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[2024] ZANCHC 1
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Daly v Road Accident Fund (2580/2019) [2024] ZANCHC 1 (12 January 2024)
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
NORTHERN CAPE
DIVISION, KIMBERLEY
Case No:
2580/2019
Heard
on:
04/09/2023
Delivered on:
12/01/2024
Reportable: YES / NO
Circulate to Judges: YES
/ NO
Circulate to Magistrates:
YES / NO
In
the matter between:
ANTHEA
SINEAD
DALY
Plaintiff
and
THE
ROAD ACCIDENT
FUND
Defendant
JUDGMENT
MAMOSEBO
J
[1]
The only issue for determination with regards to the quantum claim is
the plaintiff’s loss of income as a result of the motor vehicle
accident that occurred on 21 June 2015. Liability was
conceded
at 100% by the Road Accident Fund (RAF). The plaintiff accepted
an amount of R500,000.00 for general damages. Past
medical
expenses are not in issue. Counsel for the plaintiff, Mr Van
Onselen, submitted that although the RAF had tendered
an undertaking
in terms of s 17(4)(a) for future medical expenses directly to the
plaintiff at its offices, she has to date not
received the written
undertaking.
[2]
The action was set down for a week, 4 – 7 September 2023.
Notwithstanding that the plaintiff had already filed the various
medico-legal reports by the orthopaedic surgeon, clinical
psychologist,
neurologist, “anaesthetist with an interest in
pulmonology”, occupational therapist, industrial psychologist
and an
actuary by February 2023, there were no reports filed by the
RAF. On the first date of trial, 04 September 2023, the
plaintiff
brought an application in terms of Rule 38(2) of the
Uniform Rules of Court for evidence to be adduced on affidavit in
trial proceedings
in lieu
of
vivo voce
evidence. The
Rule provides:
“
The
witnesses at the trial of any action shall be examined viva voce, but
a court may at any time, for sufficient reason, order
that all or any
of the evidence to be adduced at any trial be given on affidavit or
that the affidavit of any witness be read at
the hearing, on such
terms and conditions as to it seem meet: Provided that where it
appears to the court that any other party
reasonably requires the
attendance of a witness for cross-examination, and such witness can
be produced, the evidence of such witness
shall not be given on
affidavit.”
[3]
Mr Van Onselen motivated the adducing of evidence on affidavit as
saving
costs and time since the RAF furnished no similar expert
evidence to counter their opinions. Mr Mogano was placed in an
invidious
situation with no grounds to object to the Rule 38(2)
application but to agree to the procedure. The pronouncements
by Plasket
AJA in
Madibeng Local Municipality v Public Investments
Corporation
2008 (6) SA 55
at 61F – H
(
para 26) are
salutary:
“
[26]
The approach to rule 38(2) may be summarised as follows. A trial
court has a discretion to depart from the position that, in a trial,
oral evidence is the norm. When that discretion is exercised,
two important factors will inevitably be the saving of costs and the
saving of time, especially the time of the court in this era
of
congested court rolls and stretched judicial resources. More
importantly, the exercise of the discretion will be conditioned
by
whether it is appropriate and suitable in the circumstances to allow
a deviation from the norm. That requires a consideration
of the
following factors: the nature of the proceedings; the nature of the
evidence; whether the application for evidence to be
adduced by way
of affidavit is by agreement; and ultimately, whether, in all the
circumstances, it is fair to allow evidence on
affidavit.”
Consequently, and since
the parties agreed to place evidence on affidavit before court, the
application was considered and granted.
[4]
The plaintiff/applicant, Ms Anthea Shinead Daly (Daly) was the only
witness
who gave
vivo voce
evidence on 05 September 2023. She
is 32 years old and resides in Kathu. She complains of upper
back pain and severe
chest pain restricting her breathing, severe hip
pain making it difficult to stand, walk or sit for extended periods.
Bending
also causes a lot of pain. Taking pain medication
continuously caused her ulcers. She was employed at Kumba Mine
since
2010 as a Maintenance Operator. She assisted the artisans
in the workshop lifting heavy objects, fixing engine parts for the
mining machines, tipping trucks etc and cleaning engine parts.
[5]
The accident occurred on 21 June 2015. She did not return to
work
immediately thereafter. However, upon her return, she was
subjected to fitness tests by her employer and did not pass them.
Dr
Nothando Moyo-Mubayiwa, is a medical doctor employed by Anglo
American, Kumba Iron Ore. She sought the opinion of
Dr Jan F
Greyling, the applicant’s treating specialist, on whether the
plaintiff could perform sedentary administrative work
and drive a
motor vehicle within the mining area or whether she was restricted to
do so, and if restricted, Dr Greyling was to
specify the period of
restriction.
[6]
Dr Moyo-Mubayiwa compiled a work report on the capacity of the
plaintiff
(OMP Report on Work Capacity) dated 29 April 2016 using the
medical reports compiled by Sue-Ellen Poya (Occupational Therapist),
Dr Chris De Beer (OMP), Colleen Fandam (Physiotherapist &
Ergonomist) and Dr Greyling (Orthopaedic Surgeon). The medical panel
reached this conclusion:
“
Ms
Vogt [maiden surname of the plaintiff] is permanently unfit for her
occupation of Maintenance Operator or any occupation that
requires
heavy lifting and physical exertion. She will require
alternative placement in administrative positions or sedentary
work.
Reasonable accommodation in a sedentary position will be
possible following appropriate rehabilitation and modifications
of
her work station.”
The panel also recorded
that her condition was manageable.
[7]
The following recommendations were made:
“
It
is recommended that Ms Vogt is permanently unfit to continue her
occupation of maintenance operator and any other occupations
that
require heavy physical exertion. Alternative placement in
administrative positions is recommended.”
[8]
The mine at that time was restructuring. A medical conference
was
conducted with the plaintiff and she was then assisted by her
union representative, Mr Jacobus Hager. Three options were on
the table: namely, medical boarding, retrenchment or taking a
voluntary severance package. She opted for the latter on advice
of Hager and took it in 2016. Since then she has not found any
employment. She explained that although in her curriculum
vitae
she has recorded the experience of a Planning Assistant and
secretarial experience at Mikom from 01 November 2012 until 31
July
2013 and as Planning Assistant and Toolstore Assistant from 01 August
2013 she was merely helping out. She has no formal
training for
administrative work. She has, to date, only applied for two
vacancies which were not advertised but was unsuccessful.
[9]
Hager confirmed plaintiff’s evidence on affidavit that because
the
mine was going through a restructuring phase and retrenching
employees, there were no vacancies for sedentary positions available
to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was advised by her union to opt
for a voluntary severance package as opposed to being medically
boarded. The voluntary package was recommended not only because
it did not impose long-term limitations on her future employment
prospects but also offered her a more advantageous financial
arrangement. She signed the Voluntary Separation Agreement on
04 May 2016.
[10]
Dr Greyling is the orthopaedic surgeon holding the MBChB and MMed
Orthopaedics qualifications.
He consulted with and assessed the
plaintiff on 30 October 2019 and thereafter compiled a report. He
also completed
the RAF 4 form. Before the accident the
plaintiff had scoliosis of the thoracic spine seen on the x-rays
which did not cause
her pain or discomfort but caused her left
shoulder to be higher than the right shoulder. She has a family
history of hypertension,
cancer, asthma and diabetes. She
smokes one pack of 20 cigarettes a day. She walks with a mild
limping gait.
[11]
Doctor Greyling recorded the following injuries from the information
provided by
the plaintiff, the clinical findings and radiological
studies: severe sternal fracture, various rib fractures 4 – 8
located
close to the sternum, left superior and inferior pubic rami
fracture and spinal compression fractures at levels T4 – T8.
She complained to the doctor about severe chest and upper back
pain which restricts her breathing at times and hip pain when
standing or walking for extended periods. She suffered from
migraines before the accident but they have become worse after
the
accident. She has had to take pain and anxiety medication daily
since the accident. She also suffers from a lower
back pain and
regular numbness on her left lower leg. She experiences
increased pain when attempting to execute household
tasks like doing
laundry or cooking or lifting her children. She reported
swelling at the back of the hip at times.
[12]
Dr Greyling observed a decreased range of movement of the lumber
spine. Radiological
examinations also revealed a thoracic
malalignment from T4 to T8 located close to the sternum. The
x-rays revealed healed
left superior and inferior pubic rami
fractures. According to the report the plaintiff will have
difficulty competing in
the labour market due to the permanent pain
and decreased range of movement. She is limited to sedentary
work. Dr Greyling
recommends physiotherapy, occupational
therapy, anti-inflammatory and analgesic medication. The doctor
did not anticipate
any future surgeries.
[13]
Dr Liesl Smith is a Neurologist qualified in MBChB, MFamMed, MMed
Neurology and a
lecturer at the Department of Neurology, University
of the Free State and a practicing neurologist. Plaintiff’s
neurological
examination is normal and she did not sustain any
permanent neurological sequelae.
[14]
The Clinical Psychologist, Dr Cobus Etzebeth, is qualified in BSoc
Sc, BA Hons (Psych),
B Psych Trauma Counselling and MA (Clinical
Psychology). He recorded that although fluctuation in
concentration, attention
and memory were reported, he did not observe
them during the assessment. There is an extensive history of
attempted suicide
both by her mother and herself. She has tried
six times to commit suicide and seems to have a history of
depression.
She smokes and consumes alcohol. Her
consultations with the psychologists preceded the accident and were
mainly for her attempted
suicides.
Dr Etzebeth recommends
that the plaintiff should be availed an orthopaedic evaluation of her
reported lingering pain to alleviate
her sense of dysphoria
. To
address her psychological symptoms and neuro-cognitive difficulties
(depression and adjustment challenges) the doctor
recommends 20
sessions of psychotherapy with a clinical psychologist. Given
her history of attempted suicide, borderline
personality traits and
family history of bipolar disorder, psychiatric intervention seems
indicated and a start on Psychopharmacological
treatment is
recommended.
[15]
Dr Dorelle Kirsten is an Anaesthetist with a special interest in
Pulmonology conditions.
Her qualifications are MBChB and MMed
(Anaes.) Since she is clearly not a Pulmonologist it is
incomprehensible why counsel
would create such an impression not only
in his oral submissions but also in his heads of argument. This
is not acceptable.
I do not accept the views expressed by Dr
Kirsten because it is not her field of specialty. Having
interest in a particular
field does not make one an expert in that
regard.
[16]
Ms Nicabeth Paul is an Occupational Therapist in possession of a
B.OccTher. She
was employed at Susan Maree Occupational
Therapists. She assessed the plaintiff and compiled a report.
On 31 October
2019 when she assessed the plaintiff she
presented with postural asymmetry, shortness of breath and high pain
levels. Plaintiff
reported to her that she repaired motors and
assembled its parts. She also charged truck batteries, the
heaviest of which
weighed 20kg, and ideally had to be lifted by two
people. She had to be on her feet the entire day in the battery
room where
the batteries are charged. She would occasionally
perform sedentary tasks by assisting the administration clerk. Test
results show that the plaintiff would be able to sustain sedentary
work. This, however, demands postural breaks in sitting
and
standing. Although the plaintiff reported memory loss during
the test session with Ms Paul she did not present any memory
difficulties. She considered the reports of Dr Greyling, Dr
Kirsten, Mr Etzebeth, and Dr JR Muller, the Radiologist. Ms
Paul further says at para 6.4 of her report:
“
After
the week she went back to Kathu for work.
She
was seen by the medical panel. They decided that she has to do
light duty on the surface, but they were unable to find
a position.
She was declared fit to work, but there were no positions
available. Her union advised her to take the
offered severance
package and she agreed.”
Ms Paul agrees with the
other doctors that the plaintiff will benefit from receiving
physiotherapy, psychological intervention and
occupational therapy.
[17]
Dr Everd Jacobs is an Industrial Psychologist with the following
qualifications:
B.P.L, B.P.L (Hons), M Econ:Bsk and D.Com (Industrial
Psychology). He consulted with and assessed the plaintiff on 31
October
2019 and again on 09 May 2020. His instructions were to
consider the plaintiff’s probable career path. He
considered
the reports of Dr Greyling, Dr Smit, Dr Kirsten, Ms Paul,
Mr Etzebeth, RAF 1, the affidavit regarding the accident, a copy of
the
ID, photos of injuries, payslips, certificates, pension pay-out
quote, and there was no collateral. At 9.5 in the report the
doctor records that
plaintiff
has not worked since
the
accident. Her income was made available via payslips.
[18]
During the first interview doctor Jacobs gathered the following
information from
the plaintiff: She completed Grade 12 at
Warrendale High School in 2008; completed courses as a maintenance
operator and
scaffold erector; participated in a learnership
programme in welding and scaffolding at Kumba; she is not a qualified
artisan;
at the time of the accident she was permanently employed at
Kumba as a maintenance operator since 2010; she never returned to the
mine due to the injuries; she received her salary for approximately
three months after the accident; no further salary was received
until
she took the severance package as a result of the retrenchment
process at the mine one year and one month after the accident;
she
said she felt at risk with her injuries; her pension pay-out was
R109,393.00.
[19]
During the follow-up telephonic interview on 09 May 2020 the
plaintiff stated that
she is still unemployed and not looking for
employment. As stated she received her salary and back pay
allowances for only
three months. When she wanted to return to
work the retrenchment process was underway. Her union advised
her to take
a package and she was also medically unfit to continue.
She could not avail the severance package letter to Dr Jacobs
since
it was given to her attorney. She only worked for Kumba
and had no other employer.
[20]
The plaintiff closed her case. The defendant also closed its
case without leading
any evidence.
[21]
It is common cause that the plaintiff was left with serious injuries
deemed permanent
by Dr Greyling. She was, however, found
suitable to perform sedentary work with no physical exertion. Simply
put, no
heavy-duty work. Her union representative advised her
to take the voluntary severance package because, according to them it
offered more advantages than the retrenchment or medical boarding.
Whereas the medical panel recommended on Friday, 29 April
2016,
that plaintiff be accommodated in sedentary work by virtue of her
condition being manageable, only five days thereafter,
on Wednesday
04 May 2016 the Union wrote the following where the medical
incapacity committee recommendation was supposed to appear:
“
took
voluntary severance package (VSP) case closed.”
This
team comprised: Dr Nothando Moyo (OMP), J Dreyer (OHP/Coordinator),
Anthea Vogt (plaintiff), J Hager (Solidarity Union Representative)
and B Shabalala (Human Resource).
[22]
I find it difficult to reconcile the medical panel’s conclusion
and recommendation
for the plaintiff’s reasonable accommodation
with her decision to take a voluntary severance package. This
was an informed
decision having taken advice from her union
representatives. She was not retrenched but opted to take a
voluntary package.
If the actuary worked on an assumption that
she was retrenched during July 2016 it cannot be correct because she
signed for
the severance package on 04 May 2016.
[23]
The actuarial report itself records the following:
“
The
normal life expectancy for a 29-year-old female according to the
South African Life Tables 1984/1986 (similar to Life Table
2 in The
Quantum Yearbook, 2020 of Dr R.J Koch) is 48.28 additional years.
We have been provided
with a report of Industrial Psychologist Dr E.J Jacobs dated 11 May
2020. The following is noted from
Dr Jacobs’ report:
‘
Mr
C Etzebeth (Clinical Psychologist):
The accident has
aggravated her symptoms as per her psychiatric history of attempted
suicide and prior diagnosis for depression…”
In the absence of
further information we have assumed a normal life expectancy in
respect of Ms Daly.”
[24]
In his report and under the subject background, the actuary, relying
on the information
furnished to him by Dr Jacobs, recorded that the
plaintiff was a Maintenance Operator, Grade 2. But, upon close
scrutiny
of the medical report by Dr Moyo, the plaintiff was a
Maintenance Operator Grade 1. There is surely a difference in
the outcome
based on her grade.
[25]
The actuarial report sought to establish capitalised value of the
loss of income
sustained by the plaintiff as a result of the
accident. The actuary used the plaintiff’s personal
information and her
life expectancy for the assessment. He
assumed a normal life expectancy of 48.28 additional years for the
plaintiff which
was revised to 44.44 in the subsequent report. The
actuary qualified the life expectancy assumption by recording that
the
actuarially correct method is to work directly with the life
table.
[26]
Since the RAF did not present countervailing evidence, the challenge
by Mr Magano,
appearing for the RAF, was directed at the
contingencies applied by the actuaries to make the calculations or to
dispute correctness
thereof. The first actuarial report
reflects a net past loss of R1,071,227.00 and a net future loss of
R5,740,348.00, all
to the total amount of R6,811,575.00.
[27]
The legal representatives, Messrs Magano and Van Onselen, could not
agree on the
contingencies to be applied and presented. The
actuary was requested to provide revised calculations based on the
submissions
by both parties. A further report dated 04
September 2023 was filed which took into consideration the expert
reports including
that of Dr Jacobs, the industrial psychologist’s
addendum report dated 10 August 2023. A normal life expectancy
of
44.44 additional years was assumed. It is settled that the
general contingency deductions are a matter for negotiation between
the legal representatives or for the discretion of the Court. The
actuary was instructed by the legal representatives
in casu
to
compute the general contingency deductions based on the following two
scenarios:
Scenario 1 (by the
plaintiff)
Earnings
Past
Future
Pre-accident
Post-accident
25.0%
……
35.0%
35.0%
Scenario
2 (by the RAF)
Earnings
Past
Future
Pre-accident
Post-accident
35.0%
…
..
35.0%
35.0%
The
actuary applied the loss limit of R228,430.00 per year as determined
at the date of the accident. He applied the principles
articulated in
Road Accident Fund v
Sweatman
2015 (6) SA 186
(SCA) also
reported in
[2015] 2 All SA 679
(SCA). Loss after the
application of the limit:
In
scenario 1 (Plaintiff)
: net past
loss with a contingency deduction of 25% is R1,680,600.00 and net
future loss with a contingency deduction of 35%
is R1,926,806.00 to
the total net loss of R3,607,406.00.
In
scenario 2 (RAF):
net past loss with a
contingency deduction of 35% is R1,523,827.00 and net future loss
with a contingency deduction of 35% is R1,926,806.00
to the total net
loss of R3,450,633.00. There is a difference of R156,773.00 in
the two scenarios.
[28]
Notwithstanding that the RAF did not lead any evidence leaving the
evidence of the
plaintiff uncontradicted, I cannot turn a blind eye
to the following:
28.1
Constitutionally, everyone has a right to fair labour practices which
includes the plaintiff.
She, however, on advice of her union
representative, accepted, what they perceived as the best option, a
voluntary severance
package. This happened a few days after the
decision was made that she was suitable to perform sedentary work.
The
industrial psychologist wrote the following “
she
said the mine was busy with retrenchments and she felt she is at
risk with her injuries.”
She could have waited for
her placement following the decision that she was suitable for
sedentary work.
28.2
It is significant that despite the industrial psychologist having
pointed out the clinical psychologist’s
finding that “
the
accident has aggravated her symptoms as per her psychiatric history
of attempted suicide and prior diagnosis for depression”,
the
actuary still went ahead and remarked “
in the absence of
further information we have assumed a normal life expectancy …”.
The report neither specifies the missing further
information nor whether any clarity was sought before compiling it.
28.3
Besides being a heavy smoker of 20 cigarettes a day and the several
suicide attempts as well
as a history of depression, the actuary
assumed a normal life expectancy. This has the potential of
ill-health, absence from
work and her carrying through to completion
the actual suicide like the father of her first-born child reportedly
did. All
these combined carry a less than normal expectation of
life.
28.4
The actuary assumed that she was a Maintenance Operator Grade 2
whereas the OMP report by Dr
Moyo-Mubayiwa dated 29 April 2016
recorded her job title as Maintenance Operator Grade 1. The
difference may be significant.
[29]
In
Southern Insurance Association Ltd v Bailey NO
1984 (1) SA 98
(A)
Nicholas JA held:
Where the method of
actuarial computation is adopted in assessing damages for loss of
earning capacity, it does not mean that the
trial Judge is "tied
down by inexorable actuarial calculations". He has "a
large discretion to award what
he considers right". One of
the elements in exercising that discretion is the making of a
discount for "contingencies"
or the "vicissitudes of
life". These include such matters as the possibility that
the plaintiff may in the result
have less than a "normal"
expectation of life; and that he may experience periods of
unemployment by reason of incapacity
due to illness or accident, or
to labour unrest or general economic conditions. The amount of
any discount may vary, depending
upon the circumstances of the case.
The rate of discount cannot, of course, be assessed on any
logical basis: the assessment
must be largely arbitrary and must
depend upon the trial Judge's impression of the case. In making
such a discount for "contingencies"
or the "vicissitudes
of life", it is, however, erroneous to regard the fortunes of
life as being always adverse: they
may be favourable.”
[30]
The courts have raised numerous concerns pertaining to the inaction
and unhelpfulness
of the RAF in the cases involving claims against
the RAF. This case is no exception. The time has come for the
RAF to take
the courts seriously and to heed its admonitions. Dr
Kirsten is not the pulmonologist as stated in the draft order but an
anaesthetist with a special interest in pulmonology as recorded in
her report. Litigants and their lawyers ought to take
better
care. No aspersions are cast at Dr Kirsten.
[31]
Regard being had to the above, it will be sensible if I award an
amount that is in
my view fair and reasonable. The mathematical
calculations are in this scenario not sound. The plaintiff’s
vicissitudes
of life warrant higher contingencies. The fact
that she made an informed decision to quit her employment without
affording
due retrenchments processes to fruition is a further risk
that she opted to take. There is no basis or cogent reason for
me to accept the calculations by the actuary and I much rather opt to
interfere with the amount computed.
[32]
It therefore follows that the plaintiff stands to succeed in her
claim for future
loss of earnings/earning capacity in the globular
amount of R1,500,000.00, having had regard to all the credible
evidence and authority
adverted to.
[33]
In the result, the following order is made:
1.
The defendant is liable to compensate the
plaintiff for 100% of her proven or agreed damages resulting from the
injuries the plaintiff
sustained in the motor vehicle collision which
occurred on 21 June 2015.
2.
Defendant shall pay the following amount to the Plaintiff’s
attorneys, Adams & Adams, in settlement of the claim for Loss of
Earnings:
2.1
Loss of earnings:
R1,500,000.00
TOTAL:
R1,500,000.00
3.
The aforesaid amount in the sum of R1,500,000.00 (One Million Five
Hundred Thousand) shall be payable by direct transfer into the trust
account, details of which are as follows:
Nedbank
Account Number: 1[...]
Branch Code: 1[...]
Pretoria
Ref: JPR/MTKM/P4790
4.
The plaintiff shall allow the defendant 180 (ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY)
court days to make payment of the capital amount from the date of
this court order, failing which the plaintiff will be entitled
to
recover interest at the applicable interest rate.
5.
The defendant shall furnish the plaintiff with a written undertaking
in terms of
s 17(4)(a)
of the
Road Accident Fund Act, 1996
, for
payment of 100% of the costs for the future accommodation of the
plaintiff in a hospital or nursing home, or treatment of
or rendering
of a service or supply of goods to her, after the costs have been
incurred and on proof thereof, resulting from the
accident that
occurred on 21 June 2015.
6.
The plaintiff’s claim in respect of past medical expenses is
separated from the other heads of damages in terms of the provisions
of Rule 33(4) of the Uniform Rules of Court and postponed
sine
die.
7.
The defendant must make payment of the plaintiff’s taxed or
agreed party and party costs on the High Court scale which is subject
to the taxing master’s discretion.
8.
The defendant shall pay the plaintiff’s taxed or agreed party
and party costs on a High Court scale to date of this order, which
shall include the reasonable qualifying, preparation, reservation
and
appearance fees (where applicable) of the following expert witnesses:
8.1 Dr
JF Greyling
Orthopaedic Surgeon
8.2 Dr
L Smit
Neurologist
8.3 Dr
DL Kirsten
Anaesthetist
8.4 Mr
C Etzebeth
Clinical Psychologist
8.5 Ms
N Paul
Occupational Therapist
8.6 Dr
E Jacobs
Industrial Psychologist
8.7 Mr
G Whittaker
Actuary
I have further allowed
for fees to be paid to
8.8 Mr
J Hager a necessary witness for trial
8.9 The
above costs will also be paid into the aforementioned trust account.
8.10 It is recorded
that the plaintiff’s instructing attorneys did not act on a
contingency fee basis.
9.
In the event that costs are not agreed:
9.1 The
plaintiff shall serve a notice of taxation on the defendant’s
attorney of record;
9.2 The
plaintiff shall allow the defendant 14 (fourteen) court days to make
payment of the taxed costs from date
of settlement or taxation
thereof;
9.3
Should payment not be effected timeously, the plaintiff will be
entitled to recover interest at the applicable
interest rate on the
taxed or agreed costs from date of allocator to date of final
payment; and
9.4 The
plaintiff shall not issue a writ prior to the expiry of the 180-day
period.
MAMOSEBO J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
NORTHERN CAPE DIVISION
For the plaintiff:
Adv. C.R. Van Onselen
Instructed by:
Adams
& Adams
c/o
Stefan Greyling Inc
For
the defendant:
Mr
A. Mogano
Instructed
by:
The
State Attorney