About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Competition Appeal Court
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Competition Appeal Court
>>
2002
>>
[2002] ZACAC 2
|
|
Schumann Sasol (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Price's Daelite (Pty) Ltd (10/CAC/Aug01) [2002] ZACAC 2; [2001-2002] CPLR 84 (CAC) (27 June 2002)
IN
THE COMPETITION APPEAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
CASE NO: 10/CAC/Aug01
In the large
merger between:
SCHUMANN
SASOL (SOUTH AFRICA) (PTY) LTD First Appellant
and
PRICEâS
DAELITE (PTY) LTD.
Second Appellant
JUDGMENT:
INTRODUCTION.
First appellant is a manufacturer of candle wax.
Second appellant manufactures household candles. In 1995 the Leo
Goodman Family
Trust acquired a controlling interest in second
appellant from first appellant. In the same year the parties
concluded a wax supply
agreement pursuant to which second appellant
procured much of its wax from first appellant. This agreement was
amended in 1998.
Second
appellant is in a parlous financial position . The financial
statements as at 31 August 2000 reflect that second appellantâs
current liabilities amount to some R79 293 796 whereas its current
assets amount to R38 757 188. As at 31 August 2000 second appellant
was indebted to first appellant in the amount of R73 429 797. But
for the fact that first appellant agreed to subordinate its claims
in
favour of other creditors, second appellant would have had
insufficient funds to pay its debts and would be commercially
insolvent.
In 1998 an
agreement of pledge was concluded between the Leo Goodman Family
Trust as the majority shareholder of second appellant
and first
appellant in terms of which the former pledged its shareholding in
second appellant to first appellant as security for
the amounts owing
under the supply agreement. In addition, loan agreements and pledge
agreements were entered into in 1998, in
terms of which first
appellant advanced loans to Avron Goodman and Ivan Goodman to acquire
minority shareholdings in second appellant.
Disputes arose between
first and second appellant in respect of both the supply agreement
and the pledge agreements. First appellant
claimed that second
appellant was in default of its payment obligations under the supply
agreement and second appellant claimed that
first appellant was in
breach of the supply agreement.
On 12
September 2000 a settlement agreement was concluded between the
parties in terms of which first appellant would exercise its
rights
under the pledge held by it and become the sole shareholder of second
appellant. The shareholders of second appellant would
be released
from their obligations under the loan agreement with first appellant
which would also release second appellant in respect
of its claims
under the supply agreement. The effect of the settlement agreement
was that first appellant acquired control of second
appellant.
As the
settlement agreement included an acquisition by first appellant of
second appellantâs shareholding, this transaction by which
first
appellant acquired 100% of the shareholding of second appellant
meant that the transaction constituted a merger. As a result
the
Competition Commission (the âCommissionâ) was required to
consider the effect of the settlement agreement in terms of
section
12A
of the
Competition Act 89 of 1998
as amended (âthe Actâ).
The
Commission recommended that the Competition Tribunal (âthe
Tribunalâ) approve the proposed transaction subject to certain
conditions. After a hearing the Tribunal concluded that the
transaction would enable first appellant to extend its dominant
position
in the market for candle wax by strengthening its position
in the downstream market. The Tribunal rejected the defences raised
by
first appellant. It concluded that the conditions proposed by
the Commission did not meet the competitive concerns which had been
identified. Consequently, it prohibited the merger in terms of
Section 16(2)
of the Act. It is against this decision that
appellants have appealed to this Court.
The
applicable law relating to mergers .
Section 12A
(1) of the Act provides as follows:
Consideration
of mergers.â(1) Whenever required to consider a merger,
the Competition Commission or Competition Tribunal
must initially
determine whether or not the merger is likely to substantially
prevent or lessen competition, by assessing the factors
set out in
subsection (2), andâ
(a) if it appears that the merger is likely to
substantially prevent or lessen competition, then determineâ
(i) whether
or not the merger is likely to result in any technological,
efficiency or other pro-competitive gain which will be greater
than,
and offset, the effects of any prevention or lessening of
competition, that may result or is likely to result from the merger,
and would not likely be obtained if the merger is prevented; and
(ii) whether the merger can or cannot be
justified on substantial public interest grounds by assessing the
factors set out in subsection
(3); or
(b) otherwise,
determine whether the merger can or cannot be justified on
substantial public interest grounds by assessing the factors
set out
in subsection (3).
Section 12A
(2) sets out a range of guidelines which the Competition Tribunal
should take into account in ascertaining whether the merger is
likely
to substantially prevent or lessen competition. The section provides
as follows :
(2) When determining whether or not a merger is likely
to substantially prevent or lessen competition, the Competition
Commission or Competition Tribunal must assess the strength of
competition in the relevant market, and the probability that the
firms
in the market after the merger will behave competitively or
co-operatively, taking into account any factor that is relevant to
competition
in that market, includingâ
(a) the actual and potential level of import competition in the
market;
(b) the
ease of entry into the market, including tariff and regulatory
barriers;
the
level and trends of concentration, and history of collusion, in the
market;
the
degree of countervailing power in the market;
(e) the dynamic characteristics of the market, including growth,
I innovation, and product differentiation;
( f ) the nature and extent of vertical integration in
the market;
(g) whether the business or part of the business of a party to
the merger or proposed merger has failed or is likely to fail; and
(h) whether the merger will result in the removal of an effective
competitor.
Section 12A
provides for definite stages in the inquiry which it mandates. In
the first place the Commission or the Tribunal must determine
whether the merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen
competition. In making such a determination the Competition Tribunal
must assess the strength of competition in the relevant market and
the probability that, after the merger, the firms in the market
will
behave competitively or co-operatively. In making this assessment
consideration must be given to the non exhaustive list of
factors set
out in
s12A(2)
which are relevant to the assessment of competition
in that market. This initial inquiry may be termed the threshold
test. The
test must be applied to the
relevant market
which
is the actual market and not a hypothetical or idealised market.
It is only
where the Commission or Tribunal makes an initial determination that
the merger is likely to substantially prevent or
lessen competition
that it then becomes obliged to proceed and determine whether the
merger is likely to result in any technological,
efficiency or other
pro-competitive gain which would outweigh the effects of a
prevention or diminution of competition that may
result or is likely
to result from the merger.
In addition to engaging in an examination of
technology and efficiency gains, the Commission or Tribunal is also
obliged to determine
whether the merger can be justified on
substantial public interest grounds. In making this determination,
section12A(3) enjoins
the Competition Tribunal to consider the effect
the merger will have on:
(a) a particular industrial sector or region;
(b) employment;
(c) the ability
of small businesses, or firms controlled or owned by historically
disadvantaged persons, to become competitive; and
(d) the
ability of national industries to compete in international markets.
In its
analysis of this legislative framework of merger control, the
Tribunal accepted that there is a distinction to be made between
the
determination of the effects of vertical and horizontal mergers.
This distinction is supported by a significant body of academic
literature. For example, A
Areeda ,Hovenkamp and Solow
:
Anti
Trust Law
(
Volume IV A) at 137 write:
â
A vertical merger, standing
alone does not alter concentration either in the supplierâs market
or in its customerâs markets and
hence adds nothing to whatever
market position either firm previously had. Nor would a series of
vertical mergers, as such, change
market concentration at either
level or necessarily contribute to market power. Accordingly, any
anti competitive effects of a vertical
merger must arise from other
structural or behavioral consequences such as increased entry
barriers, the elimination of unintegrated
rivals by foreclosure, or
the raising of rivals costs.â
Whish
Competition Law
(4
th
ed) at 541 writes:
â
It is fairly obvious that the
horizontal agreements, for example, to fix prices or to limit
output, should be prohibited: in this
situation, firms combine their
market power to their own advantage; vertical agreements do not
involve a combination of market power.
Vertical agreements are likely
to have an effect on competition only where the firm imposing a
vertical restraint already has some
degree of market powerâ.
This academic
approach to the issue of mergers has found favour with courts in the
United States of America. Thus, for example,
in
Alberta Gas
Chemicals Ltd v E I du Pont de Nemours
826 F.2d 1235
(3d
Cir.1987) 1244 the court said:
â
Indeed, respected scholars
question the anti-competitive effects of vertical mergers in general.
As one commentator phrases it:
âForeclosure does not, however,
reflect an actual reduction in competition in any meaningful senseââ¦.
A vertically integrated
firm seeking to increase profits will engage
in self dealing if the supplying divisionâs output cannot be
profitably sold elsewhere,
or is not more costly or inferior than the
product of outside suppliers⦠Because of post merger efficiencies
allowing it to
purchase the acquiring companyâs output at a
better price than in the market place, the acquired companyâs
purchasing cost
would fall â a pro competitive benefit capable of
being passed on via lower prices for its products. Thus, in this
scenario ,
post merger self -dealing could result in efficiencies
reflected in lower prices to the ultimate consumer.â
In Canada , the Merger Enforcement Guidelines of
1991 adopt the approach that vertical mergers rarely present
sufficient ground
for enforcement action. The Director of
Investigation and Research at the Bureau of Competition Policy is
unlikely to conclude
that a vertical merger is likely to prevent or
lessen competition substantially unless:
the merger results in rendering unlikely
entry into the primary market on a scale sufficient to eliminate a
material price increase
within two years , due to the need to
simultaneously enter the secondary market ; and
the exercise of market power in the
primary market is likely to be facilitated by the merger in the
absence of such entry .
(Merger Guidelines para 4.11.1)
This
comparative approach to vertical transactions assists in the
development of the interpretative approach to
s12A
where the
threshold test to be considered by the Commission or the Tribunal is
whether or not the merger is likely to substantially
prevent or
lessen competition. As
Mr Unterhalter
who appeared on behalf
of appellants contended, the requirements set out in
section 12A
capture the central premise of merger control, being that
transactions should be permitted unless it can be shown that the
threshold
requirement has been met on the basis of evidence placed
before the Tribunal. Only, if such a test is met do questions of
technology,
efficiency and public interest become important.
The
approach of the Tribunal.
The
Tribunal emphasized that there was clear evidence that there was a
high horizontal market concentration in both the sectors
involved in
the proposed merger, namely in the production of candle wax and in
the production of household candles . First appellant
enjoys a 75%
share of the upstream industry in South Africa while second appellant
enjoys a 42% of the downstream industry in South
Africa.
The Tribunal
found that the merger would affect both the upstream and downstream
markets. It would prevent or lessen competition
in the upstream wax
market by raising barriers to entry. A potential entrant would be
unable to sell its output of wax to the largest
candle producer,
being second appellant and may even be forced to enter candle
manufacturing itself. The acquisition of 100% of
the shares in
second appellant would enable first appellant to protect its monopoly
position in the candle wax market.
After
the merger, first appellant would discriminate in favour of second
appellant relative to the latterâs competitors, thus consolidating
and extending second appellantâs powerful position in the
manufacture of candles. Even were first appellant to desist from
engaging
in such discriminatory practices, second appellant would
gain from its upstream parentâs knowledge of the capacities,
demands
and strategies of its rivals who would be forced to enter
into supply agreements with first appellant.
With regard
to the upstream market the Tribunal found that the transaction would
ensure that first appellantâs competitors would
be:
ââ¦
reduced to the role of bit
players participating at the fringes of the market. They are
excluded from the largest part of the market
in an area of production
subject to scale economies and in which the respective participants â
the supplier and customer â placed
a high premium of certainty of
supply and demand. Their only way of entering the upstream candle
wax market would be to enter simultaneously
the downstream candle
market but this is unlikely to happen. Like SCHS, they are not candle
manufacturers and, in a market where
there is already one dominant
candle producer , one owned moreover, by the dominant competitor in
the candle wax market, this approach
is fraught with riskâ.
The
Tribunal examined the influential role that first appellant could
play in the downstream market, after the acquisition of the
shares in
second appellant thus:
â
[s]hould SCHS believe that its
share of the candle wax market, the upstream market, is threatened by
a possible tie-up between an
alternative supplier of wax and one of
the smaller producers of candles, its dominance of the upstream
market combined with its powerful
position in the downstream candle
market will enable it to consolidate its position in the latter
market precisely in order to maintain
the already significant
barriers in the upstream market that have⦠been consolidated and
extended by this transactionâ.
In summarizing
its finding as to of the effect of the transaction in both markets,
the Tribunal said:
â
[w]e conclude that the
transaction before us enables SCHS to maintain and extend its
dominant position in the market for candle wax.
Furthermore, should
SCHS deem it necessary to further secure its position in the upstream
market by extending its powerful position
in the downstream market
and this too is facilitated by the transaction. Accordingly we find
that the transaction will substantially
lessen or prevent competition
in both markets in question.â
In attacking
these findings
Mr Unterhalter
submitted that the risk of
foreclosure lay at the heart of the Tribunalâs rejection of the
merger. In other words the Tribunal
had concluded that in terms of
the settlement agreement, the customer firm (second appellant) could
foreclose as a market for the
supplierâs (i.e. first appellantâs)
rivals or the supplier firm could foreclose as a source of supply
for the customerâs
rivals. (cf:
Areeda, Hovenkamp and Solow,
(supra)
at 157).
Mr Unterhalter
submitted that this
theory rested upon what he termed â
shaky foundationsâ
.
As
Areeda et al (supra)
at 157 write;
â â¦
the foreclosure theory has
serious weaknesses. First, merger is a purely â
structural
â
act that indicates nothing about whether outsiders will be
foreclosed from dealing with the merged firm. Second, even in the
case of complete self-dealing to the exclusion of all others,
foreclosure has no anti-competitive effect whatsoever in competitive
markets and often has little effect in oligopolistic markets. Third,
even when foreclosure has the effect of making it more difficult
for
one or more existing firms to find inputs or patronage, injury to
competition is not obvious and an additional explanation must
be
supplied.â
Mr
Unterhalter
contended that there was no realistic possibility of
first appellant foreclosing the market to suppliers of wax when
manufacturers
had ready access to imported wax the supply of which
did not depend upon any economies of scale in the South African
market nor upon
entry into the household candle manufacturing market.
He further submitted that it was not a plausible argument to contend
that
first appellant would be able to utilise second appellant for
the purposes of either securing its position or procuring market
power
for second appellant, given the low barriers to entry into the
market for a manufacturer of household candles.
Before
analysing the details of
Mr Unterhalterâs
attack on the
Tribunalâs decision, it is necessary to establish the test which
should be applied by this Court in an appeal of
this nature. In
terms of
section 17
of the Act this Court can, in an appeal from a
decision made by the Tribunal in terms of
section 16:
(a) set aside
the decision; (b) amend the decision by ordering or removing
restrictions or by including or deleting conditions; or
(c) confirm
the decision.
In terms of
section 17(3)
if the Court allows an appeal and sets aside the
decision, it must either: (a) approve the merger; (b) approve the
merger subject
to any conditions; or (c) prohibit implementation of
the merger.
The approach
which this Court adopts to an appeal against the decision of the
Tribunal in respect of a merger should take cognizance
of the
composition and role of the Tribunal as a specialist body which
consists not only of lawyers but also of members possessed
of the
necessary financial and economic knowledge and thorough grasp of the
relevant policy issues required in these kind of deliberations.
Section 12A
requires that the Tribunal make a determination after a
holistic inquiry into whether the proposed merger is likely to
substantially
prevent or lessen competition. In assessing such a
decision, this Court should take account of the composition and
expertise of
the Tribunal as well as the nature of the enquiry which
entails an element of probabilistic investigation into the effect of
the
proposed merger. Account also needs to be taken here of the
fact that the dispute concerns a vertical merger in which case, as
has been shown, there is considerable comparative authority in
favour of a different approach to such a merger. In its decision
as
to whether to set aside, amend or confirm the decision of the
Tribunal, this Court must be cautious before imposing its own
conception
of the policy considerations upon the decision adopted by
the Tribunal. The Court should seek rather to examine and test
rigorously
the justifications offered by the Tribunal for the
decision to which it has arrived before it invokes its power in terms
of
s17.
An
Evaluation of the Tribunalâs Decision.
To recapitulate, the
central finding of the Tribunal was that the proposed transaction â
â
prevents or lessens
competition in the candle wax market, the upstream market, by raising
barriers to entry in respect of that market.
Furthermore, the
transaction significantly increases the capacity of the merged entity
to consolidate and extend Price Daeliteâs
already powerful position
in the downstream marketâ.
These
conclusions were based on the following process of reasoning:
In the case
of the upstream market the Tribunal found that once second
appellantâs custom had been secured, first appellant had
exclusive
access to the majority of the market share, being the 42% of the
market for household candles enjoyed by second appellant
and the 13%
controlled by Willowton and Cape Mills which had entered into a
supply agreement with first appellant. First appellantâs
competitors would therefore have to compete for the minority of the
market or enter the downstream candle market to ensure the purchase
of their production of candle wax. Such a competitor would have to
hope that the demand of other customers would be sufficient
to
purchase their supply.
The Tribunal
found that second appellant, which operated in the downstream market,
would be accorded:
â
a massive anti-competitive
advantage by the mere fact that Schuman Sasol, its parent in the
upstream market, has intimate, direct
and immediate knowledge of the
production capacities and output levels of all Price Daeliteâs
competitors in the downstream market,
including knowledge of
fluctuations in their demand for waxâ¦.â.
By means of
this transaction, second appellant would obtain privileged insight
into the strategy as well as the capacity of its
competitors. In
addition the transaction would enhance second appellantâs scope for
anti-competitive practice such as predation.
By predation the
Tribunal must be assumed to mean that the predator (in this case
second appellant) would take some action to harm
its competitors,
which action would not be considered
per se
to be rational
action designed directly to maximize profit. However the harm would
cause rivals to exit the market and once such
exit had occurred,
the predator would be able to raise prices above the level that
prevailed prior to the act of predation.
The Tribunal
also found that it would be extremely difficult for a new entrant to
operate successfully in the candle manufacturing
market in which the
largest participant enjoyed 42% market share of such market and the
dominant supplier of the key input would
control this largest
participant in the market.
Mr
Unterhalter
submitted that there was an inherent contradiction in
this approach. In its determination, the Tribunal recognised that
the existing
candle wax market structure was â
ripe for
competitive entryâ
. In particular it referred to the absence
of tariff barriers and the real prospect of international competition
particularly in
the form of Chinese imports. It also mentioned that
Shell, which was a potential alternative supplier ,had resolved
certain technical
problems in its Malaysian refinery and was
considering entry into the local market.
Mr Unterhalter
contended that nowhere in its determination had the Tribunal offered
any explanation as to how these competitive forces would be
dissipated by the proposed transaction. However to find that the
transaction would promote the competitive abuse required the
Tribunal
to ignore the effect of its own finding of the very real
existence of alternative sources of candle wax. Once account is
taken of
the prospect of a viable imported supply of wax (which could
be increased depending upon demand) , it follows that to ensure the
disposal of its product, first appellant must set its price below
the level of competing imports. On the basis of this reasoning
,Mr
Unterhalter contended that the observed high market share of
appellant would be more the consequence of rather than the
determinant
of its pricing behavior.
Were first
appellant to raise its prices to all downstream manufacturers within
the context of an alternative source of wax through
importation ,
competitors of second appellant would then purchase the cheaper
imported product of medium candle wax. Were first
appellant to
sell medium candle wax to second appellant at the increased price, it
would place the latter at a significant price
disadvantage. Such a
pricing decision could well cause second appellant to lose its
market share to competitors who would be able
to acquire wax at what
would then be the cheaper price.
Although the Tribunal suggested that as a result
of the transaction, second appellant would be able to engage in
predation it cited
no evidence nor explanation as to how such
conduct would be rational; that is whether or not , following the
exit of competitors,
second appellant would be able to raise prices
above the level that would have prevailed prior to its act of
predation. On the
basis of the Tribunalâs own finding concerning
the lack of barriers to entry into the candle manufacturing market,
there is a clear
implication that a recoupment of profits after the
exit of competitors would not necessarily be possible. With prices
constrained
by import competition and low barriers to entry in candle
manufacturing, candle prices could not easily be raised above the
competitive
level without inducing a greater measure of import
substitution and/or entry into the candle market which would
undermine the very
objective of predation.
Mr
Unterhalter
also criticised what he called the Tribunalâs
â
speculative accountsâ
âof the supposed anti-competitive
behaviour of second appellant. Any information which first appellant
might gain from its customers
who were competitors of second
appellant was likely to be patchy, given the access of rival candle
manufacturers to other sources
of wax supply. Furthermore no
evidence was presented which indicated that first appellant would
behave in the manner described.
If first appellant pursued such
conduct it would be subject to scrutiny as having engaged in a
prohibited practice. Such conduct
would be subject to Chapter 2 of
the Act.
The conclusion reached by the Tribunal that the
merger was likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition is
based upon speculation
of the kind which cannot be attributed to any
evidential foundation placed before the Tribunal. On the evidence,
there appears
to be no plausible basis by which the Tribunal was able
to conclude that first appellant could foreclose the market to
suppliers
of wax, particularly when manufacturers had ready access to
imported wax, which supply is not dependant upon economies of scale
within
the South African market nor upon entry into the household
candle manufacturing market.
The Tribunal
acknowledged that the relationship between the appellants was a
troubled one. As at 31 August 2000, second appellant
was indebted to
first appellant in the amount of R73 429 797,00. As already noted,
the total of second appellantâs current liabilities
amounted to
R79,293,796 whereas its current assets amounted to R38 757 188. But
for the fact that first appellant has agreed to
subordinate its
claims in favour of other creditors, would have been commercially
insolvent. The settlement agreement, which provided
for the merger
transaction which is the subject of this dispute, purported to settle
all disputes between appellants.
In summary,
the settlement agreement provided that first appellant would
exercise its rights under a pledge held by it, in terms
of which the
major shareholder of second appellant pledged its shareholdings in
the latter to first appellant as security for the
amounts owing under
an agreement. First appellant would become the sole shareholder of
second appellant. The shareholders of second
appellant would be
released from their obligations under various loan agreements with
first appellant Second appellant would be
released from
obligations in terms of claims under the supply agreement.
Viewed within
this context the entire settlement agreement was based on financial
considerations; in particular the resolution of
a dispute relating to
a considerable amount of debt. The Tribunal placed very little
substantive importance upon these objectives.
Rather it engaged in
speculation which had too weak an evidential foundation to conclude
that the real objective or result of
the agreement was to guarantee
first appellantâs dominance of the upstream market by raising
barriers to entry in that market.
The analysis
advanced by the Tribunal to justify its conclusion that the
financial considerations relating to debt were effectively
of little
importance and that broader competition issues powered the
settlement agreement is sufficiently contradicted by the
objective
facts concerning alternative sources of supply of wax and the
nature of the market with its ease of entry.
For
these reasons we find that the Tribunalâs justification for
concluding that the merger was likely to substantially prevent or
lessen competition in either of the markets identified lacks
sufficient justification to be confirmed. Given this finding that the
merger does not pass the threshold test, it is unnecessary to deal
with the additional tests contained in
Section 12A(1)(a)(i)
and
(ii). No argument was addressed to us with regard to the effect
and application of
section 12A(1)(b)
, upon which we make no comment.
As the evidence does not show that the transaction is likely
substantially to prevent or lessen
competition, the appeal must be
upheld. The failure to meet the threshold test means that there is
no necessity to impose the kind
of conditions recommended by the
Commission, nor are there facts which indicate that any other
conditions should be attached.
For these
reasons it is ordered that the decision of the Competition Tribunal
be set aside and the merger be approved.
â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦
DAVIS
JP
I agree:
â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦..
HUSSAIN JA
I agree
â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦â¦...
SELIKOWITZ
AJA