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[2024] ZAECMKHC 72
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Alfred Nzo District Municipality v Sokhani Development and Consulting Engineers (Pty) Ltd (1254/2024) [2024] ZAECMKHC 72 (20 June 2024)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CAPE
DIVISION, MAKHANDA)
CASE NO: 1254/2024
In the matter between:
ALFRED NZO DISTRICT
MUNICIPALITY
Applicant
And
SOKHANI DEVELOPMENT AND
CONSULATING
ENGINEERS (PTY) LTD
Respondent
JUDGMENT ON LEAVE TO
APPEAL
ZONO AJ
Introduction
[1] This is an
application for leave to appeal the whole judgment granted on 26
th
April 2024. The court was approached for an interlocutory or interim
order set out in Part A of the notice of motion. This was
an
application
pendete lite.
The interim court order sought was
granted pending final determination of the review application set out
or prayed for in
Part B
of the same application.
[2] In parenthesis
for what will be discussed hereunder it is important to place on
record that the applicant in this application
for leave to appeal
launched a counter review application in terms of which the applicant
sought to set aside its decision to appoint
the respondent to perform
contractual duties and also a Service Level Agreement entered into by
the parties.
[3]
It is important to note that the counter application was directed to
the main application which was review application
set out in Part B
of the application. The gravamen of the counter application is the
challenge of respondent’s appointment
made without following
supply chain management processes and imperative constitutional and
legislative prescripts
[1]
.
Effectively the applicant launched a legality review seeking to
self-review its decision.
[4] With regard to
the main application by the respondent, the applicant sought to
assail same by delivering an answering
affidavit. In that affidavit
the applicant herein raises the same collateral defence relating to
the legality of respondent’s
appointment. That defence, both in
law and in fact, with a broad view to the context of the whole
proceedings, aimed at assailing
Part B of the main application, which
is the review application.
[5] In the judgment
sought to be appealed I concerned myself with the interlocutory
relief sought in Part A of the application
and its requirements. I
preliminarily dealt with the issue of urgency. I made findings both
on urgency and the requirements of
the interlocutory/interim
interdict and thereafter came to a conclusion that favoured the
respondent. It is this judgment against
which an application for
leave to appeal has been launched.
[6] Stripped of
wordiness applicant’s grounds of application for leave to
appeal may be summarised as follows:
6.1 The court
misdirected itself in deciding the issue of urgency based on the new
case made out and introduced in the replying
affidavit about
semi-urgency as opposed to urgency referred to in the founding
affidavit. Consequently, the judgment is inconsistent
and
contradictory as it found that no case for urgency has been made out,
but later found on the basis of semi urgency raised only
in the
replying affidavit.
6.2 The court
misdirected itself in not dismissing respondent’s application
based on the fact that it has found that
the respondent failed to
make out a case for urgency.
6.3 The court
erred in deciding the issue of urgency on the basis of considerations
of sympathy as opposed to the facts and
law.
[7] The grounds
were all in relation to the issue of urgency. A lot of time and
effort was spent on urgency and how
court misdirected itself in
dealing with same both on the facts and on law. Essentially the
applicant seeks to appeal a discretion
this court exercised about the
urgency of the matter.
[8] With regard to
other issues, the application for leave to appeal proceeds to assail
the judgment as follows:
8.1 The court
misdirected itself in finding that the provisions of Rule 41A are not
peremptory and that they are not fatal
to the proceedings. It is
suggested that Service Level Agreement is consistent with the
provisions of Rule 41A as it provides for
a dispute resolution
mechanism.
8.2 The court
misdirected itself in finding that the applicant has admitted or did
not meaningfully dispute the respondent’s
claim that its
procedural fairness and contractual rights have been violated.
8.3 The court
misdirected itself in finding that the respondent would suffer
irreparable harm and/or had no alternative adequate
remedy available
to it. As a subset of this the court is criticized for failure to
appreciate the nature, extent and reach of the
collateral defence of
illegality.
8.4 The court
misdirected itself in expressely and/or impliedly finding and
concluding that the collateral defence of illegality
cannot be raised
by the applicant in that the impugned decision to award the disputed
contract to the respondent can only be set
aside in proceedings for
judicial review; and further that the applicant’s decision to
unilaterally cancel the disputed contract
was not based on the law
and thus without any lawful basis.
8.5
The court was obliged to have adjudicated on the issue as to whether
or not the applicant’s collateral defence
has merit, and erred
in not having done so.
[2]
8.6 The court
misdirected itself in finding that the respondent satisfied all the
requirements of the interim interdict and
that the application must
succeed and accordingly that the respondent is well entitled to
perform its duties in terms of the appointment
letter until that
appointment is set aside by a court of law. Performance of the duties
is a legal consequence of the appointment.
8.7 The court has
misconstrued the facts and the law in finding that the respondent has
made out a case for the interdictory
relief sought.
8.8 The court
misdirected itself in not awarding an order of costs against the
respondent.
Legal Principles
[9] Application for
leave to appeal is governed by the provisions of section 17(1) of the
Superior Court practice. Section
17(1) provides as follows:
“
1.
Leave to appeal may only be given where the judge or judges
concerned are of the opinion that-
(a)(i) the appeal
would have a reasonable prospect of
success; or
(ii) there is some
other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, including
conflicting judgments on the matter under
consideration;
(b) the decision
sought on appeal does not fall within the ambit of section 16(2),
and”
(c) The
decision sought to be appealed does not disposed of all the issues in
the case, the appeal would lead to a just and
prompt resolution of
the real issues between parties.”
[10]
Plasket
AJA
[3]
(
as
he then was) with
Cloete
and
Maya
JJA
(as
she then was) Concurring held that:
“
What
the test of reasonable prospects of success postulates is a
dispassionate decision, based on the facts and the law, that a
court
of appeal could reasonably arrive at a conclusion different to that
of the trial court.
In
order to succeed, therefore, the appellant must convince this court
on proper grounds that he has prospects of success on appeal
and that
those prospects are not remote but have a realistic chance of
succeeding. More is required to be established than that
there is a
mere possibility of success, that the case is arguable on appeal or
that the case cannot be categorised as hopeless.
There must, in other
words, be a sound, rational basis for the conclusion that there are
prospects of success on appeal.”
[4]
[11]
Schippers
AJA
[5]
with
Catchelie
JA
and
Dlodlo
AJA
Concurring shared the same sentiments:-
“
[17] An
applicant for leave to appeal must convince the court on proper
grounds that there is a reasonable prospect or realistic
chance of
success on appeal. A mere possibility of success, an arguable
case or one that is not hopeless, is not enough.
There must be a
sound, rational basis to conclude that there is a reasonable prospect
of success on appeal.”
The
court must be convinced on proper grounds that there is a realistic
chance of success on appeal. A mere possibility of success
on appeal
is not enough.
[12]
The order sought to be appealed is interim in effect and form and is
therefore generally not appealable
[6]
.
There are no facts and or grounds set out in the application for
leave to appeal to show that the interest of justice require
that an
appeal be entertained.
[13]
Harms
JA
held:
[7]
“
A
"judgment or order" is a decision which, as a general
principle, has three attributes, first, the decision must be final
in
effect and not susceptible of alteration by the court of first
instance; second, it must be definitive of the rights of the
parties;
and, third, it must have the effect of disposing of at least a
substantial portion of the relief claimed in the main proceedings
(Van streepen & Germs (Pty) Ltd case supra at
586I-587B; Marsay v Dilley
[1992]
ZASCA 114
[1992] ZASCA 114
; ;
1992
(3) SA 944
(A)
962C-F) . The second is the same as of the-stated requirement that a
decision, in order to qualify as a judgment order,
must grant
definite and distinct relief (Willis Faber Enthoven (Pty) Ltd v
Receiver of Revenue & Another
[1991]
ZASCA 163
;
1992
(4) SA 202
(A)
214D-G).”
In
Casu,
substantial portion of the relief claimed in the main proceedings has
not been disposed of, hence a complaint that the legality
of the
appointment of the respondent was left out or not dealt with.
[14] Before dealing
with the grounds contained in the application for leave to appeal it
is prudent to deal with what should
have constituted grounds of
appeal, which unfortunately are not part thereof.
Grounds of Appeal
[15]
The nature of the order granted in the judgment sought to be appealed
is interlocutory or interim in nature. What is
required to render an
order appealable is well trodden turf. The appeallability of
interim orders in terms of the common
law depends on whether they are
final in effect.
[8]
Proper
grounds must be set out in the application for leave to appeal which
would justify the entertainment of the appeal.
[9]
Grounds of appeal are pivotal as they are the foundation of the
appeal,
[10]
especially of the
interim order. Grounds of appeal must clearly and succinctly be set
out in clear and unambiguous terms to enable
the court and the
respondent to be fully informed of the case the applicant seeks to
make out and which the respondent is to meet
in opposing the
application for leave to appeal.
[11]
[16] To buttress
the point that grounds of appeal are pivotal in an application for
leave to appeal, Rule 49(1)(b) of the
Uniform Rules provides that:
“
(b)
When leave to appeal is required and it has not been requested at the
time of the judgment or order, application for such leave
shall be
made and the grounds therefor shall be furnished within 15 days after
the date of the order appealed against: Provided
that when the
reasons or the full reasons for the court’s order are given on
a later date than the date of the order, such
application may be made
within 15 days after such later date: Provided further that the court
may, upon good cause shown, extend
the aforementioned periods of 15
days.”
[17]
The provisions of Rule 49(1)(b) of the Uniform Rules are couched in
imperative terms. The Rule is peremptory.
[12]
In Xayimpi
[13]
an application
for leave to appeal was dismissed due to non-compliance with this
Subrule. It does not help the applicant to marshal
grounds of appeal
over the bar which have not been set out clearly and succinctly in
the notice of application for leave to appeal,
no matter how
meritorious those might be
[14]
.
[18]
A statutory requirement construed as peremptory needs exact
compliance for it to have that stipulated consequence and
any
purported compliance falling short of that is a nullity.
[15]
As a general Rule non-compliance with peremptory provisions results
in a nullity.
[16]
An
application for leave to appeal lacking necessary grounds of appeal
is a nullity and must fail for that reasons.
[19] There is
paucity of clear and succinct factual information in the application
for leave to appeal about the necessity
to entertain an appeal of an
interim order. Even a benevolent approach that interests of justice
require that the appeal of an
order which is not final in effect must
be entertained, cannot assist because that would lack the necessary
factual grounds to
support that kind of conclusion. Because of lack
of necessary ground relating to appeallability of this interim order,
the application
for leave to appeal has to fail. Applicant’s
problems are compounded by the impirical facts at the disposal of the
court
and concession made in court. I now turn to that evidence.
Interest of Justice
and Section 16(2) of Superior Court Act
[20] It is not
without significance that the applicant penned a letter dated 06
th
June 2024 to the Office of the Deputy Judge President recording
inter
alia,
that
“
3.
The purpose of this letter is to request the Honourable Deputy Judge
President’s (DJP) consent for special allocation of
the hearing
of the Part B review and counter review application referred to in
paragraph 1 above.”
[21] Elsewhere in
the same letter the applicant records that:
“
6.1
All affidavits or pleadings have been fully exchanged in the
Part A and Part B Review application by Sokhani. Thus, the
application is ripe for hearing and argument before court.
6.2 In the
counter review application, the respondent being Sokhani is yet to
deliver its answering affidavit, whereafter
the Counter-applicant
being the Municipality will deliver its replying affidavit within 5
(five) days.
6.3 Thereafter
the parties will each deliver the practice notes within 10 (ten)
days.
6.4
Based on the aforegoing, the parties humbly request that the
Honourable DJP grant 2 (two) dates as special allocation
of the two
application for a hearing on 27
and 28 June 2024.”
The applicant fully
motivates in the letter for the special allocation of Part B of the
application and counter review application.
[22] The court is
mindful of the fact that the lifespan and operation of the interim
court order is until the final determination
of Part B. As things
stand the finalization of Part B review application and its
concomitant counter review application is likely
to be heard before
the hearing of appeal judgment in Part A. In the circumstances it
cannot be in interest of justice that this
application be granted as
such exercise will have no practical effect or result.
[23] This drives me
to the provisions of Section 16 of Superior Court Act 10 of 2013
which provide as follows:
“
(2)(a)(i)
When at the hearing of an appeal the issues are of such a nature that
the decision sought will have no practical effect
or result, the
appeal may be dismissed on this ground alone.
(ii) Save under
exceptional circumstances the question whether the decision would
have no practical effect or result is to be determined
without
reference to any consideration of costs.”
[24] During
argument Mr Shakoene, Senior Counsel for the applicant was invited to
make submissions about the implications
of the contents of the letter
dated 06
th
June 2024 referred to in the preceding
paragraphs. The only submission in long sentences he could make is
that the Deputy Judge
President is likely not to grant applicant’s
request for special allocation for hearing of Part B on 27
th
and 28
th
June 2024. The reason for that was that, the
respondent refused to be part of that joint letter. However, he could
not make any
submission about the fact that the request or letter is
still under consideration by the Deputy Judge President as it was not
withdrawn.
[25] Mr Nzuzo, in
his submissions on behalf of the respondent started of by stating
that Part B review application has been
allocated a date of hearing,
which date is
11
th
October 2024,
a
thing Mr Shakoene did not mention in his submissions. In reply Mr
Shakoene confirmed that there is a date in October 2024 allocated
for
hearing of Part B application, but that date is
23
rd
October 2024.
What is important is the fact that there is a date
in October 2024 for hearing of Part B review application and its
concormitant
counter review application.
[26] I was
astounded by Mr Shakoene’s failure to advise the court of the
date of hearing of Part B review application,
especially when that
opportunity presented itself by reference to the letter dated 06
th
June 2024. Had Mr Nzuzo not mentioned that important fact the court
would impliedly and passively have been misled into believing
that no
date yet had been allocated for hearing of review applications.
[27]
It was accepted by all that the review applications referred to above
will, for all intents and purposes, be heard before
the appeal can be
allocated a date of hearing. The practical effect of that is the
interim order will have ceased to be in operation.
In clear
terms when review applications are heard there will be no extant
interim order sought to be appealed. It will have
lapsed by operation
of law. There is absolutely no practical effect to be served by
granting this application for leave to appeal
as the interim order
will have lapsed or become extinct at the time when the date of the
hearing the appeal is allocated, or when
the appeal is heard.
[17]
It is not in the interests of justice to grant this application. On
that basis I find that the interim order granted on 26
th
April 2024 is not appealable.
[18]
The
application for leave to appeal must, for this reasons too, fail.
[28] The majority
in the
United Democratic Movement
Case referred to above, the
appeal was struck from the roll with costs on the basis,
inter
alia
, that:
“
(a)The
order is interim in effect as well as in form.
(b)The interest of
justice does not require that an appeal be entertained, and
(consequently)
(c
) The order is indeed not appealable”
[19]
I
am therefore bound to follow this judgment and many judgments
referred to therein
[20]
. This
application cannot succeed on this ground alone.
[29] An attempt by
Mr Shakoene to argue that the judgment herein granted on 26
th
April 2024 is in conflict with the judgment of
NAC (Pty) Ltd v
MEC, Eastern Cape Department of Health and others Case No 2103/2020
was unavailing. That matter was distinguishable. In that case there
was no unilateral cancellation of an appointment by a state
organ,
which must by all means source its power in law. The facts
relating to an impending date of hearing of review application,
coupled with considerations of
Section 16(2)(a)(i) of
Superiors
Court Act 10 of 2013
were never part of important distinguishing
facts that were taken into account to consider the test of interests
of justice. Accordingly,
the case of
NCA (Pty)
Ltd
is
distinguishable from the present case.
[30] Having found
that the interests of justice do not permit the grant of the
application for leave to appeal, I also find
that leave to appeal
must fail with costs.
[31] Even if I am
wrong on the finding I made above, the application for leave to
appeal would still fail on other grounds.
[32] The applicant
pinned its faith on the fact that, when I considered the requirements
for interim interdict I should have
also considered the issue of
legality of the contract between the parties and respondent’s
appointment, as that is raised
as a reactive challenge or collateral
defence by the applicant. This submission should be given a short
shrift.
[33]
Firstly, requirements of interim interdict are trite and are
sufficiently dealt with in the main judgment. An invitation
to
consider a requirement which is not part of the trite requirements
settled by law, was effectively an invitation not to interprete
the
law but to make the law. There is an arm of government
Constitutionally empowered to make the law.
[21]
In accepting such an invitation would be to usurp the powers of the
legislature
.
Baxter: Administrative Law, at Page 305
aptly
puts it thus:
“
without
statutory authority, the court may not venture to question the merits
or wisdom of any administrative decision that may
be in dispute. If
the court were to do this it would be usurping the authority that has
been entrusted to the administrative
body by the empowering
legislation.”
[22]
This
applies with equal force in instances where courts or other arms of
government overreach the exercise of their power.
[23]
Courts are warned not to cross the divide between interpretation and
legislation.
[24]
`Whilst the
legislative authority is vested in Parliament, Provincial
Legislatures and Municipal Councils, only the judicial authority
is
vested in courts.
[25]
33.1
It is the law giver that has the power to change or adapt the common
law. I am not alone in this view, the Constitutional
Court made the
following
dictum
.
[26]
“
69
.
First, the lawgiver has the power to
change or adapt the common law provided that the change is not
inconsistent with the Constitution.
Section 39(3) acknowledges the
existence of other rights or freedoms that are recognised or
conferred by the common law, customary
law or legislation to the
extent that they accord to the supreme law. This does not mean that
the Constitution limits the
legislative power of Parliament in
relation to adapting or abolishing parts of the common law,
indigenous law or of existing legislation.
Whilst
existing rights, whatever their origin, remain important, it is
indeed open to Parliament to adapt or abolish existing rights
sourced
in any existing law provided that in doing so, it acts within the
confines of the Constitution.”
[34]
Secondly, the central issue to be determined in review applications
is the legality of the contract between the parties
and the
appointment of the respondent. Part B is undoubtedly a review
application. It is in the context of that review application
that the
applicant instituted a counter review application seeking to review
its own decision on the basis that it does not comply
with the
Constitutional provisions
[27]
and
statutory prescripts.
[28]
Counter
review application itself is undoubtedly a legality review that will
be heard in the context of Part B.
[35] The criticism
is unfounded because had I had dealt with the merits of legality of
respondent’s appointment in Part
A, I would have dealt with a
matter that was not before me. That is legally impermissible. Part B
would be dealt with separately
and was not part of Part A which was a
matter serving before me. That is apparent from the notice of motion
and the manner in which
the defence and argument was fashioned on the
date of hearing. It is for that reason paragraph 1 of the main
judgment is not sought
to be impugned where it is stated that a
matter for determination on that day was only Part A of the
application only.
[36]
Theron
JA
[29]
held
as follows:
“
13.
Turning then to the nature of civil litigation in our adversarial
system,
it is for the parties,
either in the pleadings or affidavits, which serve the function of
both pleadings and evidence, to set
out and define the nature of
their dispute and it is for the court to adjudicate upon those
issues
. That is so even
where the dispute involves an issue pertaining to the basic human
rights guaranteed by our Constitution,
for ‘it is impermissible
for a party to rely on a constitutional complaint that was not
pleaded’. There are cases where
the parties may expand those
issues by the way in which they conduct the proceedings. There may
also be instances where the court
may mero motu raise a
question of law that emerges fully from the evidence and is necessary
for the decision of the case.
That is subject to the proviso that no
prejudice will be caused to any party by its being decided.
Beyond that it is for the
parties to identify the dispute and for the court to determine that
dispute and that dispute alone.”
The dispute that was
identified by the parties for determination was the one encapsulated
in Part A of the application and nothing
else.
[37]
In any event a collateral defence or reactive challenge is suitably
raised, not in the context of an interdict, which
has its trite
requisites, but in the context of a judicial review application.
[30]
An authority was requested in vain from the applicant for a
proposition that a collateral defence or reactive challenge is a
relevant
consideration for purposes of deciding an interim or
interlocutory interdict.
[38]
With regard to urgency Mr Nzuzo made a very persuasive argument that
a finding on urgency is ruling that is not appealable.
[31]
A ground of appeal about urgency was premised on the fact that the
court relied on the case made out about semi urgency on the
replying
affidavit. No coherent answer was given when the applicant was
referred to the contents of paragraphs 55 of the founding
affidavit
where a case about the semi urgency of the matter is made out.
In fact, it is urgency that must be established
and in doing so the
applicant must give proper consideration to the degree of urgency and
tailor the notice of motion to that degree
of urgency.
[32]
I accordingly find that even this point is without merit.
[39] In conclusion,
and with regard to the ground about non-compliance with Rule 41A of
the uniform and other grounds, I stand
by my reasons in the main
judgment. I sufficiently dealt with Rule 41A and requirements
of interim interdict on my main judgment.
Accordingly, I find that
the application for leave to appeal does not pass the standard laid
down by
Section 17(1) (a) of the Superior Court Act 10 of 2013
and
therefore it must fail with costs.
Order
[40] In the result
I make the following order:
40.1
Application
for leave to appeal is hereby dismissed.
40.2
The
applicant in the application for leave to appeal is hereby ordered to
pay costs of this application.
A.S ZONO
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
HIGH COURT
APPEARANCES:
For the
Applicant
ADV SHAKOENE WITH ADV MEMELA
MADLANGA
& PARTNERS ATTORNEYS
Madlanga
Office Park & Law Chambers
120,
4
th
Street, Parkmore
Sandton,
Johannersburg
EMIAL:
admin@mpiattorneys.co.za
;
xola@mpiattorneys.co.za
Tel:
011 217 7290
Fax:
011 447 666
c/o:YOKWANA
ATTORNYS
10 New
Street
Makhanda
Tel:
046 622 9928
EMAIL
:
reception@yokwanaattorneys.co.za
For the Respondent:
ADV NZUZO
Instructed
by:
MATTHEW MOODLEY
&ASSOCIATES
51
union avenue
Selbourne
EAST
LONDON
Tel :
043 721 2449
Fax :
043 721 2601
EMAIL:
karlene@moodleyattrs.co.za
c/o:
Neville Borman & Botha Attorneys
22
Hill Street
Makhanda
Ref:
Mr J. Powers/rt
Date
heard:
:12
th
June 2024
Date
Delivered:
:20
th
June 2024
[1]
Section
33 and 217, of the Constitution; Section 32(1)(b) and 33 of the
Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003
[2]
Reliance
is placed on section 217 of the Constitution; and Local Government:
Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 (Section
32 and 33)
[3]
Smith
v S
2012(1)
SACR 567 SCA Para 7
[4]
S
v Mabena and another
2007
(1) SACR 482
SCA Para 22
[5]
MEC
for Health, Eastern Cape v Mkhitha and another
(1221/2015)
[2016] ZASCA 176
(25 November 2016) Para 17
[6]
UDM
and Another v Lebashe Investment Group (Pty) Ltd Another
2021(2)
ALL SA 90 SCA Para 26
[7]
Zweni
v Minister of Law and Order
1993 (1) SA 523
A at 532H -533A
[8]
UDM
and another v Lebashe Investment Group (Pty) ltd and others
2021
(2) ALL SA 90
SCA Para 7-8;
Philani
–Ma Africa v Maihila and others
2010 (2) SA 573
SCA Para 20.
[9]
Avbob
Funeral Services v Buzani
(2810/2020) [2024] ZACEQBHC 28(17 April 2024) Para 4.
[10]
Rule
49(1) (b) of the Uniform Rules.
[11]
Songono
v Minister of Law and Order
1996 (4) SA 384
E at 385 I-J;
Hing
v Raf
2014
(3) SA 350
WCC at 353J;
S
v Mc Laggan
2013
(1) SACR 267
(ECG) Para 4-7;
Avbob
Funeral Services v Buzani
(2810/2020) [2024] ZACEQBHC 28(17 April 2024) Para 4.
[12]
Avbob
Funeral Services v Buzani
(2810/2020) [2024] ZACEQBHC 28(17 April 2024) Para 4.
[13]
Xayimpi
and others v Chairman Judge While Commission (formally known as
Brown Commission)
2006
(2) ALL SA 442 (E).
[14]
Municipality
of Thabazimbi v Badenhorst
(66933/2011)
[2024] ZAGPPHC 212 (26 February 2024) Para 12-15.
[15]
Shalala
v Klerksdorp Town Council and another
1969 (1) SA 582
at 587 A-C
[16]
LAWSA
Vol
25, Page 399
Para 366; GM Cockram: Interpretation of Statute,
Page 163
[17]
Section 16(2)(a)(i) of the Superior Court Act 10 of 2013.
[18]
United
Democratic
Movement and another v Lebashe Investments Group (Pty)Ltd and others
2021 (2) ALL SA 90
SCA Para 26;
National
Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance and others
2012 (6) SA 223 (CC)
[19]
United
Democratic Movement v
Lebashe
Investments Group (Pty)Ltd and others
2021 (2) ALL SA 90
SCA Para 26
[20]
True
Motives 84 (Pty) Limited v Mahdi
2009
(4 SA 153 SCA Para 100-101
[21]
Section
43 of the Constitution
[22]
National
Treasury v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance
2012 (6) SA 223
(CC) Para 44.
[23]
EFF
v Speaker, National Assembly
2016
(3) SA 580
(CC) Para 92.
[24]
Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
2012 (4) SA 593
at 603-604 Para 18.
[25]
Section
43 and 165 of the Constitution.
[26]
Law
Society of South Africa and others v Minister for Transport an
another
2011
(1) SA 400
(CC) Para 69.
[27]
Section 217 of the Constitution
[28]
Section 32 and 33 of
Local Government: Municipal Finance Management
Act 56 of 2003
[29]
Fisher
v Ramahlele
2013(4) SA 614 SCA at 620C- 621C Para 13
[30]
Department
of Transport and others v Tasima (Pty) Ltd
2017
(2) SA 622
(CC) Para 138-140;
Opposition
to Urban Tolling Alliance and others v The South African National
Roads Agency Ltd and
Others
2013
(4) ALL SA 639
SCA.
[31]
Nobumba
v Presbyterian Church
1996 (3) SA 241.
[32]
Nelson
Mandela Metropolitan Municipality and others v Greyvenouw CC &
Others
2004 (2) SA 81
(EC) Para 37.