John v S (A610/2002) [2003] ZAWCHC 39 (27 August 2003)

About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Western Cape High Court, Cape Town
>>
2003
>>
[2003] ZAWCHC 39
|

|

John v S (A610/2002) [2003] ZAWCHC 39; 2003 (2) SACR 499 (C) (27 August 2003)

[REPORTABLE]
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(CAPE
OF GOOD HOPE PROVINCIAL DIVISION)
CASE
N0.:
A
610/2002
In
the matter between:
ANDREW
JOHN Appellant
and
THE
STATE Respondent
________________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
: 27 AUGUST 2003
________________________________________________________________________
COMRIE
J. :
[1.]
The
appellant was convicted by a regional court of rape and sentenced to
13 years’ imprisonment. He appeals against the conviction
and
sentence. The appellant was initially one of three accused in the
court below: he was accused no. 2. Accused no. 1 was also
convicted
of rape and the same sentence was imposed. He does not appeal.
Accused no. 3 died during the course of the trial and
accordingly no
verdict was reached in respect of him.
Ad
conviction
[2.]
The
complainant, a young woman who was still a teenager, stated that on
the night of 4 December 1996 she missed the last train home.
She
spent the first part of the night in the company of another woman,
C., in the city centre where certain untoward things occurred.
Among
those whom she encountered were the appellant (also known as
“Waterkop”) and no. 1. Thereafter, on what seems to have
been a
pretext, with or without an element of duress, she was persuaded to
accompany a group of men, which included the appellant
and no. 1, to
a council building on the foreshore. There she was raped
successively by several men including no. 1 and the appellant.
He
was the third man to rape her. The complainant was alone with each
rapist in a separate room at the time of each rape. Each
rapist wore
a condom.
[3.]
The
complainant stated that the next day she reported the rapes to her
close friend, who testified in confirmation of that report.
The
complainant’s parents were alerted and the police were informed.
An examination by a private medical practitioner was superficial
because he felt that the complainant should rather be seen by the
district surgeon. No such examination appears to have taken place.
[4.]
At
an identity parade held some two and a half months later, the
complainant identified all three accused as being men who had raped
her on the night in question. The parade appears to have been
properly conducted.
[5.]
The
appellant’s principal defence was an alibi. He claimed that during
the relevant period he and his girl friend were staying
with his
sister, Mrs. Botha, at Manenberg; that during the first week of
December 1996 he painted the inside and outside of his
sister’s
house; that he painted the outside brown; and that he ventured
nowhere near the city during that time. Mrs. Botha testified
in
support of this alibi and many of its details. She and her brother
differed, however, on the colour. Mrs. Botha stated that the
appellant painted part of the outside (the front part) and that he
painted it blue. The witness tried to escape from this answer
when
the obvious discrepancy between brown and blue was put to her in
cross-examination. But the damage in my view was done. Mrs.
Botha
could also not explain why, aware of the alibi, she had failed to
proffer it to the police.
[6.]
The
appellant had an ancillary defence, the force of which diminished as
the trial progressed. In summary it was that the complainant
was a
prostitute and that Armien Andrews, a pimp, had put her up to
implicating the appellant and others. Armien and his friends
had
given her the appellant’s nickname. The reason for the conspiracy
had something to do with gang rivalry. The complainant
denied all
these assertions. The defence was considerably watered down during
the defence case. The appellant stated that he had
no personal
problems with Armien, and that he (the appellant) was not a member of
the relevant gang (although there was other evidence
suggesting that
he was a leading member of that gang, the Dock Road Kids). According
to the appellant there was thus no reason for
Armien to want to get
rid of him. It emerged further that the appellant had learned of the
conspiracy from a third party,
viz.
another prostitute. Then it transpired that the appellant had half
inferred the conspiracy because he claimed to have seen the
complainant
associating with Armien after 4 December and prior to
the identity parade. Later in his cross-examination the appellant
was forced
to concede that he could not explain why the complainant
should have invented her implication of him. Still later the
appellant
stated that he had met Armien, who had denied the
complicity.
[7.]
A
witness by the name of Julian Petersen, also known as “Green Eyes”,
also testified for the appellant. Petersen was partly discredited
and he was in any event altogether unimpressive.
[8.]
It
might have been of some concern to enquire more closely into what
this young complainant was doing in the city at a late hour and
after
the last train had departed. Petersen, for what it is worth, implied
that she and C. were prostitutes. In the light of the
way in which
this ancillary defence developed, and based as it was on little more
than speculation, I think there is no need to examine
the theory
further.
[9.]
Although
she was a single witness, and still young, the complainant was found
by the trial court to be an outstanding witness. She
gave her
evidence on different days spread over a period of time. A perusal
of her testimony in transcript shows that she testified
with
exceptional clarity. There was but one contradiction which in my
view was not of a serious nature. I consider that it should
be
accepted, as was found by the trial court, that the complainant was
indeed raped successively be several men in the council building
on
the foreshore. That leaves the question whether the appellant was
one of the rapists. On the appellant's version of events she
met the
appellant in the city centre earlier that evening. Further, she
stated that at the council building the lighting was such
that she
had a reasonable view of each of the rapists, including the
appellant. In addition she pointed him out as one of them at
the
identity parade.
[10.]
The
appellant by contrast was a poor witness whose alibi defence
foundered and whose ancillary defence virtually disappeared. There
is no realistic scope for the contention that the complainant
mistakenly identified the appellant as one of her rapists. She had
more than adequate opportunity to see the appellant’s face in the
city centre, on the way to the foreshore, and in the council
building. And she knew the appellant’s nickname. Either the
complainant was lying or she was not. I can find no reason to differ
from the trial court’s conclusion that she was telling the truth,
or to differ from the conclusion that the appellant’s guilt
was
proven beyond reasonable doubt. I would confirm the conviction.
Ad
sentence
[11.]
The
first contention to be considered is whether the trial magistrate
exceeded her penal jurisdiction when imposing a sentence of
13 years’
imprisonment. The potentially relevant dates are as follows. The
offence was committed on 4 December 1996. The appellant
was arrested
some time later, in 1997, and appeared in court. After various
remands the trial proper commenced on 29 April 1998
when the
appellant and his co-accused pleaded. At that juncture the
magistrate’s general penal jurisdiction was a maximum of 10
years’
imprisonment. With effect from 7 October 1998 that jurisdiction was
increased to 15 years’ imprisonment. See
s. 6
of the
Magistrates
Amendment Act 66 of 1998
amending
s. 92(1)
of the principal Act 32 of
1944. At the same time the general penal jurisdiction of district
magistrates was increased from 1 to
3 years’ imprisonment. The
appellant’s trial was eventually concluded on 16 November 2001,
when he was convicted and sentenced.
[12.]
It
will immediately be observed that the appellant could not have been
sentenced (for rape) by the court
a
quo
to more than
10 years’ imprisonment when the offence was committed, or when he
was arrested and first appeared in court, or more
particularly when
he pleaded. It was only in October 1998, in the course of the trial,
that a heavier/longer sentence became competent.
It is so that prior
to his plea the appellant could have been indicted by the prosecuting
authority in the High Court, having greater
penal jurisdiction, but
that course was not followed. The sentence in excess of 10 years’
imprisonment can therefore only be justified,
if at all, on the basis
that it was constitutionally and otherwise lawfully authorised by the
amending legislation.
[13.]
This
appeal does not concern the so-called compulsory minimum sentence
legislation, because Act 105 of 1997 was enacted and came
into force
after the commission of the offence. See
S.
v. Willemse
1999(1) SACR 450 (C) in which cases such as
R.
v. Mazibuko
1958(4) SA 353 (A),
R.
v. Sillas
1959(4)
SA 305 (A), and
S.
v. Mpetha
1985(3)
SA 702 (A) were cited. As will appear later those leading decisions
accord with s. 35(3) (n) of the Constitution, subject
to a
qualification.
[14.]
In
S v Arendse
1999(1) SACR 454 (C) I dealt with the increase in the general penal
jurisdiction of district courts from 1 to 3 years’ imprisonment.

It was an automatic review. The offence (robbery) was committed on
26 July 1998. The two accused pleaded two days later. The
trial was
heard on 29 October 1998, when the accused were convicted and
sentenced to 2 years’ imprisonment each. I pointed out
that an
increase in a court’s general penal jurisdiction is usually
regarded as prospective rather than
retrospective.
S.
v. Ndevu
1975(3)
SA 519 (O) at 520;
S.
v. Qualinga en Ander Sake
1978(4) SA 556 (NC) at 559. In the case of the two accused I found
that there was no prejudice resulting from the increased jurisdiction
because the district magistrate, who convicted them, could in any
event have referred them to the regional court for sentence.
Sec.
116
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
.
[15.]
Less
than a month later a full bench of the Transvaal Provincial Division
handed down judgment in
S.
v. Mbuyane
;
S.
v. Nkitle
1999(1)
SACR 458 (T). The majority of that Court held that the amendment to
the jurisdiction was procedural; that the accused
had no “right”
to a maximum sentence of 12 months’ imprisonment; and that the
accused were competently sentenced (after 7
October 1998) to longer
sentences for their offences (house breaking and theft respectively)
committed prior to 7 October 1998.
The majority rejected an argument
based on s. 35(3) (n) of the Constitution. The Court overruled an
unreported case
(Mnisi)
in the same division, and approved an unreported case
(Hendrik
Bantam)
in the
Northern Cape Division.
[16.]
The
minority judge (
Prinsloo
AJ
) was of the
view: first, that the legislation effecting the increase in
jurisdiction was retrospective; and second, that the jurisdictional
limits before and after the amendment constituted “prescribed
punishments” within the meaning of s. 35(3) (n) of the
Constitution.
That provision of the Bill of Rights reads:
“
35. (3) Every
accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right
–
to the benefit
of the least severe of the prescribed punishments if the prescribed
punishment for the offence has been changed between
the time that
the offence was committed and the time of sentencing.”
Compare article 15(1) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which, I am
informed, was ratified by South Africa
on 10 March 1999. The learned
judge’s second view,
supra
,
has been supported by De Waal
et
al
:
The
Bill of Rights Handbook
(4 ed) at 649. See too Steytler:
Constitutional
Criminal Procedure
from 367, espec. at 376 - 8.
[17.]
Arendse’s
case,
supra
,
and the majority view in
S.
v. Mbuyane; S. v. Nkitle, supra,
were followed by
H.J.
Erasmus J
(
Cleaver
J
concurring) in
an unreported judgment of this Division in
S.
v. Mketho
(A
505/01; judgment delivered 30 August 2002). In that appeal the
offence (rape) was committed on or about 20 September 1997.
The
appellant was arrested on 10 June 1998. The date of his first
appearance in court is unclear, but he pleaded in the regional
court
on 3 February 2000. He was in due course convicted by that court and
sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. A contention
that the trial
court had exceeded its jurisdiction was rejected; the sentence was,
however, reduced to 10 years’ imprisonment
on other grounds. The
question which I address later in this judgment, namely the
significance of the date of the plea, could not
have arisen in
S.
v. Mketho
since
the appellant pleaded more than a year after the jurisdiction was
increased.
[18.]
Many
of the decided cases, and indeed s. 35(3) (n), concentrate on the
date of the commission of the offence as the first point of
comparison. That is perfectly understandable in most instances where
the competent punishment itself is increased or decreased
post
commission of the offence and prior to sentencing. The answer in the
present appeal is that the appellant, having committed rape,
was
always liable to a sentence in excess of 10 years’ imprisonment.
The limitation, if any, flowed from the court in which he
was
charged, namely the regional court. That was a decision of the
prosecuting authority made after the commission of the offence.
The
case is thus taken out of para. (n)
supra
unless it be held (as
Prinsloo
AJ
held) that the
general penal jurisdiction of a particular court constitutes a
“prescribed punishment”. I accept that the meaning
of that
expression is not confined to compulsory or semi-compulsory sentences
such as may be found, for example, in Act 105 of 1997
mentioned
earlier. I think “prescribed” here also includes punishments
which are laid down or specified by law as being competent
to impose.
Thus our statute law authorises the imposition of sentences for say
drunk driving, illicit diamond dealing, or stock
theft. Such an
accused is not liable to an increase in such potential sentence
post
commission of the offence, and would be entitled to the benefit of an
intervening reduction. That was the position in terms of our
common
law, and is now enshrined in the Constitution. The qualification in
terms of para. (n) is that the legislature many no longer
make an
increase in sentence retrospective.
[19.]
I
am not persuaded, however, that a change in the general penal
jurisdiction of a court within the judicial hierarchy, which does
not
of itself alter the authorised sentence, can be regarded as
“prescribed”. The contrary view, adopted by
Prinsloo
AJ
, with respect
unduly strains the language of s. 35(3) (n).
[20.]
It
seems to me that a more fruitful line of enquiry in the context of a
general increase in the penal jurisdiction of the trial court
is to
examine the position not at the time of the commission of the
offence, but at the time when an accused pleads and thereafter.
The
general rule, which is subject to exceptions, is that an accused
person who pleads not guilty is entitled to a verdict [s. 106(4)
of
the
Criminal Procedure Act] and
is deemed to demand that the issues
raised by the plea be tried
(s. 108).
S.
v. Sibuyi
1993(1)
SACR 235 (A) at 248 – 9. Generally speaking the verdict would
emanate from the court before which the accused pleads.
The trial
may result in a conviction (or an acquittal) and as
Smalberger
JA
said in
S.
v. Tieties
1990(2)
SA 461 (A) at 466 E:
“
A conviction
has important consequences for as long as it stands. For one, it
precludes a further trial against the person convicted
in respect of
the same or a similar offence based on substantially the same
facts.”
That has since
become a constitutional right; see
s. 35(3)(m):
“
not to be
tried for an offence in respect of an act or omission for which that
person has previously been either acquitted or convicted.”
Also
speaking generally, and again subject to exceptions, the court which
convicts an accused is the court which sentences him or
her. The
exceptions to both general propositions are many; in what follows I
shall consider those exceptions which bear an penal
jurisdiction.
[21.]
The
most obvious exception is to be found at district court level
(referred to in the
Criminal Procedure Act as
a magistrate’s
court). By
s. 114
(conviction following a plea of guilty) and
s. 116
(conviction following a plea of not guilty) a district magistrate may
in appropriate circumstances refer the convicted accused to
the
regional court for sentence. This is quite common in practice. Such
an accused is then exposed to the enhanced penal jurisdiction
of the
regional court. There is, however, no corresponding provision in the
Criminal Procedure Act which
enables a regional court to refer a
convicted accused to the High Court for sentence. That may be
sufficient to distinguish the
present appeal from
Arendse’s
case,
supra
.
[22.]
Section
117
provides for the special, but rare case where an accused
challenges the validity of a provincial ordinance or proclamation as
a ground
of his defence. In such a case the accused must be
committed for trial in the High Court.
[23.]
Chapter
19
(section 119
– 122) provides that an accused who is to be
indicted in the High Court may be required to plead in the district
court. This procedure
is followed on the instructions of the
attorney-general, now the director of public prosecutions. Different
consequences flow according
to whether the accused pleads guilty or
not guilty. Ultimately it is the decision of the attorney-general as
to the court before
which the accused will be arraigned for sentence
(plea of guilty) or trial (plea of not guilty). Chapter 19 A
(sections 122
A – D) provides for a similar but not identical
procedure in respect of cases which should be heard by a regional
court, except
that the attorney-general plays no overt role. Under
both chapters a plea of guilty, properly made, will usually be
binding on
the accused, leaving sentence to be imposed by the court
chosen by the attorney-general (ch. 19) or by the regional court (ch.
19A).
In all instances under both chapters I would expect the
magistrate, as a matter of fairness, to explain to an unrepresented
accused
the special nature of the plea proceedings and the
implications thereof. If an accused is legally represented, I would
expect that
representative to explain the position to the client.
What seems to be clear is that these plea procedures have to be
specifically
invoked at the right time, namely the time of plea, and
cannot be invoked midway through a trial in the district court.
[24.]
Finally,
there is chapter 20: preparatory examinations
(sections 123
–
143). In the normal course where the attorney-general decides on a
preparatory examination, the accused is not required to
plead until
the end of the proceedings. See
s. 131
read with
s. 130.
However,
s. 123
(b) provides for an exceptional case. It empowers the
attorney-general to convert a part-heard trial in the district or
regional
court into a preparatory examination. The paragraph states:
“at any stage . . . before sentence”, but in
S.
v. Tieties
supra,
where the history
of the legislation is set out, the court of appeal redrafted the
provision to read: “before conviction”. It
would appear
prima
facie
that the
accused will have to plead a second time, namely at the conclusion of
the proceedings. The accused may adduce evidence
(s. 134)
and may
even be discharged
(s. 135)
, but such discharge is not binding on the
attorney-general [s. 137 read with
s. 139(b)].
Different judicial
officers may hear different stages of the examination
(s. 138).
By
s. 139
it is the prerogative of the attorney-general to arraign an
accused before the court of the former’s choice for sentence (plea
of guilty) or for trial (plea of not guilty) or to decline to
prosecute.
[25.]
I
shall assume, without deciding, the constitutionality of
s. 123(b)
and the provisions ancillary thereto. It is none the less a
startling procedure, albeit very seldom used. To my mind it is
undesirable
that the prosecution, even the chief prosecutor, should
be empowered to interfere in the trial in this manner after a plea of
not
guilty has been entered; and I fear that such intervention may
conceivably lead to an unfair trial. Be that as it may, the fact
remains that the
s. 123(b)
procedure was not invoked in the present
case. Nor were the appellant and his co-accused required to plead,
for later trial, in
terms of chapter 19 or chapter 19A. Neither the
appellant nor his co-accused challenged the validity of a provincial
ordinance or
proclamation in terms of
s. 117
, since there was naught
to challenge. We are back where we started: the district court can
refer a convicted accused to the regional
court for sentence, but the
regional court enjoys no corresponding power (save in terms of Act
105/1977, which is not applicable
in this case). The question, as I
see it, is whether the imposition by the trial magistrate of a
sentence in excess of her general
jurisdiction at the time of plea,
but within her general jurisdiction at the time when sentence was
imposed, infringed the appellant’s
right to a fair trial in terms
of s. 35(n) of the Constitution.
[26.]
I
am not convinced that the decision in
S.
v. Arendse, supra,
was wrong, and it has in principle been followed in this Division in
S. v. Mketho
,
supra
.
I remain of the view that the general penal jurisdiction of a court
does not constitute a prescribed punishment, and that an increase
in
such jurisdiction is procedural and prospective and does not
constitute an increase of a prescribed punishment. That is all very
well at district court level where the magistrate can in an
appropriate case refer the accused to the regional court for
sentence,
such power existing at the time of plea though exercisable
later (after conviction). But there is no counterpart to s. 114 and
s.
116 in respect of the regional court whereby a convicted accused,
such as the appellant, can be referred to the High Court for
sentence.
As I said earlier the sentence in excess of 10 years’
imprisonment can only be justified, if at all, by virtue of the
increase
in the regional court’s general penal jurisdiction.
[27.]
In
S. v. Zuma and
Others
[1995]4
BCLR 401 (CC) and in
S.
v. Dzukuda and Others
;
S. v. Tshilo
[2000]11 BCLR 1252 (CC) the Constitutional Court made it clear that
the right to a fair trial is not limited to the specific rights
listed in s. 35(3). There is no
numerus
clausus
. In the
latter case
Ackerman
J
said:
“[9] As was said by this Court in
Zuma’s
case, an accused’s right to a fair trial under section 35(3) of the
Constitution is a comprehensive right and “embraces a concept
of
substantive fairness which is not to be equated with what might have
passed muster in our criminal courts before the Constitution
came
into force.” Elements of this comprehensive right are specified in
paragraphs (a) to (o) of subsection (3). The words “which
include
the right” preceding this listing indicate that such specification
is not exhaustive of what the right to a fair trial
comprises. It
also does not warrant the conclusion that the right to a fair trial
consists merely of a number of discrete sub-rights,
some of which
have been specified in the sub-section and others not. The right to
a fair trial is a comprehensive and integrated
right, the content of
which will be established, on a case by case basis, as our
constitutional jurisprudence on section 35(5) develops.
It is
preferable, in my view, in order to give proper recognition to the
comprehensive and integrated nature of the right to a fair
trial, to
refer to specified and unspecified
elements
of the right to a fair trial, the specified elements being those
detailed in sub-section (3).
[10] It should not be assumed
that a fair trial, as required by section 35(3), can only be achieved
by one specific system of criminal
procedure. There may be more than
one way of securing the various elements necessary for a fair trial
and provided the legislature
devises a system which effectively
secures such right, it cannot be faulted merely because it settles
for a system which departs
from past procedures. The norm prescribed
by section 35(3), is a “fair trial”. The question to be
determined in each case
is whether the criminal procedure scheme, or
the relevant part thereof, devised by the legislature, whatever its
form
,
conforms in substance to that
norm
.”
Apropos
sentencing the learned Judge said:
“
(12) More
particularly, in relation to sentencing in the context of the present
case, it seems to me that what the right to a fair
trial requires,
amongst other things, is a procedure which does not prevent any
factor which is relevant to the sentencing process
and which could
have a mitigating effect on the punishment to be imposed, from being
considered by the sentencing court. In the
present circumstances a
fair trial would also have to ensure that, in the process of the
sentencing court being put in possession
of the factors relevant to
sentencing, the accused is not compelled to suffer the infringement
of any other element of the fair trial
right.”
[28.]
It
strikes me as unfair that an accused person should attract a heavier
sentence than that to which he or she was exposed at the time
of
plea, when issue was joined. That in effect is what happened to the
appellant. As
Prinsloo
AJ
put it in his
minority judgment,
supra
,
the goal posts were shifted during the course of the trial, and
shifted to the detriment of the appellant. When he pleaded in the
regional court, the maximum punishment to which he was exposed was
one of ten years’ imprisonment. That limit was an incidence
of the
trial court’s jurisidiction at the time. To hold that the
procedural
nature of the general increase in the trial court’s penal
jurisdiction
in res
medias
afforded a
valid basis to enable the trial magistrate to impose a higher
sentence than she could competently have done when the appellant
pleaded, would be to ignore the very material
substantive
consequence of the procedural amendment. In effect, it would be akin
to allowing what in a different, but analogous context, is
expressly
proscribed by s. 35(3)(n) of the Constitution. It would at the very
least be unfair to the appellant.
[29.]
The
question which is presented in this case well illustrates the
‘imprecision of the dichotomy and the sometimes elusive nature
of
the distinction’ between statutory provisions which are
characterised as ‘procedural’ and those which are not, remarked
on by
Marais JA
in
Minister of
Safety and Security v Molutsi and Another
1996(4) SA 72 (A) at 90 F – J. It is firmly established that a
statutory provision which, while procedural in character,
substantively
affects vested rights adversely is to be construed as
prospective in effect, so as not to negate the affected rights.
[30.]
The
appellant had no vested right, in the true sense of the words, to a
sentence limit of ten years’ imprisonment when he pleaded.
The
limit of the trial court’s general penal jurisdiction was
nevertheless a circumscribing factor when his trial commenced in
the
regional court and any upward shift in the sentencing jurisdiction
while the trial was in progress would, if availed of by the
presiding
officer, adversely affect his position substantively. The consequent
prejudice, amounting to not less than an extra three
years’
imprisonment, compels the conclusion of unfairness. To that extent
the appellant (and accused no. 1) did not in my opinion
receive the
fair trial to which the Constitution entitled them. It was correctly
not argued that the amendment to s. 92 was intended
to be
retrospective. Nor was it argued, again I think correctly, that the
sentences were saved by s. 36 of the Constitution. It
follows that
the maximum sentence which the regional magistrate was competent
to impose
in casu
was 10
years’ imprisonment.
[31.]
Mr.
Bischoff
,
for the appellant, was unable to argue convincingly that the
appellant merited anything less than 10 years. The crime was
heinous.
The appellant was the third man to rape the complainant and
he must have known that he was the third in line. He has a previous
conviction for murder. In his favour I will take into account, as
did the court
a
quo
, the
substantial period which he spent in custody awaiting the trial and
its conclusion. None the less it appears to me that the
maximum of
10 years’ imprisonment would be the appropriate sentence.
[32.]
In
the exercise of this Court’s inherent review jurisdiction the
sentence imposed on accused no. 1 falls to be reduced to the
competent
maximum.
[33.]
The
order is as follows:
The appellant’s
appeal against conviction is dismissed and the conviction is
confirmed;
The appellant’s
appeal against sentence succeeds. The sentence is set aside and
replaced by:
“
Tien (10)
jaar gevangenisstraf”.
In the exercise
of this Court’s inherent review jurisdiction the sentence imposed
on accused no. 1, Peter Arries, is set aside
and replaced by:
“
Tien (10)
jaar gevangenisstraf.”
R.G.
COMRIE
JUDGE
I
agree.
A.G.
BINNS-WARD
ACTING JUDGE