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[2024] ZALMPPHC 11
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South African National Roads Agency SOC Ltd v Machaba and Others (6406/2022) [2024] ZALMPPHC 11 (30 January 2024)
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Certain
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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(LIMPOPO
DIVISION, POLOKWANE)
CASE
№:
6406/2022
REPORTABLE:
YES/NO
OF
INTEREST TO THE JUDGES: YES/NO
REVISED:
YES/NO
MG
PHATUDI J
In
the matter between:
SOUTH
AFRICAN NATIONAL ROADS AGENCY SOC LTD
APPLICANT
(Registration
№: 1998[…])
And
RICHARD
MASILO MACHABA
FIRST
RESPONDENT
(Identity
№: 6[…])
PERSONS
OCCUPYING PROPERTY
SECOND
RESPONDENT
ON
BEHALF OF OR THROUGH THE FIRST
RESPONDENT
MODIMOLLE-MOOKGOPHONG
LOCAL
THIRD
RESPONDENT
MUNICIPALITY
CORAM:
M.G. PHATUDI J
HEARD:
02 NOVEMBER 2023
DELIVERED:
This judgment was circulated electronically to
the parties’ legal representatives by email and released to
SAFLII. The date
and time for delivery of this judgment is deemed to
be
30 January 2024
at
10:00AM
.
JUDGMENT
M.G.
PHATUDI J:
INTRODUCTION:
[1]
This application pertains to eviction of the First and Second
Respondents (herein after called
“the respondents”) and
any and all persons occupying the Applicant’s immovable
property better described as Farm
7[…] Vlaktplaas “the
property” located within Modimolle-Mookgopong Local
Municipality, (Third Respondent) which
is occupied unlawfully through
the First Respondent or on his behalf, and without the Applicant’s
consent
The
Application is opposed by the First Respondent, Mr Richard Masilo
Machaba (Machaba). The Second and Third Respondents did not
participate in the litigation.
FACTUAL
BACKGROUND:
[2]
The Applicant (SANRAL) is the owner of the property as evinced by the
Deeds Search annexed to
the founding affidavit (‘FA’)
marked ‘SA
2
’
,
reflecting the registration details thereof in the name SANRAL
[1]
.
[3]
On or about 28 November 2014, the Applicant and Machaba entered into
an agreement of lease in
terms of which the property was leased to
the latter
[2]
I consider it
unnecessary to refer extensively to the provisions and the terms and
conditions of the lease agreement to the present
dispute, save to
mention its
essentiale
namely,
that: -
3.1.
The parties to the agreement are SANRAL, the
Lessor, and Machaba, the Lessee;
3.2.
The property let is Farm 7[…] Vlaktplaas
KR; (formerly remainder of the Farm Padbou 7[…] – KR;
Modimolle)
3.3.
The occupier (Lessee) shall use the property
for conducting farming activities, and for no other purpose,
whatsoever;
3.4.
The monthly rental payable by the Lessee to the
Lessor in respect of the property let for the first year comprised an
amount of
R 8 935.70 plus VAT, which translated into an amount of R
10 186.70.
The
said rental amount became due and payable by the Lessee to the Lessor
effective from 01 October 2014 (occupation date) thereafter
in
advance on each and every successive month, until termination date on
30 September 2017; and
3.5.
The duration of the lease agreement was,
therefore, for a period of three (3) years.
[4]
The lease clauses referred to above, some of (2.1 to 2.4) constituted
as they did, some of the
material and fundamental terms and
conditions of the lease agreement between the parties.
[5]
According to the Applicant, Machaba had as on 18 January 2016,
breached the terms of the lease
agreement when he fell into arrear
rental in the amount of R47 628.97. Due notice of the breach, was
given to Machaba to remedy
the default which he allegedly failed to
redress, within twelve (12) days as directed by the Applicant in the
letter of demand.
5.1.
In it, Machaba was forewarned of the
consequences of breach and failure by him to square up the arrear
rental owing, due and payable
to the Applicant and, worse still, of
termination of the lease agreement coupled with repossession and
eviction of any occupier,
together with a claim for damages
occasioned by the default.
5.2.
The default persisted in the amount of R 100
922.50 as on 04 May 2017, resulting in the Applicant eventually
issuing to Machaba
a notice of cancellation of the lease agreement
pursuant to clause 23.1 read with clause 23.12 thereof. The
provisions of the said
clauses attract penalties for
mora
on the part of the Lessee in the event of breach of the agreement,
which effectively entitled the Applicant the right to terminate
the
said agreement.
The
cancellation notice to the First Respondent was issued in a letter
dated 05 July 2016, addressed and read in part that: -
“
SANRAL
no longer consents to your occupation of the property above and you
are now regarded as an illegal occupier”.
Machaba
and/or any occupier of the property was thus given one (1) month to
vacate the premises failing which eviction proceedings
would be
instituted against the him.
5.3.
Subsequent thereto, various attempts were made
by the Applicant to resolve the impasse or to settle the claim
amicably, but all
in vain. Meanwhile, the arrear rental accumulated
further as in August 2017 to an amount of R 120 000.00. The First
Respondent
remained adamant not to vacate the property despite the
cancellation notice issued to him.
5.4.
Machaba’s reasons for resisting to vacate
was that he laboured under the impression that the Department of
Rural Development
and Land Reform (“the Department”)
sought to acquire the property from the Applicant for land reform
beneficiaries
by the said Department through Land Distribution of
Agricultural Development process. (“the LRAD”).
5.5.
The
basis of Machaba’s claims as such were, however, refuted by the
Department after it conducted an investigation into the
allegations
he made. The Department had instead made it clear that it no longer
embarked on the LRAD process, but changed the strategy
to the
so-called Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy(“PLAS”) in
terms of which it identifies the properties that it
seeks to acquire,
and the immovable property in dispute was not one of them. This much
was clarified in its email dated 12 March
2018
[3]
.
5.6.
Given the aforementioned response by the
Department it follows, logically, so the contention went, that
Machaba lacked any enforceable
right in law to remain in occupation
of the property following cancellation of the lease agreement in May
2018, alternatively,
on lapse or natural termination thereof on 30
September 2017, as the case may be.
[6]
Furthermore, the Applicant submitted that failure, refusal or neglect
of Machaba to vacate the
property brought about prejudice to it in
that despite having leased out the property to another Lessee, it
lost rental income
nor is it able to sell the property pursuant to a
mortgage.
[7]
In pursuit of its intention to evict Machaba, the Applicant on 12
October 2023, obtained an order
in terms of Section 4(2) of the
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land
Act, 1998
[4]
(“the PIE
Act”).
Paragraph
2, in particular, required that both the notice of eviction and the
order be served on the respondents as prescribed by
rule 4 of the
Uniform Rules of Court (“the rules”).
[8]
Resisting the eviction process, in his answering affidavit, Machaba
took a point
in limine
for non-compliance by the Applicant
with Section 4(2) of the PIE Act as well as clauses 15.7.2 and
15.7.3, respectively, of the
Practice Directive of this court. These
directives prescribe the time and manner in respect of which eviction
proceedings may be
initiated, which the Applicant allegedly failed to
adhere to. In consequence, Naudè-Odendaal J on 31 May 2023,
upheld the
point
in limine
raised, and ordered that the
eviction proceedings sought be stayed for a period of 30 days,
pending compliance with Section 4(2)
of the PIE Act and court order
issued by Makgoba JP on 12 October 2022.
[9]
The First Respondent’s submission in this court that the
Applicant failed to comply with
the provisions of Section 4(2) of PIE
Act, is therefore misplaced. It can certainly not be argued that the
eviction application
is premature regard being had not only to the
ex-parte application made, but also that the order was obtained on 12
October 2022.
The order of Naudè-Odendaal J issued on 31 May
2023, merely stayed the eviction proceeding for 30 days. The order
was subsequently
complied with when it was served on 20 June 2023.
[10]
The Applicant in its replying affidavit made on 02 December 2022,
stated that it has since complied with
the provisions of Section 4(2)
of the PIE Act as well as the order of Makgoba JP referred to. I
shall, for present purposes, accept
that there was indeed an
ex-parte
application made pursuant to section 4(2) of the PIE Act in respect
of which an order was made for its service upon the Respondents,
together with the authorising court order issued on 12 October 2022.
(Makgoba JP’s Order). These processes were served on
Machaba on
20 June 2023.
THE
ISSUE:
[10]
The issues in this matter are three-pronged, namely:
(a)
Whether the First Respondent (Machaba) is
legally entitled to remain in occupation of the property after expiry
or termination of
the lease agreement;
(b)
Whether the PIE Act finds application in the
eviction application;
(c)
Whether
the First and Second Respondent and any other unlawful occupiers are
covered by the provisions of
Extension of Security of Tenure Act
1997
[5]
,(ESTA) if so, whether
this court is competent to entertain the eviction application before
it.
THE
SUBMISSIONS:
[11]
It was submitted on behalf of Machaba that he was not and cannot be
regarded as an “unlawful occupier”
of the property since
his occupation thereof is subject to a land redistribution
arrangement.
His
contention was premised on the basis the that Department in the
letter dated 15 August 2008, and through the Limpopo Land Reform
Office (“LPLRO”) declared its intention to purchase the
relevant farm on behalf of black farmers for the purposes of
land
reform and agricultural transformation. He alleged further that
Marumofase Farming Project was identified as the land reform
project
beneficiary back in July 2008.
[12]
These allegations are denied by the Applicant. The contention,
conversely, is that nowhere in the lease agreement
is there a
provision of Machaba’s occupation or tenancy being made subject
to the Department acquiring the said property
from the Applicant. A
reading of the lease agreement, contextually, and in its entirety,
hardly supports that submission. This
much is clear from the email
issued by the Department as Annexure ‘SA
7
’ to
the ‘FA’, to which reference was made.
12.1
From a reading of its contents, it is plain
that “the Department no longer intends acquiring the Farm
Vlaktplaas No: 7[…]
– KR from SANRAL” since the
departmental programme for land acquisition has long changed from
LRAD process to PLAS
in terms of which the Department identifies the
properties it needs, and the property (Vlaktplaas) is not one of
them.
12.2
Against the aforegoing backdrop, it follows
logically that Machaba’s contention and the reasons he advanced
resisting his
eviction as a beneficiary under Marumofase Farm
Project, is equally untenable and falls to be rejected.
THE
LEGAL FRAMEWORK:
[13]
The PIE Act in its heading stipulates its objective as “
being
to provide for the prohibition of unlawful eviction, to provide for
procedures for the eviction of unlawful occupiers”.
In
its preamble, the said Act embraces four basic tenets protecting any
person against unlawful eviction, among others, that (1)
no one may
be deprived of property except in terms of law of general
application, and no law permit arbitrary deprivation of property,
that (2) no one may be evicted from their home, or have their home
demolished without an order of court after considering all relevant
circumstances, and that (3) the law should regulate the eviction of
“
unlawful occupiers”
from land in a fair manner,
and that (4) special consideration be given to the rights of the
elderly, children disabled persons
and household headed by women,
their needs be considered. (underling for own emphasis).
[14]
It is common cause that the Applicant (SANRAL) is in terms of
Annexure ‘SA
2
’
[6]
(Deeds
Search) the registered owner of the property in dispute. It is
furthermore, common cause that the Applicant is an organ of
state as
defined in the PIE Act (definitions) and in Section 239 of the
Constitution Act, 1996
[7]
.
[15]
Crucially the PIE Act defines in (xi) an “unlawful occupier”
as “
a person who occupies land
without the express or tacit consent of the owner or person in
charge, or without any other right in
law to occupy such land,
excluding a person who is an occupier in terms of the
Extension of
Security of Tenure Act 1997
...”
[16]
What calls for determination in the present instance is whether or
not the provisions of the PIE Act finds
application and whether the
respondents are afforded protection, if any, in terms of provisions
of ESTA.
ESTA,
generally deals with eviction of lawful occupiers or occupiers of
rural or peri-urban land whose occupation was previously
lawful,
subject to certain conditions.
This
Act defines an “occupier” as a person residing on land
which belongs to another person, and who had or on 04 February
1997
or thereafter, had consent or another right in law to do so.
This
excludes (a) labour tenant in terms of Land Reform (Labour Tenant
Act, 1996
[8]
) and (b) a person
using or intending to use the land in question mainly for industrial,
mining, commercial or commercial farming
purpose, but excluding a
person who works the land himself/herself, and does not employ any
person who is not a member of his/her
family; and (c) a person who
has an income in excess of the prescribed amount of R 5000.00 (amount
determined from time to time
by the Minister concerned).
[17]
The answer to the question posed above, (para:16), I venture to
suggest, would be on the interpretation of
the words and language
imported into the lease agreement which gave rise to Machaba’s
tenancy on the property. In modern
legal parlance, the starting point
when interpreting any contract remains the use of the words of the
document and syntax.
In
other words, the process of interpretation ends not at the perceived
literal meaning of the ordinary words used, but considers
those words
against the background of all relevant and admissible context, taking
into account the circumstances in which the document
came into being
thereby making interpretation “essentially one unitary
exercise”
[9]
.
That
said, one can now safely state that the distinction between
permissible background and surrounding circumstance often obscure,
has in my view, become obsolete and abrogated by disuse in matters of
interpretation of legislation, statutory instrument or written
contract, as the case may be.
[18]
The abovementioned observation finds reinforcement in the
Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
[10]
.
This case aptly summarise the basic principles of the interpretation
of documents.
[19]
Importantly, is the fact that “
interpretation
is the process of attributing meaning to the words used in a
document, be it legislation, some other statutory instrument,
or
contract, having regard to the context provided by reading the
particular provision or provisions in the light of the document
as a
whole and the circumstance attendant upon its coming into existence …
whatever the nature of the document, considerations
must be given
rules of grammar and syntax…”
[11]
[20]
Guided by the aforementioned principles, this court would accordingly
have to search for a more sensible
meaning to attach to the lease
agreement between the parties, weigh it in the light of all relevant
factors and circumstances,
and be vigilant and guard against the
temptation to replace what this court might regard as reasonable,
sensible or business-like
for words actually used
within the
four corners of the written agreement.
What
is crystal, however, is the actual language or words of the provision
per se
, read in context, its purpose, background and leading
to the drafting of the final document.
[21]
Eviction proceedings against an unlawful occupier are available to an
owner or person in charge of the land
in terms of Section 4(1) of the
PIE Act. In order to initiate eviction proceedings, the applicant
land owner or person in charge
thereof, must at least 14 days before
the hearing of the envisaged proceedings in terms of section 4(2),
issue a notice and obtain
a court order which must be served on the
unlawful occupier or any person occupying the land at the instance of
the unlawful occupier,
as well the local municipality having
jurisdiction.
[22]
In an instance where an unlawful occupier has occupied the land in
question for more than six (6) months,
as in the present case, at the
time when the proceedings are initiated, the court may, in its
discretion, grant an order for eviction
if it is of the opinion that
it is “just and equitable” to do so. This exercise
requires consideration of all the relevant
circumstances and factors
stipulated in section 4(7) of the said Act before an eviction order
may be sanctioned.
[12]
[23]
Given the facts and the circumstance peculiar in this case, the next
inquiry is to select a “just and
equitable” remedy after
an order of eviction is granted if it be found that the respondents
in casu
are unlawful occupiers of the property under
consideration. The inquiry is fact-bound, and the remedy is purely a
matter of judicial
discretion.
[24]
Section 4(7) reads as follows: -
“
If
an unlawful occupier has occupied the land in question for more than
six months at the time when the proceedings are initiated,
a court
may grant an order for eviction if it is of the opinion that it is
just and equitable to do so, after considering all the
relevant
circumstances, including, except where the land is sold in a sale of
execution pursuant to a mortgage, whether land has
been made
available or can reasonably be made available by a municipality or
other organ of state or another land owner for the
relocation of the
unlawful occupier, and including the rights and needs of the elderly,
children, disabled persons and households
headed by women.”
[25]
Properly read, section 4(7) sets out guidelines on what
considerations must of necessity be satisfied when
a court exercises
its judicial discretion to decide whether or not it is just and
equitable to decree an eviction order.
[26]
Furthermore, if the court is satisfied on the facts that
“
all
the requirements of this sections have been complied with and that no
valid defence has been raised by the unlawful occupier,
it must grant
an order for the eviction of the unlawful occupier; and determine a
just and equitable date on which the unlawful
occupier must vacate
the land under the circumstance”
[13]
26.1.
Regard
being had to para: [12] and 12.1 above, it admits of no doubt, to my
mind, that the requirements of the PIE Act having been
complied with,
and no valid defence being raised, this court is obliged to grant the
eviction order sought against the respondents.
26.2.
The
word “must” in subsection 8 of Section 4 makes Section 4
mandatory, and not merely directory. Once the court is
satisfied that
all the requirements of this section are fulfilled, as indicated, the
court’s discretion becomes fettered,
and must issue the
eviction order. What remains is for it to determine a “just and
equitable” date on which the respondents,
in
casu
,
must vacate the property, and the date if they fail or refuse to
vacate the land on the date set.
[27]
The view I take of the matter, in the instant case, is that the lease
agreement between the parties, as I
understand it, was for the use by
Machaba for farming activities and no other purpose, whatsoever. The
duration of the lease agreement
as already shown, (Annexure ‘SA
3
’)
was for a period of three (3) years from commencement date.
27.1.
The submission that the First Respondent is an
“occupier” of the property as defined in ESTA is, in my
view, flawed.
This is simply because none of the respondents
including Machaba acquired any residential right to reside on the
property in terms
of the lease agreement. The lessee was permitted to
exclusively use the property for farming activities. On a reading of
the lease
agreement
in toto
no right of residence can in terms of ESTA, therefore, be attached to
Machaba or any other person occupying the property at his
instance.
(own emphasis)
27.2.
The tenancy of Machaba and co-occupiers, if
any, had since terminated at the natural end of the lease agreement.
To that tenancy
no right of residence pursuant to the lease agreement
could arise or be inferred. Either way one looks at, its ESTA
provisions
do not, in my view, enter the picture in this instance.
[28]
The Constitutional Court (“ConCourt”) in the case of
Syders
& Others v De Jager & Others
[14]
expressed
the principle that the right of residence enjoyed by Mr. Breda and
his family was not necessarily tied to the specific
right they
occupied. In fact, ESTA was not designed to provide security of
tenure to an occupier in the house of his/her choice.
[15]
There
can, generally, be no justification to hold that the principle in
SYDERS’ case
cannot apply to PIE matters. The rationale
is that the will and whims or preferences of the unlawful occupier
are not relevant.
Accordingly,
unlawful occupiers such as the present respondents, have no right to
resist their eviction, either under the protection
afforded by PIE or
ESTA, regard being had to the fact that Machaba’s tenancy had
long expired in terms of the lease contract.
[29]
I, remark through
obiter
,
that an offer of alternative accommodation is not a prerequisite for
the granting of an eviction order. Of course, it is rather
one of the
important factors worthy of consideration by a court granting
eviction order.
[16]
What
remain crucial are considerations of “justice and equity”
required by PIE Act.
[17]
These
considerations require the striking of a balance between the rights
of the occupier and those of the landowner so as to maintain
equilibrium.
[30]
This exercise, tedious as it seems to me to be, did not escape the
court’s attention in the case if
Ndlovu
v Ngoco
,
Bekker
and Another v Jika
[18]
[31]
The majority view in Ndlovu’s case appears to be that
prima
facie
commercial properties fall within the purview of PIE. In
contradistinction to the court’s view, however, the respondents
in this case by virtue of Machaba’s long expired lease can,
therefore, not be covered by PIE, in particular regard being had
to
the provisions of section 6 (1) of the said Act.
CONCLUSION:
[32]
In light of the foregoing considerations, and having taken into
account all relevant circumstances, I am
satisfied that it would be
just and equitable to grant an order of eviction. The cusion set out
in section 4(7) of PIE to mitigate
the hardship of eviction order,
finds no application herein. No cogent evidence was, in any event
adduced by Machaba that he occupied
the property lawfully for a
substantial number of years in the past co-habiting with anyone
disabled, or feeble minded, or the
elderly or has had households led
by women. There is nothing remaining to balance his interests
vis-à-vis those of the Applicant.
He
said nothing about seeking alternative residence, except merely
alternative farming space. This is what he pleaded in his papers.
[19]
[33]
Before I disembark this issue, counsel for the respondents, Adv Marx,
submitted supplementary heads of Argument
at the hearing of the
application on 02 November 2023, in which he raised for the first
time an entirely new matter nowhere pleaded
in their answering
affidavit. This related to the respondent’s alleged right of
retention (ius rententiones) or lien involving
the right to claim or
to retain physical control or possession of the property if a debt is
not paid, for instance, if the owner
defaulted on mortgage bond to
cite, but one example.
33.1.
As already alluded to herein, nowhere did
Machaba prove the existence of the right to claim compensation for
expenses incurred for
any necessary or useful improvements made on
the farm in his answering affidavit, nor did he bring any
counterclaim to ward off
the eviction.
His
answering affidavit provided nothing else, but a deafening silence in
that regard. He made unsubstantiated claims in an attempt
to justify
the claim to a lien which does not exist
[20]
Furthermore, clause 3.2 of the lease agreement excludes any
compensation for improvements on the property.
[21]
In
the result, I find no merit to his claim or right of retention
alleged, or at all. This part of the claim can, therefore, not
succeed. The main application is found to have substance and should,
therefore, succeed with costs.
COSTS:
[34]
It is trite principle that the costs follow the result. The Applicant
is the party successful after having
to put a valiant effort to
vindicate its rights which, of course, came at a premium. There
exists no just cause why the respondents
should not pay the costs. In
the result, the following order would issue:
ORDER:
1.
That
the First Respondent and the Second Respondent, and any and all
persons occupying the hereinafter mentioned property, through
the
First Respondent or on his behalf, be ordered to vacate the
Applicant’s property, namely, Farm 7[…] Vlaktplaas
(previously Padbou 4[…] – KR) Modimolle –
Mookgopong Local Municipality (“the property”) within
thirty (30) calendar days from date of service of this order.
2.
That
in the event of the First Respondent and/or the Second Respondent
failing and/or refusing and/or neglecting to vacate the property
as
per paragraph 1 above, and/ or failure and or/ neglect by any and all
persons occupying the property through the First Respondent
and/or
the Second Respondent or on their behalf, to vacate the property, as
per paragraph 1 above, the Sheriff and/or his or her
deputy, is
ordered and directed to proceed immediately to evict the First
Respondent and/or Second Respondent, any and all persons
occupying
the property, through the First Respondent and/or. Second Respond or
on his behalf, from the property.
3.
The
Respondents are ordered to vacate the Farm 7[…] Vlaktplaas
(previously Padbou 4[…] – KR) Modimolle –
Mookgopong Local Municipality within thirty (30) days of the granting
of this order.
4.
A
copy of this order shall be served on the Respondents by the Sheriff
concerned immediately.
5.
The
First Respondent is ordered to pay the costs on attorney and client
scale
M.
G. PHATUDI J
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT,
LIMPOPO
DIVISION, POLOKWANE
APPEARANCES:
Counsel
for the Applicants
Advocate
RC Mathevula
Instructed
by
Michael
Raphela Attorneys
Counsel
for the Respondent
Advocate
HF Marx
Instructed
by
Richard
Spoor Inc. Attorneys
c/o
Oosthuizen & Steyn Attorneys
Date
of the hearing
02
November 2023
Date
of delivery of Judgment
30
January 2024
[1]
Ibid.
pp 32 -60, annexure ’SA
3
’
[2]
Paginated
Index Vol 1, p30 ‘FA’
[3]
Ibid.
p68, Annexure ‘SA7’ “FA”.
[4]
Act 19 of 1998. The order was obtained ex-parte for the purpose of
serving the S4(2) notice and the order on respondents as required
by
rule 4 of the Uniform Rules of Court, and for service thereof within
14 days.
[5]
Act
62 of 1997.
[6]
Ibid.
P30, vol. I
[7]
Act
108 of 1996, as amended – Section 239 defines an organ of
state among other things as any other functionary or institution
exercising public function in terms of any legislation,
in
casu
SANRAL
& National Roads Act 7/1998
[8]
Act
3 of 1996
[9]
See
Botha-Batho Transport (EDMS) BPK v S. Bothma & Seun Transport
(EDMS) BPK
2014 (2) SA 494
(SCA) par: [12]
[10]
2012
(4) SA 593 (SCA); [2012] 2 ALL SA
[11]
Ibid,
Par: [18]
[12]
This
section confers judicial discretion on a court to grant a just and
equitable remedy after an eviction is granted.
[13]
Section
4(8) of the said Act. The provisions hereof
[14]
2017 (3) SA 545
(CC) at par: [81]
[15]
Oranjie
v Rouxlandia Investments (Pty) Ltd
2019 (3) SA 108
(SCA)
[16]
See,
Port Elizabeth Municipality v People’s Dialogue on Land and
Shelter 2001 (4) SA 759 (E)
[17]
Section 6(1) PIE Act. See also, Hattingh v Juta 2013 (3) SA 275 (CC)
[18]
[2002] 4 ALL SA 384 (SCA)
[19]
P106-107,
“AA” para: 59 & 62, Record
[20]
Ibid.
He alleged investment in farming infrastructure which he did not
prove by tax receipts
[21]
Paginated
Index pp 55-56, ‘FA’, Record.