About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Eastern Cape High Court, Makhanda
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Eastern Cape High Court, Makhanda
>>
2024
>>
[2024] ZAECMKHC 75
|
|
Harrison v Hattingh (4151/2022) [2024] ZAECMKHC 75 (25 June 2024)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
EASTERN
CAPE DIVISION, MAKHANDA
CASE
NO: 4151/2022
In
the matter
between:
STACEY
ILDA
HARRISON Plaintiff
and
CHERE
HATTINGH
Defendant
JUDGMENT
Bloem
J
[1]
It might be difficult to appreciate that, not so long ago, the
litigants were friends. They had such a close relationship
that they
entered into agreements of lease and sale without the assistance of
legal practitioners. Those agreements form the subject
matters of
this judgment.
[2]
The plaintiff, Stacey Harrison, approached the defendant, Chere
Hattingh, when she learned that the defendant might sell
her farm.
After discussions, they concluded two agreements in respect of seven
hectares of farm 819, East London (the property)
of the defendant’s
farm. The one was a lease agreement and the other was intended to be
a sale agreement. The defendant received
payment in the total amount
of R157 500 subsequent to the conclusion of those agreements.
After 17 months from the conclusion
of the agreements, the parties
had a fallout. The plaintiff instituted the present action wherein
she claims repayment of the amount
of R157 500. In addition, she
claims R150 393.55 that she allegedly spent to effect certain
improvements on the property.
The
pleadings
[3]
The plaintiff founded her claims on the agreements, both of which
were concluded on either 12 or 14 February 2021. In
respect of the
lease agreement the plaintiff alleged that the defendant let the
property to her at a monthly rental of R8 000.
She took
occupation of the property on 1 March 2021. It is common cause that
the defendant received payment in the total amount
of R157 500,
made up of a deposit of R20 000 and rental in the total amount
of R137 500 paid between February 2021
and July 2022. The
plaintiff claims the repayment of the deposit and rental.
[4]
The defendant admitted that she concluded the lease agreement with
the plaintiff. She denied that certain clauses thereof
were scratched
out by agreement and pleaded that the plaintiff unilaterally
scratched out those clauses “
before [the plaintiff] returned
a copy of the agreement of lease to the defendant
”. She
furthermore pleaded that “
any plans or drawings for
permanent structures must be approved by the defendant in writing
prior to the commencement of construction
work
” and that
“
the defendant shall not be responsible for effecting any
alterations, renovations or additions to the lease premises, which
shall
be effected by the plaintiff at her own costs and expense
”.
The defendant also denied that the lease agreement was subject to the
condition that the sale agreement was binding upon
the parties, as
alleged by the plaintiff.
[5]
In respect of the sale agreement, the plaintiff alleged that she
entered into it with the defendant simultaneously with
the lease
agreement. Since the terms of the sale agreement, titled ‘A
Gentlemen’s Agreement’, are central to
the dispute, they
are quoted in full hereunder.
“
The conclusion
and full agreement is as follows:
1.
The
“Temporary” Agreement of the separate signed Lease, that
is in place for a period of 9 years commencing on the 01
March 2021,
has been set in place as a security and “interim”
measure; whilst Stacey Harrison makes lump sum payments
towards the
purchase of the above stated property of 7 HA’s and whilst we
wait for the sectional title to be finalised. Thereafter,
once
finalised in full, the Sectional Title will be transferred to Stacey
Harrison’s Family Trust.
2.
The
monthly rental of R8 000.00 for the temporary Lease Agreement,
will be kindly deductible from the purchase amount of R770 000.00.
3.
An
upfront deposit will be paid of R20 000.00 to Chere Hattingh
which is kindly deductible from the purchase price of R770 000.00.
4.
The
cost of the Sectional Title Deed will be for the account of Stacey
Harrison in regards to the 7 HA portion.
5.
Stacey
Harrison undertakes to make the lump sum payments as often as
possible to attend to the payment of R770 000.00 (R110
00.00 per
hectare) for the sale of the 7
HA’s portion of the
farm. The Lease Agreement will terminate automatically when the last
and final lump sum is paid towards
the purchase of the property;
being that the R770 000.00 has been receipted in full by Chere
Hattingh.
6.
Both parties agree that Stacey Harrison and her family, from
commencement of the Temporary Lease Agreement and whilst waiting for
the sectional title to be finalised, may treat the property with
respect thereof and care for it as if it were our own, attending
to
the wellbeing of the land and preform maintenance, carry out fixed
building, put up fencing, build fixed structures, home, shed,
dig
dams etc”.
(sic)
[6]
The
plaintiff alleged that the sale agreement is contrary to the
provisions of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act 70 of 1970,
and accordingly unenforceable. The plaintiff alleges that, when
she and the defendant entered into the lease and sale agreements,
they were unaware of the provisions of the Subdivision of
Agricultural Land Act, which prohibits the subdivision of
agricultural
land.
[1]
[7]
Although the defendant admitted the terms of the sale agreement, she
pleaded that the sale agreement was unlawful and
unenforceable and
that “
any payments made by the plaintiff to the defendant
was made in accordance with the provisions of the agreement of
lease
”. The defendant denied that the plaintiff was
entitled to payment of R150 393.55 claimed by the plaintiff in
respect
of bush clearing; levelling of a portion of the ground;
constructing a perimeter fence around the property; and for material
and
labour used in respect of the above.
The
evidence
[8]
The plaintiff and her husband testified in support of her claims. She
testified that she was looking to purchase agricultural
land to
enable her to set up stables for her daughter’s horses; to grow
vegetables for her family and oats for the horses;
and to construct a
proper dwelling for her elderly in-laws who lived in KwaZulu Natal.
It suited her and the defendant to enter
into a temporary lease
agreement to enable her to occupy the property as soon as possible
and to ensure income for the defendant,
who was, according to the
plaintiff, experiencing financial difficulties. She testified that
the defendant drafted the lease agreement
and sent it to her by
email. They subsequently discussed the terms thereof and discussed
the need for a sale agreement, which she
drafted. After discussion
with the defendant, she scratched out certain clauses of the lease
agreement to make the terms of the
lease agreement consistent with
the sale agreement. She then signed both agreements and emailed them
to the defendant for signature.
[9]
After she had signed the agreements, she arranged for her
mother-in-law to pay R20 000 to the defendant, whereafter
she
repaid her mother-in-law. On that same day, an additional R4 000
was paid to the defendant from a banking account which
she shared
with her husband. She testified that she arranged with Sassure
Agricultural Logistics Contractors (Pty) Ltd (Sassure)
to make the
monthly rental payments of R8 000 to the defendant, whereafter
she repaid Sassure. Payment to the defendant was
stopped after July
2022 because, according to her, the defendant attempted to have her
removed from the property. The plaintiff
testified that, to make the
property accessible and habitable, she spent R150 393.55.
[10]
The plaintiff’s husband, Darryn Harrison, testified that he is
a director of Sassure. It specialises in agricultural
contract work,
which includes soil testing; analysis of laboratory results for
purposes of advising what fertiliser should be used
for certain
crops; advising whether the soil should be ripped or tilled or both
and which machinery should be used; and, if contracted
to do so,
perform all or some of the above. He has about 20 years of experience
in the industry, excluding five years of training
at a college. Most
of Sassure’s clients are organs of state, both nationally and
provincially. It also has private clients.
He and his co-director
would interact with their clients to establish what they require to
be done; advise them; and, if contracted,
oversee the operations.
They are accordingly involved in the process from consultation to
completion of a project.
[11]
In this case he consulted with his wife as to what she wanted done on
the property. The brief was to make the property
accessible and
habitable. Upon his arrival on the property for the first time, he
noticed that there was hardly any portion that
was not overgrown.
Bush clearing had to be conducted. It charged the plaintiff R57 600,
exclusive of VAT of R8 640 to
clear the bush, labour in respect
thereof and the costs of the removal of bush and tree waste. The
gradients of the property were
steep and had to be levelled for the
project. Sassure hired a dozer tractor from Glendale Agri (Pty)
Ltd, which charged
for 40 hours of lending the tractor to it at
R450 per hour, plus VAT of R2 700. During that period, the
tractor was used to
clear and level the road from the entrance of the
property to the front camp and to clear and level the front camp. He
testified
that Sassure purchased poles, farm gates and fencing,
including single strand barbed wire and single strand razor wire to
construct
an external fence; and did repairs and maintenance to
portions of the existing fence. It charged Sassure R41 397,
exclusive
of VAT of R6 209.55 for the supply of materials and
labour for the construction, repair and maintenance of the fence.
[12]
Mr Harrison testified that, since the project was not a big one,
Sassure was unable to obtain big discounts from service
providers in
respect of material that it purchased for the fence. He was of the
view that the prices at which Sassure purchased
the fencing materials
and hired the tractor and the prices that Sassure charged the
plaintiff for services rendered were reasonable.
[13]
The defendant testified that she is an educator living on a farm. The
property forms part of that farm. She was in negotiations
with a
neighbouring farmer who showed interest in purchasing her farm or a
portion thereof. When negotiations failed, she concluded
the two
agreements with the plaintiff. The idea was that the plaintiff would
be a lessee until she was registered as the holder
of a unit in a
sectional title scheme that the defendant intended registering over
the farm. They did not discuss what would happen
if the sectional
title scheme could not be registered. The plaintiff took occupation
of the property on 1 March 2021. She received
a deposit of R20 000
during February 2021 and all other payments alleged by the plaintiff,
totalling R157 500. She received
the last payment of R8 000
during July 2022. When she made enquiries, the plaintiff informed her
that she had stopped making
payments on the advice of her attorney.
Throughout the plaintiff’s occupation of the property, it was
used mainly by Sassure
for the storage of its trucks, trailers,
machinery and other farming implements.
[14]
Regarding payment, the defendant acknowledged having received the
total amount of R157 500. She specifically did
not dispute that
it was the plaintiff who had arranged for payment to be made in terms
of the agreements. The defendant confirmed
that she sent the lease
agreement to the plaintiff by email. The plaintiff went to her house
with hardcopies of the lease agreement
and the sale agreement. Both
of them signed the agreements. It was only after the lease agreement
had been signed that the plaintiff
scratched out certain clauses. She
did not agree with the deletions, but the plaintiff told her that
there was no problem in that
regard. She sent the lease agreement to
her attorney who was alarmed to see what was contained therein and
what was deleted. She
said that the purpose of the sale agreement was
“
the purchase of sectional title
”.
[15]
The defendant did not dispute that bush clearing was done, the ground
was levelled and that material and labour used
therefor. Regarding
the fence, the defendant denied that the plaintiff caused an external
fence to be constructed because, according
to her, there was already
an external fence in good condition when the plaintiff took
occupation of the property. She testified
that the plaintiff added
three of four strands of wiring over the existing fence. She
estimated that the plaintiff had expended
no more than R10 000
on the repair of the fence.
Discussion
[16]
The parties agree that the agreements must be read together. It is
common cause that the plaintiff deleted certain clauses
of the lease
agreement. What is in dispute is when she deleted those clauses.
Before the agreements were signed, the parties exchanged
various
WhatsApp messages. Those messages give context to when the plaintiff
scratched out (deleted) those clauses. They show that,
prior to
14 February 2021, the plaintiff sent an email to the defendant
wherein she informed the defendant that she was awaiting
the
defendant’s “
feedback or amendments, if you have, or
if not, then just for you to please kindly sign the lease agreement
where I made all my
scribbles and also sign gentlemen’s
agreement and just please send me a copy
”. At 08h37 on 14
February 2021 the defendant messaged the plaintiff that she had a
glance at the documents, being the two
agreements, that she would go
through them properly and that she had “
also forwarded [the
documents] to [her] attorney for any comments to ensure we do things
correctly
”. At 16h48 on 14 February 2021 the defendant
messaged the plaintiff that the lease “
agreement is fine by
me. I checked. Will sign and email back to you tomorrow. Will also
confirm with attorney
”. The plaintiff testified that the
defendant thereafter signed both agreements and emailed them to her.
[17]
The exchange of WhatsApp messages does not support the defendant's
version, namely that the plaintiff deleted certain
clauses of the
lease agreement after the parties had signed it. First, if the
defendant’s version was correct, then the plaintiff
would not
have informed the defendant before 14 February 2021 that she was
awaiting the defendant’s feedback on inter alia
“
all
my scribbles
”. The plaintiff’s evidence was that the
scribbles referred to the first page of the lease agreement and the
deletion
of certain clauses. Those deletions were accompanied by the
abbreviation ‘n/a’, meaning not applicable. On the first
page of the lease agreement, the plaintiff wrote that the “
conditions
of this lease agreement are kindly binding by the separate
‘Gentlemen’s Agreement’
”. The parties’
signatures appear on the right of the entry on the front page of the
lease agreement. The position of
those signatures does not support
the defendant’s version, namely that, when she signed the lease
agreement, that entry had
not been made. Second, the entry on the
first page of the lease agreement and the nature of the clauses that
had been deleted are
consistent with the conclusion of the sale
agreement. For instance, clauses that limited the use of the property
primarily for
agricultural purposes; that provided that the defendant
should first give approval of plans or drawings for permanent
structures
on the property before they were constructed; that
provided that no permanent structures or stipulated temporary
structures be
erected during the lease period; and that provided that
the defendant or her agent could inspect non-permanent structures
that
the plaintiff was permitted to erect were all deleted. Those
deletions give credence to permanence in the form of future ownership
of the property by the plaintiff, rather than temporary occupation in
the form of a lease agreement. Third, it is common cause
that the
lease agreement was initially sent by the defendant to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff thereafter sent the lease agreement
to the defendant.
The correspondence shows that, on receipt of the plaintiff’s
WhatsApp message, the defendant informed the
plaintiff that she would
forward the lease agreement to her attorneys. If the entry on the
first page had not been made and if
the clauses had not been deleted,
there would have been no need for the defendant to have referred the
unaltered lease agreement
to her attorneys. That is so because the
lease agreement was drafted by her.
[18]
Added to the above, the defendant’s version in that regard was
not put to the plaintiff. She was accordingly not
given an
opportunity to comment on the defendant's version. In the
circumstances, it is found that, when the lease agreement
was signed,
the plaintiff had already made the entry on page one thereof and had
already deleted certain clauses thereof, as testified
to by her. The
defendant’s version in that regard is accordingly rejected.
[19]
Despite the defendant acknowledging receipt of the total amount of
R157 500, Mr Barker, counsel for the defendant,
submitted that
the payment that the defendant received could not be said to have
been made in terms of the agreements. Counsel pointed
to the
fact that the deposit was paid by the plaintiff’s mother-in-law
and the rental was paid by Sassure, the submission
being that the
lease agreement was concluded for the benefit of Sassure, to enable
Sassure to use the property to store its vehicles,
trucks and farming
implements. The difficulty with that submission is that it is not
foreshadowed in the pleadings. The plaintiff
alleged that she made
payment to the defendant in the total sum of R157 500 in terms
of the agreements. Although the defendant
denied that allegation, she
nevertheless pleaded that “
any payments made by the
Plaintiff to the Defendant was made in accordance with the provisions
of the Agreement of Lease
”. Mr Barker submitted that the
plaintiff’s own evidence showed that payment was not made by
her.
[20]
What was
essentially submitted on behalf of the defendant was that there was
no agreement between the defendant, on the one hand,
and the
plaintiff’s mother-in-law and Sassure, on the other hand. In
that case, there would have been no obligation on the
plaintiff’s
mother-in-law and Sassure to pay the deposit and rental respectively
to the defendant. The further implication
of the submission is that
the defendant was not entitled to accept payment of those amounts
from those sources. But, the defendant
accepted such payment and did
not return the payment to the payers. The defendant’s
acceptance of the payment amounted
to the discharge of the
plaintiff’s obligation to make payment in terms of the
agreements to the defendant. Her acceptance
of the payment
constituted valid payment in terms of the lease agreement.
[2]
But, more importantly, all that the plaintiff was required to show
was that the amounts that she is reclaiming were paid to the
defendant by her or her agent.
[3]
The evidence shows that Sassure and the plaintiff’s
mother-in-law acted as her agents when they made the payments to the
defendant.
[21]
In terms of
the lease agreement, the plaintiff had an obligation to pay a deposit
of R20 000 and monthly rental of R8 000.
The plaintiff
adduced proof of such payment into the defendant’s bank
account.
[4]
The proof of payment
was in the form of written notification by the banker of the
plaintiff’s mother-in-law in respect of
the deposit of R20 000
and Sassure’s banker in respect of the rental.
[22]
In the circumstances, it was immaterial that payment to the defendant
was made by the plaintiff’s mother-in-law
and Sassure, and not
by the plaintiff. In any event, the plaintiff’s undisputed
evidence was that she had repaid the money
to her mother-in-law and
Sassure. The submission on behalf of the defendant in that regard has
no substance and is accordingly
rejected.
[23]
The context within which the agreements were concluded was dealt with
above. Regard being had to the terms of those agreements,
read
together, there can be no doubt that the goal was to transfer
ownership of the property from the defendant to the plaintiff.
That
was also the evidence of both the plaintiff and defendant. The
parties agreed that the plaintiff would occupy and possess
the
property even before the registration of the transfer of ownership.
The plaintiff’s occupation and possession of the
property
before registration of transfer was secured by the lease agreement.
They agreed that, once registration had taken
place, all the payments
that the plaintiff would have made until then, would have been
treated as payment towards the purchase
price of the property. The
rental that the plaintiff paid would form part of the purchase price
only once the property was transferred
to the plaintiff by
registration. It follows that the rental paid could not form part of
the purchase price if the property was
not transferred by
registration. The sale agreement is unenforceable because subdivision
of agricultural land is impermissible
in terms of section 3(a) of the
Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act. The parties cannot rely on the
sale agreement, with the result
that the property cannot be
transferred to the plaintiff. In the circumstances, the rental paid
cannot form part of any purchase
price, since there was no sale
agreement.
[24]
In accordance with the agreements, particularly the lease agreement,
the defendant gave the plaintiff undisturbed possession
and
occupation of the property from 1 March 2021 and the plaintiff paid
the deposit and rental until July 2022, a period of 17
months. Both
parties accordingly benefitted from the agreements, in that the
defendant gave possession of the property to the plaintiff
in return
for rental, which the plaintiff paid to her. In the circumstances,
the plaintiff, having benefitted from the lease agreement
by having
enjoyed the undisturbed possession and occupation of the property, is
not entitled to the return of the rental. The rental
was paid
precisely because the plaintiff had possession and occupation of the
farm between 1 March 2021 and 31 July 2022.
She was
accordingly required to pay, and indeed paid, rental in the total
amount of R136 000 for that period. There is no
basis upon which
the defendant can lay claim to the difference between what the
plaintiff paid to her, namely R157 500, and
what the defendant
was entitled to, namely R136 000 in respect of rental. The
plaintiff is accordingly entitled to repayment
of the amount of
R21 500, which includes the deposit of R20 000. The
defendant did not institute a counterclaim in respect
of the deposit
to lay a basis as to why the deposit should not have been returned to
the plaintiff.
[25]
I now deal
with the plaintiff’s alleged enrichment claim. The plaintiff
claimed that, because the sale agreement is unenforceable
and because
she spent R150 393.55 on the property, the defendant has been
enriched by that amount and she has been impoverished
to that same
extent. The essential elements for an enrichment claim are that (i)
the defendant must be enriched; (ii) the plaintiff
must be
impoverished; (iii) the defendant’s enrichment must be at
the plaintiff's expense; and (iv) the enrichment must
be without
cause.
[5]
The onus is on the
plaintiff to prove each of the above elements.
[6]
[26]
The
expenditure by one person upon the property of another is divided
into necessary, luxury and useful expenses. Necessary expenses
are
incurred to preserve or protect the property. Luxury expenses add to
the amenity of the property, but do not render the property
more
profitable. Useful expenses increase the value of the property
although their omission would not render the property less
valuable.
[7]
Based on the
evidence, I am of the view that the expenses that the plaintiff
incurred were necessary. The plaintiff’s undisputed
evidence
was that the expenses were incurred to make the property accessible
and habitable. Access to the property could not be
gained without
those expenses having been incurred. Those expenses also had to be
incurred to enable the plaintiff to use the property
for the purpose
for which she concluded the agreements. As a rule, necessary expenses
may be reclaimed.
[8]
[27]
The facts
of this case make it immaterial to determine whether the plaintiff
was a bona fide occupier or a bona fide possessor.
[9]
The facts are that she occupied the property by virtue of the lease
agreement. She also occupied it with the intention of becoming
the
owner thereof by virtue of the sale agreement, which turned out to be
invalid. She made the improvements upon the property
believing that
she had the right to effect them. Under those circumstances, she
would be entitled to repayment of the necessary
expenses incurred by
her, if it is found that the defendant was enriched at her expense
and that the enrichment was without cause.
[28]
Once the plaintiff took occupation of the property, she expended
money to make it accessible and habitable. The evidence
shows that
the plaintiff was impoverished when she made payment to Sassure to
make the property accessible and habitable. The defendant,
on the
other hand, was enriched to the extent of the plaintiff’s
impoverishment when the plaintiff effected the improvements.
It goes
without saying that the defendant’s enrichment was at the
plaintiff's expense. There can be no doubt that, had the
parties not
concluded the sale agreement, the plaintiff would not have incurred
the expenses on the property to make it accessible
and habitable.
[29]
The plaintiff incurred the expenses because she believed that, based
on the sale agreement, she had the right to effect
the improvements.
The sale agreement is invalid. The enrichment was accordingly made in
terms of an invalid sale agreement. The
result is that the
defendant’s enrichment at the plaintiff’s expense was
without a legal ground (
sine causa
).
[30]
This court must, on the evidence placed before it, endeavour to
ascertain the extent of the plaintiff’s impoverishment
and the
defendant’s enrichment. In my view, the improvements have
increased the land by no more than the amount actually
expended,
which is the amount claimed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff is
accordingly entitled to payment of the amount of R150 393.55.
Costs
[31]
The matter
was set down for hearing on 13 May 2024. On that day it was postponed
to 15 May 2024 because the defendant’s counsel
was ill. The
costs occasioned by the postponement were reserved. Although no fault
can be laid at the defendant’s door for
the postponement, the
plaintiff was ready to proceed on 13 May 2024 and incurred
expenses and costs when she and her
legal representatives were in
attendance on that day. It would, under the circumstances, be unjust
and inequitable to the plaintiff
to order that each party should pay
her own costs occasioned by the postponement on 13 May 2024, as
submitted by Mr Barker. Given the
reason for the postponement
and that the plaintiff incurred costs, it would be appropriate to
order the defendant to pay the wasted
costs occasioned by the
postponement on 13 May 2024.
[10]
Since the plaintiff was substantially successful in the action, the
defendant should also pay the costs of the action.
[32]
In the result, it is ordered that the defendant shall pay to the
plaintiff:
1. the amount of
R21 500;
2. the amount of
R150 893.55;
3. interest on the
above amounts at the prescribed legal rate from the date of this
judgment to the date of payment thereof;
and
4. costs of suit,
such costs to include the costs reserved on 13 May 2024.
GH
BLOEM
Judge
of the High Court
APPEARANCES
For
the plaintiff: Mr M Somandi, instructed by Wheeldon Rushmere and Cole
Attorneys, Makhanda.
For
the defendant: Mr J Barker, instructed by Netteltons Attorneys,
Makhanda.
Dates
of hearing: 13, 15, 16 and 17 May 2024.
Date
of delivery of judgment: 25 June 2024.
[1]
Section 3(a) of the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act provides
that, subject to the provisions of section 2, agricultural
land will
not be subdivided, unless the Minister of Agriculture has consented
in writing. Section 2 does not apply to the facts
of this case and
it is common cause that the Minister of Agriculture has not
consented to the subdivision of the defendant’s
farm.
[2]
Vereins-
Und Westbank AG v Veren Investments and Others
2002 (4) SA 421
(SCA) par 12.
[3]
Frame v
Palmer
1950
(3) SA 340
(C) at 346F.
[4]
Pillay
v Krishna and Another
1946
AD 946
at 958.
[5]
PRASA v
Community Property Company (Pty) Ltd and Another
[2024]
ZASCA 35
par 27.
[6]
Willis
Faber Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v Receiver of Revenue and Another
[1991] ZASCA 163
;
1992
(4) SA 202
(AD) at 224H-225A.
[7]
Lechoana
v Cloete and Others
1925
AD 536
at 547.
[8]
Lechoana
fn 7
at 547.
[9]
Fletcher
and Fletcher v Bulawayo Waterworks CO Ltd
1915 AD 636
at 647.
[10]
In
Society
v Feldman
1979
(1) SA 930
(E) counsel for the respondent applied for a postponement
when the case was called. The reason for the postponement was that
the respondent was confined to hospital and too ill to attend the
hearing. The proceedings had to be postponed and the respondent
was
ordered to pay the wasted costs occasioned by the postponement. See
also
Westbrook
v Genref Ltd
1997
(4) SA 218
(D&CLD) at 221G-222D.