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[2024] ZALMPPHC 87
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Van Waveren N.O and Others v Municipal Manager City of Polokwane Local Municipality and Others (7946/2024) [2024] ZALMPPHC 87 (12 August 2024)
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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
LIMPOPO DIVISION,
POLOKWANE
CASE NO: 7946/2024
REPORTABLE:
YES/NO
OF INTEREST
TO THE JUDGES: YES/NO
REVISED
DATE:
12.08.2024
SIGNATURE:
In the matter between:
JAN WILLEM VAN
WAVEREN N.O.
(ID 4[…])
FIRST
APPLICANT
NICOLAAS VAN
WAVEREN N.O.
(ID 7[…])
SECOND
APPLICANT
JAN WILLEM VAN
WAVEREN N.O.
(ID 8[…])
THIRD
APPLICANT
LIZELLE ERASMUS
N.O.
(ID 7[…])
FOURTH
APPLICANT
In their capacities as
the Trustees for the time being of the
AGA LESWIKENG TRUST (IT
2[…] (L))
-and-
THE MUNICIPAL
MANAGER: CITY OF POLOKWANE LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
FIRST
RESPONDENT
CITY OF POLOKWANE
LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
SECOND
RESPONDENT
THE CHAIRPERSON:
MUNICIPAL PLANNING TRIBUNAL, CITY OF POLOKWANE LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
THIRD
RESPONDENT
THE CHAIRPERSON:
MUNICIPAL APPEAL TRIBUNAL, CITY OF POLOKWANE LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
FOURTH
RESPONDENT
THE CONTROLLER OF
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
FIFTH
RESPONDENT
SHELL DOWNSTREAM
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD
SIXTH
RESPONDENT
GOLOKENG (PTY) LTD
SEVENTH
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
BRESLER AJ:
Introduction:
[1] The Applicants are
the trustees for the time being of the AGA Leswikeng Trust (the
‘Applicant Trust’). The Applicant
Trust applies for
interim interdictory relief pending the finalization of the review
contained in Part B of the application.
[2] The application is
opposed by the Seventh Respondent only being Golokeng (Pty) Ltd.
[3] The matter came
before court on the 30
th
of July 2024 as an urgent
application. The issue of urgency was argued, and this court found
the matter sufficiently urgent to
warrant the hearing of the merits
on the same day. Reasons for the finding of sufficient urgency were
given in court and will not
be repeated herein.
[4] Having regard to the
technical nature of the matter, the parties were invited to deliver
supplementary Heads by Friday, 2 August
2024. The Seventh Respondent
delivered the said Supplementary Heads comprising some 42 pages
prompting the Applicant Trust to request
this Court an indulgence to
deliver a reply thereto by the 6
th
of August 2024. This
indulgence was granted by the Court to enable both parties a fair
opportunity to fully ventilate the prevailing
disputed issues. More
specifically, the contentious issue of
locus standi
of the
Applicant Trust.
[5] Consequently, this
Court is now called upon to determine if the interim relief,
contemplated in Part A of the Applicants’
application stands to
be granted.
Factual synopsis:
[6] What lies at the
heart of the dispute is the development of the Applicant Trust’s
property
vis-à-vis
the development of the Respondent’s
property directly adjacent thereto. The development of the Seventh
Respondent's property
has purportedly since been approved and they
are adamant to continue notwithstanding the pending review. The
interim relief is
opposed on the basis that the Applicant Trust has
no reasonable prospect of success in the review, rendering the
proposed
interim
relief unnecessary.
[7] The Applicant Trust’s
case is briefly the following:
7.1 The Seventh
Respondent has applied for and was granted developmental rights for
its township known as ‘Lion Hill’
by means of an
incomplete, irregular and non-compliant Application for Township
Establishment.
7.2 The Applicant Trust’s
property already formed the subject matter of applications for land
use rights for similar purposes,
being fuel station facility
development rights.
7.3 The co-existence of
two similar Filling Station facilities virtually adjacent to each
other, in the highly competitive and regulated
Petroleum Industry in
South Africa, is in practice improbable from a Town Planning and
Economic Viability point of view.
7.4 The Municipality
erred to process and approve the irregular and unsubstantiated
township of the Seventh Respondent, if regard
is had to the
compulsory processes, the statutory requirements and criteria
stipulated in the prevailing Town Planning legislation.
In its Heads
of Argument, the grounds for review are
inter alia
summarised
as follows:
7.4.1 The Seventh
Respondent’s township development was never duly authorised.
7.4.2 The Township
Development Application was substantially incomplete and not
processable.
7.4.3 The public
participation process embarked upon in respect of the Township
Development Application was flawed and not in compliance
with the
Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act,
Act 16 of 2013
(SPLUMA) or the By-Law.
7.4.4 The Township
Development Application was amended by the Seventh Respondent after
the flawed public participation process was
completed and continued,
without compliance with the compulsory amendment procedures required
in terms of the By-Law or any public
participation process having
been followed in that regard.
7.4.5 The Third
Respondent, without condonation authority having been conferred upon
it, wrongfully condoned the aforesaid flaws
and decided to process
the Township Development Application and approve same.
7.4.6 The Fourth
Respondent unreasonably refused a substantiated Application for
Postponement of the Applicant Trust and defied
the principles of fair
administrative justice enshrined in the
Constitution,
and the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act,
Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA).
The Applicant Trust was therefore deprived of their right to argue
the appeal. The Fourth Respondent furthermore
disqualified the
Applicant Trust as a lawful objector purely on the basis of a point
in liminé
raised by the Seventh Respondent and argued
in the absence of the Applicant Trust.
7.5 As to the Applicant
Trust’s
locus standi,
they have explained in detail
that, as a result of the protracted land use change process, which
commenced in 2010 / 2011, which
included the involvement of the
Jannie van Waveren Trust and that was ultimately finalised in 2024,
the property forming the subject
of their application has changed
hands and is currently registered in the name of the Applicant Trust.
Mr. Jan Willem van Waveren
(Senior), who was the initial registered
owner of the property, is still engaged as Trustee in the Applicant
Trust. The right to
object to the Seventh Respondent’s
development was ceded and delegated by means of Power of Attorney,
delegation of powers
and Trust resolutions, all of which are
contained in the Founding affidavit.
[8] The
crux
of
the Seventh Respondent’s opposition is summarised in its Heads
of Argument as follows:
8.1 The Applicant Trust’s
land use rights application was approved on the 12
th
of
June 2024. Therefore, at the time when the Seventh Respondent’s
application was approved, the current Applicant Trust
had no
contingent or direct or substantial interest in it. Mr Jan Willem van
Waveren owned the property at this stage and neither
the Jannie van
Waveren Trust nor the Applicant Trust had any interest therein.
8.2 The Applicant Trust
was neither the holder of the rights, nor an objector before the
Third or Fourth Respondent. The land use
rights, and participation
was therefore conducted by different parties.
8.3 The Seventh
Respondent furthermore submit that the relief prayed for constitutes
convoluted relief to the extent that their
actual objection, and
interest, relates to the filling station only whilst the said relief
is aimed at prohibiting the development
as a whole.
Legal Framework:
[9] To succeed with
interim
relief, the Applicant Trust is obliged to address the
following requirements:
8.1 A clear or
prima
facie
right;
8.2 A reasonable
apprehension of irreparable harm;
8.3 Balance of
convenience in favour of granting the relief;
8.4 No other satisfactory
remedy.
[10] As to the clear and
/ or
prima facie
right, this court does not intend to embark
on an elaborate disposition of the concerns raised by the Applicants
in their review
application in view of making a final determination
on the merits thereof. The merits of the review will be determined in
due course
and through the appropriate forum.
[11] This Court must
however determine if the Applicant Trust has the required
locus
standi
to launch the review proceedings and consequently the
current proceedings for
interim
relief.
[12]
As
a point of departure, the Supreme Court of Appeal in the case of
Grey’s
Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of Public Works and
Others
[1]
declared
as follows:
‘
Administrative
action is rather, in A general terms, the conduct of the bureaucracy
(whoever the bureaucratic functionary might
be) in carrying out the
daily functions of the State, which necessarily involves the
application of policy, usually after its translation
into law, with
direct and immediate consequences for individuals or groups of
individuals.’
[13]
And
further:
[2]
‘
[30]
While 'rights' may have a wider connotation in this context, and
may include prospective rights that have yet to
accrue, it
is difficult to see how the term could encompass interests that fall
short of that. It has not been shown that
any rights - or even
prospective rights - of any of the appellants (or of any other
person) have been adversely affected by the
Minister's decision.
None
of the appellants has any right to use the property that has been
let, or to restrict its use by others, nor has any case
been
made out that their rights of occupation of their own premises have
been unlawfully compromised
.
As pointed out in Kyalami Ridge, at para [95]:
'The
general rule is that the reasonable use of property by an owner is
not subject to restrictions, even if such user causes prejudice
to
others.'
(Own
underlining)
[14]
In
commenting on the question of whose rights are adversely affected,
Cora Hoexter
[3]
remarks the
following:
‘
A final
question is whose rights must be adversely affected. On a narrow and
technical approach a successful applicant, say, would
not be able to
challenge beneficial administrative conduct such as being granted a
license or being awarded a tender. It would
not amount to
administrative action
vis-à-vis
the successful applicant, and only the person disadvantaged by such
an award would be able to challenge it. On
a broader approach,
administrative conduct nearly always affects someone’s (broadly
construed) rights adversely, and so any
conduct complying with the
other requirements of s 1 would nearly always qualify on this score
as well. Although it has been suggested,
with reference to ‘direct,
external legal effect’, that the impact should fall on the
person seeking to challenge the
decision, the broader approach is
indicated by the wording of s 1 of the PAJA itself: ‘which
adversely affects the rights
of
any person’
.
As already noted, too, the Supreme Court of Appeal has apparently
been content with a decision whose impact was on the rights
not of
the applicant but of the lessee – and whose impact was moreover
beneficial, not adverse.’
[4]
[15] It is undeniable
that the Applicant Trust is the current registered owner of the
property. A development has been approved
in respect of the adjacent
property. This clearly affects the rights of the current owner. At
the very least, the Applicant Trust
has established a
prima facie
right, though open to some doubt, which will entitle them to the
relief in due course.
[16] The Seventh
Respondent has also raised the issue of Section 7(2)(a) and (c) of
PAJA dealing with internal remedies. The Seventh
Respondent submits
that alternative remedies are available to the Applicant as they have
yet to exhaust the internal remedies,
thus preventing them from
succeeding on appeal.
[17]
The
Constitutional Court dealt with the issue in the decision of
Eskom
Holdings SOC Ltd v Vaal River Development Association (Pty) Ltd and
Others
[5]
where
it was held:
‘
The substance
of the first judgment's point is that the residents ought not to have
approached the High Court for the relief sought
without first
exhausting what the first judgment suggests are internal remedies
under the ERA. The first judgment is mistaken in
this regard. The
operative word in s 7(2)(a) is 'review'. What was before the
High Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and
now this court is not a
review. It is interim relief for an interdict sought by way of
urgency pending a review. So, in the proceedings
for interim relief,
s 7(2)(a) cannot feature because these proceedings are not a
PAJA review.’
[18] The Constitutional
Court ventured further to conclude that the requirement of showing
that no other remedy is available is
wider to the extent that it must
be shown that the alternative remedy is ‘satisfactory’.
Internal remedies may not
be ‘satisfactory’. Section
7(2)(a) of PAJA, properly interpreted, does not apply to interim
interdicts sought pending
PAJA reviews. To interpret it differently
will have a negative impact on the fundamental right to access to
courts contemplated
in section 34 of the
Constitution,
1996.
It must also be borne in mind that in exceptional circumstances,
non-compliance with the provisions of Section 7(2) may be
condoned –
this aspect is however for the reviewing court to decide and does not
feature in a determination of the
pendente lite
relief.
[19] This Court is
satisfied that there is no ‘alternative’ remedy that
would yield ‘satisfactory’ results.
[20] It is trite law that
the right set up by the Applicant need not be shown on a balance of
probabilities. If it is
prima facie
established, although open
to some doubt, it is sufficient. It is furthermore trite law that the
determination of a
prima facie
right must be considered
against the backdrop of irreparable harm being caused should the
relief not be granted.
[21]
Prest,
The Law
and Practice of Interdicts
[6]
states the following:
The court has to
decide, in its discretion, whether or not to grant a temporary
interdict. In the exercise of this discretion, it
must be satisfied
that the applicant has proved an actual or well grounded apprehension
of irreparable loss if no interdict is
granted and it must have
regard to the balance of convenience
[22]
As
to the irreparable harm, this Court is of the view that the harm lies
in the development of the Seventh Respondent having an
adverse
economic effect on the proposed development of the Applicant Trust.
This rings true especially in lieu of the fact that
both developments
purport to be of a similar nature providing for similar facilities
including but not limited to the filling stations.
The Seventh
Respondent argued that approval of the petroleum site and retail
licenses can take up to two years, thus negating any
potential
irreparable harm. This Court is however not privy to those procedures
and must assume, for purposes hereof, that such
site and retail
licenses may be approved prior to the review being finalised. It is
after all not actual irreparable harm that
is envisioned but rather
‘
immers
eene gegronde vrees dat ‘er zoodanige feijtelijkheid ...
gepleegd zal worden’.
[7]
[23]
An
applicant must therefore only have a reasonable apprehension of
injury – one which a reasonable man might entertain on
being
faced with certain facts.
[8]
This constituted an objective test.
[9]
[24] This Court is
likewise satisfied that irreparable harm might result should the
relief not be granted on an
interim
basis.
[25]
Prest
supra
further states on page 79:
‘
In every case
of an application for an interdict pendente lite the court has a
discretion whether or not to grant the application.
It exercises this
discretion upon consideration of all circumstances and particularly
upon a consideration of the probabilities
of success of the applicant
in the action. It considers the nature of the injury which the
respondent, on the one hand, will suffer
if the application is
granted and he should ultimately turn out to be right, and that which
the applicant, on the other hand, might
sustain if the application is
refused and he should ultimately turn out to be right. For though
there may be no balance of probability
that the applicant will
succeed in the action, it may be proper to grant an interdict where
the balance of convenience is strongly
in favour of doing so, just as
it may be proper to refuse the application where the probabilities
favour the applicant, if the
balance of convenience is against the
grant of interim relief.’
[26]
Both
parties referred to the matter of
Economic
Freedom Fighters v Gordhan
[10]
where
the following was stated at [42]:
‘
[42] In
addition, before a court may grant an interim interdict, it must be
satisfied that the applicant for an interdict has good
prospects of
success in the main review. The claim for review must be based on
strong grounds which are likely to succeed. This
requires the court
adjudicating the interdict application to peek into the grounds of
review raised in the main review application
and assess their
strength. It is only if a court is convinced that the review is
likely to succeed that it may appropriately grant
the interdict. The
rationale is that an interdict which prevents a functionary from
exercising public power conferred on it impacts
on the separation of
powers and should therefore only be granted in exceptional
circumstances.’
[27]
In
the case of
Eskom
Holdings
referenced
supra,
the
learned Madlanga J (Mathopo J, Mhlantla J, Theron J and Tshiqi J
concurring) furthermore remarked:
[11]
‘
There
are legal questions that are capable of easy resolution to any judge
worth their salt. Those must be decided definitively.
If, as a matter
of law, the right asserted by the applicant for interim relief is
held not to exist at all, that will be the end
of the matter. And
that will result in a saving in costs as there will be no subsequent
litigation. On the other hand, the legal
right may definitively be
held to exist as a matter of law and all that may remain for
determination at the later proceedings may
be whether, on the facts,
the applicant has made out a case. There may also be those
circumstances where — either because
of a combination of
factors that include the complexity of the legal question, its
novelty, little or no assistance from the litigants'
argument, the
speed with which the outcome is required and lack of sufficient time
for the judge to consider the matter as best
they can — the
judge may not be in a position to reach a definitive decision on a
legal question. In Johannesburg Municipal
Pension Fund Malan
J held:
'Impressive
and erudite arguments were addressed to me on all these grounds. I
cannot do justice to all the considerations referred
to. All the
issues referred to involve difficult questions of law and none of
them can be described as ordinary.
Nor is it desirable to rule at
this interim stage that there is no prospect of success on any of
these bases of review. The issues
are simply too involved (a serious
question to be tried) and of such gravity that they cannot be, and
should not be, disposed of
in these interim proceedings
. The city
has disavowed reliance on the notices purporting to amend Notice 6766
and I do not intend dealing with their validity,
but accept for the
purposes of this judgment the applicants' contentions.'
(Own
underlining)
[28]
This
court is specifically concerned with the fact that the objection
in
liminé
presented
at the Appeal hearing was heard in the absence of the Applicant Trust
(or its predecessor). I do not have access to the
record of these
proceedings to ascertain precisely what transpired save for the
version presented by the parties. As was aptly
stated in
Joseph
v City of Johannesburg
[12]
with
reference to the commentary of Cora Hoexter:
‘
Procedural
fairness ... is concerned with giving people an opportunity to
participate in the decisions that will affect them, and
–
crucially – a chance of influencing the outcome of those
decisions. Such participation is a safeguard that not only
signals
respect for the dignity and worth of the participants, but it is also
likely to improve the quality and rationality of
administrative
decision-making and to enhance its legitimacy.’
[29]
The
Seventh Respondent referred to the matter of
Rainbow
Junction Development and Another v City of Tshwane Metropolitan
Municipality and Others
[13]
in
justification of its view that the review will not succeed as the
Applicant Trust was not the same party that lodged the complaint
and
initially participated in the proceedings.
[30] This Court
respectfully does not agree with the findings and reasoning of the
Honourable Justice Phahlane for the following
reasons:
33.1 Section 51(1) of
SPLUMA provides that a person whose rights are affected by a decision
taken by a Municipal Planning Tribunal
may appeal against that
decision by giving written notice of the appeal and reasons to the
Municipal Manager within 21 (twenty-one)
days of the date of
notification of the decision.
33.2 This must be read
with the provisions of Section 51(4)(c) that provides that ‘any
interested person who may be reasonably
be expected to be affected by
the land development application proceedings’ has the required
locus standi
to lodge appeal procedures in the prescribed
manner.
33.3 Section 51(5)
further elaborates to state that an interested person for the purpose
of subsection (4)(c) must be a person having
a pecuniary or
proprietary interest who is adversely affected or able to demonstrate
that she or he will be adversely affected
by the decision of the
planning tribunal or an appeal in respect of such decision.
33.4 Nowhere in SPLUMA is
it state that the status of an ‘interested person’ is
limited to the extent that it has participated
in the proceedings to
date. In fact, quite the opposite is intended in as far as interested
person are given the pertinent right
to intervene.
33.5 Furthermore, Section
45(4) of SPLUMA provides that, in the event that the question arises
as to whether a person is an interested
person in a land development
application or an appeal, the Municipal Planning Tribunal or appeal
authority concerned may make a
determination as to whether such
person qualifies as an interested person.
33.6 Regulation 31(4) of
the Regulations promulgated in terms of SPLUMA, stipulates that for
the Municipal Planning Tribunal, appeal
authority or authorised
official to determine whether a petitioner qualifies as an interested
person as contemplated in subsection
(4)
supra
it may
consider:
33.6.1 his / her rights
have been affected by the decision of the Municipal Planning Tribunal
or that his / her rights may be adversely
affected by the decision of
the Municipal Planning Tribunal or authorised official and might
therefore be adversely affected by
the decision of the appeal
authority;
33.6.2 the petitioner
represents a group of people who have a direct concern in the
proceedings;
33.6.3 the ability of the
petitioner to protect his / her interest would be impeded by the
decision of the Municipal Planning Tribunal,
authorised official or
appeal authority and his / her interest is not adequately represented
by the current parties to the proceedings;
33.6.4 the petitioner
will provide a different perspective on the issues before the
Municipal Planning Tribunal, authorised official
or appeal authority,
without expanding those issues.
33.7 This case was
therefore clearly incorrectly decided to the extent that it failed to
have regard to the right of any third party
to effectively intervene
in the appeal procedures. It furthermore failed to highlight the
discretion of the Municipal Planning
Tribunal, authorised official or
appeal authority to allow the intervention purely on the basis that
the petitioner will have for
instance, a different perspective on the
issues before them.
[31] Applying the
stare
decisis
principle, this Court is not bound to follow the
reasoning of a court of equal stature if this Court is of the view
that the judgment
and reasoning is incorrect or misguided. For the
reasons expounded upon herein before, this Court consequently do not
follow the
judgment and reasoning set forth in the case of
Rainbow
Junction Development and Another
supra.
[32]
Having
regard to the matter before court, the Municipal Appeals Tribunal
simply dismissed the appeal on the premise that the Applicant
Trust
was not the objector in the Municipal Planning application.
[14]
This decision is fatally flawed as no consideration was given to the
fact that the petitioner might have a pecuniary or proprietary
interest that might be adversely affected. It must again be noted
that the Applicant Trust did not have an opportunity to argue
the
matter as the postponement was refused.
[33] This court is
prima
facie
of the view that these two grounds for review has a
reasonable prospect of success. This will however conclusively be
decided at
the hearing of the review. Having said that, this Court is
of the view that justice demands that interim relief be granted.
[34] As matters of this
nature customarily entails a possible economic risk should it be
unreasonably delayed, the parties will
be well advised to approach
the Office of the Judge President for approval of a preferential
hearing date in respect of the review.
[35] Much of what this
Court has found, is premised upon a
prima facie
view and is
dependant upon a final determination in the main case. It would
therefore be just under the circumstances if the costs
of Part A of
the application is left for determination in the main application
under Part B.
Order:
[36]
In the result the
following order is made:
36.1
The
Application is heard as an Urgent Application in accordance with the
provisions of Uniform Rule 6(12) and the requirements pertaining
to
forms and service are dispensed with.
36.2
Pending
the outcome of the relief sought in PART B of the Application, the
First to Seventh Respondents are interdicted and restrained
from
directly or indirectly giving effect to or causing and / or allowing
the execution of the Decisions attached as ANNEXURES
‘A’
and ‘B’ to the Notice of Motion (the ‘Impugned
decisions’), in respect of the property
described at Portion
162 (A Portion of Portion 150) of the Farm Sterkloop 688,
Registration Division L.S., Limpopo Province (the
‘Subject
property’), on which the Township Lion Hill (the ‘Township’)
is intended to be developed, by virtue
of any Proclamation,
Promulgation, Approval, Consent, Authorisation and / or Licence to be
granted or issued by the First to Fifth
Respondents, in favour of the
Sixth and / or the Seventh Respondent, the Subject property or the
Township or any of their Agents,
Representatives, Consultants or
affiliated Companies, in terms of any applicable and prevailing
legislation, and which Proclamation,
Promulgation, Approval, Consent,
Authorisation and / or Licence constitutes or ultimately may form the
subject of PART B of the
Application.
36.3
The costs
pertaining to PART A are reserved for determination in PART B of the
Application.
M BRESLER
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT,
LIMPOPO DIVISION,
POLOKWANE
APPEARANCES
:
FOR
THE APPLICANTS
: Adv. MC Erasmus
SC
Adv. DJ van Heerden
INSTRUCTED BY
: Adriaan Venter
Attorneys & Associates
info@avatt.co.za
c.oberholzer@dbolaw.co.za
FOR THE SEVENTH
RESPONDENT
: Adv. LG Putter SC
: Adv. M Majozi
INSTRUCTED
BY
: Ivan Pauw &
Partners Attorneys
pierre@ippartners.co.za
solly@mmakolamatsimela.co.za
DATE
OF HEARING
: 30 July 2024
DATE OF JUDGMENT
:
12 August 2024
[1]
2005 (6) SA 313 (SCA)
[2]
At [30]
[3]
Hoexter,
Administrative
Law in South Africa
,
Second Edition, Juta on page 227
[4]
The learned writer made the remark with reference to the finding in
the
Grey’s
Marine
case
supra.
[5]
2023 (4) SA 325
(CC) at [215] to [229]
[6]
Page 57
[7]
Joannes Van der Linden,
Verhandeling
over de Judicieele Practijcq
(Leiden
1794)
[8]
See
Free
State Gold Areas Ltd v Merriespruit (Orange Free-State) GM Co Ltd
1961 (2) SA 505
(W) at
518
[9]
See
Pickles
v Pickles
1947
(3) SA 175
(W) at 179 – 180
[10]
2020 (6) SA 325 (CC)
[11]
At [251]
[12]
2010 (4) SA 55
(CC) at 71C-D
[13]
2022 JDR 0260 (GP)
[14]
See page 162 in Volume 2 of the paginated papers.