Premier of the Western Cape and Another v Electoral Commission and Another (CCT19/99) [1999] ZACC 6; 1999 (11) BCLR 1209 (2 September 1999)

80 Reportability
Constitutional Law

Brief Summary

Constitutional Law — Provincial legislature — Composition of legislature — Dispute over number of seats — Premier of Western Cape and Speaker of Provincial Parliament challenged Electoral Commission's determination of 39 seats — Applicants contended entitlement to 42 seats per section 13 of the provincial constitution — Court held that section 105(2) of the Constitution does not apply to the composition of a provincial legislature as provided for in a provincial constitution — Determination of 42 seats in provincial constitution prevails over national legislation — Respondents ordered to pay costs.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This matter concerned an urgent constitutional application brought directly to the Constitutional Court for declaratory relief regarding the lawful number of seats in the Western Cape Provincial Parliament ahead of the provincial and national elections scheduled for 2 June 1999. The applicants were the Premier of the Province of the Western Cape and the Speaker of the Provincial Parliament of the Western Cape. The respondents were the Electoral Commission and the Chief Electoral Officer.


The dispute arose after the Electoral Commission, in preparing for the second democratic elections, determined the number of seats for each provincial legislature using a population-based formula derived from national electoral legislation. In relation to the Western Cape, it determined that the Provincial Parliament would have 39 seats. The applicants contended that this was inconsistent with section 13 of the Constitution of the Western Cape 1998, which provides that the Provincial Parliament consists of 42 elected members.


After attempts to resolve the disagreement by correspondence failed, the applicants approached the Constitutional Court urgently on 20 May 1999. The matter was heard on 26 May 1999. The Court issued an order on that date setting aside the Commission’s determination and confirming that the Provincial Parliament had 42 seats, with reasons furnished later on 2 September 1999.


2. Material Facts


In preparation for the 1999 elections, the Electoral Commission made determinations of the number of seats in each provincial legislature based on a formula of approximately one representative per hundred thousand inhabitants. Applying that approach, and relying on the relevant national legislation, the Commission determined on 17 March 1999 that the Western Cape Provincial Parliament would have 39 seats after the forthcoming election.


It was common cause that the Constitution of the Western Cape 1998 contains a provision, section 13, stating in direct terms that the Provincial Parliament consists of 42 elected members. It was also common cause that national legislation (referred to in the judgment as “the Act”) prescribed a formula for determining provincial seats and that, if applied, it produced a figure of 39 for the Western Cape.


The central factual premise for the applicants’ case was that the Western Cape had a duly adopted provincial constitution that expressly regulated the size of its legislature, and that this provincial constitutional provision was authorised by the national Constitution. The central factual premise for the respondents’ case was that the size of every provincial legislature was regulated by the national Constitution’s framework read with national legislation prescribing a formula, and that any inconsistency should be resolved in favour of the national framework and legislation.


Although the respondents raised arguments relating to equality, free and fair elections, and the fiscal implications of a larger legislature, the Court treated these as submissions on constitutional effect rather than as disputes of fact requiring evidentiary resolution.


3. Legal Issues


The first legal issue concerned jurisdiction and procedure: whether the matter fell within the Constitutional Court’s exclusive jurisdiction under section 167(4)(a) of the Constitution (as a dispute between organs of state in the national or provincial sphere concerning constitutional status, powers, or functions), or whether the Court should instead entertain the matter by granting direct access under rule 17, given urgency and the nature of the dispute.


The principal merits issue was a question of constitutional interpretation: whether section 105(2) of the Constitution (requiring provincial legislatures to consist of between 30 and 80 members and requiring the number of members to be determined by a formula prescribed by national legislation), and the national legislation enacted pursuant to it, applied to the Western Cape given that the Western Cape provincial constitution itself fixed the number of members at 42.


A further interpretive issue was whether the apparent divergence between the provincial constitutional provision and the national legislative formula amounted to a “conflict” to be resolved under section 147(1)(a) of the Constitution (which provides that national legislation prevails over a conflicting provision of a provincial constitution where the Constitution specifically requires or envisages the enactment of national legislation).


In addition, the Court had to assess whether recognising 42 seats in the Western Cape, rather than 39, would infringe constitutional rights and principles relied upon by the respondents, including equality and the right to vote in free and fair elections, and whether related fiscal concerns affected validity.


Overall, the dispute was predominantly a matter of law, specifically the relationship between provincial constitutions and national constitutional “default” provisions, and the application of that relationship to the undisputed structural facts about how the seat numbers had been set.


4. Court’s Reasoning


On jurisdiction, the Court expressed doubt that section 167(4)(a) necessarily applied. While it accepted that the Commission and the Chief Electoral Officer might fall within the broad definition of organs of state in section 239, it was not clear that they were organs of state “in the national or provincial sphere” as contemplated by section 167(4)(a). The Court reasoned that, in constitutional usage, “sphere” is associated with spheres of government, whereas the Electoral Commission is an independent institution and not part of government, and thus not readily located within either the national or provincial sphere in the sense envisaged by section 167(4)(a).


The Court also highlighted policy considerations favouring a narrow construction of exclusive jurisdiction under section 167(4)(a), noting the undesirability of requiring all disputes between any institutions qualifying as organs of state under section 239 to be heard only by the Constitutional Court, with the consequence that the Court would act as both court of first and final instance.


However, the Court did not finally determine exclusive jurisdiction because it considered the alternative route—direct access—to be justified. It granted direct access under rule 17, emphasising that the matter presented a single, crisp issue of constitutional interpretation, that the Court had previously considered the relevant point, that the declaration sought raised no major practical difficulties, that the parties were ready to argue, and that the matter was urgent given the impending election. The Court concluded that the interests of justice required that it hear and determine the matter directly and urgently.


On the merits, the Court’s reasoning turned on the relationship between section 143 (permitting provincial constitutions to provide for legislative and executive “structures and procedures” that differ from those in Chapter 6) and section 105(2) (which regulates the number of provincial legislators via a national formula). The applicants’ claim rested on section 13 of the Western Cape provincial constitution fixing the legislature at 42 members, and the Court accepted that this subject matter fell within the scope of “legislative structures and procedures” contemplated by section 143(1)(a).


The Court held that where a provincial constitution regulates the legislative structures and procedures of a provincial legislature in a manner permitted by section 143(1) and not in breach of the limitations in section 143(2), then the default provisions of Chapter 6—expressly including section 105(2)—do not apply to that province on those points. The Court characterised the Chapter 6 arrangements as providing a framework for provinces where no provincial constitution provides otherwise, and it reasoned that a valid provincial constitutional provision on legislative structure displaces the Chapter 6 default provisions on that topic.


Because section 105(2) was held not to apply to the Western Cape in the face of section 13 of its provincial constitution, the Court concluded that national legislation enacted pursuant to section 105(2) likewise could not govern the seat determination for the Western Cape while the provincial constitutional provision remained in force. The Court therefore rejected the respondents’ reliance on section 147(1)(a). It reasoned that the difference between the national legislative prescription (39 seats) and the provincial constitutional prescription (42 seats) was not the type of “conflict” envisaged for resolution under section 147, because the divergence was specifically sanctioned by the Constitution itself through section 143’s authorisation for provincial constitutions to differ on legislative structures and procedures.


The Court reinforced this conclusion by referring to its earlier decision during the certification process of the Western Cape Constitution, in which it had already rejected objections to section 13 and had held that the number of members of a legislature is part of legislative structure or procedure, and therefore a matter on which a provincial constitution may validly provide something different under section 143(1)(a). The Court treated this prior determination as directly supporting the applicants’ position that section 13 was constitutionally competent and not overridden by section 105(2) or national legislation.


The respondents’ further constitutional objections based on equality, free and fair elections, and fiscal burden were also rejected. The Court reasoned that because the electoral system is one of proportional representation, additional seats in a provincial legislature do not increase the strength or weight of a vote within the province; the allocation of representation remains proportional irrespective of the absolute number of seats. The Court also rejected the suggestion that a larger provincial legislature would yield illegitimate or unequal influence at national level, noting that representation in the National Council of Provinces is fixed at 10 members per province, and that votes in the National Assembly are not affected by the number of seats in a provincial legislature.


The Court further observed that, even under section 105(2)’s own framework, the minimum and maximum limits can produce differences between provinces relative to population size, and it cited this as undermining the respondents’ contention that any deviation from a strict population formula necessarily violates equality or electoral fairness. As to fiscal concerns, the Court responded that the provincial constitution had been passed by a two-thirds majority, reflecting democratic and constitutional acceptance of its size and attendant fiscal implications.


Finally, the Court addressed the practical consequence of its interpretation. It held that the Commission’s determination under the national legislation, insofar as it purported to set Western Cape seats at 39, was invalid. It noted that if the Western Cape were to amend its constitution by removing section 13 so that the provincial constitution no longer regulated the number of seats, the Commission would then be empowered to make a determination under the Electoral Act read with section 105(2).


5. Outcome and Relief


The Court unanimously declared that the number of seats in the Western Cape Provincial Parliament is governed by section 13 of the Constitution of the Western Cape 1998, namely 42 seats.


It set aside as invalid the Electoral Commission’s determination of 17 March 1999 that the Western Cape Provincial Parliament would have 39 seats after the election scheduled for 2 June 1999.


The respondents were ordered to pay the costs of the application, consistent with the parties’ agreement that costs should follow the result.


Cases Cited


In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Western Cape, 1997 (4) SA 795 (CC); 1997 (12) BCLR 1653 (CC)


Legislation Cited


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996


Constitution of the Western Cape, 1998


Electoral Act 73 of 1998


Rules of Court Cited


Rules of the Constitutional Court: Rule 17


Held


The Constitutional Court held that section 105(2) of the Constitution and national legislation enacted pursuant to it do not apply to determine the number of seats in a provincial legislature where a valid provincial constitution, authorised by section 143(1)(a), itself provides for a different legislative structure, including fixing the number of members.


Accordingly, section 13 of the Constitution of the Western Cape 1998 validly governs the composition of the Western Cape Provincial Parliament, with the result that the Commission’s determination fixing the number at 39 seats was invalid, and the Provincial Parliament was entitled to 42 seats.


The Court further held that recognising 42 seats did not infringe equality or the right to vote in free and fair elections, given proportional representation and the structure of representation at national level, and that fiscal objections did not affect validity in light of the democratic adoption of the provincial constitution.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A provincial constitution may, under section 143(1)(a) of the Constitution, validly provide for provincial legislative structures and procedures that differ from those set out in Chapter 6, subject to compliance with section 143(2) (including consistency with the Constitution, the founding values in section 1, and the principles of cooperative government in Chapter 3, and not conferring powers beyond those constitutionally allocated).


Where a provincial constitution validly regulates a matter falling within legislative structures and procedures, the relevant provisions of Chapter 6 operate as default provisions and do not apply to that province on that subject. Consequently, national legislation authorised by a default provision such as section 105(2) cannot override a valid provincial constitutional provision regulating the same structural matter.


A divergence between national legislation enacted pursuant to a constitutional default provision and a provincial constitutional provision authorised by section 143 is not necessarily a “conflict” to be resolved under section 147(1)(a), because the Constitution itself contemplates and permits such authorised provincial variation.


Direct access to the Constitutional Court under rule 17 may be granted where the interests of justice so require, including in circumstances of urgency and where the dispute presents a focused issue of constitutional interpretation suitable for determination without the ordinary sequence of litigation.

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[1999] ZACC 6
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Premier of the Western Cape and Another v Electoral Commission and Another (CCT19/99) [1999] ZACC 6; 1999 (11) BCLR 1209 (2 September 1999)

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case CCT 19/99
THE
PREMIER OF THE PROVINCE OF THE
WESTERN CAPE
First Applicant
THE SPEAKER OF THE PROVINCIAL PARLIAMENT
OF THE
WESTERN CAPE Second
Applicant
versus
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION
First Respondent
THE CHIEF ELECTORAL OFFICER Second
Respondent
Heard on : 26 May 1999
Order issued
on : 26 May 1999
Reasons furnished on : 2 September
1999
JUDGMENT
MOKGORO J:
[1]On 26 May 1999, and at
the conclusion of oral argument in this matter, the
following order was
unanimously made by the Court:
"1. The number of seats in the
Western Cape Provincial Parliament
is governed by section 13
of the Constitution of the Western
Cape 1998, namely 42.
2. The determination made by the first respondent on 17 March
1999, namely that after the election scheduled for 2 June 1999
the Western Cape Provincial Parliament will have 39 seats, is
invalid.
3. The respondents are to pay the costs of the
application."
At the time, it was intimated that reasons for the order
would be furnished later. These
are the reasons.
[2]In preparation
for the second democratic election in the history of the country,
the
Electoral Commission ("the Commission") made a determination of the
number of seats
for each provincial legislature. For the Western Cape, the
number, based on a formula
of one representative per hundred thousand
inhabitants, was set at 39 seats. The
provincial government of the Western
Cape, however, contended that in terms of section
13 of the Constitution of
the Western Cape ("the provincial constitution"), the province
is entitled to
a total of 42 seats. Much correspondence passed between the parties in
an
effort to resolve the conflict, but without success. On 20 May 1999 the
applicants, at the
eleventh hour, approached this Court for a declarator that
would vindicate their position.
With the Commission as first respondent, the
matter was urgently set down for hearing
on 26 May 1999.
[3]The
applicants argued that this Court had exclusive jurisdiction to hear the
matter
by virtue of section 167(4)(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa (the
Constitution), which provides:
"Only the
Constitutional Court may . . . decide disputes between organs of state
in the national or provincial sphere concerning the constitutional status,
powers
or functions of any of those organs of
state;"
Alternatively, in light of the urgent nature of the matter, the
applicants sought leave to
obtain direct access to this Court in terms of
rule 17.
[4]It is not clear that section 167(4)(a) governs the current
situation. It may be that
the Commission and its Electoral Officer are
organs of state as defined by section 239
of the Constitution. However, it
is not clear that they are organs of state "in the national
or provincial
sphere" as contemplated by section 167(4)(a). If one has regard to the
use
of the concept "sphere" in the Constitution, it seems that what is
contemplated in section
167(4)(a) is a dispute between different spheres of
government, whether national or
provincial. This Court has held that the
Commission is an independent institution and
does not form part of
government. Moreover, it clearly does not form part of national
government
in contradistinction to provincial government. It is doubtful therefore
that
the respondents constitute organs of state in the national or provincial
sphere, as
provided for in section 167(4)(a).
[5]Furthermore, there
are sound considerations of policy for a narrower reading of
section
167(4)(a). It would be undesirable if, whenever there is a dispute between
any
of the many institutions that are defined as organs of state in section
239, such disputes
had to come to this Court and this Court only. The most
obvious of these considerations
is that exclusive jurisdiction holds with it
the consequence that this Court acts as court
of first and final instance, a
situation which should be avoided for the reasons we have
expressed in other
decisions. However, as there is merit in the applicants'
alternative
submission in relation to jurisdiction, we do not need to decide
this question. The case
before us dealt with a single crisp issue of
constitutional interpretation, which this Court
has had an opportunity to
consider before; the declaration sought raises no practical
problems of any
magnitude; the parties were already before the Court and prepared to
argue;
and the matter was urgent as contended. Accordingly, the clear demands of
the
interests of justice required this Court to grant direct access and hear
the matter on an
urgent basis.
[6]The applicants claimed that their
right to have 42 seats in the provincial legislature
flowed directly from
section 13 of the provincial constitution. This section provides
quite
simply that "[t]he Provincial Parliament consists of 42 elected
members." Such a
provision, they submitted, was regulated by section 143 of
the Constitution which, in
relevant part states:
"(1) A
provincial constitution . . . must not be inconsistent with this Constitution,
but
may provide for-
(a) provincial legislative .
. . structures and procedures that differ
from those provided
for in [chapter 6 of the Constitution]; or
(b) . . .
(2)
Provisions included in a provincial constitution . . . in terms of [paragraph]
(a)
. . . of subsection (1)-
(a) must comply with the
values in section 1 and with Chapter 3;
and
(b)
may not confer on the province any power or function that falls-
(i) outside the area of provincial competence in terms of
Schedules 4 and 5; or
(ii) outside the powers and functions
conferred on the
province by other sections of the
Constitution."
The applicants contended that a province is permitted to
originate legislative structures
and procedures that differ from those
provided for in the Constitution by providing for
such structures and
procedures in its provincial constitution. Thus, they argued, section
13 of
the provincial constitution is not subject to the requirements of section 105(2)
of
the Constitution.
[7]The respondents disagreed. In their
submission, section 105(2) of the Constitution
was the legal standard
governing the situation. Section 105(2) states:
"A provincial
legislature consists of between 30 and 80 members. The number of
members, which may differ among the provinces, must be determined in terms of
a
formula prescribed by national legislation."
Their argument was
that the number of members of every provincial legislature is to
be
determined in terms of a formula prescribed by national legislation. Such
legislation,
which includes the formula, had been passed in the form of the
Act. The formula,
provided for by section 114 read with item 2 to schedule 3
of the Act, prescribed the
number of seats for the Western Cape as a number
equal to 39. In the result, there was
a conflict between a provision in the
provincial constitution and national legislation.
Such conflicts, they
contended, fell to be resolved in favour of the national legislation
as
required by section 147(1)(a) of the Constitution which states:
"If there is a conflict between national legislation and a provision of a
provincial
constitution with regard to . . . a matter concerning which
this Constitution specifically
requires or envisages the enactment of
national legislation, the national legislation prevails
over the
affected provision of the provincial constitution"
Accordingly, in the
respondents' submission, the provisions of the Act take precedence
over the
provisions of the provincial constitution.
[8]The succinct legal issue
in this case, therefore, is whether section 105(2) and the
legislation passed
pursuant thereto, has any application to the composition of a
provincial
legislature which is provided for in a provincial
constitution.
[9]It does not. Section 143(1) permits provincial
constitutions to provide for different
legislative structures and procedures
for provinces who choose to establish their own
distinctive legislatures. It
permits such differences subject to the qualification in
subsection 2(a) and
(b). They must comply with the founding values in section 1 and
the
principles of cooperative government in Chapter 3 of the Constitution.
Furthermore,
a provincial constitution may not bestow powers beyond those
conferred upon the
province by the national Constitution. The respondents
correctly did not contend that any
of these qualifications had been violated.
If a provincial constitution regulates the
procedures and structures of a
provincial legislature and in so doing it does not violate
section 143(2),
then the provisions of chapter 6, including section 105(2), have
no
application to that province. One might loosely refer to these provisions
of chapter 6 as
default provisions: they provide the framework for provincial
legislative and executive
structures and procedures where none is provided
for by a provincial constitution. If
section 105(2) has no application, then
neither does any legislation authorised pursuant
thereto. Any difference in
this regard that there might be between the prescripts of
national
legislation passed pursuant to constitutional authorisation and a
provincial
constitution is therefore not a conflict envisaged to be resolved
by section 147. It is a
difference that is exempted from the application of
that section because it is sanctioned
by another provision of the
Constitution.
[10]This is not a novel proposition. The issue was
squarely before us in the judgment
delivered by this Court during the
certification process of the Western Cape
Constitution. In the course of
that judgment the Court unanimously held the following
at paragraph 51:
"The ANC and the national government also object to [section 13], which provides
that
the provincial parliament shall consist of 42 members. The basis
of the objection was that
it was inconsistent with NC 105(2) . . . The
objectors also argued that because the NC
provides that national
legislation must prescribe the formula in terms of which the number
of
seats of provincial legislatures will be calculated, it was not competent for a
provincial
legislature to regulate this matter in its constitution.
Neither argument is valid. The
number of members of a legislature is
clearly a part or aspect of a legislative structure or
procedure, in
respect of which NC 143(1)(a) permits a provincial constitution to provide
something different."
Once a province has determined its own legislative
structures in terms of section 143,
such structures cannot be altered by
national legislation. It is clearly the intention of the
Constitution to
exempt provisions of a provincial constitution relating to legislative
or
executive structures or procedures from the application of the
constitutional default
provisions. In this case, it is the 42 seats
determined by section 13 of the provincial
constitution and provided for by
section 143 of the Constitution, and not the 39
determined in terms of the
Act, which prevail.
[11]The respondents also submitted that if the
Western Cape legislature was entitled
to have 42 as opposed to 39 members in
its legislature, it would infringe the right to
equality and to vote in free
and fair elections. Equality would be violated, so they argued,
because the
province would ultimately have more seats in relation to its population
size.
The Western Cape would be out of step with the rest of the provinces
and the Republic
generally, and would create a situation where the voting
strength would be unequal. This
in turn would violate the right to free and
fair elections. It was further contended that this
situation would place an
extra burden on the fiscus.
[12]There is no merit in any of these
arguments. Because we have a proportional
system of representation, the
additional number of seats does not increase the strength of
the vote cast in
the Western Cape. The outcome of the election will entitle the parties to
be
proportionally represented in the provincial parliament. That is the case
irrespective
of the number of seats.
[13]The "bloated" Western Cape
parliament will not be able to exercise illegitimate or
unequal power in the
National Council of Provinces. There the number is fixed at 10
members per
province. Votes cast in the Western Cape will not only have equal
effect
within that province, but also equal effect in relation to other
provinces within the
National Assembly. The differences between provinces do
not extend beyond the specific
boundaries of any province. Similarly,
because of the minimum and maximum limits
stipulated in section 105(2),
relative to its population size the Northern Cape has more
seats and
Kwa-Zulu-Natal less seats than they would have in terms of the strict
application
of the formula. There is therefore no violation of equality or
of the right to vote in free
and fair elections. The complaint about
burdening the fiscus is met by the fact that the
provincial constitution was
passed by a two-thirds majority, thus democratically and
constitutionally
accepting its size and its resulting fiscal implications.
[14]What is the
effect then of the determination made under the Act as far as the
Western
Cape is concerned? It is invalid. Were the Western Cape to amend
its
constitution by removing section 13 so that the provincial constitution
no longer regulated
the number of seats in the provincial legislature, the
Commission would then be
empowered in terms of the Electoral Act read with
section 105(2) of the Constitution to
make an appropriate
determination.
[15]In this matter, the parties agreed that costs should
follow the result.
Chaskalson P, Langa DP, Ackermann J, Goldstone
J, Madala J, O'Regan J, Sachs J and
Yacoob J concur in the reasons of Mokgoro
J.For the applicants: J Kentridge instructed by Mallinicks Inc., Cape
Town.
For the respondents: IAM Semenya SC with P Mokoena instructed
by Pule,
Selebogo & Partners, Marshalltown.