S v Woest and Another (SS15/2004) [2004] ZAWCHC 41 (11 March 2004)

75 Reportability
Criminal Law

Brief Summary

Criminal Law — Plea of guilty — Entry of not guilty plea — Accused charged with multiple serious offenses including murder and armed robbery — Accused initially pleaded guilty but court entered not guilty plea due to conflicts in statements and potential defenses raised — Court's duty to ensure proper plea entered when doubt exists regarding guilt. On 20 January 2003, two accused entered a massage parlour intending to rob the occupants, resulting in a massacre of nine individuals and serious injury to one survivor. The accused initially pleaded guilty to various charges but the court, upon evaluating their statements, determined that conflicting accounts warranted a not guilty plea to be entered. The legal issue was whether the court should accept the guilty pleas or enter a not guilty plea based on the evidence presented and the potential defenses raised by the accused. The court held that due to the conflicts in the statements and the possibility of a valid defense, it was appropriate to enter pleas of not guilty, obliging the prosecution to proceed with the case.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This was a criminal trial in the High Court of South Africa (Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division) arising from a multiple-homicide incident at premises operating as a male-to-male massage parlour/escort agency known as Sizzlers in Sea Point, Cape Town.


The parties were the State as prosecutor and two accused persons, namely Adam Roy Woest (accused 1) and Trevor Bazil Theys (accused 2).


Procedurally, both accused initially pleaded guilty to the charges (subject to limited exceptions by accused 1 in relation to particular counts). Each accused also tendered a statement explaining the plea, with accused 1 providing a statement in terms of section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, and accused 2 tendering a statement treated by the court as a section 112(2) statement (described as one that purported to be a confession). After evaluating these statements, the court entered pleas of not guilty in terms of section 113 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, principally because the statements revealed conflicts with the allegations in the charges and raised a possible defence. The State then proceeded to lead evidence on the merits. After the State closed its case, the defence elected to call no evidence.


The dispute concerned responsibility for a series of offences committed during a robbery at Sizzlers, including nine murders, attempted murder, robbery with aggravating circumstances, and firearms- and ammunition-related offences, as well as whether the murders were premeditated and committed with direct intent for purposes of the minimum-sentencing regime.


2. Material Facts


The court treated much of the factual material as common cause or not genuinely disputed, particularly after the defence led no evidence to rebut the State’s case. The premises at 7 Graham Road, Sea Point operated as Sizzlers. Accused 1 lived opposite the premises at Bordeaux Flats, and accused 1 and accused 2 knew each other through accused 1’s employment and accused 2’s work as a taxi driver.


Shortly before midnight on 19–20 January 2003, accused 1 made a telephone booking at Sizzlers. The two accused arrived around midnight. They were armed with two firearms, carried a knife, rope, duct tape, surgical gloves, balaclavas, and a two-litre container of petroleum. Accused 2 had stolen his brother’s firearm and obtained the use of a BMW motor vehicle. The court accepted that the accused did not attend to obtain the services offered but acted pursuant to a criminal plan.


On arrival, one of the deceased, Sergio De Castro, opened the door and took them to a massage studio. De Castro then returned to another room to continue services with a client, Gregory Seymour Berghaus. According to the survivor, Quinton Simon Taylor, the usual procedure at the premises was for workers to present themselves to clients, but on this occasion the robbery unfolded before that could occur.


The owner, Aubrey John Otgaar (Eric Otgaar), appeared at the dormitory doorway, with both accused present. By then the accused were wearing surgical gloves and were armed. They announced a robbery. They were not disguised at that stage, and accused 1 spoke to Eric Otgaar as if they were known to each other. Eric Otgaar was made to open a safe in the dormitory. Cash was taken and shared by the accused. Individuals present were bound (hands and feet), forced to lie face down (Taylor was allowed to lie on his back), and gagged with socks and duct tape. Personal items such as jewellery and watches were taken. The accused moved through the premises, and evidence indicated that a second safe in Eric Otgaar’s room was also opened.


After the robbery had been executed, the accused proceeded to cut the throats of the bound occupants in the dormitory. The court recorded evidence that accused 2 appeared hesitant and acted under accused 1’s direction, and that the victims screamed and moaned as this occurred. Accused 1 later returned with petroleum and doused the bound victims. The evidence also included that accused 1 appeared to speak on a cellphone while walking up and down the premises, although the court regarded the implications of these calls as speculative.


Later, shots were fired elsewhere in the house; this was accepted as the time when De Castro and Berghaus were shot. Thereafter, both accused returned to the dormitory and shot the bound occupants “execution style,” starting from opposite sides and working towards the centre. Taylor was seriously injured but survived, fled to a nearby filling station, and sought help. The accused left the scene after approximately 03h00, used balaclavas as they ran to the get-away vehicle, and accused 2 later disposed of the firearms.


In argument, the State contended that the accused went to Sizzlers to rob and intended to leave no survivors, meaning that both the robbery and the massacre were premeditated. Accused 1’s counsel argued that the killings were committed on the spur of the moment following the accidental shooting of Berghaus during an alleged attack by Berghaus. The court rejected that version as inconsistent with uncontested evidence about the accused’s whereabouts at the relevant time, and drew inferences from the preparation and conduct of the accused (including the presence of petrol, the throat-cutting, the delay at the scene, and the manner of shooting) that supported premeditated killing.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions included whether, in light of the plea explanations tendered under section 112, the court was obliged to invoke section 113 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and enter pleas of not guilty, thereby requiring the State to prove the charges.


A further issue was whether the statements by each accused that they feared the other raised a possible defence of necessity, and how that possibility affected the acceptance of guilty pleas and the need for a trial on the merits.


On the merits, the key issue was whether the State proved beyond reasonable doubt that both accused were guilty of the charged offences, including whether the murders and attempted murder were committed with direct intent and were premeditated, and whether the accused acted with a common purpose even where they were not together at every moment of the killings.


A consequential legal determination concerned the applicability of the minimum sentence regime under the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, which depended on findings of premeditation and direct intent for the murders and attempted murder, and aggravating circumstances for the robbery.


The issues involved a combination of application of law to fact (sections 112 and 113; common purpose; minimum-sentencing prerequisites), factual inference (premeditation and intent), and evaluative judgment in drawing the only reasonable inference from the proved facts.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court first addressed the effect of the plea explanations. It interpreted section 113 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 as requiring the court to substitute a plea of not guilty where, at any stage before sentence, the court is in doubt whether the accused is legally guilty on the plea, or where the accused’s admissions do not align with the charge allegations, or where a possible defence is disclosed. The court articulated the operative test, in its view, as whether the content of a section 112(2) statement discloses a possible defence to the charges. The court emphasised that credibility at that stage was not decisive; the focus was on whether a possible defence emerges on the accused’s own version.


Applying that approach, the court found conflicts between the accused’s statements and the allegations in the charges. In addition, both accused indicated they feared the other during the commission of the offences. The court treated this as raising a possible defence of necessity. Because the prosecutor did not accept the factual basis of the pleas tendered, and because the statements disclosed possible defences or non-admissions, the court held it was obliged to enter pleas of not guilty under section 113 and require the State to proceed with evidence.


On the merits, the court declined to summarise the entire evidentiary record, stating that most of it was common cause or not in dispute. The reasoning centred on whether the killings were premeditated and whether the defence contention that the massacre was spontaneous could reasonably be accepted.


In rejecting the submission that the killings occurred on the spur of the moment following an accidental shooting, the court relied on several interrelated factual considerations. It accepted that Taylor’s evidence about the location of the accused when Berghaus was shot was uncontested and rendered the proposed scenario factually untenable. It reasoned that the accused arrived equipped with items consistent with advance planning, including balaclavas, petroleum, binding materials, and weapons, and it questioned why disguises were not used at first if the plan had been merely to rob in circumstances where accused 1 was apparently known to Eric Otgaar and thus at risk of later identification. The court treated the presence and later use of petrol as inconsistent with an explanation tied to coercing compliance with the robbery, particularly because the robbery had already been completed when the throat-cutting and dousing occurred.


The court further considered the sequence and nature of violence. The robbery was completed shortly after arrival, yet the accused remained at the premises for a prolonged period, which the court regarded as inconsistent with a purely opportunistic robbery and raised the question why they did not leave once valuables were obtained. The throat-cutting of bound victims after the robbery, and the later “execution style” shooting pattern and number and placement of shots, were viewed as demonstrating an intention to kill rather than merely to escape.


From these considerations, the court concluded that the only reasonable inference was that the accused went to Sizzlers with a premeditated intention to kill everyone they found, in addition to robbing them. Having reached this conclusion, the court stated that it was unnecessary to analyse in detail the fact that the accused were not together when De Castro and Berghaus were killed, because they acted with a common purpose throughout.


The court also addressed an argument that certain counts constituted an impermissible splitting of charges, particularly in relation to theft of a firearm and possession counts. The judgment records that this submission was readily conceded by counsel for accused 2 as untenable when the court reminded him of the applicable legal position, and the court did not accept the splitting-of-charges contention.


Finally, having found that the murders were premeditated and committed with direct intent, the court held that the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 applied, with the consequence that the relevant counts carried prescribed minimum sentences, including life imprisonment for the murders and the prescribed minimum sentence for robbery with aggravating circumstances.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court convicted accused 2 on the count of theft (relating to the firearm).


The court convicted both accused of the murders of Aubrey John Otgaar, Sergio De Castro, Marius Meyer, Warren Robert Visser, Stephanus Abraham Fouche, Travis Reade, Johan Joseph Meyer, Timothy Craig Boyd, and Gregory Seymour Berghaus.


The court convicted both accused of the attempted murder of Quinton Simon Taylor.


The court convicted both accused of robbery with aggravating circumstances involving cash, watches, jewellery, a gold necklace, and other items.


The court convicted both accused of unlawful possession of firearms and unlawful possession of ammunition, with the court specifically noting that even if accused 2 held a licence for one firearm, he was at least in unlawful possession of the other firearm.


The court expressly found that the murders (and attempted murder) were premeditated and committed with direct intent, rendering the minimum sentencing provisions under the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 applicable, including a minimum prescribed sentence of life imprisonment for the murder counts. The excerpt provided does not record a final sentence order or any costs order.


Cases Cited


No specific case authorities were cited by name in the judgment as provided.


Legislation Cited


Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (including sections 112 and 113).


Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment as provided.


Held


The court held that the plea explanations tendered under section 112 revealed conflicts with the charge allegations and disclosed a possible defence (necessity), and that the prosecutor did not accept the factual basis of the pleas. In those circumstances, the court held it was obliged under section 113 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 to enter pleas of not guilty and require the State to proceed with the prosecution.


On the evidence led by the State (left unrebutted by any defence evidence), the court held that the only reasonable inference was that both accused acted pursuant to a premeditated plan to rob and to kill the occupants, and that they acted with common purpose in the killings. The court found the murders and attempted murder were committed with direct intent and were premeditated, triggering the prescribed minimum sentence regime under the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. The court accordingly convicted the accused on the listed counts, including nine murders, attempted murder, robbery with aggravating circumstances, and firearms and ammunition offences, and convicted accused 2 of theft of a firearm.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Section 113 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 obliges a court to record a plea of not guilty and require the prosecution to proceed where, before sentence, the court is in doubt whether the accused is legally guilty on a guilty plea, where the accused does not admit an allegation in the charge, where an allegation has been incorrectly admitted, where a valid defence is disclosed, or where for any other reason the guilty plea should not stand.


In assessing whether a statement tendered under section 112(2) justifies conviction on a plea of guilty, the court applied the approach that the question is whether the accused’s statement discloses a possible defence to the charge; the truthfulness or credibility of that disclosure is not determinative at the plea stage for purposes of section 113.


Where the proved facts support only one reasonable inference, namely that the accused acted with a premeditated intention to kill in addition to committing robbery, a court may draw that inference from objective factors such as the preparation undertaken, the sequence of conduct, the nature and extent of violence, and the duration of events at the scene, particularly where no evidence is led to rebut the State’s case.


The doctrine of common purpose may sustain liability for killings committed during the course of a joint criminal enterprise, even where co-perpetrators are not physically together at every moment, provided the common purpose subsists throughout the relevant conduct.


A finding that murders were committed with direct intent and were premeditated renders the prescribed minimum sentence provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 applicable, including the prescribed sentence of life imprisonment for qualifying murder counts, and the prescribed minimum sentencing framework for robbery with aggravating circumstances.

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[2004] ZAWCHC 41
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S v Woest and Another (SS15/2004) [2004] ZAWCHC 41 (11 March 2004)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(CAPE OF GOOD HOPE PROVINCIAL
DIVISION)
CASE NO: SS15/2004
DATE: 11-3-2004
In the matter of:
THE STATE
versus
1- ADAM ROY WOEST
2- TREVOR BAZIL THEYS
JUDGMENT
N C ERASMUS, J: On the morning of 20
January 2003, Mark Hamilton visited the Sizzier's Massage Parlour, as
he had done before. He
was met with one of the most gruesome horror
scenes imaginable. After seeking help he returned with the police to
find nine men
either dead or dying. One can only imagine the stench
of petrol, blood and bodies everywhere, the gurgling sound of a
person drowning
in his own blood, another in a pool of blood trying
to kick out of his bonds. This was the aftermath of one of the worst
massacres
Cape Town has experienced.
The families and friends of the nine
dead men, a single survivor, the greater Cape Town and the country
were expecting to hear why
these men were butchered in the most
violent and senseless fashion, as they were. Questions were asked,
speculation was rife, but
I am afraid we are still left with, as the
songwriter says "more questions than answers". Another song
rang through this
court as a background tо a police video that
was taken shortly after the shootings, which included the following
lyrics:
"Tell it like it is don't be
ashamed to let your conscience be your guide. Life is too short to
have sorrow. We may be here
today and gone tomorrow. You might as
well get what you want so go on and live baby, go on and live."
The two accused are charged with
various charges, in total 14 of them. Accused number 1 was charged
with the theft of a firearm,
which firearm plus one other was used in
the killing of the following nine people:
1. Aubrey John Otgaar
2. Sergio De Castro
3. Marius Meyer
4. Warren Robert Visser
5. Stephanus Abraham Fouche
6. Travis Reade
7. Johan Joseph Meyer
8. Timothy Craig Boyd
9. Gregory Seymour Berghaus
There was an attempt on the life of
Quinton Simon Taylor.
They are further charged with armed
robbery in that they robbed the occupants of the house of cash,
jewellery and other items whilst
being in the possession of firearms.
A further charge for the possession of two firearms and ammunition.
Both of the accused pleaded guilty to
all the charges, save that accused number 1 pleaded not guilty to
charges 3 and 10. They both
tendered statements in explanation of
their pleas in which accused number 1, in a statement in terms of
section 112 of the Act,
gave a full explanation of what transpired in
his view on the night in question. On behalf of accused number 2 a
statement that
purports to be a confession was handed in as a
statement in terms of section 112(2). There are authorities in our
law that this
is admissible and I admitted it as such.
On evaluating said statements I came
to the conclusion that it would be appropriate to enter pleas of not
guilty in terms of section
113 of Act 51 of 1977. Section 113 reads
as follows:
"If a court at any stage of the
proceedings under section 112(1)(a) or (b) or 112(2) and before
sentence is passed, is In doubt
whether the accused is in law guilty
of the offence to which he or she has pleaded guilty, or if it is
alleged or appears to the
court that the accused does not admit an
allegation in the charge, or that the accused has incorrectly
admitted such allegation,
or that the accused has a valid defence to
the charge, or if the court is of the opinion for any other reason
that the accused's
plea of guilty should not stand, the court shall
record a plea of not guilty and require the prosecutor to proceed
with the prosecution."
It was clear from the contents of the
statements that there were conflicts between the accused on the facts
admitted and the allegations
in the charge and, therefore, the Court
was obliged to enter pleas of not guilty.
The test for section 113, in my view,
when assessing whether the contents of a statement in terms of
section 112(2) of Act 51 of
1977 justifies a conviction is, if what
the accused says would disclose a possible defence to the charges
preferred against him.
Whether the accused should be believed in what
he discloses in this statement is not a relevant consideration. Both
the accused
stated in their statements that they feared the other
accused when participating in the events that formed the basis of the
charges.
I have already mentioned the differences in the allegations
they admitted.
In stating as such in respect of the
fear, they raised a possible defence in law of necessity. The
prosecutor further did not accept
the factual basis of the pleas as
tendered by the accused. After the pleas of not guilty were entered,
the prosecutor proceeded
to present evidence on the merits of the
case.
After the close of the State's case,
the defence elected not to present any evidence to rebut or qualify
the admissions made, nor
the evidence as led by the State.
Accordingly I do not intend to summarise all the evidence led as the
bulk of the evidence either
amounts to common cause facts or simply
facts not in dispute.
I deal with the facts. Number 7 Graham
Road, Sea Point is a single residential dwelling that was used as a
male-to-male massage
parlour, or an escort agency known as Sizzlers.
Directly opposite on the northern side of Graham Road is a block of
flats, namely
Bordeaux Flats, Accused number 1 and a State witness,
Jacobus Steyn, were residents in this block of flats. Steyn's
apartment overlooked
No. 7 Graham Road.
Accused number 1 was employed as a
manager at a local restaurant where he met accused number 2, who was
a taxi driver at the time.
Shortly before midnight on 19-20 January
2003, accused number 1 made a telephonic booking at Sizzlers. The
plan was that both he
and accused number 2 would go there. Unbeknown
to the occupants at No. 7 Graham Road, the two accused had no
intention of utilising
the services offered by Sizzlers, but were
fostering an evil and criminal intent.
Around midnight they arrived at
Sizzlers, after carefully plotting their plan. Accused number 2 had
stolen his brother's firearm
and obtained the use of a BMW motor
vehicle. They armed themselves with two firearms, a knife, rope, duct
tape, a two litre container
filled with petroleum, surgical gloves
and balaclavas. They state that their primary goal for visiting
Sizzlers was to rob the
occupants. Upon their arrival the front door
was opened by one of the deceased, Sergio De Castro, whereafter they
were taken to
a massage studio and Sergio returned to another massage
studio to complete his services with a client, Berghaus. According to
Quinton
Taylor, the only eyewitness and sole survivor of the events,
this was normal procedure. The normal procedure would have been that

the workers as he called them "boys" would all be in the
front room that doubled as a dormitory, They, the workers, would
then
present themselves one by one to the prospective clients in the
massage studio. Once an election is made by the client they
would
then go to a vacant studio for their business.
On the night in question, however, the
workers did not get the opportunity to present themselves to the
accused. Shortly after the
accused entered the premises, the owner,
Eric Otgaar, appeared in the doorway of the dormitory with both the
accused following.
They were now wearing surgical gloves that they
did not wear when entering the premises. Both were armed with
firearms. The occupants
of the house were told that it was a robbery.
The two accused wore no disguises. Accused number 1 spoke to Eric as
if they were
known to each other. Eric was told to open the safe in
the dormitory. Cash was found that the two accused shared. All those
present
in the dormitory were tied up by binding the hands and feet
together. They were also forced to lie face down. Quinton insisted
lying on his back and was allowed to do so. He testified that he
wanted to see if he got killed. This reminds one of the famous
last
words of Che Guevara when he told the person who shot him, before
being shot, "I know you. You came to kill me. Shoot
coward, you
are only going to kill the man."
All of the occupants of the dormitory
were gagged by having a sock stuck in their mouths and tied over with
the duct tape. Their
personal belongings, including jewellery and
watches, were taken. According to Quinton Taylor, Eric and himself
tried to hide their
belongings but this was spotted by accused number
1, who was taking the lead, and ordered them to hand their belongings
over. The
two accused left the dormitory and went to the kitchen.
When they returned accused number 1 was armed with a steak knife and
accused
number 2 had his own knife that he had earlier used to cut
the rope with which the victims were tied up.
At this stage Sergio and Berghaus (the
client) were still in the adjacent room. Accused number 2 stayed with
the people in the dormitory
whilst accused number 1 was wandering
through the house. Judging from the photographs and the objective
evidence, he must have
been looking for valuables or something that
he could find. In Eric's room was a second safe that was also opened
according to
the evidence of his brother-in-law. According to Taylor
there was at least R7 000 in the safe that he brought from Knysna.
The
people in the dormitory asked accused number 2 if they were going
to die, but the were assured that it would not happen. However,

shortly thereafter both accused started to cut their throats. The
accused started from opposite ends and worked their way towards
the
centre. According to Taylor, accused 2 was hesitant to do it but was
ordered to proceed by accused number 1. Whilst this was
happening and
shortly thereafter, the victims were screaming and moaning as a
result of the cuts to their throats.
Accused number 2 was constantly trying
to calm accused number 1 and reassured the victims that they would
not die. Later accused
number 1 left the room and came back with the
two litre container that was filled with petroleum and doused the
victims with that.
Thereafter, accused number 1 was walking up and
down the house and it appeared as if he was talking to somebody on a
cellphone.
Taylor was under the impression that he was waiting for
transport in order to leave.
As time went on, the bonds loosened
and accused number 2 re-tied them continuously. At one stage Eric
Otgaar managed to get loose,
but was knocked down by accused number
1. Later again accused number 1 left the room whilst number 2 stayed
behind with the people
in the dormitory. Shots were fired in another
part of the house. This must have been when Sergio and Berghaus were
shot. When accused
number 1 returned to the room, both him and number
2 started shooting the people in the dormitory, again starting from
left and
right and working their way to the centre. It is common
cause that all those present were shot, execution style.
Taylor sustained serious injuries and
survived miraculously. He ran to a nearby filling station and sought
help. The two accused
left the premises shortly after 3 o'clock. When
leaving, they covered their faces with their balaclavas and ran to
the get-away
car that was parked nearby. The guns were later disposed
of by accused number 2.
The arguments follow. Mr Stephen, who
appeared on behalf of the State, submitted that the accused went to
Sizzlers to rob and had
no intention to leave any survivors, meaning
that not only was the robbery premeditated, but also that the idea to
massacre was
preconceived. Mr Calitz, on behalf of accused number 1,
submitted that the killings were executed on the spur of the moment,
after
Berghaus was accidentally shot, following an attack on the
accused by Berghaus. Mr Ballem's submission in respect of the facts
did not take the matter further, save his reference to the
possibility of the complicity of others. The reference by Mr Bellam
of other persons' involvement cannot be found on any direct evidence.
The only indication of this comes from the evidence of Taylor,
where
he referred to the telephone conversations that accused number 1 had.
We know that they did not wait for a lift as they brought
their own
get-away car.
The possibilities stemming from the
telephone conversations are legion, but to limit them to the
complicity of others would be pure
speculation. However, this raises
certain questions that remain a mystery. In dealing with the contrary
and opposing submissions
made by Mr Calitz and Mr Stephen, the
following factors, inter alia, are taken into account:
(a) Taylor's evidence of the
whereabouts of the two accused at the time of the shooting of
Berghaus is uncontested, therefore it
would have been impossible for
Berghaus to be shot in the circumstances as submitted by Mr Calitz.
(b) It must be accepted that accused
number 1 was either known to Eric Otgaar, or the probabilities of
being identified afterwards
would have been good and he would have
been aware of this. They took along balaclavas but never used them.
Was this possibly because
they knew there would be no survivors?
(c) They took along a two litre
container of petrol. Mr Calitz submits it was for the purposes of
torture. Why? Why did they want
to torture the people? To gain access
to the money? If so, why use it after they had the money? Therefore,
the purpose of the torture
or the dousing of the individuals with the
petroleum had nothing to do with robbery. The question arises why the
torture, or is
Mr Stephen correct in his submission that the only
reasonable inference was that they wanted to obliterate the evidence.
(d) We know that they slit the
victims' throats. Why? it could not have been with the intention to
enforce submission to the robbery
because at that time they had the
money. Why then slit their throats? Was this to torture, as Mr Calitz
has put it, or possibly
to humiliate the victims, or did they have
another motive?
(e) The robbery was completed shortly
after their arrival on the scene. Why did they not leave then? The
possibilities of complications
must have crossed their minds. This
scene was a 24-hour business venture, potential clients could arrive
and in fact did arrive.
Why the delay of almost three hours?
(f) Judging by the position of the
shots, the number of shots fired at the victims, the accused had only
one intention and that
was to kill. The question arises why shoot to
kill If you only came to rob?
(g) Even if the first shot that struck
Berghaus was accidental, why proceed with the massacre?
I have no doubt that the submissions
by Mr Calitz on the fact that the primary intention was robbery, is
without merit. We are of
the view that the only inference is that the
two accused went to the scene with the premeditated intention to kill
everyone they
found, and robbery.
In the light of this finding, it is
consequently not necessary to deal with the fact that the accused
were not together when Berghaus
and De Castro were killed. They had a
common purpose at all times. The Court can only further speculate
about the motives for these
killings. Mr Ballem attempted to argue
that the theft of the firearm in count 1 and the possession of the
firearms and ammunition
in counts 13 and 14 amount to a splitting of
charges. However, he readily conceded the absurdity of such an
argument when reminded
of the legal position by the Court.
For these reasons that I have
furnished, the accused are convicted as follows:
Count 1 - accused number 2 is
convicted of theft.
Count 2 - both accused are convicted
of the murder of Aubrey John Otgaar.
Count 3 - both accused are convicted
of the murder of Sergio De Castro.
Count 4 - both accused are convicted
of the murder of Marius Meyer,
Count 5 - both accused are convicted
of the murder of Warren Robert Visser.
Count 6 - both accused are convicted
of the murder of Stephanus Abraham Fouche.
Count 7 - both accused are convicted
of the murder of Travis Reade.
Count 8 - both of the accused are
convicted of the murder of Johan Joseph Meyer.
Count 9 - both accused are convicted
of the murder of Timothy Craig Boyd.
Count 10 - both accused are convicted
of the murder of Gregory Seymour Berghaus.
I further find that these murders were
premeditated and committed with direct intent. Therefore the
provisions of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
are
applicable. This means that there is a minimum prescribed sentence of
life imprisonment on those charges.
Count 11 - both accused are convicted
of the attempted murder of Quinton Simon Taylor, also premeditated
and with direct intent.
Count 12 - both accused are convicted
of robbery with aggravating circumstances, again the minimum sentence
is applicable, which
includes cash, watches and jewellery, a gold
necklace and other items unknown to the Court.
Count 1 3 - both accused were in
possession of firearms. In respect of accused number 2, if he had a
licence for one firearm at
least he was in unlawful possession of the
other and therefore they are convicted on a charge of unlawful
possession of a firearm.
Count 14 - both accused are convicted
of the unlawful possession of ammunition.
N C ERASMUS, J