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[2024] ZAMPMBHC 49
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WH Civil Engineering (Pty) Ltd and Another v Vander Diamonds (Pty) Ltd and Others (3575/2020) [2024] ZAMPMBHC 49 (18 July 2024)
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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(MPUMALANGA DIVISION,
MBOMBELA)
CASE NO: 3575/2020
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO
OTHER JUDGES: YES
(3) REVISED: YES
18/07/2024
In the matter between:
WH
CIVIL ENGINEERING (PTY) LTD
First Applicant
WHISKY
HENDRICK MATWALANE
Second Applicant
and
VANDER
DIAMONDS (PTY) LTD
First Respondent
DANIESE
ELAINE STEYN N.O.
Second Respondent
IZAK
JOHANNES BOSHOFF
Third Respondent
THE
MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT: MBOMBELA
Fourth Respondent
This judgment was
handed down electronically by circulation to the parties and/or
parties’ representatives by email. The date
and time for
hand-down is deemed to be 18 July 2024 at 10:00.
JUDGMENT
MASHILE J:
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This is a rescission of judgment application. On 8 February 2021 and
following an application
in terms of Section 344 as read with Section
345 of the Companies Act, 63 of 1973 and with Schedule 5 (item 9) of
the
Companies Act of 2008
, this Court granted a winding-up order in
favour of the First Respondent (“Vander Diamonds” and
against the First Applicant
(“WH Civil Engineering”). WH
Civil Engineering now seeks to rescind and set aside the aforesaid
order on the grounds
of the provisions of Section 354(1) of the
Companies Act 61 of 1973 and has substantiated by adding the
following:
1.1
The service of the application was defective because it was served at
an address that had been changed
on 28 June 2018.
1.2
The amount of
R502 455.00
. initially thought to be owed to
Vander Diamonds was incorrectly calculated and was reduced to
R203
550.00
for which an invoice was sent on 14 April 2018.
1.3
When the application was launched, WH Civil Engineering was
commercially solvent, and it could pay its
debts as and when they
arose.
1.4
Matwalane and Vander Diamonds reached a settlement of their dispute
during October 2022.
1.5
Vander Diamonds is utilising liquidation process to enforce a debt
against WH Civil Engineering when
it has a judgment against the
latter.
1.6
In terms of the acknowledgment of debt, Vander Diamonds holds
security for the debt.
1.7
Vander Diamonds deliberately withheld information from this Court to
obtain the final winding –
up order.
FACTUAL MATRIX
[2]
It is necessary to state right on the onset that the facts that led
to the winding-up order are
substantially common cause. That said, it
remains necessary to describe them to give the context against which
the facts were anaylised.
On 15 April 2017, Vander Diamonds and WH
Civil Engineering concluded a verbal agreement in terms of which the
former let certain
Plant and earth moving equipment to WH Civil
Engineering for construction purposes on a project involving a third
party. WH Civil
Engineering undertook to effect payment of the
invoices of Vander Diamonds within thirty days of date of receipt of
statement setting
out the services rendered, and Plant hired on the
project.
[3]
Having complied with the terms of the agreement, Vander Diamonds
invoiced WH Civil Engineering
for the period commencing on 20 May
2017 culminating on 26 February 2018 for the hire of the Plant and
earth moving equipment.
In consequence of the above, an amount of
R502 455.00
became due and payable to Vander Diamonds. That
said and as will be seen later, the amount due was by agreement
between the parties
revised down to
R203 550.00
.
[4]
Vander Diamonds demanded payment of the amount of
R502 455.00
from WH Civil Engineering, but the latter ignored to effect payment
as per the demand. On 8 January 2018, WH Civil Engineering,
represented by Matwalane, acknowledged that WH Civil Engineering was
indebted to Vander Diamonds in the amount of
R502 455.00
.
Matwalane then also stood surety for WH Civil Engineering for the
amount that it owed to Vander Diamonds.
[5]
In terms of the acknowledgment of debt, WH Civil Engineering was to,
among others
,
liquidate the amount of
R502 455.00
as
follows:
5.1
Thirty percent of
R502 455.00
on or before 31 January 2018.
5.2
The parties would decide within 7 days after date of first payment
regarding the full payment of the
balance.
5.3
Should WH Civil Engineering fail to effect payment timeously, the
full outstanding balance together
with interest component at the rate
of
10.25 %
per annum
a tempore morae
would immediately
become due and payable.
[6]
It is common cause that WH Civil Engineering has, the acknowledgment
of debt notwithstanding,
failed to make any payments to Vander
Diamonds. When payments were not forthcoming, Vander Diamonds sent a
letter demanding payment
of the outstanding amount as envisaged in
Section 345 of the Companies Act, 61 of 1973 in august 2020. Vander
Diamonds regarded
the failure of WH Civil Engineering to make payment
as per the letter of demand, as inability to settle its debts as when
they
fall due. In other words, WH Civil Engineering was commercially
insolvent, and this Court agreed on 8 February 2021 when it granted
an order liquidating WH Civil Engineering.
[7]
To go back to the reduction of the initially acknowledged amount of
R502 455.00
as the amount due by WH Civil Engineering. It is
common cause between the parties that they reduced the amount to
R203
550.00
because of error in calculation. In response to a letter
dated 20 February 2021 pointing out the mistake, Vander diamonds sent
a corrected version of the invoice in the amount of
R203 550.00
on 14 April 2021. Vander Diamonds, however, avers that the reduction
does not assist WH Civil Engineering as the reduction affected
one of
several invoices such that the amount remains higher than the
R203
550.00
.
[8]
Matwalane states that he discovered that WH Civil Engineering was
under liquidation for the first
time on 29 March 2021 when he
attempted to withdraw funds from the bank account of WH Civil
Engineering with Nedbank. The fact
of the liquidation of WH Civil
Engineering was later confirmed by his attorneys on 10 April 2021.
They further advised him that,
in fact, liquidators have been
appointed to administer the liquidation of WH Civil Engineering. It
was now that he also understood
that the order liquidating WH Civil
Engineering was granted on 8 February 2021.
[9]
Matwalane avers that at the time when WH Civil Engineering was
wound-up, its bank account had
funds well above the amount of
R502
455.00
. As proof of this, Matwalane annexes a bank statement of
WH Civil Engineering for the period of 7 December 2020 to 7 January
2020,
meaning to say, 2021. For this reason, Matwalane believes that
WH Civil had sufficient funds in its bank account with which to
discharge its liability to Vander Diamonds. WH Civil Engineering was
therefore liquid as contemplated in the
Insolvency Act, 24 of 1936
.
The only reason for its failure to pay, it maintains, was due to
invoices being incorrect and contrary to acceptable accounting
practices.
ASERTIONS OF THE
PARTIES
[10]
The Applicants in this application, WH Civil Engineering and
Matwalane, assert that they could not have been
in willful default
when they failed to oppose the winding-up application. They argue
that they neither received the demand nor
the application as they
were not served at the address that they had provided for the
purpose. Had they received the papers they
certainly would have
opposed because WH Civil Engineering was, at the time of the
liquidation, solvent. If they were solvent at
the time, it means that
they would have had a
bona fide
defence to the application.
[11]
Conversely, Vander Diamonds states that the issue is straightforward
in the sense that one should enquire
whether WH Civil Engineering was
indebted to it at the time when the order was granted. According to
Vander Diamonds, WH Civil
Engineering was indeed indebted to Vander
Diamonds whether in the amount stated in the acknowledgment of debt
or the lesser amount
of
R203 550.00
.
[12] If
it is correct that the error in calculation was rectified as early as
14 April 2018, remarks Vander Diamonds,
why then did WH Civil
Engineering not pay the amount due at the time? WH Civil Engineering
has since 20 February 2018, known that
the amount was wrongly
calculated, and it was corrected on 14 April 2018, yet it did not
make payment. As far as the address of
service of the application is
concerned, Vander Diamonds states that it served the application at
the registered address of WH
Civil Engineering.
ISSUES
[13]
There are two issues for determination by this Court. They emanate
from the fact that WH Civil Engineering
must show good cause. The
elements that WH Civil Engineering ought to show are that to render a
reasonable and satisfactory explanation
for the delay and that it has
a
bona fide
defence that has some measure of prospects of
success. These two issues, however, cannot be independently decided
without the following
ancillary matters:
13.1
Could Vander Diamonds have obtained a winding-up order, as it did,
regardless of the revision of the amount
from
R502 455.00
to
R203 550.00
?
13.2
Was the service of the application at the registered address of WH
Civil Engineering defective?
13.3
What influence, if any, should the factual solvency of WH Civil
Engineering have on whether the order should
be rescinded?
13.4
Did Matwalane and Vander diamond conclude a settlement agreement on
13 October 2022?
13.5 Is
Vander Diamonds using the liquidation process to enforce a debt that
is legitimately contested?
13.6
What are the implications of the judgment that Vander Diamonds has
obtained against WH Civil Engineering
and that it had security for
the debt in terms of the acknowledgment of debt?
13.7
Did Vander Diamonds deliberately withhold information from this Court
to obtain the final winding –
up order?
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
[14] To
the extent that this application concerns a rescission in terms of
Section 354(1) of the Companies Act,
61 of 1973, it could be
instructive to cite the Section in full:
“
A
Court
may stay or set aside winding
up.
The Court may at any
time after the commencement of a winding-up, on the application of
any liquidator, creditor or member, and
on proof to the satisfaction
of the Court that all proceedings in relation to the winding-up ought
to be stayed or set aside, make
an order staying or setting aside the
proceedings or for the continuance of any voluntary winding-up on
such terms and conditions
as the Court may deem fit.”
[15]
Section 344 is concerned with those circumstances in which a company
may be wound-up by a Court. Of relevance
to this matter are
sub-paragraphs (f) and (g). These sub-paragraphs respectively provide
that a Court will be entitled to wind-up
a company if it is unable to
pay its debts as contemplated in Section 345 and where it appears
just and equitable.
[16]
Section 345 deals with circumstances in which a company will be
deemed to be unable to pay its debts and
it provides as follows:
“
A
company or body corporate shall be deemed to be unable to pay its
debts if-
(a)
a creditor, by cession or otherwise, to whom the company is indebted
in a sum not less than one
hundred rand then due –
(i)
has served on the company, by leaving the same at its registered
office, a demand requiring the
company to pay the sum so due; or
(ii)
in the case of any Body Corporate not incorporated under this Act,
has served such demand by leaving
it at its main office or delivering
it to the secretary or some director, manager or principal officer of
such body corporate or
in such other manner as the Court may direct,
and the company or body corporate has for three weeks thereafter
neglected to pay
the sum, or to secure or compound for it to the
reasonable satisfaction of the creditor; or
(b)
any process issued on a judgment, decree or order of any court in
favour of a creditor of the
company is returned by the sheriff or the
messenger with an endorsement that he has not found sufficient
disposable property to
satisfy the judgment, decree or order or that
any disposable property found did not upon sale satisfy such process;
or
(c)
it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the company is
unable to pay its debts.”
[17]
Turning to case authority pertaining to the rescission of winding-up
orders. It is trite that, in appropriate
circumstances, winding-up
orders may be rescinded and set aside. This can be achieved at common
law and under Section 354 (1) of
the Companies Act, 61 of 1973, to
which I have already referred above. The Section is particularly
involved with the setting aside
or the stay of proceedings when
supervening events demand that such measures be adopted. A company
has the right to rescind or
appeal a winding – up order, or to
oppose an application for winding up. In terms of Section 354 a
company is expressly excluded
from seeking relief that the
proceedings be stayed or set aside based on supervening events.
[1]
[18]
The Court has the power (under the section) to suspend or stay the
proceedings, or to set them aside. This
would mean that the entire
proceeding, including the application for winding – up, would
be set aside. Where an order has
been incorrectly granted, the Court
ordinarily would simply rescind the order and leave the application
for winding up intact
[2]
. Having
traversed through several case authorities, the Court in the
Storti
v Nugent
[3]
case stated the following:
“
The
principles to be gleaned from the authorities, often not harmonious,
are in my view the following:
(1)
The Court's discretionary power conferred by this section is not
limited to rescission on common-law
grounds.
(2)
Unusual or special or exceptional circumstances must exist to justify
such relief.
E
(3)
The section cannot be invoked to obtain a rehearing of the merits of
the sequestration proceedings.
(4)
Where it is alleged that the order should not have been granted, the
facts should at least support
a cause of action for a common-law
rescission.
F
(5)
Where reliance is placed on supervening events, it should for some
reason involve unnecessary
hardship to be confined to the ordinary
rehabilitation machinery, or the circumstances should be very
exceptional.
(6)
A Court will not exercise its discretion in favour of such an
application if undesirable consequences
would follow.”
[19]
Since the assertion of WH Civil Engineering is that the order should
not have been granted, the facts should
be such that they support a
common law rescission. The requirement at common law is that WH Civil
Engineering must demonstrate
good cause. To show good cause, WH Civil
Engineering ought to establish firstly, a reasonable and acceptable
explanation for the
default and secondly, that it has a
bona
fide
defence
with a
prima
facie
prospect
of success
[4]
.
ANALYSIS
GOOD CAUSE
REASONABLE AND
ACCEPTABLE EXPLANATION FOR THE DELAY
[20]
The explanation of the Applicants is that they did not know about the
demand delivered at the registered
address of WH Civil Engineering
and the application for the latter’s winding-up. They could not
have received both these
documents, they assert, because they had, by
letter dated 28 June 2018, furnished Vander Diamonds with another
address to use for
sending correspondence. That said, Matwalane
acknowledges that he learnt of the order on 29 March 2021. If this is
correct, it
means that he acquired knowledge of the order thirteen
days after it was granted.
[21] On
Matwalane’s own version, the Applicants have been aware of the
order 13 days following it having
been granted by this Court. There
is no explanation why it did not immediately embark on steps to have
the order rescinded and
set aside. This would have been a proper
reaction especially because Matwalane would have been mindful at the
time that the amount
of
R502 455.00
for which he had signed an
acknowledgment of debt had, by agreement between the parties, been
corrected and adjusted down to
R203 550.00
. The invoice that
was sent to the Applicants on 14 April 2018 is confirmation of the
revision of the invoice.
[22]
The Applicants did not liquidate their indebtedness with Vander
Diamonds because they regarded the matter
as settled. Vander Diamonds
vigorously refutes that the matter became settled at any stage. To
this end, this Court was referred
to correspondence between the
parties. It is important to cite the exchange of WhatsApp messages to
appreciate what then transpired
on 13 October 2022. Matwalane had
initiated a telephone call to Ms Van der Merwe of Vander Diamonds,
which call elicited the following
exchange:
“
Good
morning, Whisky I’ll call you in half an hour. I can’t
sign that settlement I’m going to wait too long for
my money
then. If you are waiting for maruleng to pay. What I can do for now
is to settle for R550 000. Then I’ll forgive
the R380 000
balance that is left because of the cost and interest. That is the
only option and safest for me. This is carrying
on for too long now.
If you can agree on that it will be ok for me to write off the rest
of that amount and we stop everything
right now
.”
[23]
Responding to the message above, Matwalane wrote back stating that:
“
I
don’t have R550 000 to pay now.
I
can only commit on something we have at the moment of which that can
be paid to you urgently
But
we are ready to proceed with the matter and file our witnesses to the
court
”
[24]
Describing herself as a businessperson, Ms Mothokwa, deposed to an
affidavit wherein she confirms that she
spoke to Ms Ven der Merwe of
Vander Diamonds in the afternoon of 13 October 2022 during which the
latter stated that Vander Diamonds
had in principle concluded a
settlement agreement with the Applicants. Ms Mothokwa’s
affidavit is at variance with the exchange
of the correspondence that
I have mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The contents of the
exchange of messages between Ms Van
der Merwe and Matwalane are
unequivocal – no agreement was reached. Any allegation to the
contrary by Ms Mothokwa ought to
be rejected as being at odds with
what transpired between the parties.
[25]
The Applicants and Ms Mothokwa referred to a settlement agreement
signed by Matwalane following the agreement
with Ms Van der Merwe of
Vander Diamonds. Although there are instances where signature of an
agreement is not necessary to bring
into life an agreement between
parties, this is not such an instance. In the light of the exchange
of messages between the parties
pointing to the opposite, the
production and exhibition of an agreement signed by both parties was
necessary. The Applicants’
failure to produce such a document
fortifies this Court’s approach that their version is contrived
and should be rejected
as false.
[26] It
is now opportune to examine the impact that the incorrect amount of
the indebtedness of WH Civil would
have made to the Court granting
the order. This issue is crisp and requires an upfront answer. It
would have been of no moment
that the Applicants were indebted to
Vander Diamonds in the amount of
R502 455.00
or
R203
550.00
. In either case, the Applicants admit being indebted to
Vander Diamonds the extent of such indebtedness, on the facts of this
matter,
being insignificant.
[27]
The provisions of Section 345 of the Companies Act, 61 of 1973 are
plain - a party to whom another is indebted
in a sum not less than
R100.00
then due must have served a demand at the registered
office of the debtor calling upon the debtor to settle the amount so
stipulated.
The Applicants were indebted to Vander Diamonds in the
amount of not less than
R100.00
and have to date failed to
settle the sum owed. If the Applicants believed that they owed
R203
550.00
then for them to succeed, they ought to show that at the
time of its liquidation the amount was either not due and payable or
they
had settled it. Neither instance pertained on 8 February 2021
consequently, the Court granted the order liquidating WH Civil
Engineering.
[28]
The Applicants have argued that the service of the application at the
registered address of WH Civil Engineering
was defective because on
28 June 2018 they had notified Vander Diamonds of the new address at
which it ought to send correspondence.
It is important to cite the
letter in full and it reads:
“
Dear
Sir
Refer to the matter
above.
Kindly refer this
matter to the following addresses. Our engineering offices has moved
from Rock Fig Life Centre to Polokwane
Mphela Motimela
Attorneys
1[...] K[...] Street
Morgloed
Postnet Suite 111,
Private Bag X9307
Email:
m[...]
Tel: 0[...]
Or
Mlenaar & Olivier
Attorneys
P.O Box 805
Phalaborwa
1[...]
Email:
Louiselibenberg.
L[...]
Limpopo Province
Please receive the
attached new company addresses for KSS Investors’. And the name
KSS Investors been changed
to WH Civil Engineering
Refer
to the attached letter
Best
regards
Whisky
Matwalane …”
[29]
Section 345 of the Companies Act, 61 of 1973 is specific in that it
refers to the registered address of the
company as the address at
which the demand must be delivered. I understand Vander Diamonds to
be saying that when it served the
demand, the registered address of
WH Civil Engineering was the Roma Church Street in Hluvukani. There
is no indication on the addresses
mentioned in the letter cited above
that the two addresses therein are the registered addresses of WH
Civil Engineering. That said,
the addresses might well have been the
business addresses of WH Civil Engineering. I cannot falter Vander
Diamonds for having served
the demand at the registered address of WH
Civil Engineering lest it would have been in default of the provision
of Section 345.
The service of the demand was accordingly in order.
[30]
Section 346(4A) (a)(iv) of the Companies Act, 61 of 1973 provides
that:
“
[a61y1973s345]
When
an application is presented to the court in terms of this section,
the applicant must
furnish
a copy of the application-…..
to
the company
,
unless the application is made by the company, or the court, at its
discretion, dispenses with the furnishing of a copy where
the court
is satisfied that it would be in the interests of the company or of
the creditors to dispense with it.”
[31]
The Applicants, it would seem, are also arguing that they did not
receive the application and that such might
have been occasioned by
service at the wrong address. Section 346 of the Companies Act, 61 of
1973 refers to ‘furnishing
a copy to the company’. It is
difficult from the reading of Section 346(4A) (a) of the Companies
Act, 61 of 1973 why parties
tend to associate service of applications
with the Section when it unambiguously uses the word, ‘furnish’.
From the
use of the word, it can safely be inferred that the
Legislature deliberately employed it to indicate that service at he
registered
address is not required as in the case of the demand. Were
the converse true, the Legislature would have expressed itself in a
more explicit manner as it did with Section 345.
[32]
Insofar as the use of the word, ‘furnish’, is concerned,
see the case of
Eb
Steam Company (Pty) Ltd V Eskom Holdings Soc Ltd
[5]
.
From the reading of Matwalane’s affidavit, it is undeniable
that both he and WH Civil Engineering were aware of the application
and the order as early as 29 March 2021. They cannot rely on a
settlement that was obviously, as per the correspondence between
the
parties, not reached. The conclusion on this issue should be that the
Applicants were aware or should have been, as the service
of the
demand and the application is unimpeachable. Accordingly, compliance
with Section 346(4A) (a) has occurred as Matwalane’s
knowledge
is imputed to WH Civil Engineering.
[33]
The next issue for consideration is what influence or impact, if any
at all, should the factual solvency
of WH Civil Engineering have on
whether the order should have been granted or not. It is significant
to bear in mind that the claim
of Vander Diamonds is founded on the
provisions of Section 345. The Section is merely concerned with a
debtor’s inability
to settle its debts as and when they fall
due for payment. Accordingly, the question to be asked is, was WH
Civil Engineering able
to pay when Vander Diamonds demanded payment.
The simple answer is that it was not and to date it has not shown
that it could.
All it did is, in a rather vain manner, shown that it
was factually solvent insofar as it claims that there were sufficient
funds
to cover the claim of Vander Diamonds in its account.
[34]
Commercial insolvency is not concerned with whether a party’s
assets exceed its liabilities. It involves
the ability or inability
of a debtor to pay its debts as and when they fall due. Thus, WH
Civil Engineering was commercially insolvent
in that it failed to
liquidate its indebtedness with Vander Diamonds when it was called
upon to do so. The Applicants cannot hide
behind the settlement
agreement because the evidence does not support the contention that a
settlement agreement was concluded.
Additionally, the Applicants do
not have a valid defence because they admit that they were indebted
to Vander Diamonds, whether
in the sum of
R502 455.00
or
R203
550.00
, being way off base.
[35] Is
there room to say that, on the facts of this case, Vander Diamonds is
using the liquidation process to
enforce a debt that is legitimately
contested? WH Civil Engineering was served with a legitimate demand,
and it failed to settle
the debt. Confronted with the inability of WH
Civil Engineering to pay and there being no apparent defence, Vander
Diamonds was
entitled to launch the winding-up application. I am
constrained to find that Vander Diamonds is not using the winding-up
process
to recover a debt that is validly contested.
[36]
Another assertion by the Applicants is that notwithstanding that
Vander Diamonds had obtained judgment against
them on 5 January 2021,
it has proceeded to launch the winding-up application without showing
that it has attempted to execute
on the judgment. It is evident from
the provisions of Section 345 of the Companies Act, 61 of 1973 that
subparagraphs (a), (b)
and (c) are not conjunctive. As such, it is
adequate that Vander Diamonds has demonstrated that WH Civil
Engineering was unable
to pay as and when Vander Diamonds made a
demand to that effect. It is therefore immaterial that it brought the
application without
exhausting the execution measures against the
Applicants.
[37]
The Applicants have also contended that Vander Diamonds withheld
information from this Court when it was
applying for the winding-up
so that this Court could grant the order oblivious of certain
pertinent facts. This is too general.
I am in the dark on what
relevant information was withheld. I understand this to mean that had
the Court been conscious of such
facts, it would have refused to
grant the order. If my reading of the Applicants is correct, it is
startling that they did not
choose to bring the rescission under
Uniform Rule of Court 42. In any event, the problem of this Court is
rather that the alleged
concealed information is not disclosed
consequently, it is difficult to guess.
BONA FIDE DEFENCE
[38]
This leg of the good cause should not detain this Court for long. The
admission of the indebtedness to Vander
Diamonds and inability to
settle it when demanded to do so necessarily mean that the latter was
entitled to the liquidation order.
If WH Civil Engineering did not
have a defence then, what possible defence will it suddenly have now
if it were to be granted the
rescission? It might well be that WH
Civil Engineering did not defend because it did not receive the
papers, but the point is,
would service have turned its fortunes
around? The answer must be in the negative because until now this
Court has not been told
what the defence would have been or what the
defence would be where the rescission to be granted. In short, this
whole application
is a red herring whose objective is to avoid
confronting the reality of the liquidation.
[39] In
the result, the application fails, and I make the following order.
The application for the
rescission of the order liquidating WH Civil Engineering is dismissed
with costs.
B A MASHILE
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
MPUMALANGA DIVISION,
MBOMBELA
APPEARANCES:
Counsel
for the Applicant:
Adv
J Van Den Bergh
Instructed
by:
Desire
Koch Attorneys
Counsel
for the Respondent:
Adv
A Els
Instructed
by:
Barnard
& Patel Inc
C/O
Gerrie Groenewald Attorneys
Date
of Judgment:
18
July 2024
[1]
Storti
v Nugent
2001
(3) SA 783
(W) at 796E – F
[2]
Note
1
supra
[3]
Note
1
supra
[4]
Storti
supra
at 807B – C
[5]
[2014] 1 ALL SA 294
(SCA)