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[2002] ZACAC 1
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Competition Commission v Unilever PLC and Others (13/CAC/Jan02) [2002] ZACAC 1; [2001-2002] CPLR 29 (CAC); 2004 (3) SA 23 (CAC) (14 February 2002)
IN
THE COMPETITION APPEAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No. 13/CAC/Jan 02
In
the matter between:
The
Competition Commission of South Africa Appellant
and
Unilever
PLC First Respondent
Unifoods,
a division of Unilever South Africa (Pty) Limited
Second Respondent
Robertsons
Foods (Pty) Limited Third Respondent
Robertsons
Food Service (Pty) Limited
Fourth Respondent
JUDGMENT
Davis
JP:
1.
Introduction:
On
18 January 2001 the Competition Tribunal (‘the Tribunal’)
made the following
order:
The
Commission must give the parties’ legal advisors access to
the full record that has been supplied to the Tribunal
in
connection with the merger including all
information
claimed as confidential, by Monday 21 January 2002 at 12h00.
2.
The legal advisors must give confidentiality undertakings to the
Commission prior to being granted access.
If
the merging parties wish to expand the class of persons to whom
access to confidential information should be afforded
or if they
wish to contest confidentiality claims, they must do so at the
next prehearing.
4. A further prehearing conference will be held on 25 January
2002 at 10:00
The
Commission will furnish the confidential version only of its
recommendations to FAWU. Appellant approached this Court
for a
stay of compliance with the
decision
of 18 January, pending a final determination of appellant’s
application to this Court in terms of section 45(3)
of the
Competition Act 89 of 1998
as
amended
(‘the Act’).
On
22 January 2002 the following was ordered:
The
Competition Commission provide the Respondents’ legal
representatives with access to the entire record in respect of
the
merger proceedings filed by the Competition Commission with the
Competition Tribunal under Case Number 55/ LM/Sep01;
Access
to the said record is limited to:
2.1
inspection to take place at the offices of the Competition
Commission;
2.2
the respondent may not reproduce the record which they have
inspected; and
Costs
are reserved pending the appeal.
The
appeal against the Tribunal’s order of 18 January 2002 was
heard by this Court on 31 January 2002. After hearing argument
from
both parties, this Court set aside the order of the Competition
Tribunal of 18 January 2002 and replaced it with the following
order:
1.
The Competition Commission is ordered to provide the respondents’
legal representatives with access to the entire record
in respect of
the merger proceedings filed by the Competition Commission by
Competition Tribunal under case number 55/LM/01.
2.
Access to the said record is limited to:
2.1.Inspection
solely by the legal representatives of respondents at the offices of
the Competition Commission;
2.2.The
legal representatives of respondents may not reproduce the record
which they have inspected.
The
legal representatives must give confidentiality undertakings to the
Competition Commission prior to the granting of such access.
In
the event that an application is brought by the respondents in terms
of
section 45
of the
Competition Act, 1998
as amended, a copy of the
notice of motion and affidavits must be served on each person who
provided confidential information
to the Competition Commission
within five days after filing of such notice of motion.
Costs
of the application heard before the court on 22 January 2002 are to
be paid by the Commission including the cost of two
counsel. Costs
of this hearing, including the costs of two counsel, are to be paid
by the Commission. The reasons for this decision
now follow.
Background.
On
14 December 2001, appellant, acting in terms of
section 14
A of the
Act, forwarded a written recommendation with reasons in the large
merger between respondents to the Tribunal. Appellant
recommended, in
terms of
section 3
of its report, that the merger be approved subject
to certain conditions and in particular the condition that second
respondent
divest its whole product portfolio currently marketed
under certain brands. A copy of the report was provided to the
respondents
with certain portions removed by a process of blacking
out of certain passages. Respondents did not have access to certain
information
on which appellant purported to rely in formulating its
recommendations to the Tribunal. On 20 December 2001 respondents’
legal representatives wrote a letter to appellant requesting that,
insofar as the blacked out portions of the report were based
on
claims of confidentiality, they be provided with copies of the
relevant CC7 form in terms of which confidentiality had been
claimed
so as to enable them to consider whether to challenge such claims
pursuant to
section 45
(1) of the Act. In a further letter dated 3
January 2002 respondents’ legal representatives also requested
that appellant
provide them with (1) a list of the persons who made
representations to appellant, the nature of the information submitted
and
the contents of such submissions; (2) any further form CC7’s
filed on behalf of persons making submissions to appellant; (3)
any
sourced documents used by appellant in preparing its report. On 4
January 2002 appellant informed respondents’ legal
representatives that it would not make available certain of the
information requested on the grounds that such information was
considered to be confidential.
At
a prehearing conference held on 18 January 2002 respondents’
legal representatives applied to the Tribunal for an order
directing
appellant to make available to them the information in its possession
including that relied on in its report so that
the legal
representatives could consider whether the confidentiality claims
made in respect of such information were valid. Pursuant
to such
application the Tribunal made its order of 18 January 2002.
Relevant
Provisions of the Act with respect to Confidentiality
In terms
of appellant’s Rule 14(1)(c)(ii) all information received by
appellant during its investigation of the merger is
considered to be
restricted information until appellant has, in the case of a large
merger, made a recommendation to the Tribunal
pursuant to
section 14
A of the Act.
Rule 15
provides for the manner in which access to
restricted information can be obtained. Once appellant has completed
its investigation
and made a recommendation to the Tribunal in
respect of a large merger the restricted status of information and
the limitations
thereon fall away. Any person may have access to such
information which was previously restricted, save where
confidentiality has
been claimed in connection therewith. Appellant
must identify any information included in its report in respect of
which a claim
of confidentiality has been made (see appellant’s
Rule 15(4)). Any person can then challenge the confidentiality of
such
information before the Tribunal in terms of
section 45(1)
of the
Act.
Section 45(1)
of the Act provides as follows: ‘A person
who seeks access to information which is subject to a claim that it
is confidential
information may apply to the Competition Tribunal in
the prescribed manner and form and the Competition Tribunal may:
a)
determine whether or not the information is confidential information;
b)
if it finds that the information is confidential, make any
appropriate order concerning access to that confidential information.
Confidential information is defined in
section 1
of the Act as
meaning ‘ trade, business or industrial information that
belongs to a firm, has a particular economic value
and is not
generally available to or known by others.’
The
basis upon which such information becomes confidential is set out in
section 44
of the Act.
Section 44(1)
provides :
a)
A person, when submitting information to the Competition Commission
or the Competition Tribunal may identify information that
the person
claims to be confidential information.
b)
Any claim contemplated in paragraph (a) must be supported by a
written statement in the prescribed form, explaining why the
information is confidential.
Section
44(2)
provides: The Competition Commission is bound by a claim
contemplated in subsection (1) but may at any time during its
proceedings
refer the claim to the Competition Tribunal to determine
whether or not the information is confidential information.
Section
44(3)
provides, inter alia , that the Competition Tribunal may b) if
it finds that the information is confidential, make any appropriate
order concerning access to that information. Mr Pretorius, who
appeared on behalf of appellant, submitted that there was no legal
basis by which the Tribunal could have made its order of 18 January
2002. He contended that the only manner in which information
can be
disclosed where such information is considered to be confidential in
terms of
section 44
of the Act is to make an application in terms of
section 45.
For this reason he contended that it was clear that, in
the present dispute, no application had been made by respondents in
terms
of
section 45
for a disclosure of the information. Accordingly
there was no basis by which the Tribunal was legally empowered to
order disclosure
even on the basis of restricted access for the legal
representatives until a proper hearing had taken place in terms of
section 45.
At such hearing all interested parties including those
who had provided information to appellant on a confidential basis
could
be heard and a proper determination as to whether the
information was confidential and, if it was confidential , the extent
to
which it could be disclosed , could be debated. Mr Unterhalter,
who appeared together with Mr Wilson on behalf of the respondents,
submitted that
section 45
creates a legislative mechanism whereby any
person seeking information claimed to be confidential could challenge
this claim of
confidential information submitted to appellant during
its investigation of a merger. The challenge could go to whether the
confidentiality
had in fact been claimed or claimed properly in terms
of procedures set out in terms of the Act or whether the information
in question
was in fact confidential as defined in
section 1
of the
Act. In order for a party effectively to challenge such a claim of
confidentiality it must have a means of obtaining access
to such
information in order to know, in the first place, whether the
information submitted to appellant and supplied to the Tribunal
has
been withheld from it on grounds of confidentiality, whether such
confidentiality has been properly claimed and thus whether
the claim
of confidentiality should be challenged or whether an application
should be made for restricted access thereto. Mr Unterhalter
submitted that in common law it was recognised that a balance needed
to be struck between the rights of respondents to procedural
fairness
and the recognition of a public \ and private interest in protecting
confidential information provided to an appellant.
While it is
understandable that appellant would wish to protect informants who
had provided information on a confidential basis
in order to ensure
that similar sources of information will be forthcoming in the
future, respondents needed to have the means
to exercise their
legislative right to challenge spurious claims to confidentiality and
to ensure that a process of adjudication
of such confidentiality
claims could take place fairly before the Tribunal.
The
Act recognises certain exceptions to a breach of confidence. In terms
of section 69 it is an offence to disclose any confidential
information concerning the affairs of any person or firm:
a)
in carrying out any function in terms of this Act; or
b)
as a result of initiating a complaint or participating in any
proceeding in terms of this Act.
Significantly,
subsection (2) provides as follows:
Sub
section (1) does not apply to information disclosed –
a)
for the purpose of a proper administration or enforcement of this
Act;
b)
for the purpose of the administration of justice; or
at
the request of inspector, Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner or
Competition Tribunal member entitled to receive the information.
In
short, section 69(2) envisages that information can be made available
for the proper administration of the Act and for the purpose
of the
administration of justice. Thus the Act does not place absolute bar
upon disclosure of confidential information. The administration
and
enforcement of the Act is recognized as such a ground. This is
significant in the context of appellants case, namely that the
information is required to ensure that respondents can exercise their
rights in terms of s45. Were Mr Pretorius’ submissions
to be
upheld, it would mean that when an application in terms of section 45
of the Act was made, all the parties to the hearing
would have access
to all the information in dispute save for the very party who brought
the application. That party would be entirely
reliant upon the
Tribunal to come to a decision without having had the benefit of
putting a proper case before the Tribunal. Fairness
must require that
the respondents be given a hearing as to whether there is any
justification as to why they should not be given
access to the
record. Not only is such a principle enshrined in our common law but
it is to be found in the very principles of
fairness and openness
which underpin the Constitution. See
Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association of S.A and Others:
in re
ex
parte President of the RSA and Others
2000(2) SA 674 (CC). The
present dispute has arisen because s45 is silent on what disclosure
is required for the purposes of a challenge
in terms of this section.
As a result, this court is confronted by two challenges. In the first
place it is required to find a
right to some disclosure to enable
respondents to exercise their rights meaningfully in terms of s45.
This right is to be found
in a reading of the purpose of s45 which
remains congruent with the constitution and the common law principle
of a fair hearing.
Secondly it is confronted with an exercise in the
balancing of rights. On the one hand parties provide information to
appellant
on the basis that such information will remain confidential
and would certainly not find its way into the hands of respondents.
On the other hand the Act envisages a deliberative process of
determining whether information is confidential as defined. This
set
of procedures is set out in section 45 of the Act. As stated above,
were respondents’ legal representatives to be denied
all access
to the impugned information, it would render a hearing under section
45 profoundly unfair; the applicant would come
before the tribunal in
a veil of ignorance which would be incurable. For these reasons, any
order that is granted must take account
of both sets of rights to
achieve a measure of balancing between these competing claims.
For
this reason, the order made by the Court granted respondents access
to confidential information in the most restrictive manner
possible
without denying respondents its rights to a fair hearing and at the
same time recognizing the importance of the rights
to privacy which
are also protected in terms of the Act. I must deal, albeit briefly,
with Mr Pretorius’ submission that
there was no legal
justification by which the Tribunal could have made the order it did
on 18 January 2002. In other words the
argument run that there was no
express provision of the Act from which the Tribunal had the power to
make the order of 18 January.
This overlooks a residual power
possessed by the Tribunal. In terms of section 27 (1) of the Act, the
Tribunal is empowered to
make any ruling or order necessary or
incidental to the performance of its functions in terms of this Act.
Clearly the order made
to provide restricted access to respondents is
performed pursuant to its function of determining confidentiality in
terms of section
45 of the Act; that is one of its functions under
the Act. The decision to award costs to respondents insofar as the
initial stay
is concerned does require some explanation. As Mr
Unterhalter contended respondents were confronted by a refusal on the
part of
appellants to comply in any way with the order of the
Tribunal. In order to gain some access to confidential information,
respondents
were forced to approach the court for an interim order on
22 January 2002. In the light of their success in so obtaining an
order
, it follows that they are entitled to costs so incurred
pursuant to that hearing .
__________________
DAVIS,
JP
Jali
and Hussain JJA concurred