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[2024] ZANCHC 7
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Sol Plaatje University v SRC of the Sol Plaatje University and Others (1471/2023) [2024] ZANCHC 7 (26 January 2024)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTHERN
CAPE DIVISION, KIMBERLEY
Case
No: 1471/2023
Reportable:
YES/NO
Circulate
to Judges:
YES/NO
Circulate
to Magistrates:
YES/NO
Circulate
to Regional Magistrates:
YES/NO
In
the matter between:
SOL
PLAATJE
UNIVERSITY
Applicant
and
THE
SRC OF THE SOL PLAATJE UNIVERSITY
1
st
Respondent
MAWETHU
JERRY
YONA
2
nd
Respondent
MASEGO
MOTHLABI
3
rd
Respondent
OARABILE
MOSWEU
4
th
Respondent
LETHOGONOLO
EDWIN THINTHA
5
th
Respondent
QUINTON
OLIPHANT NONOFO
6
th
Respondent
TSHIDISO
BARRY
BABE
7
th
Respondent
ZINTLE
PRUDENCE XAKEKA
8
th
Respondent
OFENTSE
CENTY MODIMAKOANA
9
th
Respondent
GUDANI
LISWOGA
10
th
Respondent
SELLO
LOUW
11
th
Respondent
KETSHEPOANE
KEGAKILWE
12
th
Respondent
MBALI
SKOSANA
13
th
Respondent
THE
UNIDENTIFIED PERSONS
PARTICIPATING
IN THE UNLAWFUL
CONDUCT
OF THE FIRST TO THIRTEENTH
RESPONDENTS
AT THE SOL PLAATJIE
UNIVERSITY
14
th
& Further Respondents
THE
PROVINCIAL COMMISSIONER OF THE
SOUTH
AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE:
NORTHERN
CAPE PROVINCE
15
th
Respondent
JUDGMENT
Lever
J
1. This
is an application for the confirmation of a
Rule Nisi
issued
by this court on an urgent basis on 8 August 2023. The said
rule
nisi
provided an interdict with immediate effect against the
First to Thirteenth Respondents who were named and identified.
However,
the said interdict set out in the
rule nisi
also
applied to persons who participated in the unlawful conduct of the
First to Thirteenth respondents cited collectively as the
fourteenth
respondent.
2. The
first respondent is the Student Representative Council (SRC) of the
Sol Plaatje University. The second
to the thirteenth respondents are
individual members of the SRC. The fourteenth and further respondents
are an unidentified group
who associate themselves with the unlawful
activities of the first to thirteenth respondents.
3. The
relief sought against the said respondents is wide ranging and
includes,
inter alia
: that they allow unhindered access to the
campus of the university by students, staff, building contractors
and/or subcontractors;
that they are prohibited from locking and/or
barricading entrances to buildings on the campus of the university;
that they are
prohibited from threatening or intimidating students,
staff and building contractors and/or subcontractors; that they are
interdicted
from disrupting or interfering with the academic,
logistic, administrative functions and day-to-day functions of the
university;
that they are prohibited from interfering with any of the
applicant’s employees, staff or building
contractors/subcontractors
in the exercise of their duties or
functions; and that they are interdicted from blocking or obstructing
access to a number of
entry points to the university by vehicles and
pedestrians.
4. Only
certain of the individual members of the SRC opposed the confirmation
of the
rule nisi
in this matter. The members of the SRC that
opposed the confirmation of the
rule nisi
are: second
respondent; third respondent; fourth respondent; fifth respondent;
seventh respondent and eleventh respondent (the
opposing
respondents).
5.
Although an appearance to defend was filed on behalf of the eleventh
respondent the confirmatory affidavit
filed on his behalf was never
deposed. A confirmatory affidavit was also filed on behalf of the
eighth respondent, but she was
not included in the Notice of
Opposition and her confirmatory affidavit was also never deposed.
These facts will only become relevant
when I consider an appropriate
order regarding the costs of this application.
6. It
is clear from the papers that, at the material time, university staff
and students were prevented from participating
in the ordinary
functions of teaching and learning that take place at a university.
It is also clear that there was intimidation
and violence that took
place at the university at the material time. There was damage to
property. There was blockading of access
points to the university
campus and access to other points on campus was also interfered with.
Also, building activities on campus
were disrupted. None of this is
denied by the opposing respondents. In broad terms the opposing
respondents take the position that
none of these activities can be
connected to identifiable persons by admissible evidence.
7. The
defences raised by the opposing respondents include: the applicant
has an alternative remedy; there was
short service of the application
and in reality, it is alleged, the order issuing the
rule nisi
was taken
ex parte;
it is alleged that a material fact was not
disclosed when the
rule nisi
was sought, allegedly
ex
parte
; the situation on the applicant’s campus was now
stable and there is no need for a final interdict; none of the
respondents
are linked to the unlawful acts described by the
applicant in its founding affidavit; and applicant made out its case
in reply
and certain of the evidence introduced in reply constitutes
inadmissible hearsay evidence.
8. In
their answering affidavit, the opposing respondents also raised the
issues of urgency not being properly
established and the authority of
the Vice – Chancellor, the deponent to the applicant’s
founding and replying affidavits,
to launch the present application.
However, at the hearing of this matter, Mr Babuseng who appeared for
the opposing respondents,
indicated that the opposing respondents
were no longer proceeding with these points. Accordingly, I will not
consider these issues.
9.
Turning to the first issue, being the alternative remedy alleged by
the opposing respondents. The alternative
remedy alleged by the
opposing respondents was that some of them had already been
provisionally suspended at the time that the
rule nisi
was
sought.
10.
For the
alleged alternative remedy to be considered a suitable alternative
remedy in the circumstances, such alternative remedy
needs to be: (a)
adequate under the circumstances
[1]
;
(b) ordinary and reasonable
[2]
;
(c) a legal remedy
[3]
; and (d)
grants similar protection
[4]
.
11. On the papers, the
applicant has established that certain of the incidents of unlawful
conduct occurred after the temporary
suspension of the opposing
respondents.
12. In these
circumstances, the applicant contended that temporary suspension was
an internal remedy that was not an alternative
to the interdict, in
that it did not offer similar protection as afforded by the interdict
conferred under the
rule nisi
against the unlawful behaviour
complained of. I agree with these contentions made by the applicant.
The temporary suspension of
the opposing respondents is accordingly
not a suitable alternative remedy. Accordingly, this argument cannot
stand and temporary
suspension or even disciplinary action with a
permanent effect, in these circumstances is not a suitable
alternative remedy.
13. The next issue raised
by the opposing respondents that needs to be considered is the issue
of the alleged short service and
the alleged taking of the
rule
nisi
on an
ex parte
basis. Not much needs to be said on
these matters. The opposing respondents contend that they were
notified electronically but
they were given very little time to
obtain the services of legal representatives, put in a notice of
opposition and be present
to oppose the application for a
rule
nisi
.
14. The notice given
prior to the
rule nisi
was dictated by the events that
unfolded on the applicant’s campus. The adequacy of the notice
period is an issue that was
dealt with by the judicial officer
considering the application for the
rule nisi.
15. If the opposing
respondents were prejudiced in any way by inadequate notice, they
could fall back on the provisions of Rule
6(12)(c) of the Uniform
Rules of Court (the Rules). This would allow the respondents on
notice to the other affected parties to
set the order granted
urgently, as a
rule nisi,
down for reconsideration. None of
the opposing respondents or any other respondent took this route. The
argument of short notice
is not a substantive defence to the
confirmation of the
rule nisi
. Other than possibly an issue to
be considered in the context of costs, it is not a matter to be
considered on the extended return
day of the
rule nisi
.
16. The next contention
made by the opposing respondents is that on the basis that they
allege the
rule nisi
was taken on an
ex parte
basis,
there was an obligation on the applicant to disclose all material
facts that might influence the court in granting, or otherwise,
of
the
rule nisi
.
17. Firstly, there was
notice albeit short notice. Secondly, the urgent court that issued
the
rule nisi,
considered and to the extent required condoned
the notice period given by issuing the
rule nisi
. If the
respondents were in any way prejudiced, the order being taken in
their absence, the opposing respondents could have invoked
the
provisions of Rule 6(12)(c). The respondents did not take that route.
Thirdly, as set out above the temporary suspension of
the respondents
concerned is not a suitable alternative remedy to the interdict. In
these circumstances, its disclosure or otherwise,
would not have
affected the outcome of the application for the urgent
rule nisi
in this matter. Accordingly, the fact of temporary suspension was
not a material fact that the applicant was under an obligation
to
disclose to the relevant urgent court. In these circumstances such
defence also cannot stand.
18. The next defence
proffered by the opposing respondents is that the situation on the
applicant’s campus is now stable and
that there is now no need
for a final interdict. The situation on the applicant's campus is now
stable because of the
rule nisi
issued out of this court. This
is not a defence to the confirmation of the said
rule nisi
.
19. The opposing
respondents then contend that none of the respondents are linked to
any of the unlawful acts described in the founding
affidavit. Several
issues arise from this contention. These issues are: Firstly, is
there a basis for making an order against the
fourteenth respondent,
being those associating themselves with the alleged unlawful conduct
of the first to thirteenth respondents;
Secondly, whether there is in
fact unlawful conduct that has been linked to certain of the
respondents; and Thirdly, if any unlawful
conduct is linked to any
individual or group, is it justifiable to simply confirm the
rule
nisi
or would it be better to trim down the final relief granted
to fit the case made out in the papers.
20. Considering the
position of the fourteenth respondent, being those unidentified
persons who are alleged to have by their conduct
associated
themselves with the unlawful conduct of the first to thirteenth
respondents.
21. No person claiming to
have been a member of the group associating themselves with the
unlawful conduct of the first to thirteenth
respondents came forward
to oppose the confirmation of the
rule nisi
even though the
Court Order had been widely distributed amongst the applicant’s
students.
22. This court was
referred to a number of authorities on this question, these
authorities included: City of Cape Town v Yawa and
Others
[2004] 2
All SA 281
(C); Mondi Paper v Paper Printing Wood and Allied Workers
Union & Others (1997) 18 ILJ 84 (D); Consolidated Fine Spinners
and
Weavers Ltd & Another, ex parte in re Consolidated Fine
Spinners & Weavers v Govender & Others (1987) 8 ILJ 97 (D);
Durban University of Technology v Sphiwe Zulu & Others unreported
Case No. 1693/16P judgment delivered 27 June 2016 (Pietermaritzburg);
Rhodes University v SRC of Rhodes University & Others Case No.
1937/2016 judgment delivered 1 December 2016 (Grahamstown);
and Sol
Plaatje Local Municipality v Economic Freedom Fighters and 3 others
Case No. 702/2015 judgment delivered 9 October 2015
(Kimberley).
23. The principles that
can be distilled from these authorities are: Firstly, the group of
unidentified persons must be identifiable
by some means, for example
the unidentified persons in occupation of a specific piece of land.
The association with that specific
piece of land makes that group
identifiable; Secondly, whether a group of unidentified persons is
identifiable is a question of
fact to be determined on the relevant
evidence established in the papers; Thirdly, and related to the first
principle, courts do
not issue edicts calling upon unidentified
persons to obey the law, even if nobody is prejudiced thereby;
Fourthly, an order of
court must be effective. An order of court can
only be effective if it is issued against identified or identifiable
person/s who
have or had an interest in the issue decided by the
court. It is only if such order is made against identifiable persons
that an
order is capable of being enforced. An order of court is only
effective if it can be enforced. If persons wilfully defy a
court order, they are guilty of contempt of court. It follows that
they can only be convicted of that offence if they can be identified,
and all the other requirements of that offence can be established
against them.
24. On the facts placed
before this court, it is clear from the applicant’s own version
that some students were pursuing their
academic activities online to
avoid the disturbances created by the SRC and its members.
Understandably, those students would object
to being identified with
the unlawful activities concerned. They would have every right to
feel aggrieved.
25. On the facts
presented to this court there is no way to separate the students who
participated in the unlawful conduct at the
time from those who did
not participate in such conduct. The situation might have been
different if there was video in which individuals
could be identified
whilst engaged in unlawful activity or if persons had been arrested
by the South African Police Service for
engaging in unlawful
activity. In those circumstances persons identified by video or
arrest could have been cited as respondents.
It so happens, in
circumstances that will be discussed later, the security cameras of
the applicant were turned off. Also, there
is no evidence that anyone
was arrested for unlawful activity at the material time. No doubt,
the ease with which the security
camera network was disabled is
something the applicant will have to deal with in future.
26. In short, on the
facts placed before this court, the fourteenth respondent does not
constitute an identifiable group of persons.
Accordingly, no order
can be made against the fourteenth respondent in these circumstances.
27. On the 6 August 2023
the first respondent issued a statement by way of a media release.
The said media release dealt mainly,
but not exclusively with
grievances with the decisions and conduct of The National Student
Financial Aid Scheme (NSFAS), something
the applicant had no direct
control over. The uncontested evidence shows that the applicant tried
to take steps to ameliorate the
effect of the decisions taken by
NSFAS on the student body of the applicant.
28. The offending portion
of the first respondent’s media statement reads as follows:
“The SRC took a resolution that:
NO STUDENT OF RETAIL
BUSINESS MANAGEMENT, BACHELOR OF EDUCATION AND COURT INTERPRETING
WILL ATTEND PRACTICALS. NO ACADEMICS
(sic)
ACTIVITIES WILL
ALSO TAKE PLACE UNTIL ALL DEMANDS OF THE SRC AND THE STUDENTS ARE
MET.”
(Emphasis as it appears in the said media statement)
29.
It can be
seen from this statement that this is not merely a call for students
and the SRC to stage a protest to air their grievances
as
contemplated by section 17 of the Constitution
[5]
.
The SRC by way of their statement closed the space for academic
activity of any description despite the uncontested evidence of
the
applicant that there were indeed students that were pursuing their
studies online at the time of the relevant disturbances.
The
statement is imperative and imposes the will of the SRC on the
student body in an unlawful manner. It oversteps the bounds
of
peaceful and lawful assembly and demonstration in that it infringes
the rights of those who chose to continue with their studies
and
academic pursuits despite the demonstration.
30. The SRC instigated
the academic disturbances. None of the opposing respondents disputed
the blockade of the entrances to the
university. They merely claimed
that the persons who did so had not been identified. Clearly, the
media statement of the SRC instigated
this blockade.
31. There is disputed
evidence, that if accepted, shows that certain individual respondents
went further. It is convenient to deal
with the admissibility of this
evidence now. This evidence includes: a voice note that has been
transcribed and attached to the
replying affidavit although the
person who made the recording asked not to be identified as that
person feared reprisals; screenshots
of a WhatsApp group
conversation, the person who provided the said screenshots also did
not want to be identified as that person
also feared reprisals; a
warning statement made in the presence of a security officer which
formed the basis of subsequent disciplinary
action; and the
identification in the replying affidavit of the seventh respondent as
the person who threatened and intimidated
a building contractor.
32.
Hearsay
evidence is ordinarily not admitted as evidence. The situation is
regulated by section 3 of the law of Evidence Amendment
Act
[6]
.
The said section reads as follows:
“
3(1)
Subject to the provisions of any other law, hearsay evidence shall
not be admitted as evidence at criminal
or civil proceedings, unless
–
(a)
each party against whom the evidence is to be adduced agrees to the
admission
thereof as evidence at such proceedings;
(b)
the person upon whose credibility the probative value of such
evidence
depends, himself testifies at such proceedings; or
(c)
the court, having regard to –
(i)
the nature
of the proceedings;
(ii)
the nature of the evidence;
(iii)
the purpose for which the evidence
is tendered;
(iv)
the probative value of the evidence;
(v)
the reason why the evidence
is not given by the person upon whose
credibility the probative value of such evidence depends;
(vi)
any prejudice to a party the
admission of such evidence might entail;
and
(vii)
any other factor which should in
the opinion of the court be taken
into account,
is of the opinion that
such evidence should be admitted in the interests of justice.”
33. In respect of the
first two examples of hearsay evidence, being the transcribed voice
note and the screenshots of the WhatsApp
group, I need to apply
section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act.
34.
In respect
of these examples of hearsay evidence, the Vice – Chancellor of
the applicant being the deponent to the founding
and replying
affidavits states that where the content of his affidavit is not
within his personal knowledge, he believes the averments
that he
makes in his affidavits are true and correct in all respects. The
deponent to the applicant’s affidavits also states
that both
persons who provided him with the relevant information fear for their
safety and that he was not willing to disclose
the identities of
these people. In my view, applicant has not made out a case for this
court to admit this hearsay evidence under
the provisions of section
3(1)(c) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act
[7]
as contemplated in the matter of Hlongwane & Others v Rector, St
Francis College and Others
[8]
.
Accordingly, I do not think it is in the interests of justice for
this court to admit such hearsay into evidence.
35.
The warning
statement by the student Bennett Potgieter stands on an entirely
different footing. Mr Potgieter is a student registered
with the
applicant. He is a person who was identified as being involved in
switching off the electricity to a part of the applicant’s
campus. Mr Potgieter wrote and signed his warning statement in the
presence of a security officer who confirmed same in a supporting
affidavit. The said warning statement is a statement against the
interest of Mr Potgieter as when he made the said statement it
was
contemplated that it would form the basis of a disciplinary hearing
against him. In the said warning statement Mr Potgieter
identified
the second respondent as one of the persons who gave instructions to
turn off the electricity which Mr Potgieter carried
out. In these
circumstances and after considering the provisions of section 3(1)(c)
of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act
[9]
I conclude that it is in the interests of justice to admit this
evidence to the record.
36. Mr Babuseng who
appeared for the opposing respondents also objected to this evidence
on the basis that it was raised in the
replying affidavit for the
first time.
37.
In motion
proceedings a proper case must be made out in the founding affidavit
and that ordinarily an applicant may not make out
a case or
supplement his case in reply.
[10]
This, however is not an absolute rule and the court has a discretion
to allow the new matter to remain in reply and afford the
respondent
an opportunity to file an extra affidavit to deal with the new
matter.
[11]
New matter in
reply will only be allowed in appropriate circumstances.
[12]
38. In the present matter
the urgent application was launched on the 8 August 2023. In
circumstances where it is undisputed that
tyres were being burned and
applicant’s property was being damaged. It was also undisputed
that applicant was prevented from
functioning normally and that there
were threats, intimidation, and violence on its campus. Applicant has
laid a basis for the
evidence of Mr Potgieter in that it has
contended in the founding papers that certain students had switched
off the electricity
supply on campus. It appears from the warning
statement itself that such statement only became available to the
applicant on the
23 August 2023. This evidence could not have been
included in the founding affidavit.
39. In these
circumstances the foundation was laid in the founding affidavit, and
it was supplemented in reply. This is a case where
the second
respondent ought to have sought the leave of this court to file an
extra affidavit to deal with this new evidence. If
the second
respondent had asked to file an extra affidavit to deal with the new
evidence, in these circumstances such permission
would certainly have
been granted. Instead, the opposing respondents contented themselves
with arguing that this court should simply
ignore the new evidence.
The circumstances of this case are such that this new evidence ought
to be allowed. The evidence is such
that it called for a response.
The opposing respondents in these circumstances were opportunistic in
arguing that this court ought
to ignore the contentions in reply
instead of dealing substantively with those contentions.
40. Turning now to the
identification of the seventh respondent as the person who
intimidated and forced a building contractor to
cease work at the
material time. The opposing respondents objected to this evidence on
two grounds. Firstly, the opposing respondents
contend that this
arises for the first time in the replying affidavit. Secondly, that
although the contractor identifies the seventh
respondent, there is
no confirmatory affidavit from the person who showed the
sub-contractor the photographs that indeed it was
the seventh
respondent identified by the sub-contractor.
41. Dealing with the
opposing respondents’ complaints in regard to the affidavit of
Mr Darryl Stroebel on behalf of the relevant
contractor. Again, a
basis was laid in the founding affidavit of students interfering with
contractors on the applicant’s
campus. The seventh respondent
was only identified by way of a confirmatory affidavit to the
replying affidavit. In the circumstances
of this case and on the
basis of the authorities already cited above, I believe this
supplementary evidence should be accepted
and that the opposing
respondents ought to have dealt with this evidence substantively in a
further affidavit. As set out above,
the opposing respondents failed
to seek leave to file a further affidavit to deal substantively with
this new evidence and contented
themselves with asking this court to
ignore such evidence. In the prevailing circumstances, I accept this
evidence into the record
of these proceedings.
42. Turning now to the
second complaint in regard to the identification of the seventh
respondent, being that there is no confirmatory
affidavit from the
person who showed Mr Stroebel the photographs of students that Mr
Stroebel in fact identified the seventh respondent.
Mr Stroebel has
stated under oath that he identified the seventh respondent from
photographs shown to him. In proceedings of this
kind this is
sufficient to call for a response or answer from the seventh
respondent. As set out above, in these circumstances,
seventh
respondent would have been granted leave to file a further affidavit
to respond to this new evidence. The seventh respondent
has failed to
respond to this evidence. These are not criminal proceedings, and the
applicant cannot be held to the criminal standard
of proof.
43.
To sum up,
the media statement issued by the first respondent went beyond the
right to assembly, demonstration, picket, and petition.
Such
statement also went beyond any other right contemplated in Chapter 2
of the Constitution
[13]
. Such
statement shows an intention to unlawfully disrupt the applicant’s
ordinary day to day functions and activities and
infringes the rights
of both students and staff who chose to continue with their lawful
academic activities. Also, the second respondent
has been shown to
have issued instructions to another student to turn off the
electricity supply to a portion of the applicant’s
campus.
Thereby unlawfully interfering with the applicant’s ordinary
day-to-day functions and activities. These activities
can only be
attributed to the first up to and including the thirteenth
respondents. In these circumstances, the following final
interdict
will be issued:
“
That
the first to thirteenth respondents are interdicted and prohibited
from disrupting and/or interfering with any of the applicant’s
academic, logistical, and administrative functions.”
44. The seventh
respondent has been shown to have threatened, disrupted, interfered
with and intimidated one of the applicant’s
contractors. In
these circumstances the seventh respondent will face the following
final interdict:
“
That the seventh
respondent is interdicted and prohibited from threatening,
intimidating, disrupting or interfering with any of
the applicant’s
contractors.”
45. Turning now to the
issue of the costs of the application. There are several factors to
consider in this regard. Firstly, applicant
only sought an order of
costs against those respondents who opposed the matter. A notice of
opposition was filed on behalf of the
second, third, fourth, fifth,
seventh and eleventh respondents. The eleventh respondent never
signed or deposed to his confirmatory
affidavit filed in opposition
to the application. However, an appearance to defend was filed by an
attorney on his behalf. Accordingly,
eleventh respondent has opposed
this application and will be treated in the same manner as all of the
other opposing respondents.
46. Secondly, the SRC
which included at the material time the second to thirteenth
respondents, overstepped the bounds of legitimate
protest and
demonstration and in the course of action that they pursued as
evidenced by the media statement quoted above, unlawfully
infringed
the rights of others.
47. Thirdly, the bulk of
the opposing respondents as well as the SRC’s complaints
related to NSFAS over which the applicant
had no direct control.
Furthermore, the applicant took steps to try and ameliorate the
consequences of the steps taken by NSFAS
on their students. Also, a
senior official of the applicant tried to engage with the SRC to
avoid the unlawful disruptions that
took place. However, the members
of the SRC in authority at the material time refused to engage with
the senior officials of the
applicant and chose to pursue their
chosen course of action to unlawfully disrupt the activities of the
applicant. These facts
were not disputed by the opposing respondents
and the opposing respondents never individually distanced themselves
from the relevant
unlawful conduct of the SRC.
48. Also, although the
respondents affected by the Order has been trimmed down significantly
and the relief sought has also been
trimmed significantly, in
substance the applicant has been successful, particularly against the
opposing respondents. The secondary
rule, being that costs should
follow the event is still applicable in these circumstances. The
opposing respondents have not shown
any good reason why this rule
should not be applied.
49. In all of these
circumstances, it is equitable and appropriate that the opposing
respondents should be held jointly and severally
responsible for the
costs of this application.
Accordingly,
the following order is made:
1) As
against the first to the thirteenth respondents, the following final
order is made:
“
That
the first to thirteenth respondents are interdicted and prohibited
from disrupting and/or interfering with any of the applicant’s
academic, logistical, and administrative functions.”
2) As
against the seventh respondent, the following final order is made:
“
That the seventh
respondent is interdicted and prohibited from threatening,
intimidating, disrupting or interfering with any of
the applicant’s
contractors.”
3) The
second, third, fourth, fifth, seventh and eleventh respondents will
jointly and severally, the one paying
the others to be absolved, pay
the applicant’s costs of this application on the ordinary party
and party scale.
Lawrence
Lever
Judge
Northern
Cape Division, Kimberley
Representation:
For
The Applicant:
Adv JL Olivier
Instructed
by:
Van De Wall Inc.
For
The 2
nd
, 3
rd
,4
th
,5
th
,7
th
and 11
th
Respondents:
Adv B Babuseng
Instructed
by:
Lulama Lobi Inc.
Date
of Hearing:
03
November 2023
Date
of Judgment:
26
January 2024
[1]
Berg River Municipality v Zelpy
2013 (4) SA 154
(C) at para [47].
[2]
Martin v Kiesbeampte Newcastle Afdeling
1958 (2) SA 649
(D) at
654B-G.
[3]
Francis v Roberts
1973 (1) SA 507
(RAD) at 512D – E.
[4]
Cape Town Municipality v Abdulla
1974 (4) SA 428
(c) at 440H.
[5]
Act 108 of 1996.
[6]
Act 45 of 1988.
[7]
Above.
[8]
[1989] All SA 55 (D).
[9]
Above.
[10]
Shephard v Tuckers Land & Development Corp (1)
1978 (1) SA
173
(WLD) at 177G.
[11]
Shephard v Tuckers Land., Above at 177H to 178A.
[12]
Shepherd v Cotts Seafreight (SA) (Pty) Ltd
1984 (3) SA 202
(TPD) at
205F-H.
[13]
Above.