About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Eastern Cape High Court, East London Local Court
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Eastern Cape High Court, East London Local Court
>>
2024
>>
[2024] ZAECELLC 17
|
|
N.M v Hamadulay N.O and Others (EL713/2024) [2024] ZAECELLC 17 (10 May 2024)
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN
CAPE DIVISION, EAST LONDON CIRCUIT COURT)
CASE
NO: EL713/2024
In
the matter between:
N[...]
M[...]
Applicant
And
SILMA
HAMADULAY N.O
1
st
Respondent
STANDARD
BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA
2
nd
Respondent
THANDEKA
BEAUTY BATALA
3
rd
Respondent
S[...]
M[...]
4
th
Respondent
K[...]
M[...]
5
th
Respondent
MASTER
OF THE HIGH COURT
6
th
Respondent
JUDGMENT
Zono
AJ
Introduction
[1]
The applicant is a female divorcee who, during the substance of her
marriage, was
married to Mr K[...] N[...] M[...], the deceased, in
community of property. It appears from the order granted by Gqamane J
dated
26
th
October 2023 annexed to the applicant’s
papers as annexure F, that the marriage between the applicant and the
deceased was
dissolved by a decree of divorce on 15
th
August 2017. Mjali J’s order dated 19
th
October 2021
annexed to first and second respondents’ papers ordered that
the applicant is entitled to (50%) fifty percent
of the joint estate
and to the deceased members interest on a pension fund held and
administered by Liberty Life Group Limited.
It is this court that
granted the division of joint estate and pension benefits.
[2]
After the death of the deceased, the estate was reported to and
registered with the
Master of the High Court Makhanda, the sixth
respondent herein. Subsequent to that, the Master issued Letters of
Executorship in
favour of the first and second respondent, appointing
them as executors.
[3]
In the exercise of their powers in terms of Section 28 (1) of
Administration of Estates
Act
[1]
the first and second respondents opened an estate account and
deposited therein such money they may have from time to time received
for the estate.
[4]
In pursuit of the right the applicant might have been having on the
estate, she approached
this court on 30
th
April
2024 at 0930, or so soon thereafter on urgent basis for an order in
the following terms
[2]
:
“
1.
Condoning the applicant’s non-compliance
with the Uniform Rules of Court and dispensing with forms and
service
provided for in the normal Rules of this Honourable Court and
directing that this (sic) disposing of this matter by way
of urgency
in accordance with Uniform Rule 6(12) of the above Honourable Court.
2.
An order directing the first and second respondents to pay the sum of
R500 000.00
into the Trust account of B.Nduli & Co
whose details are as follows:
Name
of Bank
: S[…]
B[…]
Name
of Account :
B. Nduli & Co (Trust Account)
Account
Number :
[…]
Branch
: E[…]
L[…]
Branch
Code
:
[…]
3.
An order directing first and second respondents to pay the said sum
of money within two (2) days
of the granting of the order.
4.
That the costs hereof shall be costs in the main application.
5.
Granting such further and/or alternative relief.”
[5]
For Purposes of determination of Part A, which is an urgent
application, it is ordinarily
not necessary to make any reference to
Part B of the application, save to set out the relief sought therein.
[6]
The applicant seeks in Part B of the application the following
relief:
“
1.
An order interdicting the first and second respondents from attending
further to the administration of
estate of the late K[...]
N[...] M[...] Until such time that the estates of the late K[...]
N[...] M[...] and that
of the applicant have been
divided.
2.
An order appointing the Receiver Mr A.S. Peterson who will attend to
the division of the joint
estate of the late K[...] N[...] M[...] and
that of the applicant.
3.
An order directing Mr A.S. Peterson to convene a meeting within 30
days of granting of the order
with the applicant and/or her legal
representative to attend to division of estates of K[...]
N[...] M[...] and that of the
applicant.
4.
That the first and second respondents pay costs of the applicant.
5.
Further and/or alternative relief.”
[7]
In Part A of the
application the applicant seeks an order directing the first and
second respondents to pay an of
R500 000.00
within two
days of this order, ostensibly from the estate account held and
controlled by first and second respondents, to the applicant’s
attorneys Trust account held in East London. It is not apparent
from the papers as to where the estates account is held.
The bank
with which the estate account is held is not stated in the papers.
The essence of applicant’s papers is that the
money is in
possession of the first and second respondents.
[8]
However, it is expressely set out in the applicant’s founding
affidavit that
the first respondent is an executor appointed in terms
of the letters of executorship with his address at, care of S[…]
B[…] Centre, […] Floor H[…], […] […],
Boulevald, F[…], Cape Town. Second respondent’s
address
is at S[…] B[…] Centre, S[…] Street,
Johannesburg. These are the respondents against whom the
order
is sought in Part A of the application.
[9]
The first and second respondent in their answering affidavit
challenges this court’s
jurisdiction. They contend that this
court does not have the necessary jurisdiction to entertain this
matter. They contend that
this court’s jurisdiction is limited
only to the Magisterial District of East London. Secondly, they
contend that the estates
which is the subject matter of this
application was reported to and registered with the sixth respondent,
the Master of the High
Court in Makhanda. They conclude that the
estate vests with the Master of the High Court, Makhanda or with them
at the addresses
set out in paragraph 8 above. The nub of their
contention is that this matter lacks the requisite jurisdictional
connecting factors,
which would enable this court to entertain this
matter. It is not in dispute that if we were to follow first, second
and sixth
respondent’s addresses, this court could not have
jurisdiction to entertain these proceedings.
Discussion
[10]
Superior Courts Act
[3]
endows a
Provincial or Local Division of the High Court with jurisdiction in
civil matters “
over
all persons residing or being in and in relation to all causes
arising …… within its area of jurisdiction…”
The
first and second respondent (parties against whom the relief is
sought in Part A) are neither ‘
residing’
nor
‘
being
in’
the
area of this court. The issue remaining is whether it can be said, on
the facts of this case, that “
all
causes arising
”
within
the area of jurisdiction of this court are present. It must be
established what is meant by “
all
causes arising
”
.
[11]
Hoexter
JA
[4]
(the appellate Division) held as follows:
“
In
a long line of cases, the words
"causes
arising" have been interpreted as signifying not
"causes
of action arising" but "legal proceedings duly
arising",
that is to say, proceedings in which the court
has
jurisdiction under the common law.”
The
Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) concurred with this exposition when
Jafta JA
[5]
had this to
say: -
“
Plainly,
what is meant in the above interpretation is that ‘causes
arising’ does not refer to causes of action but to
all factors
giving rise to jurisdiction under the common law.”
[6]
[12]
The factors giving rise to jurisdiction are often referred to
as the “
jurisdictional
connecting factors.”
The
legal proceedings are based on facts from which legal
inferences may be drawn (jurisdictional connecting factors).
[7]
When referring to or considering jurisdictional connecting factors
Trollip
JA
[8]
had this to say:
“
I
therefore turn to consider whether the court a quo had jurisdiction
in these proceedings according to the general
principles of our
law. That depends on (a) the nature of the proceedings,
(b) the nature of the relief claimed therein,
or (c ) in some cases
both (a) and (b).”
[9]
[13]
The issue, therefore is whether the legal proceedings in this
application can be said to
have arisen within the area of
jurisdictioin of this court. The specific term ‘
jurisdiction’
has
been defined as the power or competence of a court to hear and
determine an issue between parties
[10]
. The Consutitional Court
[11]
held as follows with reference to the importance of pleadings in
determining jurisdiction:
“
75
Jurisdiction
is determined on the basis of the pleadings…In the event of
the Court’s jurisdiction being challenged
at the outset (in
limine), the applicant’s pleadings are the determining factor.
They contain the legal basis of the claim
under which the applicant
has chosen to invoke the court’s competence. While the
pleadings – including in motion proceedings,
not only the
formal terminology of the notice of motion, but also the contents of
the supporting affidavits – must be interpreted
to establish
what the legal basis of the applicant’s claim is, it is not for
the court to say that the facts asserted by
the applicant would also
sustain another claim, cognisable only in another court. …..”
[14]
While the relief sought in Part A is set out verbatim in paragraph 4
above, the applicant, under
the rubric
JURISDICTION
lay the
basis for this court’s jurisdiction as follows:
“
9.
I
submit that the above Honourable court has juridiction to hear this
matter as the deceased in the matter was resident and domiciled
within its jurisdiction. Furthermore, the estate in question is
situated within the jurisdiction of the above honourbale
court.
The third and fifth respondnets are also residents within the
jurisdiction of the above honourable court.”
It
is re iterated that there is no releif sought in Part A of this
application against the third and fifth respondent. Their
presence, for purposes of determining Part A of the
application, is immaterial and of no moment, and thus cannot
be
regarded as a jurisdictional connecting factor.
[15]
It worths a while to properly characterize a claim that is
serving before court to determine
if the court is endowed with the
necessary jurisdiction to entertain the matter.
Nuggent
JA
[12]
observed as follows: “
The
second observation is that a claim, which exists as a fact, is not
capable of being converted into a claim of a different kind
by the
mere use of language. Yet that is often what is sought to be done
under the guise of what is called ‘characterising’
the
claim. Where that word is used to mean ‘describing the
distinctive character of’ the claim that is before the
court, as a fact, then its use is unexceptionable…”
The
relief sought in, and the nature of Part A is for payment of
money.
[13]
Whether the claim
is a good one or a bad one is immaterial and is beside the
point.
[14]
[16]
The applicant seeks a mandatory interdict. This is an order
requiring a person to do some
positive act to remedy a
wrongful state of affairs for which he is responsible,
or to do something
which he ought to do if the
complainant is to have his rights. It has been said
that a mandatory interdict can
serve to compel the
perfomance of a specific statutory duty and to remedy the
effects of unlawful action already
taken.
[15]
[17]
It
is now trite that the three requirements for a final interdict are
(1) a clear right; (2) a threat to breach such right (in the
case of
a prohibitory interdict) or a refusal to act in fulfilment of such
right (in the case of a mandatory interdict); and (3)
no other
remedy.
[16]
Alkema
J
[17]
held that:
“
In
interdict proceedings a court will have jurisdiction if the
requirements for the grant of an interdict are satisfied by the facts
within the territorial area of jurisdiction of the court.”
He
found that this is the only test which should be applied in deciding
jurisdiction in interdict proceedings.
[18]
The applicant seeks to exercise her right to receive payment from the
deceased estate/estates.
She describes herself “
as an adult
female presently residing at T[...] Location, K[...], Ngqamakhwe.”
In paragraph 62-63 of her founding affidavit under the rubric
Factors Pertaining to Part A of the application
the applicant
states as follows:
“
62. Around
14
th
,
15
th
,
16
th
and 17
th
April
2024, heavy rains fell in the Western Cape, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu
Natal. As I am presently staying in Ngqamakhwe at the
homestead in
the Eastern Cape. This property was too affected by heavy rains.
63.The
rain which fell on the 15
th
April 2024 usually referred to
as a tornado. This is a destructive vortex of violently rotating
winds and advancing beneath large
storm system. This was followed by
heavy rains which fell within a short period and leaving a
distruction of property behind.”
[19]
In paragraph 65 the applicant further states as follows:
“
Even
though the property is on a plain, when there was a lot of water,
formed a small dam on the side of the houses and then move
and flow
towards the front entrance as well as the rear entrance of the house.
This caused the damage to the house and therefore
compromised the
structure of the house.”
In
paragraph 67 and 68 of the founding affidavit the applicant states
that she requested the first respondent for an advance payment
from
her 50% part of the joint estate so that she can repair the
property. That request was refused by the respondents.
[20]
According to the facts of this case the applicant resides in
Ngqamakhwe, in the former Transkei.
The property that is sought to be
repaired is the same property she is residing in, situating at
Ngqamakhwe, in the former Transkei.
[21]
The proceedings are for a breach of a right to
payment. The right is rooted in the entitlement to the half
share of
the joint estate which is a legal consequence of a marriage in
community of property. A rhetoric question is, “
where that
right can rightfully be exercised. Where the breach of that right
occurred?”
[22]
Alkema
J
[18]
opined as follows:
“
Generally,
a breach of a right occurs at the place where the right vests. The
act of setting the breach in motion may occur somewhere
else, but the
breach usually takes place where the right vests.”
The
situs
of
a right is a determining factor in determining the jurisdiction in
matters of this nature. It is important to take into account
the
dictum of
Trollip
JA
[19]
where he held as follows:
“
It
is, of course, clear that ordinarily a person is free to carry on the
trade, calling or profession of his choice. That is a right
which the
law recognises and protects from unlawful interference from others…
It stems from his legal capacity or personality
as a natural person
of full age. It can be regarded as a real right in the sense that it
is an absolute right, one available and
enforceable against
everybody… By its very nature it inheres in and is inseparable
from the person. Hence, the situs of
the right to carry on business
as an estate agent., if it can be said to have one, is where the
person is. And that cannot be affected
in any way by the Boards power
under the Act to permit or prevent the exercise of the right by
granting or refusing…. the
issue of the fidelity fund
certificate. Its situs would remain where the person is…”
[20]
[23]
It does not appear anywhere in the papers that the applicant, before
instituting the present
proceedings, requested the payment to be made
anywhere otherwise than to herself. In the light of the fact that
this kind of right
usually inheres in the person unless otherwise
stated, that presupposes that the first and second respondents who
are carrying
on businesses and residents in Cape Town and
Johannesburg respectively, would make payment at Ngqamakhwe, where
the applicant resides.
Ngqamakhwe is located within the jurisdiction
of the Eastern Cape High Court, Mthatha and not this court.
[24]
I therefore conclude that the right to receive payment vested in
Ngqamakhwe within the territorial
jurisdiction of Mthatha High Court
of the Eastern Cape Division. Having found that the right vested
outside the area of jurisdiction
of this court, I accordingly find
that the breach of that right occurred outside the territorial
jurisdiction of this court. No
exercise of a right and breach thereof
occurred within the area of jurisdiction of this court.
[25]
The matter seems not to end there. The applicant in paragraph 2 of
the notice of motion seeks
an order in terms of which payment is made
into the Trust Account of her attorneys in East London. That happens
when there was
neither exercise of a right nor breach thereof
occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. There is
no evidence
that, before instituting the present proceedings, that
the applicant had a right to exercise within the territorial
jurisdiction
of this court. It follows that no breach seems to have
occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of this court.
[26]
Applicant’s attorneys are within this court’s area of
jurisdiction. They hold
their Trust Account within this court’s
area of jurisdiction. In my respectful view the address of the
attorneys was appointed
for purposes of the court order that may be
obtained in these proceedings. Put differently, applicant’s
attorneys Trust account
details were given for purposes of this
application and for purposes of exercising the rights to receive the
portion of half share
of applicant’s joint estate. These
details were given with a view to bring this application within the
territorial
jurisdiction of this court. Whether this conduct falls
within the definition of the concept “
causes arising”
is the subject of next discussion. It is important to understand
whether or not the appointment of applicants Trust account details
within this court’s territorial area of jurisdiction,
constituted a jurisdictional connecting factor.
[27]
I intend to visit the second approach of
Trollip
JA
in
Estate
Agents Boards v Lek
[21]
,
which is “
the
nature of relief.”
Trollip
JA
describes
it as approach (b) and defines it as approach based on the principle
of effectiveness- which is the power of the court
not only to grant
the relief claimed, but also to effectively enforce it directly
within its area of jurisdiction.
[28]
The judgment this court may grant may be enforced or executed within
the boundaries of this court’s
area of jurisdiction as the
payment would be made within the territorial jurisdiction of this
court. An order sought required
the first and second respondent
to effect payment within the jurisdictional boundaries of this court.
On that basis I find that
this court is endowed with jurisdiction to
entertain this matter. The fact that the step to bring this matter
within the territorial
limits of this court occurred belatedly is a
matter to be considered for determination of costs. On the basis of
Doctrine of effectiveness
this court assumes jurisdiction in this
matter.
[29]
Even if I am wrong on the finding I made above, I find solace on the
sentiments shared by
Herbstein
and Van Winsen
.
[22]
Where the court has jurisdiction in respect of some claims, but
not others, it may apply the
causae
continentia
doctrine,
which is designed to avoid a multiplicity of process and the
possibility of conflicting judgments on the same
cause of action, and
to provide for the convenient disposition of suits. In terms of
this doctrine if a court has jurisdiction
in respect of one claim it
can assume jurisdiction in respect of the other claims in the same
action which are based on different
causes of action .
[23]
[30]
A single notice of motion supported by a single founding affidavit
was issued in this court on
24
TH
April 2024 consisting of
two parts, namely Part A and Part B. Single motion proceedings were
instituted in this court for determination
at different stages of the
case.
[31]
In making submissions, applicant’s Counsel contended that these
proceedings are intended
to give effect to the court order of Mjali J
granted on 19
th
October 2021 which granted relief in the
following terms:
“
1. There shall
be a division of Joint Estate
1.1
The applicant is entitled to the 50% of the joint estate”
It
was contented that a claim for part or advance payment was based on
that order and the fact that the deceased and the applicant
were
married to each other in community of property. Whether or not that
is a good claim is neither here nor there for purposes
of
determination of jurisdiction of this court.
[32]
Part B of the application is clearly a sequel to the court order of
Mjali J aforesaid, especially
paragraph 2 and 3 thereof. This court
does have a jurisdiction to enforce its orders.
[33]
I therefore conclude in my respectful view that this court is clothed
with jurisdiction to entertain
this matter on the grounds
foreshadowed above.
[34]
However, that is not the end of the matter. Whether or not the
applicant has fully satisfied
further requirements of a final
interdict is a subject of discussion hereinunder. In next I discuss
if the applicant has satisfied
to the full extent the requirement of
a clear right.
[35]
The respondent raises the provisions of Section 26(1A) of
Administration of Estates Act 66 of
1995, which provide as follows:
“
The
executor may before the account has lain open for inspection in terms
of section 35 (4), with the consent of the Master release
such amount
of money and such property out of the estate as in the executor's
opinion are sufficient to provide for the subsistence
of the
deceased's family or household.”
[36]
It appears that the right to the release of money is exercisable only
if a precondition of a
consent by the Master has been given. Put
different, the Master may exercise a power to release the money out
of the estates to
provide for the subsistence of the deceased family
only when an objective jurisdictional fact of the consent of the
Master has
been given. In clear terms the applicant is not entitled
to the release of the money for her subsistence in the absence of the
consent given by the Master. There is no consent given by the Master,
nor does it appear that the Master was approached for that
consent.
[37]
Under common law, necessary preconditions that must exist before an
administrative power can
be exercised are referred to as
jurisdictional facts. In the absence of such preconditions or
jurisdictional facts, so it is said,
the administrative authority
effectively has no power to act at all.
[24]
[38]
Legal writings on the subject are not silent
[25]
.
Cora Hoexter puts it thus:
“
Jurisdictional
facts refer broadly to preconditions or conditions precedent that
must exist prior to the exercise of the power and
procedures to be
followed, or formalities to be observed, when exercising the power:
substantative jurisdictional facts in the
case of conditions, and
procedural jurisdictional facts in the case of procedural
requirements and formalities. These facts are
jurisdictional because
the exercise of the power depends on their existence or observance,
as the case may be…. If the jurisdictional
facts are not
present or observed (or to put it differently if the administrator
makes a mistake of fact about their presence or
observance), then the
exercise of the power will as a general rule be unlawful. To hold
otherwise, the courts have always reasoned,
would be to allow
administrators to arrogate powers to themselves or inflate their own
jurisdiction.”
[39]
Consent of the Master of High Court is a condition precedent to the
exercise of power to release
the money for the subsistence of the
deceased family or household. In the absence of that consent no power
to release the money
may be exercised by the executor. That
quintessentially means that no right or entitlement to receive money
if the Master has not
been approached for and granted consent. For
this reason applicant’s Part A application cannot succeed. It
is therefore not
necessary to deal with other issues raised on the
papers and during oral submissions.
[40]
I see no reason why costs of Part A cannot follow the result. The
applicant in her submissions
requested that in the event that they do
not succeed in the application, third respondent should not be
awarded costs. It was contended
that no relief in this part of the
application is sought against her. She should not have joined the
fray at this stage.
[41]
The third respondent is a surviving spouse of the deceased. The
liquidation and distribution
account is referred to in the
applicant’s founding affidavit and is annexed thereto as
annexure H. At pages 48 to 49 of the
papers, which is part of the
liquidation and distribution account, reference is made to the third
respondent’s entitlement
to the deceased estate as surviving
spouse and a widow. Inheritance written under her name is as follows:
“
Movable
Property
R4,661,482,85
Claims in favour of
the estate
R6,221,59
Cash
R 8,563,523,60
R13,231,228,04”
[42]
It was argued on third respondent’s behalf that Part A of the
application is a threat to
third respondent’s entitlement to
the estate. It is so because it is not known what was the value of
the applicant’s
entitlement (50%) during the time of the
divorce. Therefore, an amount of R500 000.00 may have
exceeded her value of
the joint estate and have encroached to the
third respondent’s inheritance. Therefore, it was submitted
that she could not
sit back and do nothing when the legal proceedings
have an effect of threatening her entitlement. I agree.
Order
[43]
I accordingly make the following order
41.1 Part A of
applicant’s application is hereby dismissed.
41.2
The applicant is hereby ordered to pay costs of the application.
A.S
ZONO
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
APPEARENCES
Counsel
for the Applicant
Respondents:
Mr
Meyers
Instructed
by:
B.
NDULI & CO
Applicant’s
attorneys
28
Beatty Road
Vincent
East
London
Tel:
043
743
4206
E-mail:
xola@bnduliattorneys.co.za
Ref:
B.NDUI/sbp/14643
Counsel
for the 1
st
and 2
nd
Respondent:
Adv.
Steenkamp
Instructed
by:
HEIDI
VAN DER MEULEN
ATTORNEYS
E-mail:
heid@hvdmlaw.co.za
Tel:
021 422 3721
082 777
3061
Counsel
for the 3
rd
Respondent:
Mr
De Klerk
Instructed
by:
BAX
KAPLAN RUSSEL INC
34
Pearce street
Berea
East
London
Email:jasonbkr-inc.co.za
Tel:043
706
8400
Date
heard
:
30
th
April
2024
Date
Delivered:
10
th
May 2024
[1]
Section
28 of
Administration of Estates Act No 66 of 1965
provides
as follows:
“
(1)
An executor-
(a)
shall, unless the Master otherwise directs, as soon as he or she has
in hand moneys in the estate in excess of R1 000, open
a cheque
account in the name of the estate with a bank in the Republic and
shall deposit therein the moneys which he or she has
in hand and
such other moneys as he or she may from time to time receive for the
estate;
(b)
may open a savings account in the name of the estate with a bank and
may transfer thereto so much of the moneys deposited
in the account
referred to in paragraph (a) as is not immediately required for the
payment of any claim against the estate;
(c)
may place so much of the moneys deposited in the account referred to
in paragraph (a) as is not immediately required for the
payment of
any claim against the estate on interest-bearing deposit with a
bank.”
[2]
Part
A of the application.
[3]
Section
21(1)
of Act 10 of 2013
[4]
Bisonboard
Ltd v K. Braun Woodworking Machinery
(Pty)
Ltd
[1990] ZASCA 86
;
1991
(1) SA 482
A at 486 D-E
[5]
Gordiant
Trading CC v Daimler Chrysler Financial Services
2005
(6) SA 205
(SCA) Para 11
[6]
Leibowitz
t/a Lee Finance v Mhlana and Others
2006
(4) ALL SA (SCA) 428 at 430 Para 7
[7]
Zokufa
v Compuscan (Credit Bureau)
2011
(1) SA 277
Para 32-33
[8]
Estate
Agent Board v Lek
1979
(6) SA 1049
at 1063 F
[9]
Gulf
Oil Corportaion v Rombrandt Fabrikante en Handerlaars (EDMS) Bpk
1963
(2) SA 10
(T)
[10]
Gcaba
v Minister of Safety and Security and
Others
2010(1)
SA 238 (CC) Para 74
[11]
Gcaba
v Minister of Safety and Security (Supra
)
Para
75
[12]
Makhanya
v University of Zululand
2010
(1) SA 62
(SCA) Para 72
[13]
Estate
Agent Board v Lek
1979
(3) SA 1049
at 1063
[14]
Makhanya
v University of Zululand
2010
(1) SA 62
(SCA) Paras 71 and 95
[15]
Erasmus
: Superior Court Practice, 2
nd
Edition,
Page D6-3
[16]
Setlogelo
v Setlogelo
1914
AD
221
at 222;
Zokufa
v Compuscan (Credit Bureau)
2011
SA 272
Para 37
[17]
Zokufa
v Compuscan (Credit Bureau)
2011
(1) SA 272 Para 62
[18]
Zokufa
v Compuscan (Credit Bureau)
2011
(1) SA 272
Para 44
[19]
Estate
Agent Board v Lek
1979
(3) SCA 1049 at 1064 D-F
[20]
1067
B-D
[21]
1979
(3) SA 1049
at 1063 G
[22]
Herbstein
and Van Winsen: The Civil Practice of the High Courts of South
African, Fifth edition, Volume1, Page 76
[23]
Roberts
Construction Co Ltd v Willcox Bros (Pty) Ltd)
1962
(4) SA 326
(A);
Thomas
v BMW South Africa (Pty ) Ltd
1996
(2) SA 106
(C) at 127 H/I-128 A/B
;
Van
Der Walt Business Brokers (Pty) Ltd v Budget
Kilometers
CC
1999
(3) SA 1149
(W) at 1154A
[24]
Kimberly
Junior School and another v Head of the Northern Cape Education
Department and others
2010
(1) SA 217
SCA Para 11;
Paola
v Jeeva No and others
[2003] ZASCA 100
;
2004
(1) SA 396
(SCA),
2003 (4) ALL SA 433
(SCA) Paras 11,14, and 16;
President
of RSA and Others v South African Rugby Football Union
and
others
2000
(1) SA 1
(CC) Para 168
[25]
Cora
Hoexter, Administrative Law in South Africa, Second edition, Page
290