IN DIE HOOGGEREGSHOF VAN SUIDAFRIKA
(ORANJE VRYSTAATSE PROVINSIALE AFDELING)
Saak nr: A311/2004
In die saak tussen:
ELIAS DITHEBE POLELO Eerste Appellant
THABO LEHLWESA Tweede Appellant
en
DIE STAAT Resondent
_____________________________________________________
CORAM: BECKLEY, R et CILLIé,
et C.J. MUSI, RR
_____________________________________________________
UITSPRAAK: BECKLEY, R
AANGEHOOR OP: 14 NOVEMBER 2005
GELEWER OP: 17 NOVEMBER 2005
[1] Appellante het as beskuldigdes 2 en 3 saam met ‘n mede
beskuldigde tereggestaan tydens ‘n sitting van die
Rondgaande Hof te Virginia op klagtes van poging tot
verkragting en huisbraak met die opset om te verkrag en
verkragting. Hulle is beide skuldig bevind aan onsedelike
aanranding en huisbraak met die opset om te verkrag en
verkragting. Beide klagtes is saamgeneem vir doeleindes
van vonnis, en albei beskuldigdes is op 26 Augustus 1999
gevonnis tot lewenslange gevangenisstraf. Hulle kom nou
in ho ër beroep teen die opgelegde vonnis met die verlof
van die Hof a quo.
[2] Op die stadium toe voormelde vonnis opgel ê is, was die
rigtinggewende gerapporteerde uitspraak met betrekking
tot wesenlike en dwingende omstandighede die beslissing
van S v MOFOKENG AND ANOTHER, 1999 (1) SASV 502
(W) waarin Stegmann, R, die volgende benadering ten
opsigte van wat wesenlike en dwingende omstandighede
daarstel, voorhou te 523c – 524d:
“...for ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ to be
found, the facts of the particular case must present some
circumstance that is so exceptional in his nature, and that so
obviously exposes the injustice of the statutory subscribed
sentence in the particular case, that it can rightly be
described as ‘compelling’ the conclusion that the in
2
possession of a lesser sentence than that prescribed by
Parliament is justified.
It is not easy to see how, in relation to the crime of rape, when a group of
young men, acting in concert, have seized a woman, and each of them has
repeatedly raped her, there can ever be circumstances that can honestly be
described as be so ‘substantial and compelling’ as to justify the in possession
of a sentence that is less severe than that which Parliament has seen fit to
prescribed as the statutory sentence that is to result from the perpetration of
the crime of rape in the manner and in the circumstances referred to in Part I
of Schedule 2… The absence of previous convictions, the comparative
youthfulness of the prisoners, the unfortunate factors in their backgrounds, the
probable effect upon them of the liquor they have taken, the absence of
dangerous weapons, and the fact that complainant had not suffered serious
injury, are all factors that a court sentencing a convicted rapist in the ordinary
course, would weigh up as substantial factors relevant to the assessment of a
just sentence, and as tending to mitigate the severity of the punishment to be
imposed. However in my judgment, these factors, ‘substantial’ they, are
matters that parliament must have had in mind as every day circumstances
that would be found present in many or most of the crimes referred to in Part I
of Schedule 2 of Act 105 of 1977. Without emasculating the legislation, they
cannot be thought as ‘compelling’. The conclusion that a sentence lesser
than that prescribed by Parliament should be substituted for the prescribed
sentence… As I understand this legislation, ‘substantial and compelling’
circumstances must be factors of an unusual and exceptional crime that
Parliament cannot be supposed to have had in contemplation when
prescribing standard penalties for certain crimes committed in circumstances
described in Schedule 2.”
[3] Die hof a quo het die benadering van Stegmann, R, supra,
toegepas op die feite in die onderhawige saak en derhalwe
tot die volgende bevinding geraak:
“Na my mening is daar geen wesenlike of dwingende
omstandighede wat my regverding om beskuldigdes 2
en 3 ligter te straf as wat die Wetgewer voorgeskryf
het nie. Wat in hulle guns aangevoer kan word, is die
3
sogenaamde, ‘normale versagtende omstandighede’
wat in baie gevalle aanwesig is, soos die feit dat daar
geen toespaslike vorige veroordelings is nie; dat die
klaagster nie ernstig beseer is nie; dat sy sy op die
oogaf geen ernstige psigiese nagevolge oorgehou
het nie; dat hulle moontlik of selfs waarskynlik, tot ‘n
mate onder die invloed van drank was, ensovoorts.”
Met voormelde bevinding van die Hof a quo, inaggenome
die uitspraak van STAAT v MOFOKENG EN ANDERE,
supra, kan nie fout gevind word nie.
[4] In die uitspraak van die Hof a quo met betrekking tot die
aansoek om verlof om te appelleer, spreek die geleerde
Regter President hom as volg uit:
“Toe vonnis opgel ê is, was daar nog nie veel regspraak op die
Strafregwysigingswet, Wet nr. 105 van 1997 nie. Ek het my
grootliks laat lei deur die uitspraak deur die uitspraak van
Stegmann, R in STAAT v MOFOKENG EN ANDERE,
1999 (1) SASV 502 (W) vir my bevinding dat daar geen
wesenlike of dwingende omstandighede teenwoordig was
4
wat die oplegging van ‘n mindere vonnisse regverdig nie.
Sedert vonnisoplegging meer as 5 jaar gelede is die
bekende uitspraak in STAAT v MALGAS, 2001 (1) SASV
469 (A) gelewer wat skerp verskil van die Mofokeng
uitspraak. In die lig van die gesaghebbende uitspraak in
die Malgassaak, is dit wel moontlik dat ‘n ander Hof mag
bevind dat die sogenaamde normale versagtende
omstandighede wat ek bevind het, wesenlike of
dwingende omstandighede daarstel, daarom behoort
verlof verleen te word om teen die opgelegde vonnis te
appelleer.”
[5] In die beslissing STAAT v MALGAS, supra, meld Marais,
AR die volgende te bladsy 481 paragraaf 25:
“What stands out quite clearly is that the courts are a good deal
freer to depart from the prescribed sentences than has been
supposed in some of the previously decided cases and that it is
they who are to judge whether or not the circumstances of any
particular case are such as to justify a departure. ... The
Legislature has however deliberately left it to the courts to
decide whether the circumstances of any particular case
call for a departure from the prescribed sentence. While
5
the emphasis has shifted to the objective gravity of the
type of crime and the need for effective sanctions against
it, this does not mean that all other considerations are to
be ignored. All factors ... traditionally taken into account
in sentencing (whether or not they diminish moral guilt)
thus continue to play a role; none is excluded at the
outset from consideration in the sentencing procss.”
In ‘n latere beslissing van die Hoogste Hof van Appèl,
STAAT v ABRAHAMS, 2002 (1) SASV 116 te 127, d – f
handel Cameron, AR as volg met die oplegging van die
verpligte lewenslange vonnis:
“...I agree with Foxcroft J that this is not one of the worst
cases of rape. This is not to say that rape can ever be
condoned. But some rapes are worse than others, and
the life sentence ordained by the Legislature should be
reserved for cases devoid of substantial factors
compelling the conclusion that such a sentence is
inappropriate and unjust.”
In STAAT v MAHOMOTSA, 2002 (2) SASV 435 te 443
6
handel Mpati, AR, verder met die klassifisering van
verkragtings:
“The rapes that we are concerned with here, though very
serious, cannot be classified as falling within the worst
category of rape. .... According to the probation officer –
she interviewed both complainants – they do not suffer
from any aftereffects following their ordeals. I am
sceptical of that but the fact remains that there is no
positive evidence to the contrary. These factors need to
be taken into account in the process of considering
whether substantial and compelling circumstances are
present justifying a departure from the prescribed
sentence. ..... There should be no misunderstanding
about this: they will all be serious but some will be
more serious than other and, subject to the caveat that
follows, it is only right that the differences in
seriousness should receive recognition when it come to
the meting out of punishment.”
Wanneer gelet word op die feite in die onderhawige saak,
blyk die volgende, naamlik, dat die klaagster ‘n 31jarige
volwasse vrou was, wat aan drie kinders die lewe geskenk
7
het, wat die aand deur die appellante en die derde persoon
verkrag is nadat hulle haar die nag na ‘n huis agtervolg het
en die deur oopgeskop het en haar daarna verkrag het.
Alhoewel die appellante met messe gewapen was, is sy nie
met die messe beseer nie. Trouens, sy het slegs bytmerke
aan haar wang opgedoen.
Dit volg derhalwe na mening dat, alhoewel die bevinding
dat daar geen wesenlike en dwingende omstandighede
bestaan nie, die korrekte bevinding van die Hof a quo was
kragtens die Mofokeng beslissing, die “normale”
versagtende omstandighede, naamlik dat appellante nie
relevante vorige veroordelings gehad het nie, dat die
klaagster nie noemenswaardige beserings opgedoen het
nie, en dat die appellante in alle waarskynlikheid tydens die
voorval onder die invloed van drank was, wel volgens die
beslissings wat daarna gevolg het, as wesenlike en
dwingende omstandighede bestempel moes word, en dat
die Hof a quo by gevolg fouteer het, luidens laasgenoemde
beslissings, deur te bevind dat geen wesenlike en
8
dwingende omstandighede bestaan nie.
[6] In die lig van voormelde bevinding, moet bepaal word wat
‘n gepaste vonnis is. Alles inaggenome, meen ek dat ‘n
vonnis van 20 jaar gevangenisstraf gepas sal wees. Die
aanvanklike vonnis is opgelê so lank gelede as 26
Augustus 1999. Uiteraard moet die vervangende vonnis
geag word op daardie datum opgelê te gewees het.
[7] Bygevolg slaag die appèl teen die opgelegde vonnis. Die
lewenslange vonnis wat opgelê is ten opsigte van elk van die
appellante word tersyde gestel en vervang met ‘n vonnis van 20
(twintig) jaar gevangenisstraf, welke vonnis moet geag word
opgelê te gewees het op 26 Augustus 1999.
_______________
A.P. BECKLEY, R
Ek stem saam.
____________
C.B. CILLIé, R
9
Ek stem saam.
___________
C.J. MUSI, R
Namens die applikante: Adv. G.J.M. Wright
In opdrag van:
Die Regshulpraad
BLOEMFONTEIN
Namens die respondent: Adv. E. Liebenberg
In opdrag van:
Die Direkteur:
Openbare Vervolgings
BLOEMFONTEIN
/em
10