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1987
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[1987] ZASCA 136
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S v Mzinyane and Others (137/87) [1987] ZASCA 136 (26 November 1987)
THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(
APPELLATE DIVISION
)
In the matter between:
DLOZILAKHE RICHARD MZINYANE
First Appellant
SIHLE MZINYANE
Second Appellant
VO VICTOR MZINYANE
Third Appellant
AND
THE STATE
Respondent
Coram
: CORBETT,
JOUBERT et JACOBS, JJ A
Heard
: 6 November 1987
Delivered
: 26 November 1987
JUDGMENT
JACOBS
, J A :
The three appellants were convicted by Galgut J
and two assessors in the Northern Circuit Local Division at
Ladysmith .... / 2
2
Ladysmith, Natal, of murder without extenuating circumstances
and
sentenced to death. With the leave of the trial Judge the
appellants appeal
against the finding that there were no ex-
tenuating circumstances and
against the death sentences. The
allegations against them were that on the
3rd March 1986 and at
or near the Mnweni River in the district of Bergville
the appel-
lants unlawfully and intentionally killed Mapegu Mtolo (the de-
ceased). I
shall for the sake of convenience continue to re-
fer to the appellants individually as accused nos 1, 2 and 3
as they
appeared before the trial Court.
The facts and circumstances surrounding the killing
of the deceased which led to the convictions and sentences of
the accused can be summed up as follows.
Accused no 1 had a relationship with the sister of
the...... / 2
3
the deceased as a result of which she became pregnant. At a
tribal hearing
which followed, accused no 1 was ordered to pay
two head of cattle as
damages. The deceased, as head of the
girl's family,was apparently pressing
for payment and accused
no 1 was unable to pay. On the evening of Monday 3
March 1986
accused nos 2 and 3, who were cousins of accused no 1,
arrived
at the home of the deceased. They pretended to be policemen
and told the deceased, his wife and her mother that they had
come to fetch the deceased who, so they said, was wanted by the
police. When asked what the deceased had done they said that
further enquiries could be made by the family at the police
station the next day. Accused nos 2 and 3 thereafter hand-
cuffed the deceased with a pair of handcuffs which they had
with them and took him away. I may perhaps at this stage say
that .... / 4
4
that the evidence was to the effect that the deceased was phy-
sically and
sexually underdeveloped. He weighed approximately
40 kg and although he was
approximately 37 years old, he had the
general appearance of a 13 year old
boy. Early the next morning
the deceased's family went to the police station
where they were
told that the police knew nothing about the whole matter
and
that the deceased had not been fetched from his home by the po-
lice or by anyone acting on their behalf. A search for the de-
ceased was
then organised and later the same day his
body was found in a deep pool in a
river about 1½ km from de-
ceased's home. The body was inside a synthetic plastic bag.
In the bag were also three large stones which were obviously put
there to keep the bag under the water. The findings of the
doctor who performed the autopsy were that the deceased had not
died .... / 5
5
died of drowning, but of loss of blood caused by multiple stab
wounds and
lacerations on his neck and head, the most serious
of which were three
lacerations next to the right ear, which .
severed certain vital arteries or veins in the neck, and one
stabwound near the Adam's apple.
The three accused were arrested a week cr two after
the discovery of the deceased's body and shortly thereafter each
of them made a statement before a magistrate. Despite object-
ions on accuseds' behalf these statements were, after a trial
within a trial, admitted as evidence against the respective
accused. In his statement accused no 1 admitted that, because
the deceased had been pressing him for payment of the damages
he had been ordered to pay, he decided to kill the deceased and
for this purpose enlisted the aid of accused nos 2 and 3.
At...... / 6
6
At his request accused nos 2 and 3 fetched the deceased from
his home and
brought him to where he, accused no l,was waiting.
The three of them then cut
the deceased's throat and put his
body in a bag which they dumped in a pool
in the river. In
their statements accused nos 2 and 3 for all practical
purposes
confirmed accused no l's version of the events and admitted
the
part they played in the commission of the crime.
After the close of the State's case, all three
accused testified in their
own defence. They merely repeated
their evidence during the trial within a
trial which was to the
effect that what they had told the magistrate in their
state-
ments to which I have referred earlier was not true. Each one
again
relied on alleged assaults by certain policemen which
assaults were aimed at forcing them to confess to the crime and
which .... / 7
7
which, so they alleged, resulted in them making the statements
before the
magistrate. Accused nos 2 and 3 in addition, as
they did during the trial
within a trial, relied on alleged pro-
mises by accused no 1 after their
arrest that if they admitted
to having assisted in the killing of the
deceased he, accused
no 1, would see to it that they would be acquitted
should they
appear before a Judge accused of committing the crime.
After the three accused were convicted of murder
Dr Buccimazza was called as a witness by Mr
Singh
, who appeared
on behalf of accused nos 2 and 3. He had examined these two
accused for the purposes of establishing their respective ages.
His opinion, which was based largely on the accuseds' tooth and
sexual development, was that accused no 2 was in his early
twenties. It was put to him that according to the accused he
was .... / 8
8
was born in 1967 which would have made him 19 at the time of
the trial.
His answer was that if he had to accept that accu-
sed no 2 was in fact 19
years old when he examined him, he would
say that the accused was in any
event closer to 20 than to 19.
The doctor was of the opinion that accused no
3 was probably
older than accused no 2 and he estimated accused no 3's age
at
20-21. I may just add that accused no 1 testified that he was
born in 1964
and this was apparently accepted by the trial Court.
Accused nos 2 and 3 were thereafter called to testi-
fy in extenuation. Their versions were for all practical pur-
poses to the
same effect and can be summarised thus. They
both admitted that the evidence
given by them during the trial
within a trial as well as their evidence given
after the close
of the State case was untrue. They stated that they lived
about .... / 9
9
about three hours walk from where accused no 1 lived with his
father, who
is their uncle. On Sunday the 2nd March 1985
they were away from home and on
their return in the late after-
noon they received a message that during
their absence their
cousin, accused no 1, had been there and had left a
message that
accused no l's father wanted them to come to his kraal.
They
immediately proceeded to their uncle's kraal but although
accused no
1 and his father were there when they arrived, no
one told them, nor did they
ask anyone, why they had been called.
Accused no 1 and his father merely told
them to come back the
next day. The next day, 1 e Monday the 3rd, they went
back
to accused no l's home. On their way they were met by accused
no 1 who bought some spirits at a store which he gave to the
two of them to drink. On their arrival at accused no l's
father's ....... / 10
10
father's kraal they were given further liquor from a large bucket
of beer.
They were also given some dagga to smoke. Accused
no 1 did not drink any
liquor but he also smoked dagga. Late
in the afternoon, when they were well
under the influence of
liquor and dagga, accused no l's father told them that he wanted
them to
assist him and accused no 1 to kill the deceased be-
cause of the damages
which accused no 1 was required to pay to
the deceased. They at first refused
to assist but accused no
l's father offered to reward them and also threatened them that
if they refused to assist, they would not reach home that night,
the
implication being that they themselves would be killed.
Because they were affected by the liquor and dagga, and because
of the threats and the offer of a reward, they agreed to assist
in the killing. That evening accused no 1 accompanied them
and..../ 11
11
and pointed out the deceased's home to them. Accused nos 2 and
3 entered the deceased's home and they pretended to be police-
men who had
come to arrest the deceased. They handcuffed him
with a pair of handcuffs
which accused no 1 had given them
earlier and took him to a spot near the
river where accused no 1
and his father were waiting for them. Accused no l's
father
then told them to hold the deceased down and he, the father,
cut
the deceased's throat with a knife. The four of them there-
after put
the deceased's body in a sack which they had with them
and threw the sack
with the body into the river.
Accused no 1 gave no evidence in extenuation. His
counsel, in cross-examination, put it to accused nos 2 and 3
that they were falsely implicating him and his father. It was
further put to accused nos 2 and 3 that the first time accused
no 1 ..../ 12
12
no 1 ever met the other two was after the three of them had been arrested and
locked up together.
As already stated, the trial Court found that there were
no extenuating circumstances and all three accused were sentenced to death.
The
principle is, of course,well settled that the question as to the existence or
otherwise of extenuating circumstances is essentially
one for decision by the
trial Court, and that in the absence of misdirection or irregularity, this Court
will not interfere with
a finding that no extenuating circumstances were
present, unless it is one to which the trial Court could not reasonably have
come.
Mr
Bezuidenhout
, on behalf of accused no 1, quite rightly, in my view,
disavowed reliance on any misdirections on
the part of the trial Court. His submissions were simply that
no reasonable court
could .... / 13
13
could have come to the conclusion that accused no l's youth and
limited sophistication and the influence which his father pro-
bably had
over him were not such as to sufficiently reduce his
moral blameworthiness so
as to constitute extenuating circum-
stances. As far as accused no l's alleged youthfulhess was
concerned, he
testified that he was born in 1964 which would
mean that when the crime was
committed in March 1986 he was at
least 21 years old. He was therefore not a teenager any more
but, as was
pointed out by Rumpfff C J in
S v Lehnberg en 'n
Ander
1975 (4) SA 553
at p 561 H, a person of 20 years or older
can also show, by acceptable evidence, that he was psychologi-
cally immature to the extent that his immaturity could serve in
extenuation. As stated earlier, accused no 1 gave no evidence
in extenuation and nothing was placed before the trial Court
to .... / 14
14
to show, on a balance of probabilities, that accused no 1 must be regarded as
less mature than the average 21 year-old. In-deed, as
the trial Court quite
rightly pointed out he is, and was at the time of the commission of the crime,
already married. It is also
perhaps of some significance that accused no 1
him-self testified that when the deceased's sister fell pregnant he discussed
the
possibility of marrying her, presumably as a se-cond wife, with his father
who pointed out that lobola had already been paid for
his first wife. According
to the accused his father added "that I had to see for myself as to what to do
because I am now a grown-up
man." As far as the submission, which was also
máde before the trial Court, that accused no 1 probably acted under the
influence
of his father the trial Court found that it had not been shown on
balance that accused no 1
was .... / 15
15
was under his father's influence when the decision to kill the
deceased
was made and the plan devised to do so. The Court
found that all the indications are that accused no 1 was
as much in
control of the whole situation as his father.
Here again it is perhaps
significant that when accused nos 2
and 3 arrived at the river with the deceased it was, accord-
ing to the evidence of accused no 2, accused no 1 who did the
talking and said:
"You have helped me out. I have been looking for this dog a long
time."
In my view nothing has been advanced which would
warrant this Court interfering with the trial Court's finding
that, as far as accused no 1 is concerned, no extenuating cir-
cumstances were present.
I .../16
16
I turn now to the appeals by accused nos 2 and 3 against the trial Court's
finding that, also as far as they were concerned, there
were no extenuating
circumstances. Before the trial Court Mr
Singh
, who appeared on their
behalf, advanced the following facts and circumstances as constituting
extenuation:
(a) Their alleged intoxication when on the Monday,
according to
them, they were told what they were expected to do and agreed to do so. In fact,
according to them they were strongly
under the in-fluence of liquor when they
fetched the deceased from his home and assisted in the killing;
(b)
the alleged threats by the
father of accused no 1;
(c)
the probability
that they were under the influence
of .../ 17
17
of accused no 1 and his father; and lastly (d) the youthfulness and lack of
sophistication and
education of accused nos 2 and 3.
The trial Court fully considered the submissions
made by Mr
Singh
and dealt with each and every one of the
factors advanced by him. As far as the alleged intoxication
and influence
of dagga were concerned the trial Court was pre-
pared to accept that on the
Monday, i e the day the deceased
was killed, accused nos 2 and 3 drank liquor
and smoked dagga
but the Court found that the effect thereof was exaggerated
by both of them. The Court pointed out that the deceased's
wife, Bushapi,specifically stated in her evidence that if the
two accused had been drinking before they arrived at her home
they certainly showed no sign of it. They also played their
role .... / 18
18
role so well that she, Bushapi, and obviously also the deceased's
mother
who was called before the deceased was taken away, were
fooled into believing that accused nos 2 and 3 were in fact
policemen. It
is also significant that in their confessions
before the magistrate neither
of the accused mentioned a word
about liquor or dagga having played a role in
what they did.
But on the question of the alleged intoxication, and this
also
has an important bearing on the alleged threats by accused no l's
father, the trial Court expressed the view that on the Sunday
accused nos 2 and 3 already knew what the reason was for having
been invited to the home of accused no l's father and were already
at that stage informed of the plan which had been devised to kill
the deceased and the part they were expected to play. The
trial Court was not prepared to accept that the two accused
would...... / 19
19
would have walked for three hours to get to the kraal of accused
no l's
father and then when, as they wanted the Court to believe,
no one told them
the reason why they were called and they were
simply told to come back the next day, they would not have asked
for a reason. In my view the trial Court was fully justified
in coming to this conclusion especially when one looks at their
evidence in this regard. In answer to questions by counsel for
the State, accused no 2 testified as follows:
"Did they tell you at all why you had to come back the next day? .... No they
did not tell us. So you spent 3 hours walking back to
your home without being
any the wiser? .... That is how it happened. Why did you not ask them 'what are
you calling us all the way
here for?' .... We did not think of asking them."
Accused no 3, also in answer to questions by counsel
for the State,testified as follows:
"Why.... ? 20
20
"Why were you not curious to find out what this was all about? .... We did not
find out. We thought they were going to tell us because
they are the ones that
had called us.
Yes, and when they didn't tell you why didn't you enquire? .... It did not occur
to us to ask them, because they had called us.
You were quite happy to walk for 6 hours and not to know what was going on? ....
We were just taking a walk. We were not in a hurry
to get
anywhere."
At no time was there any suggestion that
on the Sun-
day accused nos 2 or 3 had been given or had partaken of any liquor or that
they were threatened by accused no 1 or his father should
they refuse to take
part in the plan. Once therefore the trial Court found that the two accused were
al-ready told on the Sunday
what the plan was, their versions when they gave
evidence that they agreed to the plan because they were intoxicated or because
they
were threatened were devoid
of ..... / 21
21
of all truth. On the Monday the two accused, out of their own
free will,
proceeded to the kraal of accused no 1's father well
knowing why they were
going there. The probabilities seem to
be that any liquor which they may have
taken thereafter, and
which in any event as the Court found had no visible
effect on
them, was taken to fortify themselves to enable them
"insensi-
tively to carry out (their) fell design", to use the words
of
Holmes JA in
S v Ndhlovu
(2)
1965 (4) SA 692
(A) at p 695
D-E.
As regards the alleged influence of accused no 1 and his father
over accused nos 2 and 3 the trial Court found that there was
nothing in the evidence to show that their relationship was
such that accused nos 2 and 3 were compelled to go along with
the plan devised by the former two and that there was no
suggestion that accused no 1 or his father were in any way in
authority .... / 22
22
authority over accused nos 2 and 3.
I come now to deal with the last, and perhaps the
most important, factor
advanced on behalf of accused nos 2 and 3
as constituting extenuation, namely
their youthfulness and lack
of sophistication. There was no evidence as to
their exact ages
or the years in which they were born. I have already
referred
to the evidence of Dr Buccimazza who examined the two accused
for
the purposes of establishing their approximate ages. He consider
ed that they were at the very youngest 19 at the time of the com-
mission
of the offence but said that if he had to accept no 2's
statement that he was 19 years old at the time of examination he,
the doctor, would say that he was closer to 20 than 19 which would
have made him closer to 19 than 18 at the time of the offence. :
its judgment on extenuating circumstances the trial Court approached
the..../ 23
23
the matter on the basis that accused no 2 might have been as
young as 18
years and accused no 3 as young as 19 years at the
time of the offence. This
was also the basis upon which Mr
Singh
presented his argument before
this Court. The two accused
were therefore both teenagers when they committed
the crime which
meant that they were both
prima facie
to be regarded
as immature.
It would follow from this that a court would normally be re-
luctant to find that there are no extenuating circumstances un-
less there are present other factors such as eg the manner of and
the motive for the commission of the crime and whatever else is
relevant to show that the crime stemmed from inner vice ("in-
herente boosheid"). This, in summary is the broad effect,
as I understand it, of some of the leading cases on the pro-
blem of sentencing a youth found guilty of murder (see
S v Lehnberg
........ / 24
24
S v Lehnberg en 'n Ander
1975 (4) SA 553
(A);
S v Mapatsi
1976
(4) SA 721 (A);
S v Ceasar
1977 (2) SA 348
(A) and
S v
Ngoma
[1984] ZASCA 59
;
1984 (3) SA 666
(A). The concept of "inherente boosheid"
was explained by
Miller JA in
Ceasar
's case (
supra
) as follows
(at p 353 C-F):
"A finding that a person acted from inner vice in the commission of a crime does
not imply that he has mani-fested vicious or wicked
propensities throughout his
life; nor is a long history of wickedness necessary to such a finding.
Primarily, the question in any
given case (in the context under discussion, i e
with refe-rence to youth as a mitigating factor) is whether the crime in
question
stemmed from the inner vice of the wrongdoer, whether he be a first
offencer or one with many previous convictions. It is in order
to answer that
question that the Court will examine, and take into account as
indicia
,
the wrongdoer's motive, per-sonality and mentality, past history and whatever
else is relevant to the enquiry. And, of course, it
will take into account the
nature of the crime and the manner of its commission. (See the passage quoted
above from the judgment
of the CHIEF JUSTICE in
Mapatsi's
/ 25
25
Mapatsi
's case.) The concept of inner vice as the genesis of a grave
crime committed by a youth throws into proper contrast the case of a
crime
(perhaps equally dastardly) committed by another youth who has, largely because
of his youth and its attendant degree of in-experience,
acted in response to
outer
influences; eg under the pressure and stress of intense emotions
in-duced by another (cf
Lehnberg
's case) or under direct or indirect
influence of one older than himself, or under circumstances which to him,
because of his youth
and inex-perience, were provocative or
emotive."
In its judgment on whether, because of their
youth-
fulness, the accuseds' moral blameworthiness was diminished,
the
trial Court said the following:
"The difficulty, however, is that the facts surrounding the killing of the
deceased show that it was a most despicable crime. It
was premeditated and
carried out in a careful and cowardly manner. They gained control of the
deceased by means of a ruse. Four people
killed him by holding him and cutting
his throat while he struggled and screamed. He was a man with the build of a 13
year old, as
Dr Prins testified and as confirmed by the evidence of Cebelchulu.
He was, therefore, completely helpless. Another matter
which ....
/ 26
26
which is most disturbing is that the whole thing was done with money as a
motive.
Accused No 1 sought to kill the deceased because he intended thereby to avoid
paying a debt that he owed. Accused Nos 2 and 3 apparently
took part for
personal gain. In our view, the whole matter should fill any right-thinking
person with revulsion."
Referring to the above passage in the
trial Court's
judgment Mr
Singh
submitted, and I quote from his heads
of
argument:
"The Honourable Judge correctly described the crime as a 'most despicable crime'
that 'should fill any right thinking person with
revulsion'. With respect,
however, the learn-ed Judge misdirected himself in testing the extenuating
factors argued on behalf of
the second and third Appellants against the horrible
circumstances under which the de-ceased met his death; for any cold-blooded
murder is always an evil and despicable one."
For the submission
that the trial Court misdirected
itself, Mr
Singh
relied exclusively in what was said by this
Court..../ 27
27
Court in
S v Van der Berg
1968 (3) SA 250
(A) on page 252C - 253A
and particularly on the following passage appearing on page 252H:
'n Verhoorhof sou dus, by oorweging van die gepaste vonnis in 'n geval van 'n
skuldigbevinding aan moord met versagten-de omstandighede,
tereg die aard van
die versagtende om-standighede sowel as die aard van die moord in aanmerking kon
neem, maar, by oorweging van
die vraag of 'n bepaalde omstandigheid as 'n
versagtende omstandigheid aangemerk be-hoort te word, kan die aard van die moord
nie
relevant wees nie."
The judgment in
Van der Berg
's
case was considered
by this Court in
S v Petrus
1969 (4) SA 85.
In the
latter
case, the appellant, a youth of 18, was with two others con-
victed of a murder in which the deceased received 70 stab wounds.
He was sentenced to death. It was also, relying on the judg-
ment in
Van der Berg
's case, argued before this Court -
" .... dat die Hof, by oorweging van die vraag van minder
verwytbaarheid .... / 28
28
verwytbaarheid, misgetas het deur die wreedheid van die misdaad daarby te betrek
en sodoende die aanwesigheid van 'n versagtende
omstandigheid verwerp het uit
die aard van die misdaad."
In the Court a
quo
where
Van
der Bergh
's case was
also relied on, Tebbutt AJ had problems with the
passage in this
Court's judgment which I have quoted above. He -
inter
alia
said the following:
"Myns insiens het die geleerde Appèlregter deur die woorde 'kan die aard
van die moord nie relevant wees nie', be-doel dat
daar nie aan die gruwelikheid
of die wreedheid van 'n besondere moord teveel gewig gegee behoort te word nie.
Ek glo nie dat hy -
met die hoogste eerbied - bedoel het dat daar nie na die
omstandighede van die misdaad gekyk kan word nie. As dit wel so was, dan
sou dit
beteken dat, byvoorbeeld, by 'n vergiftigingsaak waar daar miskien drank deur
die dader gebruik was sou die Hof gebonde wees
om nie na die omstandighede van
die misdaad, naamlik die vergiftiging te kan kyk nie om te oordeel of enige
drank wat gebruik is
wel die dader so beinvloed het dat dit sy misdaad minder
laakbaar maak en sy morele skuld verminder. Myns insiens, soos alreeds
gesê,
het die geleerde
Appèlregter .... / 29
29
Appèlregter dit nie bedoel nie. Die hele trant van die uitspraak in die
saak van
Van der Berg
, met eerbied, wys daarop dat die Appèlregter
nie so bedoel het dat daar nie na die omstandighede van die geval kan gekyk word
nie, en ek het ook my Assessore so ingelig."
Steyn,
CJ in
Petrus
' case does not specifically refer
to the above quoted passage appearing in
Van der Berg
's case
but
from his judgment, with which Jansen JA concurred, read as
a whole, I think
it is quite clear that he approved of the inter-
pretation of Tebbutt AJ of
this Court's judgment in
Van der Berg
's
case. On page 91 E-G the CHIEF
JUSTICE, after referring to
section 330 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 56 of 1955 (sec-
tion 277
of the present Act) says the following:
"Dit gaan hier om 'n bepaalde dader, die beskuldigde, en die moord wat hyself
gepleeg het, en dit laat verder vermoed dat die Wetgewer
hier omstandighede in
die oog het wat as ver-sagtend beskou word in die samehang van die feite wat
be-trekking het op die bepaalde
dader en sy wandaad, soos hy
dit.... / 30
30
dit gepleeg het, en nie in samehang van ander feite wat op 'n ander denkbeeldige
of 'n ander veronderstelde gewone dader en daad
betrekking sou hê
nie."
What clearly emerges from the judgment of Steyn CJ
in
Petrus
' case, and is in fact clearly stated in the seperate
judgment
of Rumpff JA, is that the atrocity of the crime as such
cannot exclude or
wipe out such extenuating circumstances as
there may be but, ih the words of
Rumpff JA at page 95 H of
Petrus
' case:
"Om vas te stel of daar versagtende omstandighede is of nie, spreek dit m i
vanself dat die feite van die misdaad sowel as die moontlike
omstandighede wat
as versagting sou kon dien oorweeg moet word. Die erns of afskuwelikheid van die
misdaad, as sodanig, kan nie die
moontlikheid van ver-sagtende omstandighede
uitsluit nie. Ek dink nie iemand sou dit ooit wil beweer nie. Wat wel kan gebeur
is dat
wanneer die versagtende omstandighede oorweeg word in die lig van die
feite van die misdaad, 'n Verhoorhof sou kon be-vind dat die
beweerde
omstandighede in die besondere ge- , val nie volgens sy mening as versagting kan
geld nie."
In...... / 31
31
In my view the trial Court in the present case did not, in the passage of its
judgment relied on by Mr
Singh
, say or even suggest that the "horrible
circumstances under which the deceased met his death"
per se
exclude any
extenuating circum-stances flowing from the youthfulness and
prima facie
immaturity of accused nos 2 and 3.
As I read the judgment the trial Court paid due
regard to the youthfulness
of the accused but when it came to
the third part of the threefold enquiry as
outlined in the case
of
S v Ngoma
(
supra
) at p 673 H, and other
cases, the Court in
having to pass a moral judgment came to the conclusion
that,
taking all the circumstances into consideration, it had not been
shown that the moral blameworthness of accused nos 2 and 3 was
reduced.
In...../ 32
32
In my view it has not been shown that the trial Court had misdirected itself
nor has it, also as far as accused nos 2 and 3 are concerned,
been shown that
the finding that there are no extenuating circumstances is one which the Court
could not reasonably have come to.
The appeals of all three the accused are dismissed.
H R JACOBS, JA
CORBETT, JA )
concur
JOUBERT, JA )