Cindi v Eastern Free State Co-operative Ltd (439/2002) [2004] ZAFSHC 6 (26 February 2004)

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[2004] ZAFSHC 6
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Cindi v Eastern Free State Co-operative Ltd (439/2002) [2004] ZAFSHC 6 (26 February 2004)

IN THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(ORANGE
FREE STATE PROVINCIAL DIVISION)
Appeal
No.: 439/2002
In the
matter between:
MBUTI
JACOB CINDI
Appellant
and
EASTERN
FREE STATE CO-OPERATIVE LTD
Respondent
_____________________________________________________________________
CORAM:
MALHERBE
J.P.
et
VOGES A.J.
_____________________________________________________________________
HEARD
ON:
23 FEBRUARY 2004
_____________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
BY:
MALHERBE J.P.
_____________________________________________________________________
DELIVERED
ON:
26 FEBRUARY 2004
_____________________________________________________________________
Appellant is a businessman from Lesotho. On 8 March
1995 respondent issued summons against appellant in the Magistrate’s
Court,
Ladybrand claiming payment of the amount of R19 361,23, being
the balance owing for goods sold and delivered. After the exchange
of pleadings the matter was enrolled for trial on 5 December 1997.
On 3 December 1997 appellant’s attorneys withdrew as attorneys
of
record. On the trial date there was no appearance on behalf of
appellant. According to the record of the proceedings respondent’s
attorney handed in an updated statement showing the balance owing
(including interest since the issue of summons) as R51 419,46.

(This updated statement does not form part of the appeal record).
The Magistrate granted default judgment in the amount reflected
in
the statement, plus costs. Almost 4½ years later, on 31 May 2002,
appellant applied for the following relief:
“1. That
the late bringing of this application be condoned.
2. That the judgment granted
against the Applicant by default on the 5
th
December 1997 be rescinded.
3. That the warrant of
execution issued herein be set aside.
4. That the Applicant pay the
costs of this application unless the Respondent unsuccessfully
opposes same.”
Respondent opposed the application and on 7 August 2002
the Magistrate refused the application for condonation with costs.
This appeal
is directed against that judgment.
Appellant’s
explanation for his failure to apply timeously for rescission of the
judgment appears from the following paragraphs
of his founding
affidavit:
“ 6.
During 1997, following service
upon Respondent’s attorneys of my plea referred to above, I was
advised by my attorneys, then Buys
and Mare attorneys, that the
matter was to be heard on the 5
th
December 1997.
7.
On the 5
th
December 1997 I attended at the office of Buys and Mare attorneys
with a view to consulting for purposes of preparing for trial.
I was
however informed by my said attorneys that they were no longer
representing me and advised me to look for another attorney.
I was
shown their notice of withdrawal as attorneys of record a copy
whereof is attached hereto and marked Annexure MJC A.
8.
I could not immediately raise
any attorneys in Ladybrand who could assist me and on the grounds
that the matter was to be heard on
that day I resolved to go to court
personally to advise the court of the predicament I was faced with.
9.
On my arrival at Court, I
enquired from the clerk of the civil court about the matter and I was
informed that the matter had already
been dealt with. I was however
not given any explanation as to how the matter was dealt with.
10.
As I am not resident in the
Republic of South Africa and had not before dealt with the local
attorneys I started enquiring from my
friends in the RSA as to which
attorneys I could go to for assistance and I was referred to Litheko
and Associates Incorporated,
of Thaba Nchu.
11.
During January 1998 I attended
at the offices of Litheko and Associates Incorporated in Thaba Nchu
where I consulted with an attorney
known as Molefi Litheko. During
consultation I then instructed him to assist me in this matter and he
undertook to proceed with
the defence of my case.
12.
Approximately two months after
the consultation referred to in paragraph 11 above, Molefi Litheko
called me to his office and informed
me that he had perused the court
file and discovered that on the 5
th
December 1997 when the matter was heard in my absence, judgment was
granted in favour of the Respondent in the amount of
R51
419-46
in stead of
the amount for which I was sued being the sum of
R19
361-23.
13.
Molefi Litheko advised me that
judgment should not have been granted in the amount in excess of the
amount I was sued for and I then
gave him instructions to apply for
rescission of that judgment. I further informed him that I did not
owe the Respondent the amount
of R19 361-23 or any other amount
whatsoever whereupon he undertook to do the necessary in connection
with my instructions.
14.
After I gave Molefi Litheko
instructions to apply for rescission of judgment in this matter, I
consulted with him on various occasions
and at all times he assured
me that my case was being attended to as I had instructed.
15.
On or about the 26
th
October 2001 when I was travelling in a motor vehicle with
Registration number BRX 081 FS belonging to my daughter and in her
presence,
we met die deputy-sheriff at the RSA-Lesotho border who had
been instructed to execute the judgment granted in favour of
Respondent
in this matter. The deputy-sheriff there and then removed
the said motor vehicle.
16.
On the 9
th
November 2001 I again went to Thaba Nchu to the offices of Litheko
and Associates Incorporated to find out what my said attorney
had to
say regarding the execution steps referred to above.
17.
I did not find him on that day
and I subsequently made several visits at his office all of which
were fruitless as he was always not
there. I was advised to go to
the offices of Litheko Matsididi Motsoeneng Attorneys to make
enquiries regarding my matter and there
I was informed that Molefi
Litheko is no longer practising as an attorney.
18.
Upon receiving information that
Molefi Litheko is no longer practising, I then instructed the firm of
Litheko Matsididi Motsoeneng
attorneys to assist me in this matter.
I was advised that the fact that a warrant of execution was served in
connection with this
matter on the 26
th
October 2001 is an indication that the application for rescission of
judgment was either not successful or it was never brought before
this Honourable Court.
19.
My attorney informed me that
before an application could be brought before the court an
application for condonation would have to
be made to the Respondent
or its attorneys seeing that the judgment was granted a long time
ago. Further my attorney informed me
that he would have to peruse
the Court file to determine whether an application was in fact
brought by Molefi Litheko or not and
thereafter to determine what
steps could be taken.
20.
During March 2002 my attorney
informed me that he has had an opportunity of perusing the court file
and has discovered that the application
for rescission of judgment
that Molefi Litheko had undertaken to bring on my behalf was never
brought before court. I do not know
why my instructions were never
carried out.
21.
I have now instructed my
attorney to apply for rescission of the judgment granted by default
herein as it has always been my intention
to defend the Respondent’s
claim as I have a defence thereto which is that I at no stage during
my dealings with the Respondent
bought from the Respondent any goods
on credit. All the purchases I made at the Respondent were on the
basis of cash on delivery.”
Having
quoted at length from appellant’s affidavit, it is just as well
that I quote extensively from respondent’s answering affidavit
that
was deposed to by a Mr Dippenaar:
“ 5.
Ek het die Beëdigde Verklaring
van die Applikant behoorlik nagelees en wens die Agbare Hof op sekere
aspekte uit te wys. Die Applikant
voer aan dat hy gedurende JANUARIE
1998 (sien paragraaf 11 van verklaring) sy prokureurs Mnre LITHEKO &
ASSOSIATE in THABA ‘NCHU
gaan spreek het wie onderneem het om sy
saak te verdedig. Ongeveer TWEE (2) maande daarna in MAART 1998 het
Applikant se prokureur
hom na bewering geskakel en hom in kennis
gestel van die Vonnis wat in Applikant se afwesigheid teen hom
toegestaan is. Applikant
beweer dat hy op hierdie datum sy prokureur
instruksies gegee het om voort te gaan met die Aansoek om
Tersydestelling van Vonnis.
Dit is dus duidelik uit die Applikant se
Beëdigde Verklaring dat hy reeds teen MAART 1998 kennis gedra het
van die Vonnis.
6.
Applikant beweer in paragraaf 14
van sy Beëdigde Verklaring dat hy sedert APRIL 1998 sy prokureur by
geleentheid geskakel het wie
onderneem het dat hy besig is om aan die
saak te werk. Die volgende datum waarna die Applikant in sy
verklaring verwys is 26 OKTOBER
2001, by welke geleentheid daar op sy
motorvoertuig met registrasienommer: BRX 081 FS beslag gelê is.
Applikant beweer dat hy
op 9 NOVEMBER 2001 weer na Mnr LECHEKO se
kantore gegaan het om stappe te doen om die beslaglegging te bestry.
Applikant sou daarna
by sy huidige prokureur van rekord se kantore
vasstel dat Mnr Litheko nie meer praktiseer as prokureur nie. Dit is
nie duidelik
uit die verklaring van die applikant waarom so ‘n lang
tydperk verloop het en sy opdrag aan sy prokureur nie uitgevoer is
nie,
alternatiewelik waarom hy nie daarop aangedring het nie.
7.
Dit is my respekvolle submissie
dat die Applikant nie die volle toedrag van sake aan die Hof voorhou
nie. Die Respondent/Eiser het
reeds so vroeg as 29 OKTOBER 1999 via
die Balju van LADYBRAND beslag gelê op ‘n TOYOTA CRESSIDA
motorvoertuig met registrasienommer:
BRX 081 FS. Die Applikant in
hierdie aansoek het op 3 NOVEMBER 1999 ‘n Ex-Parte aansoek teen die
Balju in sy hoedanigheid
ex
officio
gebring
waarin tussentydse Regshulp gevra is dat die voertuig onmiddellik
teruggegee word aan die eienaar Me. NELLY NANKOSI CINDI.
‘n
Afskrif van die Applikant se aansoek gedateer 5 NOVEMBER 1999 word
hierby aangeheg, gemerk Aanhangsels “A1” tot “A11”.
Die
Respondent het die aansoek opponeer en het die Applikant die betrokke
aansoek op 26 NOVEMBER 1999 teruggetrek en kostes aan
die Respondent
aangebied aangesien die Applikant nie die korrekte remedie gevolg het
deur ‘n Tussenpleit aanhangig te maak nie.
‘n Afskrif van
Respondent se Opponerende Verklaring word vir die Agbare Hof se
aandag hierby aangeheg, gemerk Aanhangsel “B1”
tot “B5”. Op
grond van die Applikant se
mala
fides
soos
uiteengesit in paragraaf 5 van die Applikant se verklaring het die
Hof bevind dat die Applikant die Respondent se kostes moet
betaal.
Dit dien aan die Hof vermeld te word dat kostes getakseer is op 23
DESEMBER 1999 in die bedrag van R4 560,59. Sedert die
kostes
getakseer is het Applikant nog geen poging aangewend om die
regskostes te vereffen nie ten spyte van verskeie versoeke deur
Respondent se prokureur dat die kostes betaal moet word. Ek
submiteer aan die Hof dat die Applikant nie by magte sal wees om
verdere
Regshulp aan te vra vir solank daar nog ‘n uitstaande
kostebevel teen die Applikant hangend is nie. Afskrifte van die
getakseerde
rekenings word vir die Agbare Hof se aandag hierby
aangeheg, gemerk “C1” tot “C6”.
8.
Dit is voorts my submissie aan
die Hof dat die Applikant ten tyde van die bring van die Aansoek soos
in paragraaf 7 na verwys, deeglik
kennis gedra het van die feit dat
daar ‘n Vonnis teen hom gevel is maar het Applikant geen stappe
geneem om die Vonnis tersyde
te stel nie. Dit blyk onmoontlik te
wees dat Applikant se prokureur die aansoek in NOVEMBER 1999 kon
bring indien hy nie instruksies
van sy kliënt gehad het nie. Dit
dien as ‘n verdere bevestiging dat Applikant en sy prokureur wel in
kontak was met mekaar en
seer sekerlik ‘n Aansoek om
Tersydestelling moes bespreek het indien daar enige sprake van so ‘n
aansoek was.
9.
Sedert NOVEMBER 1999 is die
onderhawige aansoek die eerste verdere Regshulp wat die Applikant die
Hof mee genader het. Ek is met respek
teenoor die Hof van oordeel dat
die Respondent sedert 26 NOVEMBER 1999 geen poging aangewend het om
die Vonnis tersyde te stel nie.
Eers teen 29 MEI 2002 versoek die
Applikant die Hof om verdere regshulp vir Tersydestelling van Vonnis.
Daar het dus bykans DERTIG
(30) maande verloop vandat die Applikant
se prokureur die vorige aansoek gebring het tot en met die
onderhawige aansoek om Tersydestelling
van Vonnis en is ek met respek
van oordeel dat die Applikant nie kwalifiseer aan die tydsbepaling
soos uiteengesit in Artikel 49
nie en kan die Hof nie sodanige growwe
nalatigheid deur die Applikant en/of sy prokureur kondoneer nie.
10.
Die Applikant in die onderhawige
saak het op 26 OKTOBER 2001 weereens kennis geneem van die feit dat
Vonnis destyds teen hom toegestaan
is toe die Respondent vir ‘n
tweede keer gepoog het om op ‘n voertuig van die Applikant beslag
te lê. By nadere ondersoek het
dit geblyk dat dit wel dieselfde
voertuig is as die een waarop beslag gelê is op 29 OKTOBER 1999 en
het die Applikant die voertuig
van beslaglegging vrygestel. Sedert
26 OKTOBER 2001 het daar ‘n verdere tydperk van SEWE (7) maande
verstryk voordat die onderhawige
aansoek gebring is en dui dit
weereens op die growwe nalatigheid van die Applikant in die
onderhawige saak. Dit is duidelik dat ten
spyte van twee
beslagleggings op voertuie van die Applikant daar nog geen
dringendheid aan sy kant te bespeur was nie aangesien sy
huidige
prokureur van rekord eers teen MAART 2002 na bewering by die Hof sou
vasstel dat Applikant se eerste prokureur, Mnr LITHEKO,
nooit ‘n
Aansoek om Tersydestelling van Vonnis gebring het nie.
11.
Dit is derhalwe my submissie dat
die Applikant nie die Hof in sy vertroue neem nie en nie die volle
waarheid aan die Hof openbaar
nie. Die enigste rede hiervoor is dat
die Applikant probeer voorgee dat sy voormalige prokureur nie sy
opdragte uitgeoefen het nie
terwyl dit duidelik blyk dat die
Applikant by verskeie geleenthede wel in kontak met sy prokureur was.
Dit is onverskoonbaar dat
‘n periode van bykans DRIE (3) jaar
verloop en Applikant nie die kwessie rondom sy opdragte aan sy
prokureur opgevolg het nie.”
The following passage in the recent decision of the
Supreme Court of Appeal in
UITENHAGE
TRANSITIONAL LOCAL COUNCIL v SOUTH AFRICAN REVENUE SERVICE
2004 (1) SA 292
at 297 I – J
encapsulates
the well-known criteria with which an application for condonation
should comply:
“
condonation is not to be had
merely for the asking; a full, detailed and accurate account of the
causes of the delay and their effects
must be furnished so as to
enable the Court to understand clearly the reasons and to assess the
responsibility. It must be obvious
that, if the non-compliance is
time-related then the date, duration and extent of any obstacle on
which reliance is placed must be
spelled out.”
Appellant is an adult businessman. It is inexplicable
that he did almost nothing to enquire from his attorneys why they
were so remiss
to carry out his instructions. If what he says is
true, their almost unbelievable negligence should be imputed to him.
His whole
version lacks credibility: From his failure on 5 December
1997 to enquire in what manner
“the
matter had already been dealt with”
throughout the ensuing years. The strong impression is
rather that he has been trying over the last almost 9 years to avoid
his responsibility
towards respondent. The obvious question is why a
businessman would apply for credit and then make payments to his
creditor in reduction
of an indebtedness if he never bought on
credit, as has been pleaded by appellant in the main action. Even his
plea lacks conviction
as it stands.
I agree with the Magistrate’s finding that appellant’s
explanation for the long delay to apply for rescission of the default
judgment
is not at all satisfactory. Moreover, the following extract
from
SALOOJEE AND ANOTHER NNO v MINISTER OF
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
1965 (2) SA 135
(A)
quoted with approval in
DE
WITTS AUTO BODY REPAIRS (PTY) LTD v FEDGEN INSURANCE CO. LTD
1994 (4) SA 705
(ECD)
at pp.
713
– 714
is also applicable to this matter:
“
There
is a limit beyond which a litigant cannot escape the results of his
attorney’s lack of diligence or the insufficiency of the
explanation tendered. To hold otherwise might have a disastrous
effect upon the observance of the Rules of this Court.”
On behalf of appellant Mr Human submitted that even if
the explanation for the delay is not convincing or satisfactory, the
default
judgment is so clearly wrong that it has to be rescinded and
that the appeal, therefore, has to succeed. He developed his
argument
as follows: Appellant did not appear at the time appointed
for the trial on 5 December 1977. In terms of Rule 32(2) the
Magistrate
could have given
“
judgment (not exceeding the
relief claimed) against him with costs.”
The relief claimed as set out in the particulars of
claim, was:
“a) Betaling
van die bedrag van R19 361,23
b) Betaling van rentes daarop
teen ‘n koers soos wat van tyd tot tyd van toepassing was.
c) Betaling van
invorderingskoste op die twee paaiemente reeds deur Verweerder betaal
en ten aansien van enige verdere paaiemente
wat Verweerder mag maak
uit hoofde van Klousule 9 van Aanhangsel “A”.
d) Betaling van regskoste
bereken op ‘n prokureur en kliënt-skaal in terme van klousule 9
van Aanhangsel “A”.”
By granting judgment in the amount of R51 419,46 plus
interest at a rate of 28% p.a., the Magistrate granted relief
“exceeding the
relief claimed” and the default judgment should,
therefore, be rescinded as being void
ab
origine.
(Mr Human had calculated that the
maximum amount that could have been outstanding on 5 December 1977
was R47 888,00 (R19 361,23 at
28% interest p.a. for 6 years, less R4
000,00 paid off before summons).
The argument that the outstanding amount had been
calculated incorrectly was not raised at all by appellant in his
application for
rescission of the judgment in the Court
a
quo,
as appears from the quotation from his
affidavit. If it had been raised, respondent could have responded to
it by filing an affidavit
setting out how its calculations had been
made. I doubt very much whether calculations made by counsel in
heads of argument can
carry much weight in the circumstances of this
case.
Be that as it may, it is true that the Magistrate
granted default judgment in an
amount
exceeding the amount claimed in the summons. However, that does not
necessarily mean that judgment was given “exceeding the
relief
claimed”. The relief claimed was payment of a specific sum of
money plus interest thereon plus costs, and judgment was also granted
for the payment of an amount of money plus interest plus costs. We
do not know what the updated statement that was handed up on
5
December 1977 looks like because it does not form part of the appeal
record. We are, therefore, completely in the dark as to how
the
amount that was allegedly then owing, had been calculated. It is
quite possible that respondent’s calculations cannot be faulted.

In the result appellant has not shown that the default judgment was
granted in contravention of Rule 32(2).
Appellant also seeks condonation of his failure to
prosecute this appeal in accordance with the applicable rules. The
appeal was
noted on 20 August 2002. In terms of Supreme Court Rule
50(4)(a) appellant should have applied to the Registrar for a trial
date
within 40 days of noting the appeal, i.e. on or before 16
October 2002. He applied only on 18 November 2002. Rule 50(7)(a)
provides
that two copies of the record have to be lodged
simultaneously with the application for the trial date and Rule
50(7)(c) requires
such copies to be complete and properly indexed.
It is common cause that the record is not even now complete as the
updated statement
does not form part of the record. Appellant’s
attorney says in his affidavit that he only filed a proper record on
4 September
2003 whereafter 23 February 2004 was assigned as date of
hearing. It is also common cause that appellant’s heads of
argument were
out of time.
Perhaps
the most important omission is the failure to prosecute the appeal
within 60 days of noting it. Such failure means that the
appeal
“shall
be deemed to have lapsed”
.
(Supreme Court Rule 50(1)).
Appellant’s present attorneys did not fare much better
than their predecessors in attending to his affairs! Even if the
appeal
is reinstated and all these failures are condoned, the appeal
has to fail for the reasons set out above.
In
the result the appeal is dismissed with costs.
___________________
J.P.
MALHERHE, JP
I
CONCUR
______________
M.
VOGES, A.J.
On behalf of Appellant:
Adv.C.A.
Human
instructed by
Litheko
Matsididi Motsoeneng Attorneys
Bloemfontein
On behalf of Respondent:
Adv.
P.C.F. van Rooyen
instructed by
Symington & De Kok
Bloemfontein
/scd