Petersen v Maintenance Officer and Others (6541/03) [2003] ZAWCHC 61; [2004] 1 All SA 117 (C); 2004 (2) BCLR 205 (C); 2004 (2) SA 56 (C) (11 November 2003)

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[2003] ZAWCHC 61
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Petersen v Maintenance Officer and Others (6541/03) [2003] ZAWCHC 61; [2004] 1 All SA 117 (C); 2004 (2) BCLR 205 (C); 2004 (2) SA 56 (C) (11 November 2003)

REPORTABLE
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
[CAPE
OF GOOD HOPE PROVINCIAL DIVISION]
Case No: 6541/03
In the matter between:
JADE LEE PETERSEN
Applicant
and
THE MAINTENANCE OFFICER
SIMON’S TOWN MAINTENANCE
COURT
First Respondent
GASANT
ABRAHAMS
Second Respondent
SAADIA
ABRAHAMS
Third Respondent
BEULAH
PETERSEN
Fourth Respondent
EUGENE
BREDENKAMP
Fifth Respondent
JUDGMENT DELIVERED: 11
NOVEMBER 2003
FOURIE, J:
[1] In
Motan
and Another v Joosub
1930 AD 61
, it was held that in terms of our common law the paternal
grandfather of an extra-marital child owes no duty of support to the
child.
The issue in this application is whether the common law rule
as enunciated in
Motan
,
passes constitutional muster.
[2] The
applicant, an 18 year old single female, gave birth to a boy (“the
child”) on 7 January 2003. The natural father of the
child admits
paternity, but has failed to contribute towards the maintenance of
the child. In June 2003, the applicant approached
the Maintenance
Court at Simon’s Town and an enquiry in terms of section 10 of the
Maintenance Act No. 99 of 1998 (“the Maintenance
Act”) was held
with a view to enquiring into the provision of maintenance by the
father of the child. However, in view of his poor
financial position,
the father was only able to offer payment of an amount of R200,00 per
month, which amount the applicant maintains
is grossly inadequate to
enable her to maintain the child. The applicant is a student with no
income and she and the child are supported
by her parents with
whatever means they have at their disposal.
[3] On 20 July 2003, the
applicant lodged a complaint with the first respondent in terms of
section 6(1)
of the
Maintenance Act, to
the effect that the paternal
grandparents of the child are legally liable to maintain the child,
but have failed to do so. The applicant,
through her legal
representative, requested the first respondent to summon the paternal
grandparents of the child to attend an enquiry
in terms of
Section 10
of the
Maintenance Act, with
a view to enquiring into the provision
of maintenance by the paternal grandparents of the child. The first
respondent, however, refused
to take such steps and in her affidavit
which forms part of the papers in this application, she states that
her decision
“was
taken on the basis of my understanding that the law does not
recognise a legal duty of support by the paternal grandparents
of an
extra-marital child. I was not in a position to deviate from this
principle which, as I understand it, finds authority in the
case of
Motan v Joosub
1930 AD 61.”
[4] The applicant then launched
the present application in which the main relief sought is a mandamus
directing the first respondent
to take the necessary steps for an
enquiry to be held in terms of
Section 10
of the
Maintenance Act, to
consider the applicant’s complaint that the paternal grandparents
of the child are liable to maintain the child, but fail to do
so. The
applicant has joined the paternal grandparents of the child as second
and third respondents and the maternal grandparents
as fourth and
fifth respondents.
[5] The application was initially
opposed by the first respondent, but the opposition was subsequently
withdrawn and she abides the
decision of the court. The second to
fifth respondents do not oppose the application, but Ms.
Weyer
was appointed as amicus curiae by the Cape Bar Council to assist the
court in determining the matter.
[6] The
Motan
decision is
generally accepted as authority for the assertion that the paternal
grandparents of an extra-marital child do not owe
a duty of support
to the child. The interpretation of the common law in
Motan
and the resultant denial of a duty of support by the paternal
grandparents of an extra-marital child, has even prior to the present
constitutional dispensation, been widely criticized by South African
writers.
F. P. van den
Heever
,
Breach
of
Promise
and Seduction in South African Law
(1954) at 70 says the following:
“It
is submitted that the decision is so patently wrong that it should be
reconsidered; for it is based on legislative considerations
and
methods, which are, moreover, unsound. It is contrary to public
policy and humanity and should, if necessary, be rectified by
the
legislature.”
See
too:
Boberg’s, Law of
Persons and the Family
,
Second Edition, 423 and 424 (footnotes 312 and 313);
Jordaan
and Davel
,
Law
of Persons
Source
Book
, Second Edition,
358 – 360;
Lee and
Honoré
,
Family,
Things
and
Succession
, paragraph
161 (footnote 3);
Van
der Vyver en Joubert
,
Persone- en Familiereg
,
Third Edition, 223 -224;
Barnard,
Cronje and
Olivier
,
The South African Law
of Persons and Family Law
,
314 (footnote 81) and
Wille’s
Principles of South African Law
,
Eighth Edition, 214.
Spiro
,
Law of Parent and
Child
, 395, however,
supports the interpretation of the common law in
Motan
and states that the Hooge Road of Holland never decided in favour of
a duty of support between an extra-marital child and his/her
paternal
grandparents.
[7] Mr.
Abduroaf
,
who appears for the applicant, submitted that the common law rule as
interpreted in
Motan
,
violates the extra-marital child’s constitutional rights to
equality and dignity enshrined in sections 9 and 10 of the
Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa, Act No. 108 of 1996
(“the Constitution”) and is contrary to the best interest of the
child (See
section 28(2) of the Constitution). He accordingly submits
that the common law rule is unreasonable and unjustifiable and should
be declared unconstitutional and invalid.
[8] I
am bound by the decision in
Motan
with regard to the
interpretation of the common law, but section 173 of the Constitution
provides that the court has the inherent
power to develop the common
law, taking into account the interest of justice. Section 8 (3) (a)
of the Constitution enjoins the court
in order to give effect to a
right in the Bill of Rights set out in Chapter 2 of the Constitution,
where necessary, to develop the
common law to the extent that
legislation does not give effect to that right. Section 39 (2) of the
Constitution provides that when
developing the common law, the court
must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.
[9] The discharge of this duty to
develop the common law, involves a two-stage enquiry to be undertaken
by the court. The first stage
is to consider whether the existing
common law, having regard to the section 39 (2) objectives, requires
development in accordance
with these objectives. This requires a
reconsideration of the common law in the light of section 39 (2) of
the Constitution and involves
a careful examination of the existing
principles which underpin the common law rule and a comparison
thereof with the key principles
of the Constitution. If this enquiry
leads to a positive answer, the second stage concerns itself with how
such development is to
take place in order to meet the section 39 (2)
objectives. See
Carmichele
v
Minister
of Safety and Security and Another
[2001] ZACC 22
;
2001 (4) SA 938
(CC) at 955I - 956C;
Rivett-Carnac
v Wiggins
1997 (3) SA
80
(C) at 87E-F and
McNally
v M & G Media (Pty) Ltd and Others
1997 (4) SA 267
(W) at 274 G – 275C.
[10] The rationale for this
common law rule is described as follows in
Motan
at 70:
“I
now come to Mr. de Villiers’ argument that we ought to draw no
distinction between the maternal and the paternal grandfather.
They
are both bound to the illegitimate child of their daughter or son
respectively nexu sanguinis and therefore the same duty lies
upon
both. From an ethical point of view there is much to be said for this
contention, and the Civilians may have taken this view
if there were
no great practical difficulties in the way. But there are. The father
of the mother of an illegitimate child knows
full well that it is his
daughter’s child, and if called upon to pay for its support, the
proof of the nexus sanguinis is at hand.
If, however, the paternal
grandfather is called upon to pay, he may perhaps be sufficiently
certain in those cases where the woman
is the concubine of his son,
where they live together as man and wife, but in no other case can
he be certain. He must either accept
the word of the mother or trust
to the wordly wisdom of his son. He is called upon to prove a
negative where he has no real means
of repelling the claim. To hold,
therefore, that the paternal grandfather is liable to maintain every
illegitimate child of his son
would be to cast upon him a burden
which it may be difficult for him to remove by proof. In these
circumstances it appears to me
to be the more correct view to follow
the Civil law as adopted by the Supreme Court of Appeal at Mechlin
and as laid down by Gluck
and others to the effect that no such
liability as we are considering lies upon the paternal grandfather.”
[11]
Boberg
,
supra, at 423 (footnote 312), states that it is illogical to argue
(as Wessels JA did in
Motan
at 70) that the paternal grandfather (unlike the maternal
grandfather) cannot be certain that the child is his grandchild, for
this
begs the question and confuses adjective with substantive law.
See too
F.
P. Van den Heever
,
supra at 70 (footnote 66). I agree, with respect to the learned Judge
of Appeal, that the envisaged evidentiary difficulties should
not
serve as a basis for the formulation of a rule of substantive law. In
any event, the post 1930 developments in technology and
science have
significantly eased the evidentiary burden which may rest upon the
paternal grandparents to disprove that their son
is the father of the
extra-marital child. See
Boberg
,
supra, at 369 (footnote 142) with regard to blood tests, the HLA
system of tissue typing and the DNA fingerprinting test. In my
view
the grounds upon which our common law sought to draw a distinction
between the maternal and paternal grandparents in this regard,
are at
this juncture not persuasive and the validity thereof should be
seriously questioned.
[12] In the mid 1980’s the
South African Law Commission (“the Commission”) investigated the
legal position of extra-marital
children, including the aspects
relating to support. In its report issued during October 1985, the
Commission recommended at paragraph
8.50 that the following duties of
support be imposed by legislation: paternal blood relations towards
the extra-marital child; the
extra-marital child towards the father;
and the extra- marital child towards blood relations on the paternal
side. This resulted
in the publishing of the Children’s Status
Bill, No. 30 of 1987, which contained the following provisions:
(a) Clause
4 (1) which provided that the paternal relations of an extra-marital
child would be liable to maintain that child to the
same extent as
that to which the maternal relations are liable.
(b) Clause 4 (2) which provided
that the extra-marital child would be liable to maintain his/her
father and a blood relation of his/her
father to the same extent to
which he/she would be liable to maintain his/her mother and a blood
relation of his/her mother.
However, clause 4 was not
included in the Children’s Status Act, No. 82 of 1987. The reason
for the omission does not appear from
Hansard, which merely contains
the following report by the Chairman of the Standing Select Committee
on Justice, dated 24 June 1987:
“
Your committee wishes to
recommend that in the light of objections and submissions received in
respect of the negatived clause 4 of
the Bill, this clause be
referred to the Department of Justice with a view to the revision
thereof and the possible introduction
of a further amending measure.”
[13] To date the legislature has
not, and despite the passing of the
Maintenance Act (which
came into
operation on 26 November 1999), seen fit to give effect to the
abovementioned recommendations of the Commission.
Section 2
of the
Maintenance Act provides
that:
“
(1) The
provisions of this Act shall apply in respect of the legal duty of
any person to maintain any other person, irrespective of
the nature
of the relationship between those persons giving rise to that duty.
(2) This
Act shall not be interpreted so as to derogate from the law relating
to the liability of persons to maintain other persons”.
The “legal duty” referred to
in
section 2
(1) of the
Maintenance Act, is
not defined in the said
Act.
[14] Mr.
Abduroaf
submitted that the constitutional values embodied in sections 9, 10
and 28 (2) of the Constitution, dictate that the common law rule
as
enunciated in
Motan
,
be developed by imposing a duty of support upon the paternal
grandparents of an extra-marital child in the event of the natural
parents of such child being unable to support the child. The said
sections of the Constitution provide:
“
9
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal
protection and benefit of the law.
(2) Equality includes the full
and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the
achievement of equality, legislative
and other measures designed to
protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged
by unfair discrimination may
be taken.
(3) The state may not unfairly
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more
grounds, including race, gender,
sex, pregnancy, marital status,
ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability,
religion, conscience, belief,
culture, language, and birth.
(4) No
person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against
anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3). National
legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair
discrimination.
(5) Discrimination on one or
more of the grounds listed in subsection (3) is unfair unless it is
established that the discrimination
is fair.
10. Everyone has inherent
dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.
28(2) A child’s best
interest is of paramount importance in every matter concerning the
child.”
[15] The importance of the right
to equality has been stressed by the Constitutional Court and the
Supreme Court of Appeal. See
Fraser
v
Children’s
Court
,
Pretoria
North and Others
1997
(2) SA 261
(CC) at par. 20;
President
of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo
1997 (4) SA 1
(CC) at par. 41 and
Antonie
Michael Du Plessis v Road Accident
Fund
,
judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of Appeal under Case No.
443/2002 on 19 September 2003. The nature of the enquiry to be
followed in determining whether the common law rule in this case
violates the fundamental right to equality, appears to be as follows:
(a) Does the common law rule
differentiate between people or categories of people? If so,
(b) Does
the differentiation amount to unfair discrimination? This requires a
two stage analysis:
(i) Firstly, does the
differentiation amount to discrimination? If it is on a ground
specified in section 9 (3), then discrimination
will have been
established.
(ii) If
the differentiation amounts to discrimination, does it amount to
unfair discrimination? If it has been found to have been
on a
specified ground, then unfairness will be presumed.
(c) If the differentiation is
found to be unfair then a determination will have to be made as to
whether the common law rule can be
justified under the limitations
clause (Sec. 36 of the Constitution).
See
Harksen
v Lane NO
and
Others
[1997] ZACC 12
;
1998 (1) SA 300
(CC) at par. 54 and
Daniels
v Campbell
NO
and Others
2003 (9)
BCLR 969
(C) at 992E – 993D.
[16] In
terms of our common law the maternal and paternal grandparents of a
child born in wedlock are obliged to support him/her,
if the child’s
parents are unable to do so. In the case of an extra-marital child
whose parents are unable to support him/her,
our common law, as
interpreted in
Motan
,
provides that the maternal grandparents have a duty of support
towards the extra-marital child, but not the paternal grandparents.
The common law rule accordingly differentiates between children born
in wedlock and extra-marital children on the ground of birth.
This
differentiation amounts to discrimination as birth is a ground
specified in section 9(3) of the Constitution. In terms of section
9(5) of the Constitution discrimination on the ground of birth as a
listed ground is presumed to be unfair unless it can be justified
under section 36 of the Constitution.
[17] The importance of the right
to dignity enshrined in section 10 of the Constitution, was
emphasised as follows in
Dawood,
Shalabi, Thomas and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Others
[2000] ZACC 8
;
2000
(8) BCLR 837
(CC) at par. 35:
“The
Constitution asserts dignity to contradict our past in which human
dignity for black South Africans was routinely and cruelly
denied. It
asserts it too to inform the future, to invest in our democracy
respect for the intrinsic worth of all human beings…dignity
is not
only a value fundamental to our Constitution, it is a justiciable and
enforceable right that must be respected and protected.”
[18] In my view the rights of
equality and dignity in this case are closely related, as was the
case in
Antonie Michael
Du Plessis v Road Accident
Fund
,
supra;
National
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another
v Minister of Justice
and Others
1999 (1) SA
6
(CC) and
National
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs
and Others
2000 (2) SA 1
(CC). In the latter case the Constitutional Court put
it as follows at par.42:
“The
sting of past and continuing discrimination against both gays and
lesbians is the clear message that it conveys, namely, that
they
whether viewed as individuals or in their same sex relationships, do
not have the inherent dignity and are not worthy of the
human respect
possessed by and accorded to heterosexuals and their relationships…It
denies to gays and lesbians that which is foundational
to our
Constitution and the concepts of equality and dignity, which at this
point are closely intertwined, namely that all persons
have the same
inherent worth and dignity as human beings, whatever their other
differences may be.”
[19] I am of the opinion that
this common law rule which differentiates between children born in
wedlock and extra-marital children,
not only denies extra-marital
children an equal right to be maintained by their paternal
grandparents, but conveys the notion that
they do not have the same
inherent worth and dignity as children who are born in wedlock.
[20] In
addition, section 28 (2) of the Constitution underlines the
paramountcy of the best interest of the child, which has always
been
a golden thread which runs throughout the whole fabric of our law
relating to children. (See
Kaiser
v Chambers
1969 (4) SA
224
(C) at 228E-G;
Fletcher
v Fletcher
1948 (1) SA
130
(A) and
Bethell v
Bland and Others
1996 (2) SA 194
(W) at 208). The general standard of the best
interest of the child introduced in section 28 (2), provides a
benchmark in the review
of all proceedings in which decisions are
taken regarding children. The reach of the “best interest”
principle has already been
viewed as extending beyond the ambit of
the rights specified in section 28 (1) of the Constitution. See
Cheadle, Davis and
Haysom, South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of
Rights
,
at 530-1 and the authorities there cited. As stated at 531 by Cheadle
et al, the “best interest” standard is, however, not without
limitation. If statutory provisions or rules of the common law are
inconsistent with the best interest of the child, such inconsistency
may be found to be justified under the provisions of section 36 of
the Constitution. In
LS
v AT and
Another
[2000] ZACC 26
;
2001 (2) BCLR 152
(CC), it was held, on the assumption that the provisions of the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction
Act
No. 72 of 1996, were inconsistent with the short term best interest
of the child, that such inconsistency was justifiable in
an open and
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.
[21] In
my view, the common law rule as interpreted in
Motan
,
and in particular the differentiation between the duty of support of
grandparents towards children born in wedlock and extra-marital
children, constitutes unfair discrimination on the ground of birth
and amounts to an infringement of the dignity of such children.
The
common law rule is also clearly contrary to the best interests of
extra-marital children. It follows, in my view, that it violates
the
constitutional rights of extra-marital children, and in particular
the rights enshrined in sections 9, 10 and 28 (2) of the
Constitution.
[22] It remains to be considered
whether this violation of the constitutional rights of extra-marital
children is justifiable under
section 36 of the Constitution. This
would be the case if the violation is reasonable and justifiable in
an open and democratic society
based on human dignity, equality and
freedom. I am of the view that if the importance and purpose of the
common law rule are weighed
against the nature and extent of the
gross infringement caused by the said rule, there is no justification
for the retention of the
common law rule. In this regard it should be
borne in mind that extra-marital children are a group who are
extremely vulnerable and
their constitutional rights should be
jealously protected. This would not only be in line with our
constitutional principles, but
also in accordance with public
international law which dictates that children should not be allowed
to suffer on account of their
birth. See
Cheadle
et al, South African Constitutional
Law: Bill of Rights
at 528.
[23] In view of the aforesaid, I
conclude that the limitation imposed by the common law rule, is
clearly unreasonable and unjustifiable
in an open and democratic
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. It follows, in
my view, that in this respect our
common law has to be developed to
promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.
[24] How should the development
of the common law be undertaken? Mr.
Abduroaf
submitted that the
court should undertake this task. Ms.
Weyer
submitted that
although it may be desirable for the court to highlight the need for
further urgent legislative scrutiny of the issue
of the duty of
support of paternal grandparents of an extra-marital child in the
context of the constitutional imperatives, it would
not be
appropriate or desirable for the court to undertake this task. She
submitted that for the following reasons the court should
not enter
this field of mixed common law and statutory law by effectively
nullifying the common law position as it currently prevails:
(a) The legal position of
extra-marital children has and is still determined by policy
decisions governing the proper relationships
between the adults
related to and associated with the extra-marital child and the
child’s relationships with those adults. In developing
the common
law the legislature has been mindful to ensure that a proper balance
of interests between the single mother and natural
father has been
maintained, while applying the ultimate yardstick of the best
interest of the child. This has been achieved by maintaining
a
maternal preference and allowing the natural father
locus
standi
to approach the
courts for relief in a proper case. (See
sections 10
and
11
of the
Births and Deaths Registration Act No. 51 of 1992
; section 3 of the
Children’s Status Act No. 82 of 1987; section 2 of the National
Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act No.
86 of 1997; section 1
of the Guardianship Act No. 192 of 1993 and section 19 of the Child
Care Act No. 74 of 1983.)
By extension, and given that the
legislature has- by not specifically legislating to the contrary in
regard to the duty of paternal
grandparents of an extra-marital
child- apparently intentionally maintained the common law position
where only the maternal grandparents
would be liable to maintain such
a child. This approach, so it was argued, at the very least appears
to ensure consistency in the
approach to maternal preference.
[b] In affording extra-marital
children rights
vis-à-vis
their paternal grandparents the “delicate balance” achieved in
related areas of our law will be disturbed. This will necessarily
give rise to the consideration of whether or not such duty of support
is to operate reciprocally and the desirability thereof. This
is a
particularly vexed question where the child has been conceived in
circumstances of rape. In addition, concomitant matters of
access,
custody and the like would have to be revisited in the context of
paternal grandparents and extra-marital children.
[c] The impact of such a decision
on the wider community needs wider debate and careful consideration.
[25] In
Carmichele
v Minister of Safety and Security and Another
[2001] ZACC 22
;
2001 (4) SA 938
(CC) at par. 36, it was stated that it is implicit in
section 39 (2), read with section 173, of the Constitution, that
where the
common law as it stands is deficient in promoting the
spirit, purport and objectives of the Bill of Rights, the courts are
under
a general obligation to develop it appropriately. The court,
however, warned that judges should be mindful of the fact that the
major
engine for law reform should be the legislature and not the
judiciary. The judiciary should confine itself to those incremental
changes
which are necessary to keep the common law in step with the
dynamic and evolving fabric of our society.
[26] The legislature has adopted
a number of measures to ameliorate the negative impact of the common
law relating to extra-marital
children, as appears from paragraph 24
(a) above. However, the law continues to treat extra-marital children
differently from children
born in wedlock, particularly in relation
to the duty of support. This discrimination should not be tolerated.
In my view the attempts
of the legislature to strike a balance
between the rights of the single mother and natural father of an
extra-marital child, would
not be impeded by extending the duty of
support to the paternal grandparents of an extra-marital child. On
the contrary, I hold the
view that this extension of the duty of
support would enhance what ultimately ought to be one of the aims of
the legislature, i.e.
to serve the best interests of extra-marital
children.
[27] In my view it is necessary,
in order to keep our common law in step with the values enshrined in
the Constitution, that a duty
be imposed on paternal grandparents to
support their extra-marital grandchildren to the same extent to which
the maternal grandparents
are liable to maintain their extra-marital
grandchildren. The imposition of this duty of support would be an
incremental step in
the development of the common law. It is not
necessary for the purposes of this judgment to consider whether such
duty of support
is to operate reciprocally between the extra-marital
child and his/her grandparents and other paternal relations. It is
also not
necessary for purposes of this judgment to deal with matters
of access, custody and the like in the context of paternal
grandparents
and extra-marital children. With regard to the
presumption of paternity and the envisaged evidentiary difficulty
which it may present
to paternal grandparents, I wish to reiterate
that it should not serve as a basis for the formulation of a rule of
substantive law,
nor should it be used as an excuse or justification
to perpetuate the violation of the constitutional rights of
extra-marital children.
[28] I am indebted to counsel, as
well as Mr.
Hutton
who assisted in the preparation of the heads of argument of the
amicus curiae
,
for their full and most helpful arguments.
[29] In
the result I make the following order:
[1] It is declared that the
second and third respondents have a legal duty to support the
extra-marital child of the applicant, Jordan
Petersen born on 7
January 2003, to the same extent to which the fourth and fifth
respondents are liable to maintain the said child.
[2] The
first respondent is directed to take the necessary steps for an
enquiry to be held in terms of
section 10
of the
Maintenance Act No.
99 of 1998
, with a view to enquiring into the provision of
maintenance by the second and third respondents for the said
extra-marital child
of the applicant.
[3] No order as to costs is
made.
_______________
P.B. Fourie, J
REPORTABLE
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
[CAPE
OF GOOD HOPE PROVINCIAL DIVISION]
Case No: 6541/03
In the matter between:
JADE LEE PETERSEN
Applicant
and
THE MAINTENANCE OFFICER
SIMON’S TOWN MAINTENANCE
COURT
First Respondent
GASANT
ABRAHAMS
Second Respondent
SAADIA
ABRAHAMS
Third Respondent
BEULAH
PETERSEN
Fourth Respondent
EUGENE
BREDENKAMP
Fifth Respondent
Advocate for Applicant : Adv.
M. Abduroaf
Amicus Curiae : Adv. P. K.
Weyer
Attorney
for the Applicant : AJ Hamman & Associates
Date
of hearing : 24 October 2003
Date
of Judgment : 11 November 2003