellant contends that
the commissioner did not exercise his discretion
judicially as the
compensation amount was grossly excessive. It submits that the Labour
Court should have set aside the compensation
and substituted it with
one month’s salary.
[12]
The appellant is
correct. When it comes to the issue of jurisdiction, the decision of
the arbitrator would be reviewable on objectively
justifiable
grounds. The test is that of correctness and not one of
reasonableness. At the arbitration, the appellant raised the
CCMA’s
lack of jurisdiction because there was no dismissal as the contract
had terminated by effluxion of time. This contention
was met with the
employee’s version that he had been dismissed as he expected a
renewal of his contract on a permanent basis
once the appellant had
secured the contract with Life St George Hospital. The commissioner
found that the fixed-term contract ended
on 31 January 2015 and that
the notice period issued on 03 February 2015 could not be for a
contract that had already expired.
Consequently, the commissioner
found that the employee was on an indefinite contract from 01
February 2015 and that he had been
dismissed.
[13]
The above approach is
not only too technical an approach, it fails to take into account the
real and practical way in which the
parties dealt with each other. On
the commissioner’s analysis, the employee should, in fact, have
been in the appellant’s
permanent employ on 1 January 2015
already because he had remained in the appellant’s employ on
that date despite the fact
that the original fixed contract had come
to end on 31 December 2014. The reality was that the appellant and
the employee only
commenced discussion and agreed on the fixed-term
contract for the month of January sometime after the second week of
January and
there was no issue of the employment being permanent
because of the absence of a new fixed-term contract or the employee
remaining
in the appellant’s employ after the expiry of the
original contract.
[14]
On 3 February, after
being informed that he was unsuccessful, the employee raised the
issue that he had a legitimate expectation
to be permanently
appointed to the post and as such the notice to say that his fixed
term contact came to an end constituted a
dismissal. This argument is
misconceived. The facts are that the employee was or became aware
that the appellant advertised to
fill the post the employee occupied
and that he made himself available to be considered for the post. In
the circumstances there
could be no legitimate expectation to the
post he occupied. Furthermore, that he rendered services to the
appellant after
the end of January when his fixed-term contract came
to an end does not mean that that the fixed-term contract morphed
into permanent
employment. Also the appellant’s mistaken belief
that it was obliged to pay two weeks’ notice pay, during which
time
the employee did not nor was he required to render any services
mean that the relationship had gone beyond the fixed-term
relationship.
[15]
In my view, the fixed
term contact ended on 31 January 2015. The fact that the appellant
did not inform the employee prior to the
expiry of the contract that
the contract will not be renewed or extended or that it will be
coming to an end does not mean that
it is either automatically
extended or that the employment has become permanent, unless
provisions of the law specifically provided
for that.
[16]
It follows therefore
that the CCMA erred in concluding that there was a dismissal and as
such it was entitled to arbitrate the dispute.
[17]
In the light of the
above there is no reasons to deal with the other two issues raised by
the appellant. This is also not a matter
where costs should follow
the result.
[18]
Finally, the appellant
has sought condonation for the late filing of its notice of appeal. I
am satisfied that condonation should
be granted.
[19]
In the result I make
the following order:
(a)
Condonation for the late filing of the notice of appeal is granted.
(b)
The appeal is upheld and the order of the Labour Court is substituted
to read:
“
The award
handed down by the CCMA is hereby reviewed and set aside and replaced
with the following: The CCMA has no jurisdiction
to arbitrate the
dispute in the absence of a dismissal.”
_______________
Waglay JP
I agree:
________________
Murphy
AJA
I agree
_______________
Savage AJA
APPEARANCES:
FOR
THE APPELLANT:
Mr Orton, attorney from Snyman attorneys
FOR THE THIRD RESPONDENT:
In person