Competition Commission v Unilever PLC and Others (13/CAC/Jan02) [2002] ZACAC 1; [2001-2002] CPLR 29 (CAC); 2004 (3) SA 23 (CAC) (14 February 2002)

80 Reportability
Competition Law

Brief Summary

Competition — Confidentiality — Access to information in merger proceedings — Competition Commission ordered to provide respondents’ legal representatives with access to entire record of merger proceedings, subject to confidentiality undertakings — Tribunal's initial order for limited access set aside as lacking legal basis under section 45 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 — Respondents entitled to challenge confidentiality claims to ensure procedural fairness and proper adjudication of such claims.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


These proceedings were an appeal to the Competition Appeal Court against an interlocutory order made by the Competition Tribunal relating to access to the record in a pending large merger matter and, specifically, access to information claimed to be confidential.


The appellant was the Competition Commission of South Africa. The respondents were Unilever PLC (first respondent), Unifoods, a division of Unilever South Africa (Pty) Ltd (second respondent), Robertsons Foods (Pty) Ltd (third respondent), and Robertsons Food Service (Pty) Ltd (fourth respondent). The dispute arose in the context of a large merger in which the Commission had made a recommendation to the Tribunal.


The procedural history was central to the judgment. The Commission had delivered its recommendation to the Tribunal and provided the merging parties with a version from which certain portions were blacked out on confidentiality grounds. The respondents then sought disclosure of information and documents underpinning the recommendation so as to consider whether to challenge the confidentiality claims. At a prehearing conference on 18 January 2002, the respondents applied to the Tribunal for an order compelling disclosure, and the Tribunal granted relief requiring the Commission to provide the parties’ legal advisers access to the full record, including information claimed confidential, subject to confidentiality undertakings.


The Commission approached the Competition Appeal Court seeking to stay compliance with the Tribunal’s order pending final determination of its own application to the Court (brought in terms of section 45(3) of the Competition Act). On 22 January 2002, an interim order was issued granting restricted inspection of the record at the Commission’s offices and prohibiting reproduction, with costs reserved. The appeal against the Tribunal’s order was heard on 31 January 2002, after which the Court set aside the Tribunal’s order and substituted it with a differently framed order granting limited access, imposing confidentiality undertakings, and requiring service on confidential-information providers if an application under section 45 were launched. The present judgment provides the reasons for that substituted order and the associated costs orders.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was the interaction between confidentiality protections in competition proceedings and the merging parties’ entitlement to procedural fairness in preparing to challenge confidentiality claims under section 45 of the Competition Act.


2. Material Facts


The court treated as material, and largely undisputed, the sequence of steps through which the confidentiality dispute arose. On 14 December 2001, the Commission, acting under section 14A of the Competition Act, forwarded to the Tribunal a written recommendation with reasons in relation to the large merger between the respondents. The recommendation was that the merger be approved subject to certain conditions, including a condition requiring the second respondent to divest its entire product portfolio marketed under specified brands.


A copy of the Commission’s recommendation report was supplied to the respondents, but with certain portions removed by blacking out passages. As a result, the respondents did not have access to certain information on which the Commission purported to rely in formulating its recommendation to the Tribunal.


On 20 December 2001, the respondents’ legal representatives requested that, insofar as the blacked-out portions were based on claims of confidentiality, the Commission provide copies of the relevant CC7 confidentiality claim forms, to enable the respondents to consider challenging the confidentiality claims under section 45(1). On 3 January 2002, the respondents’ attorneys expanded the request, seeking a list of persons who had made representations to the Commission, the nature and contents of the information submitted, any additional CC7 forms, and any sourced documents used by the Commission in preparing its report.


On 4 January 2002, the Commission refused to make certain requested information available, asserting that it was confidential.


At a prehearing conference on 18 January 2002, the respondents applied to the Tribunal for an order directing the Commission to make available to them the information in its possession, including information relied upon in its report, so that the respondents’ legal representatives could consider whether the confidentiality claims were valid. The Tribunal granted an order requiring access to the full record supplied to the Tribunal, including information claimed confidential, subject to confidentiality undertakings and with further directions concerning any expansion of the class of persons granted access, and any contestation of confidentiality claims.


The Commission then sought a stay and appealed. On 22 January 2002, an interim order from the Competition Appeal Court permitted access by way of inspection at the Commission’s offices and prohibited reproduction of the record, with costs reserved. After hearing the appeal on 31 January 2002, the Court replaced the Tribunal’s order with a substituted order allowing inspection by the respondents’ legal representatives at the Commission’s offices, prohibiting reproduction, requiring confidentiality undertakings, and directing that if an application under section 45 were brought, the respondents must serve the notice of motion and affidavits on each person who had provided confidential information within five days of filing.


To the extent there was a dispute, it was not about these events but about the legal basis for compelled disclosure and the proper procedural route for dealing with confidential information before a formal section 45 determination.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions concerned the source and scope of the Tribunal’s (and the system’s) power to compel disclosure of information claimed confidential, and the correct interpretation and operation of the confidentiality provisions of the Competition Act in the pre-determination stage.


The key issues the court was required to determine were whether, in the absence of a formal application by the respondents in terms of section 45, the Tribunal nonetheless had lawful power to order disclosure of the full record (including information claimed confidential) to the respondents’ legal advisers; and, relatedly, whether the statutory scheme required or permitted some form of limited disclosure to enable a party meaningfully to exercise its rights under section 45(1) to challenge confidentiality.


The dispute was primarily one of law (statutory interpretation and the existence of powers under the Act), combined with the application of legal principles to procedural facts, and it required an evaluative balancing between competing considerations: protection of confidential information on the one hand, and procedural fairness and the administration of justice on the other.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court’s reasoning proceeded from the statutory framework governing confidentiality and access to information in merger proceedings. It referred to the Commission’s rules providing that information received during a merger investigation is treated as restricted information until the Commission, in a large merger, makes its recommendation to the Tribunal under section 14A. Once the recommendation is made, the restricted status falls away, subject to the continued protection of information for which a confidentiality claim has been lodged. The court noted that the statutory mechanism for challenging confidentiality is section 45(1), under which a person seeking access to information claimed confidential may apply to the Tribunal for a determination of confidentiality and, if the information is confidential, for an appropriate order concerning access.


The Commission’s principal contention was that disclosure of information claimed confidential could occur only through a formal section 45 process and that, because the respondents had not yet brought such an application, the Tribunal lacked power to order disclosure on 18 January 2002. The respondents’ position was that section 45 provides a right to challenge confidentiality, but that right could not be exercised meaningfully unless the party seeking to challenge confidentiality had some means of obtaining access to the information in dispute at least in a constrained way, so as to know what had been withheld, whether confidentiality had been properly claimed, and whether a challenge should be mounted.


The court accepted that the Act does not impose an absolute bar on disclosure of confidential information. It relied on section 69(2), which expressly provides that the offence provision relating to disclosure of confidential information does not apply to disclosures made for the purpose of the proper administration or enforcement of the Act, or for the purpose of the administration of justice, or at the request of specified officials or Tribunal members entitled to receive the information. The court treated this as a clear legislative recognition that disclosure can be permissible where needed for the administration of the Act and justice, which bore directly on whether limited disclosure could be ordered to facilitate a fair process under section 45.


A central element of the court’s reasoning was that, if the Commission’s interpretation were accepted, a party bringing a section 45 application could be placed in an untenable position: the hearing would proceed with access to the disputed information available to all parties except the very applicant seeking access, leaving that applicant unable to present a proper case and relying entirely on the Tribunal to determine the matter without adversarial assistance. The court regarded such a result as incompatible with fairness. It reasoned that the silence of section 45 on what disclosure is required to mount a challenge created a need to recognise a right to some disclosure that enables the statutory right to be exercised effectively, and that this recognition must be consistent with constitutional and common-law principles of a fair hearing.


In developing the fairness rationale, the court referred to constitutional values of fairness and openness, citing Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of S.A and Others: In re Ex parte President of the RSA and Others as authority for constitutional underpinnings relevant to statutory interpretation and lawful administrative action. Against this, it acknowledged the countervailing interest: information is often provided to the Commission on the basis that it will remain confidential, and there is a public and private interest in protecting such information, including to ensure that informants will continue to provide information in future investigations.


The court therefore framed the problem as requiring a balancing of competing rights and interests. It concluded that an order should provide access in the most restrictive manner possible that still permits the respondents to exercise their rights to challenge confidentiality, while recognising the importance of privacy and confidentiality protections. This balancing approach informed the substituted order’s limitations: inspection only by legal representatives, inspection only at the Commission’s offices, a prohibition on reproduction, and the requirement of confidentiality undertakings.


The court also addressed directly the Commission’s submission that the Tribunal lacked a legal basis to make the order because no express provision authorised it. It rejected this by pointing to the Tribunal’s residual power under section 27(1) of the Act to “make any ruling or order necessary or incidental to the performance of its functions in terms of” the Act. The court held that granting restricted access to the respondents’ legal representatives was necessary or incidental to the Tribunal’s function of determining confidentiality under section 45, and thus within the Tribunal’s competence.


Finally, on costs, the court reasoned that the respondents had been confronted with the Commission’s refusal to comply with the Tribunal’s order and were compelled to approach the Competition Appeal Court for interim relief on 22 January 2002 to obtain some access. Because the respondents succeeded in obtaining such relief, the court considered that they were entitled to the costs incurred in that interim application. The court likewise ordered costs against the Commission for the appeal hearing itself, including the costs of two counsel.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Competition Appeal Court set aside the Competition Tribunal’s order of 18 January 2002 and replaced it with an order compelling the Commission to provide the respondents’ legal representatives access to the entire record in the merger proceedings, but only on strictly limited terms. Access was confined to inspection by the respondents’ legal representatives at the Commission’s offices, the legal representatives were prohibited from reproducing the record, and they were required to furnish confidentiality undertakings before access was granted.


In addition, the substituted order directed that if the respondents brought an application in terms of section 45 of the Competition Act, they had to serve the notice of motion and affidavits on each person who had provided confidential information to the Commission within five days after filing.


The court ordered that the costs of the interim application heard on 22 January 2002, including the costs of two counsel, were to be paid by the Commission, and that the costs of the appeal hearing itself, also including the costs of two counsel, were likewise to be paid by the Commission.


Cases Cited


Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of S.A and Others: In re Ex parte President of the RSA and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC).


Legislation Cited


Competition Act 89 of 1998 (as amended), including sections 1, 14A, 27(1), 44, 45(1), 45(3), and 69(2).


Rules of Court Cited


Competition Commission Rules, including Rule 14(1)(c)(ii) and Rule 15 (including Rule 15(4)).


Held


The court held that the statutory scheme, read consistently with principles of fairness and the Constitution, permits and requires a mechanism of restricted disclosure so that a party can meaningfully exercise the right under section 45 to challenge confidentiality claims. Denying any access to the disputed information would render a section 45 process fundamentally unfair.


The court further held that the Competition Tribunal was not confined to express powers in section 45 and had authority under section 27(1) to make rulings or orders necessary or incidental to performing its functions, including facilitating a fair confidentiality determination under section 45 through restricted access arrangements.


The Tribunal’s order was therefore replaced with a more tightly controlled access regime (inspection by legal representatives only, at the Commission’s offices, no reproduction, confidentiality undertakings), coupled with a direction ensuring notice to confidential-information providers if a section 45 application were instituted, and with adverse costs orders against the Commission.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The confidentiality provisions of the Competition Act do not create an absolute prohibition on disclosure. Section 69(2) recognises that disclosure of confidential information may be permissible where required for the proper administration or enforcement of the Act or the administration of justice, supporting a contextual and functional approach to confidentiality in competition proceedings.


A statutory right to challenge confidentiality under section 45(1) must be capable of meaningful exercise. Where the statute is silent on the disclosure necessary to enable such a challenge, the Act must be construed in a manner consistent with procedural fairness so as not to reduce the section 45 procedure to an unfair process in which the applicant is unable to present a case.


The Competition Tribunal possesses a residual or incidental power under section 27(1) to make orders necessary or incidental to the performance of its statutory functions. This includes authority to fashion restricted access arrangements to confidential information to facilitate a fair determination under section 45, balancing the protection of confidential information with the affected party’s right to a fair hearing.


Where competing interests arise between confidentiality and fairness, the appropriate approach is a balancing exercise that seeks to protect confidentiality while granting the minimum necessary access to ensure fairness, such as limiting access to legal representatives, restricting inspection to controlled premises, prohibiting reproduction, and requiring confidentiality undertakings.

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Competition Commission v Unilever PLC and Others (13/CAC/Jan02) [2002] ZACAC 1; [2001-2002] CPLR 29 (CAC); 2004 (3) SA 23 (CAC) (14 February 2002)

IN
THE COMPETITION APPEAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No. 13/CAC/Jan 02
In
the matter between:
The
Competition Commission of South Africa Appellant
and
Unilever
PLC First Respondent
Unifoods,
a division of Unilever South Africa (Pty) Limited
Second Respondent
Robertsons
Foods (Pty) Limited Third Respondent
Robertsons
Food Service (Pty) Limited
Fourth Respondent
JUDGMENT
Davis
JP:
1.
Introduction:
On
18 January 2001 the Competition Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’)
made the following
order:
The
Commission must give the parties’ legal advisors access to
the full record that has been supplied to the Tribunal
in
connection with the merger including all
information
claimed as confidential, by Monday 21 January 2002 at 12h00.
2.
The legal advisors must give confidentiality undertakings to the
Commission prior to being granted access.
If
the merging parties wish to expand the class of persons to whom
access to confidential information should be afforded
or if they
wish to contest confidentiality claims, they must do so at the
next prehearing.
4. A further prehearing conference will be held on 25 January
2002 at 10:00
The
Commission will furnish the confidential version only of its
recommendations to FAWU. Appellant approached this Court
for a
stay of compliance with the
decision
of 18 January, pending a final determination of appellant’s
application to this Court in terms of section 45(3)
of the
Competition Act 89 of 1998
as
amended
(‘the Act’).
On
22 January 2002 the following was ordered:
The
Competition Commission provide the Respondents’ legal
representatives with access to the entire record in respect of
the
merger proceedings filed by the Competition Commission with the
Competition Tribunal under Case Number 55/ LM/Sep01;
Access
to the said record is limited to:
2.1
inspection to take place at the offices of the Competition
Commission;
2.2
the respondent may not reproduce the record which they have
inspected; and
Costs
are reserved pending the appeal.
The
appeal against the Tribunal’s order of 18 January 2002 was
heard by this Court on 31 January 2002. After hearing argument
from
both parties, this Court set aside the order of the Competition
Tribunal of 18 January 2002 and replaced it with the following
order:
1.
The Competition Commission is ordered to provide the respondents’
legal representatives with access to the entire record
in respect of
the merger proceedings filed by the Competition Commission by
Competition Tribunal under case number 55/LM/01.
2.
Access to the said record is limited to:
2.1.Inspection
solely by the legal representatives of respondents at the offices of
the Competition Commission;
2.2.The
legal representatives of respondents may not reproduce the record
which they have inspected.
The
legal representatives must give confidentiality undertakings to the
Competition Commission prior to the granting of such access.
In
the event that an application is brought by the respondents in terms
of
section 45
of the
Competition Act, 1998
as amended, a copy of the
notice of motion and affidavits must be served on each person who
provided confidential information
to the Competition Commission
within five days after filing of such notice of motion.
Costs
of the application heard before the court on 22 January 2002 are to
be paid by the Commission including the cost of two
counsel. Costs
of this hearing, including the costs of two counsel, are to be paid
by the Commission. The reasons for this decision
now follow.
Background.
On
14 December 2001, appellant, acting in terms of
section 14
A of the
Act, forwarded a written recommendation with reasons in the large
merger between respondents to the Tribunal. Appellant
recommended, in
terms of
section 3
of its report, that the merger be approved subject
to certain conditions and in particular the condition that second
respondent
divest its whole product portfolio currently marketed
under certain brands. A copy of the report was provided to the
respondents
with certain portions removed by a process of blacking
out of certain passages. Respondents did not have access to certain
information
on which appellant purported to rely in formulating its
recommendations to the Tribunal. On 20 December 2001 respondents’

legal representatives wrote a letter to appellant requesting that,
insofar as the blacked out portions of the report were based
on
claims of confidentiality, they be provided with copies of the
relevant CC7 form in terms of which confidentiality had been
claimed
so as to enable them to consider whether to challenge such claims
pursuant to
section 45
(1) of the Act. In a further letter dated 3
January 2002 respondents’ legal representatives also requested
that appellant
provide them with (1) a list of the persons who made
representations to appellant, the nature of the information submitted
and
the contents of such submissions; (2) any further form CC7’s
filed on behalf of persons making submissions to appellant; (3)
any
sourced documents used by appellant in preparing its report. On 4
January 2002 appellant informed respondents’ legal

representatives that it would not make available certain of the
information requested on the grounds that such information was

considered to be confidential.
At
a prehearing conference held on 18 January 2002 respondents’
legal representatives applied to the Tribunal for an order
directing
appellant to make available to them the information in its possession
including that relied on in its report so that
the legal
representatives could consider whether the confidentiality claims
made in respect of such information were valid. Pursuant
to such
application the Tribunal made its order of 18 January 2002.
Relevant
Provisions of the Act with respect to Confidentiality
In terms
of appellant’s Rule 14(1)(c)(ii) all information received by
appellant during its investigation of the merger is
considered to be
restricted information until appellant has, in the case of a large
merger, made a recommendation to the Tribunal
pursuant to
section 14
A of the Act.
Rule 15
provides for the manner in which access to
restricted information can be obtained. Once appellant has completed
its investigation
and made a recommendation to the Tribunal in
respect of a large merger the restricted status of information and
the limitations
thereon fall away. Any person may have access to such
information which was previously restricted, save where
confidentiality has
been claimed in connection therewith. Appellant
must identify any information included in its report in respect of
which a claim
of confidentiality has been made (see appellant’s
Rule 15(4)). Any person can then challenge the confidentiality of
such
information before the Tribunal in terms of
section 45(1)
of the
Act.
Section 45(1)
of the Act provides as follows: ‘A person
who seeks access to information which is subject to a claim that it
is confidential
information may apply to the Competition Tribunal in
the prescribed manner and form and the Competition Tribunal may:
a)
determine whether or not the information is confidential information;
b)
if it finds that the information is confidential, make any
appropriate order concerning access to that confidential information.

Confidential information is defined in
section 1
of the Act as
meaning ‘ trade, business or industrial information that
belongs to a firm, has a particular economic value
and is not
generally available to or known by others.’
The
basis upon which such information becomes confidential is set out in
section 44
of the Act.
Section 44(1)
provides :
a)
A person, when submitting information to the Competition Commission
or the Competition Tribunal may identify information that
the person
claims to be confidential information.
b)
Any claim contemplated in paragraph (a) must be supported by a
written statement in the prescribed form, explaining why the

information is confidential.
Section
44(2)
provides: The Competition Commission is bound by a claim
contemplated in subsection (1) but may at any time during its
proceedings
refer the claim to the Competition Tribunal to determine
whether or not the information is confidential information.
Section
44(3)
provides, inter alia , that the Competition Tribunal may b) if
it finds that the information is confidential, make any appropriate

order concerning access to that information. Mr Pretorius, who
appeared on behalf of appellant, submitted that there was no legal

basis by which the Tribunal could have made its order of 18 January
2002. He contended that the only manner in which information
can be
disclosed where such information is considered to be confidential in
terms of
section 44
of the Act is to make an application in terms of
section 45.
For this reason he contended that it was clear that, in
the present dispute, no application had been made by respondents in
terms
of
section 45
for a disclosure of the information. Accordingly
there was no basis by which the Tribunal was legally empowered to
order disclosure
even on the basis of restricted access for the legal
representatives until a proper hearing had taken place in terms of
section 45.
At such hearing all interested parties including those
who had provided information to appellant on a confidential basis
could
be heard and a proper determination as to whether the
information was confidential and, if it was confidential , the extent
to
which it could be disclosed , could be debated. Mr Unterhalter,
who appeared together with Mr Wilson on behalf of the respondents,

submitted that
section 45
creates a legislative mechanism whereby any
person seeking information claimed to be confidential could challenge
this claim of
confidential information submitted to appellant during
its investigation of a merger. The challenge could go to whether the
confidentiality
had in fact been claimed or claimed properly in terms
of procedures set out in terms of the Act or whether the information
in question
was in fact confidential as defined in
section 1
of the
Act. In order for a party effectively to challenge such a claim of
confidentiality it must have a means of obtaining access
to such
information in order to know, in the first place, whether the
information submitted to appellant and supplied to the Tribunal
has
been withheld from it on grounds of confidentiality, whether such
confidentiality has been properly claimed and thus whether
the claim
of confidentiality should be challenged or whether an application
should be made for restricted access thereto. Mr Unterhalter

submitted that in common law it was recognised that a balance needed
to be struck between the rights of respondents to procedural
fairness
and the recognition of a public \ and private interest in protecting
confidential information provided to an appellant.
While it is
understandable that appellant would wish to protect informants who
had provided information on a confidential basis
in order to ensure
that similar sources of information will be forthcoming in the
future, respondents needed to have the means
to exercise their
legislative right to challenge spurious claims to confidentiality and
to ensure that a process of adjudication
of such confidentiality
claims could take place fairly before the Tribunal.
The
Act recognises certain exceptions to a breach of confidence. In terms
of section 69 it is an offence to disclose any confidential

information concerning the affairs of any person or firm:
a)
in carrying out any function in terms of this Act; or
b)
as a result of initiating a complaint or participating in any
proceeding in terms of this Act.
Significantly,
subsection (2) provides as follows:
Sub
section (1) does not apply to information disclosed –
a)
for the purpose of a proper administration or enforcement of this
Act;
b)
for the purpose of the administration of justice; or
at
the request of inspector, Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner or
Competition Tribunal member entitled to receive the information.
In
short, section 69(2) envisages that information can be made available
for the proper administration of the Act and for the purpose
of the
administration of justice. Thus the Act does not place absolute bar
upon disclosure of confidential information. The administration
and
enforcement of the Act is recognized as such a ground. This is
significant in the context of appellants case, namely that the

information is required to ensure that respondents can exercise their
rights in terms of s45. Were Mr Pretorius’ submissions
to be
upheld, it would mean that when an application in terms of section 45
of the Act was made, all the parties to the hearing
would have access
to all the information in dispute save for the very party who brought
the application. That party would be entirely
reliant upon the
Tribunal to come to a decision without having had the benefit of
putting a proper case before the Tribunal. Fairness
must require that
the respondents be given a hearing as to whether there is any
justification as to why they should not be given
access to the
record. Not only is such a principle enshrined in our common law but
it is to be found in the very principles of
fairness and openness
which underpin the Constitution. See
Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association of S.A and Others:
in re
ex
parte President of the RSA and Others
2000(2) SA 674 (CC). The
present dispute has arisen because s45 is silent on what disclosure
is required for the purposes of a challenge
in terms of this section.
As a result, this court is confronted by two challenges. In the first
place it is required to find a
right to some disclosure to enable
respondents to exercise their rights meaningfully in terms of s45.
This right is to be found
in a reading of the purpose of s45 which
remains congruent with the constitution and the common law principle
of a fair hearing.
Secondly it is confronted with an exercise in the
balancing of rights. On the one hand parties provide information to
appellant
on the basis that such information will remain confidential
and would certainly not find its way into the hands of respondents.

On the other hand the Act envisages a deliberative process of
determining whether information is confidential as defined. This
set
of procedures is set out in section 45 of the Act. As stated above,
were respondents’ legal representatives to be denied
all access
to the impugned information, it would render a hearing under section
45 profoundly unfair; the applicant would come
before the tribunal in
a veil of ignorance which would be incurable. For these reasons, any
order that is granted must take account
of both sets of rights to
achieve a measure of balancing between these competing claims.
For
this reason, the order made by the Court granted respondents access
to confidential information in the most restrictive manner
possible
without denying respondents its rights to a fair hearing and at the
same time recognizing the importance of the rights
to privacy which
are also protected in terms of the Act. I must deal, albeit briefly,
with Mr Pretorius’ submission that
there was no legal
justification by which the Tribunal could have made the order it did
on 18 January 2002. In other words the
argument run that there was no
express provision of the Act from which the Tribunal had the power to
make the order of 18 January.
This overlooks a residual power
possessed by the Tribunal. In terms of section 27 (1) of the Act, the
Tribunal is empowered to
make any ruling or order necessary or
incidental to the performance of its functions in terms of this Act.
Clearly the order made
to provide restricted access to respondents is
performed pursuant to its function of determining confidentiality in
terms of section
45 of the Act; that is one of its functions under
the Act. The decision to award costs to respondents insofar as the
initial stay
is concerned does require some explanation. As Mr
Unterhalter contended respondents were confronted by a refusal on the
part of
appellants to comply in any way with the order of the
Tribunal. In order to gain some access to confidential information,
respondents
were forced to approach the court for an interim order on
22 January 2002. In the light of their success in so obtaining an
order
, it follows that they are entitled to costs so incurred
pursuant to that hearing .
__________________
DAVIS,
JP
Jali
and Hussain JJA concurred