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[2024] ZAECMHC 55
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Mbhiiyozo v Eskom Holdings SOC Limited (3133/2023) [2024] ZAECMHC 55 (25 June 2024)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN
CAPE DIVISION, MTHATHA)
CASE
NO.: 3133/2023
In
the matter between:
ODWA
MBHIYOZO
PLAINTIFF
and
ESKOM
HOLDINGS SOC LIMITED
DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT
ZONO
AJ:
Introduction
[1]
The plaintiff is a South African citizen of Msintsini Location,
Libode born on 09 July 1993. To the Particulars of Claim
the
plaintiff annexed as annexure “
MO1
” his identity
document copy reflecting this Identity Number 9[…]
[2]
The defendant is described as a juristic entity defined both in
section 1
of the
Eskom Conversion Act 13 of 2001
and defined
in section 1 of the
Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 2006.
[3]
The defendant is cited and sued herein on the basis that it is
vicariously liable for all the delictual and contractual
acts and
omissions committed by its employees whilst acting within the course
and scope of their employment.
[4]
The matter was set down for the hearing of a special plea raised by
the defendant. The defendant raised a special plea
of prescription.
Prescription of debt is governed by the
Prescription Act No. 68 of
1969
.
Pleadings
[5]
The relevant portions of the plaintiff’s amended particulars of
claim read as follows:
“
1. The
plaintiff is Odwa Mbhiyozo an adult male, currently residing at
Msintsini Location at Libode in the Eastern Cape Province.
A copy of
the plaintiff’s identity document attached hereto annexed as
annexure “MO1”.
6. On or about
the 17
th
of January 2007, the plaintiff was walking along
the nearby farm at Ntlaza, in Libode when he came into contact with
an uncovered
high voltage electric cable while he was walking, he was
electrocuted as a result plaintiff suffered severe third degree burns
and severe bodily injuries.
8. The plaintiff
was admitted at Life St Mary’s Hospital where he was treated
for the severe burn wounds he suffered
. . . . . . He remained in St
Mary’s Hospital for a period of three (3) months and he was
transferred to Nelson Mandela Academic
Hospital where he spent seven
(7) months until he was discharged.”
[6]
It is in these particulars of claim that a special plea of
prescription is raised. The special plea in its amended form
reads as
follows:
“
1.
Prescription
1.1
The
plaintiff’s claim is based on an incident which is alleged to
have occurred on the 17
th
of January
2007.
1.2
The
plaintiff’s summons was served on the defendant on or about the
28
th
of July 2023 which is more than three
(3) years after the date upon which the plaintiff’s claim
arose. In fact, the action
was instituted approximately sixteen (16)
years after the alleged incident occurred.
1.3
Accordingly, the action of the plaintiff as against the
defendant expired on the 18
th
of January
2010 and the defendant cannot be held liable for the plaintiff’s
alleged claim and subsequent damages.
1.4
In
the premises, the plaintiff’s claim has prescribed in terms of
section 11(d)
of the
Prescription Act.
>
1.5
Alternatively, the plaintiff became aware of the identity of
the debtor as at 17
th
February 2007. Further
alternatively with the exercise of reasonable care he could have
acquired such knowledge of the identity
of the debtor.”
[7]
In his replication the plaintiff disputes that his claim had
prescribed. For that he relies on the provisions of section
12(3) of
the Prescription Act 68 of 1969 (as amended) and avers that the
plaintiff became aware of identity of the creditor and
the facts
giving rise to the cause of action upon consulting with his legal
representatives on the 5
th
of June 2023. Although the word
creditor was used I take it that the defendant was referring to the
debtor. Although that the defendant
was responsible for payment his
medical bills at St Mary’s Hospital the plaintiff laboured
under the impression that there
were no further claims for other
heads of damages he would be entitled to.
[8]
Parties led evidence on the subject of prescription. The defendant
led the evidence of one witness, Makhosandile Malinge
who is an
employee of the defendant as a Supervisor. The plaintiff testified
and no other witness was called and he closed his
case.
Evidence
[9]
On behalf of the defendant and relevant to the case Mr Malinge
testified that on 17 January 2007 he was on duty and was
informed by
colleagues that a person was electrocuted, and he then proceeded to
the scene. Upon arrival at the scene he saw electricity
wires on the
ground and he took photographs thereof. He then proceeded to St
Mary’s Hospital where the plaintiff was admitted
in his
capacity as an Eskom member or employee. After having been allowed to
see the plaintiff, he went to him and on arrival he
noticed that the
plaintiff was bandaged on the areas he was electrocuted. He spoke to
the plaintiff although it was difficult for
him to speak. He
introduced himself to the plaintiff by telling the plaintiff his name
and his work-related details as well as
the purpose of his visit.
[10]
Mr Malinge then took photographs of the plaintiff in his condition
and prepared documentation for investigation by Eskom.
As Eskom
employees they are not allowed to inform the injured persons of their
rights to institute claims against Eskom.
[11]
In cross-examination, Mr Malinge confirmed that on 17 January 2007
the plaintiff was still a minor as he was thirteen
(13) years of age.
He testified that at that age he could not have known the debtor
without the existence of a lawyer. He said
he does not know if he
could not have known of the facts giving rise to the claim. He
further confirmed that he was advised that
the plaintiff left school
in 2009 and was an orphan as he was told by the plaintiff. He stated
that the information he took on
during his visit at St Mary’s
Hospital was given to Eskom, and he does not know what happened to
that information.
[12]
The plaintiff testified to the effect that he was born on 09 July
1993 and he resides at Msintsini Location and he only
passed Standard
5 in 2009. On the 17
th
of January 2007 when in the mealie
field with his cousin looking for lost cattle, he was electrocuted by
Eskom cables. He was ultimately
taken to St Mary’s Hospital
where he was admitted for three (3) months and thereafter to Mandela
Academic Hospital where
he spent seven (7) months. He testified that
in 2007 he was thirteen (13) years old.
[13]
He further testified that he only saw his legal representatives on 5
June 2023 after one Yolisiwe Poswa arranged a consultation
for him.
Before consultation with his legal representatives he knew nothing
about the debtor and the facts giving rise to the claim.
He confirmed
that Summons was issued on 27 July 2023 and service thereof was
effected on 31 July 2023.
[14]
In cross-examination he said he had always known that his injuries
were caused by Eskom cables and that he
was subsequently visited by
Eskom member of employee at St Mary’s Hospital. He confirmed
that Eskom paid his hospital bills.
He confirmed that he reached
eighteen (18) years of age in 2011.
Discussion
[15]
The basic rules governing the incidence of the onus of proof have
been subject of much judicial debate and has been settled.
In
Pillay
v Krishna & Another
[1]
the following three (3) rules were set out:
“
(a)
If one person claims something from another in a court of law, then
he has to satisfy the court that
he is entitled to it;
(b)
where the person against whom the claim is made is not content with a
mere denial of that claim
but set up a special defence, then he is
regarded ‘quo ad’ that defence, as being the claimant:
for his defence to
be upheld he must satisfy the court that he is
entitled to succeed on it.
(c)
he who asserts proves and not he who denies since a denial of a fact
cannot naturally be proved
provided that it is a fact that is denied
and that the denial is absolute.”
[16]
Thus the onus to prove prescription rest upon the defendant. It is
the defendant that must satisfy the court that it
is entitled to
succeed on the special plea of prescription. That is supported by the
second principle in the judgment of
Pillay
referred to above.
Again, on the basis of third principle of that judgment, it is the
defendant that asserts a special defence of
prescription, therefore
it must prove it.
[17]
Prescription Act
[2
]
requires
that prescription must be invoked in a relevant document. The actual
text section 17(2) of the Act is worded as follows:
“
(2) A
party to litigation who invokes prescription, shall do so in the
relevant document filed of record in the proceedings:
Provided that a
court may allow prescription to be raised at any stage of the
proceedings.”
The document referred to
in this provision is a plea or a special plea relating to
prescription. In simple terms a prescription
must be raised in the
relevant pleading, which invariably is the defendant’s plea.
[18]
The defendant has succeeded to invoke a special plea of prescription
in its pleading. The nature of the special plea
raised by the
defendant is as set out in paragraph 6 above. The essence of that
special plea is that the prescription commenced
to run on 17 January
2007 and on 18 January 2010 the debt had prescribed. In so doing, the
defendant relied on the provisions of
section 11(d) of the
prescription Act 68 of 1969.
The plea of prescription was premised
on the date when the cause of action arose or the date when the
incident occur.
[19]
Section 11(d) aforesaid provides as follows:
“
11.
Periods of prescription of debts
—
The periods of
prescription of debts shall be the following—
(a) ………..
(b) ………..
(c) ………..
(d) save where
an Act of Parliament provides otherwise, three years in respect of
any other debt.”
The
debt referred to in (a), (b) and (c) relates to the debt secured by
mortgage bonds, debt owed by the State and arising out of
an advance
or loan of money, a sale or lease of land by the State to the debtor;
and lastly to debt arising from bill of exchange
or other negotiable
instrument or from a notarial contract. The present debt correctly
falls within the category of section 11(d)
of the Act.
[20]
The plaintiff, while having made out a case about his age by
reference in paragraph 1 of the particulars of claim to
annexure
“
MO1
” which is plaintiff’s identity
document, he delivered a replication which pertinently states that
the plaintiff, during
the period spanning from 17 January 2007 to 18
January 2010 was still a minor. That fact was repeated unequivocally
in evidence
and it became a common cause.
[21]
This therefore leads to the provisions of
section 3
and
13
of the
Prescription Act. Section
13 of the Act provides for
completion of
prescription delayed in certain circumstances.
Subsection 1
provides this:
“
(1) (a) If the
creditor is a
minor
or insane or is a person
under curatorship or is prevented by superior force including any law
or any order of court from interrupting
the running of prescription
as contemplated in section 15 (1) the period of prescription shall
not be completed before a year has
elapsed after the day referred to
in paragraph (i).”
Paragraph 1 refers to
the circumstances contemplated in paragraph (a) – (h) as
impediments to the running of and completion
of prescription periods.
Essentially creditor’s minority status delays the running and
completion of the prescription. Prescription
only starts to run once
minority ceases to exist
[3]
. The
age of majority is eighteen (18) years
[4]
.
[22]
Of similar importance and more relevance are the provisions of
section 3(1) (a) of the same
Prescription Act which
read as follows:
“
Completion
of prescription postponed in certain circumstances
—
(I) If-
(a) the person
against whom the prescription is running is a
minor
or
is insane, or is a person under curatorship, or is prevented by
superior force from interrupting the running of prescription
as
contemplated in
section 4
; or
(b) …..
(c) the period of
prescription shall not be completed before the expiration of a period
of three years after the day referred to
in paragraph (c).”
Paragraph c referred to
herein reads as follows: -
“
(c ) The
period of prescription would, but for the provisions of this
subsection, be completed before or on, or within three
years after,
the day on which the relevant impediment referred to in paragraph (a)
or (b) has ceased to exist.”
[23]
The plaintiff attained the age of majority in
July
2011.
I
accordingly find that prescription of plaintiff’s claim would
not have started to run before July 2011. The debt was undoubtedly
not due before that time, if regard is had to the provision of
section 12 of the Act
[5]
.
Accordingly, defendant’s pleaded special plea on prescription
cannot succeed on that basis.
[24]
However, the defendant during the hearing of the matter sought to
rely on the fact that (I am paraphrasing) the plaintiff
attained the
age of majority during July 2011 and the prescription commenced
therefrom and accordingly completed three (3) years
thereafter before
the institution of the section and service of summons. Accordingly,
so the version was put to the plaintiff,
Summons having been issued
on 22 July 2023 and service thereof having been effected on 31 July
2023, plaintiff’s claim has
been extinguished by prescription.
Mr Madokwe, counsel for the plaintiff sternly objected to that
version on the simple reason
that the plaintiff did not plead those
facts or rather did not rely in its papers on those facts as the
facts giving rise to a
plea of prescription. I agree. Defendant ‘s
pleaded case or facts on the special plea of prescription is somewhat
different
from the one sought to be introduced during the evidence.
Defendant’s prescription defence was based on the date when the
cause of action arose not on the date when the plaintiff attained the
age of majority.
[25]
Every pleading shall contain a clear and concise statement of the
material facts upon which the pleader relies for his
claim, defence
or answer to any pleading, as the case may be, with sufficient
particularity to enable the opposite party to reply
thereto
[6]
.
Facts not evidence must be pleaded
[7]
.
[26]
While a pleader’s first duty is to allege the facts upon which
he relies, his second duty is to set out the conclusions
of law which
he claims follow from the pleaded facts. Facts and conclusions of law
must however be kept separate
[8]
.
[27]
Rule 18(4) of the Uniform Rules of Court referred to above had found
expression in many authorities. It is trite that
the whole purpose of
pleadings is to bring to the notice of the court and the parties the
issues upon which reliance is to be placed
for rivalling contentions.
It has been repeatedly said that the object for the pleadings is to
define and ascertain definitely
what the question at issue between
the parties is, and this object can only be attained when each party
states his case with precision.
Accordingly, a pleader cannot be
allowed to direct the attention of the other party to one issue and
then at the trial attempt
to canvass another
[9]
.
[28]
The Supreme Court of Appeal in
Minister
of Safety & Security v Slabbert
[10]
affirmed the aforesaid position and relied on the judgment of
Moaki
and
Imprefed
referred
above and held as follows:
“
[11]
The purpose of the pleadings is to
define the issues for the other party and the court. A party
has a
duty to allege in the pleadings the material facts upon which it
relies. It is impermissible for a plaintiff to plead a particular
case and seek to establish a different case at the trial.
2
It
is equally not permissible for the trial court to have recourse to
issues falling outside the pleadings when deciding a
case.”
[29]
In this case, there are no facts pleaded by the defendant premised on
the fact that the prescription of plaintiff’s
debt commenced to
run in July 2011 when the plaintiff attained the age of majority. A
pertinent case pleaded by the defendant is
that the prescription
commenced to run on 17 January 2007 when the incident of plaintiff’s
electroculation took place and
accordingly completed and the
claim expired on 18 January 2010. The case based on the plaintiff's
attainment of age of majority
was an afterthought and sought to be
introduced by ambush.
[30]
Theron JA (as she then was) in
Fischer
v Ramahlele
[11]
held that:
“
[13]
Turning then to the nature of civil
litigation in our adversarial system it is for the parties,
either in
the pleadings or affidavits, which serve the function of both
pleadings and evidence, to set out and define the
nature of
their dispute and it is for the court to adjudicate upon those
issues. That is so even where the dispute involves
an issue
pertaining to the basic human rights guaranteed by our Constitution,
for ‘it is impermissible for a party to rely
on a
constitutional complaint that was not pleaded’. There are
cases where the parties may expand those issues by the
way in which
they conduct the proceedings. There may also be instances where the
court may mero motu raise a question
of law that emerges
fully from the evidence and is necessary for the decision of the
case. That is subject to the proviso that
no prejudice will be caused
to any party by its being decided. Beyond that it is for the
parties to identify the dispute and
for the court to determine that
dispute and that dispute alone.”
The Constitutional Court
affirmed and relied on this decision in
Public
Protector v South African Reserved Bank
[12]
.
[31]
There are, however, instances in which a party may be allowed to rely
on an issue which was not covered by the pleadings
[13]
.
A court is not bound by pleadings if a particular issue was fully
canvassed during the trial by both parties
[14]
.
The next issue is whether this issue was fully canvassed by both
parties at the trial or in evidence.
[32]
When the defendant’s witness, Mr Malinge was giving evidence
being led by defendant’s counsel, he did not
say anything at
least about plaintiff’s age. The witness testified at length
about what happened on 17 January 2007, which
is the date of
incident, and what he subsequently did for purposes of igniting
defendant’s investigation of that incident.
[33]
It is only during cross-examination that plaintiff’s age was
introduced to the witness by plaintiff’s counsel
to show that
at the time of accident the plaintiff was a young village boy who
left school after having passed Standard 5 and accordingly
lacked
cognitive abilities to know the identity of the debtor and the facts
giving rise to the debt. That was as far as the issue
of plaintiff’s
age was introduced by plaintiff’s counsel in cross-examination
of defendant’s witness. That line
of questioning still had to
do with the case made out in the special plea about the prescription
which has been have been alleged
to have commenced on 17 January 2007
or thereabout.
[34]
It was during plaintiff’s case, after defendant’s witness
had been excused that defendant’s counsel
in his
cross-examination of plaintiff attempted to canvass a version that
the plaintiff attained his age of majority in July 2011
and that debt
prescribed three (3) years after. That line of questioning was
objected to.
[35]
The plaintiff, when he was led by his counsel in chief said nothing
about his age of majority and the reason to delay
to institute the
instant proceedings from that date of age of majority. The gravamen
of this evidence was that he became aware
of the identity of the debt
on 05 June 2023 and he was questioned at length about that.
[36]
I therefore have no doubt in my mind that the issue of prescription
premised on the fact that the plaintiff attained
the age of majority
on July 2011 and the prescription commenced to run therefrom was not
fully canvased. Accordingly, on this basis
I cannot find in favour of
the defendant.
[37]
In conclusion, I agree with the defendant’s counsel’s
written submissions that “
the prescription special plea is
fact based and therefore the issue of the date which prescription
began to run is a factual issue
which has to be traversed.
”
A conclusion of law about prescription follow pertinent facts pleaded
in the plea, which are about the date of incident,
which is the date
when prescription allegedly commenced to run.
[38]
Having been informed by Theron JA (as she then was) in
Fischer
v Ramahlele
[15]
where she held that “
there
may also be instances where the court may mero motu raise a
question of law that emerges fully from the evidence…”
I
requested during hearing of the matter parties to make submissions
about the power of court to
mero
motu
raise
questions of law. No submissions were made on behalf of the
defendant. Counsel for the plaintiff held an opinion that the
court
does not have power to raise point of law as that would amount to
creating defence for the other party. I invited parties
to submit
heads of arguments or written submissions,
inter
alia,
dealing with the judgment of
CUSA
v Ta Ying Metal Industries & Others
[16]
vis-à-vis
the provisions of
Section 17(1)
of the
Prescription Act.
[39
] Paragraph 67
of the aforesaid judgment is as follows:
“
[67]
…
Where a point of law is apparent on the
papers, but the common approach of the parties proceeds on a wrong
perception of what the
law is, a court is not only entitled, but is
in fact also obliged, mero motu, to raise the point of law and
require the parties
to deal therewith. Otherwise, the result would be
a decision premised on an incorrect application of the law. That
would infringe
the principle of legality.”
It emerges from
plaintiff’s papers that he was born on 09 July 1993. It is by
the exercise of simple arithmetic calculations
that the plaintiff
turned eighteen (18) years on 09 July 2011 and became major. It is
the
Prescription Act that
provides that prescription commences to run
when minority ceases to exist
[17]
hence that point is a point of law.
[40]
However, that is not the end.
Section 17(1)
finds application in
instances where a special plea has to be raised. I next quote the
full text of
section 17
of the
Prescription Act,
“
17.
Prescription
to be raised in pleadings
(1)
A court shall not of its own motion take notice of prescription.
(2)
A party to litigation who invokes prescription, shall do so in the
relevant document filed of record in the
proceedings: Provided that a
court may allow prescription to be raised at any stage of the
proceedings.”
[41]
These provisions are couched in peremptory terms. If a provision is
couched in a negative form, it is to be regarded
as peremptory rather
than a directory mandate. A statutory requirement construed as
peremptory usually need exact compliance for
it to have the
stipulated legal consequences
[18]
.
As a general rule non-compliance with peremptory provision results in
nullity
[19]
.
[42]
The net effect of the above sentiments is that, if peremptory
provisions of
section 17(1)
of the
Prescription Act may
be breached
any act that may follow may not only be unlawful but also be null and
void. Even though it is permissible for a court
to raise any point
that is apparent from the papers, that general principle does not
apply in the case of prescription.
Section 17(2)
of the
Prescription
Act requires
that a special plea with clear and concise facts
supporting it must pertinently be raised in the relevant pleading, a
plea in this
case. The court is expressly prohibited to
mero motu
raise any point relating to prescription if it is not raised in the
plea filed of record.
[43]
It is a fundamental principle of our law that a thing done contrary
to the direct prohibition of the law is void and
of no effect. Innes
CJ aptly puts it thus:
“
What is done
contrary to the prohibition of the law is not only of no effect but
must be regarded as never having been done –
and whether the
lawgiver has expressly so decreed or not, the mere prohibition
operate to nullify the act.”
[20]
This principle pass
constitutional muster as the aforesaid judgment was affirmed and
heavily relied on by the Constitutional Court
[21]
.
It is the prohibition which operates to nullify the act performed
contrary to it. This court is prohibited to
mero
motu
raise a point of prescription and deal therewith if not raised in the
plea.
[44]
Section 165(2) of the Constitution provides:
“
The courts are
independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, which
they must apply impartially and without fear,
favour or prejudice.”
In interpreting this
provision, Jafta J remarked as follows in
Cool
Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard & Another
[22]
:
“
[99] In
our democratic order, it is the duty of courts to apply and enforce
legislation ….. If the validity of legislation
is not
impugned, there can be no justification for not enforcing it, let
alone giving legal effect to prohibited conduct.”
Applying and enforcing
the law includes refraining from doing what the law prohibits and to
do what the law prescribes and requires.
[45]
Court themselves are subject to the fundamental principle of legality
as they are bound to uphold the Constitution
[23]
.
Courts are constrained by doctrine of legality to exercise only those
powers bestowed upon them by the law
[24]
.
[46]
In the Amalgam of all the circumstances discussed above, I come to a
conclusion that special plea of prescription cannot
succeed. I see no
reason why costs can not follow the result.
Order
[46]
In the result I make the following Order:
1. The defendant’s
special plea of prescription is hereby dismissed.
2. The defendant is
hereby ordered to pay all costs occasioned by raising and hearing of
the special plea.
A.S
ZONO
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
APPEARANCES:
For
the PLAINTIFF:
ADV MADOKWE
Instructed
by:
MSITSHANA INC.
NO.47 CUMBERLAND
STREET
MTHATHA
TEL:047
004 0031
For
the DEFENDANT:
ADV RUSI
Instructed
by:
SMITH TATABA INC.
34 STANFORD TERRACE
MTHATHA
TEL: 043 703 1876
EMAIL:ginaf@smothtabata.co.za
Matter
heard on
18 June 2024
Delivered
on
25 June 2024
[1]
Pillay
v Krishna & Another
1946
AD 946
at 951.
[2]
Section 17(2)
of the
Prescription
Act 68 of 1969
.
[3]
Section
13(1)(a)
and (i) of the
Prescription Act 68 of 1969
.
[4]
Section
17
of Children’s Act 38 of 2005.
[5]
Section
12
of
Prescription Act No. 68 of 1969
provides as follows:
(1)
Subject to the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) prescription
shall commence to run as soon as the debt is due.
[6]
See
Rule 18(4) of the Uniform Rules of Court.
[7]
Moaki
v Reckitt & Colman (Africa) Ltd
1968
(3) SA 98
(A) at 102 A; Erasmus: Superior Courts Practice Vol 2 para
D1 -232B.
[8]
Prinsloo
v Woolbrokers Federation Ltd
1955 (2) SA 298
(N) at 299 E.
[9]
Imprefed
(Pty) Ltd v National Transport Commission
1993
(3) SA 19
(A) at 107 C-H;
Absa
Bank Limited v Blumberg & Wilkinson
1995 (4) SA 403
WLD at 409 C-F.
[10]
Minister
of Safety & Security v Slabbert
2010
(2) ALLSA 474
(SCA) para 11.
[11]
Fischer
v Ramahlele
2014
(4) SA 614
(SCA) at 620 – 621 C para 13.
[12]
Public
Protector v South African Reserve Bank
2019
(6) SA 253
CC para 234;
Damons
v City of Cape Town
2022 (10) BCLR 1202
CC para 117.
[13]
South
British Insurance Co. Ltd v Unicorn Shipping Lines (Pty) Ltd
1976
(1) SA 708
A at 714 G.
[14]
Minister
of Safety & Security v Slabbert
2010
(2) ALL SA 474
(SCA) para 12 and 22.
[15]
Fischer
v Ramahlele
2014
(4) SA 614
(SCA) para 13.
[16]
CUSA
v Ta Ying Metal Industries & Others
[2008] ZACC 15
;
2009
(2) SA 204
CC para 67.
[17]
Section
3 and 13(1)(a) of
Prescription Act 68 of 1969
.
[18]
GM
Cockram: Interpretation of Statutes, 3
rd
Ed page 163.
[19]
LAWSA
Vol 25
Part 1
page 399 para 366.
[20]
Schierhout
v Minister of Justice
1926
AD 99
at 109-110.
[21]
Cool
Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard & Another
2014
(4) SA 474
(CC) paras 53, 77, 90 and 91.
[22]
Cool
Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard & Another
2014
(4) SA 474
(CC) para 99.
[23]
National
Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma
[2009] ZASCA 1
;
2009
(2) SA 277
(SCA) para 28;
Cool
Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard & Another
2014 (4) SA 474
(CC) para 58.
[24]
Lester
v Ndlambe Municipality
2015
(6) SA 283
(SCA) para 26.