Scott v Hough (3001/2005) [2005] ZAFSHC 17; 2007 (3) SA 425 (O) (18 August 2005)

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[2005] ZAFSHC 17
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Scott v Hough (3001/2005) [2005] ZAFSHC 17; 2007 (3) SA 425 (O) (18 August 2005)

IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
(ORANGE FREE STATE
PROVINCIAL DIVISION)
Case No.: 3001/2005
In the case between:
PIETER BADENHORST
SCOTT
Applicant
and
MARIA CATHARINA
HOUGH
Respondent
_____________________________________________________
HEARD ON:
15 JULY 2005
JUDGEMENT:
RAMPAI J
_____________________________________________________
DELIVERED ON:
18 AUGUST 2005
_____________________________________________________
[1] The matter came to me
by way of an application in terms of rule 6(12)(c) of the Uniform
Rules of Court. For the purposes of this
judgement I shall refer to
the parties as in the main application. In this judgement the word
applicant refers to the gentleman,
Mr. Scott and the word respondent
to the lady, Ms Hough.
[2] Before I deal with
the issue, it is expedient to give a brief historical background of
the matter. The parties were previously
husband and wife. Three
dependent minor children were born of the martial relationship,
namely: P., a boy born on the [day/month]
1990, now 14 years old,
H., a boy born on the [day/month] 1992, now 12 years old, M., a girl
born on the [day/month] 1997, now 8
years old. The family previously
lived in Bloemfontein.
[3] The respondent file
for a divorce early last year. On the 26 February 2004 their
marriage was dissolved. By agreement between
the parties, which was
reduced to writing and embodied in a deed of settlement, custody of
the three minor children was awarded to
the respondent. The deed of
settlement was made an order of the court.
[4] After the divorce the
respondent moved to Stellenbosch in the Western Cape. The applicant
remained in Bloemfontein in the Free
State. In his founding
affidavit the applicant averred that since their divorce he had
remarried someone else as did the respondent.
By mutual agreement P.
alias R. had been in the
de facto
custody of his father, the
applicant since September 2004, notwithstanding the provisions of
the court order. His two siblings
had been in the custody of their
mother, the respondent, at all material times. On the 28
th
June 2005 H., alias H. with his sister M. travelled from Stellenbosch
to Bloemfontein to spend the winter school holidays with their
farther. The two children were supposed to return to their mother
together on the 10
th
July 2004. H. never did.
[5] On Thursday the 14
th
July 2005 the applicant launched an urgent application for the
provisional custody of H. pending the finalization of the application
for the variation order. Advocate C. Reinders appeared for the
applicant. For the respondent their was no appearance. Counsel
for
the applicant informed me that a copy of the application had been
faxed to the respondent’s attorneys at Stellenbosch early
on the
same day. I heard the matter in haste, in camera and in the absence
of the respondent.
[6] I granted the
following order on Thursday the 14
th
July 2004 after
hearing a unilateral argument by the applicant’s counsel. The
order reads as follows:
¡°
1. Hierdie aansoek as ‘n
dringende aansoek aangehoor word en dat afstand gedoen word van die
reels met betrekking tot tye en betekenings
soos voorgeskryf en soos
bedoel in Hofreël 6(12).
2. ‘n
Bevel
nisi
uitgereik word waarin
die respondent opgeroep word om redes, indien enige aan te voer op
Donderdag, 11 Augustus 2005 om 09h30 voormiddag
waarom die volgende
bevele nie finaal gemaak sal word nie:
2.1 waarom, hangende die afhandeling
van hierdie aansoek die bewaring van die minderjarige kinders R. en
H. nie aan applikant toegeken
sal word nie.
2.2 waarom die bewaringsbevele in
terme van die skikkingsakte aangegaan tussen die partye (en hierby
aangeheg as aanhangsel “A”)
nie opgeskort sal word wat betref R.
en H. ten einde gevolg te gee aan smeekbede 2.1 hierbo nie.
2.3 waarom die respondent nie gelas
sal word om die koste van hierdie aansoek te etaal nie (ingeval van
opposisie).
Smeekbedes 2.1 en 2.2 hierbo sal dien
as ‘n tussentydse interdik hangende die afhandeling van hierdie
aansoek en dat alle bevele
hierin verleen sal verval indien
applikant nie binne tien (10) dae na verlening van ‘n finale bevel
hierin, sal aansoek doe nom
wysiging van die Akte van Dading
(aanhangsel “A”) waarin applicant sal aansoek doen dat die
bewaring van die minderjarige kinders
R., H. en M. aan applikant
toegeken word.
4. Hierdie aansoek tesame met die
bevel nisi
op die respondente persoonlik beteken moet word.”
[7] The very next day on
Friday the 15
th
July 2005 the respondent launched an
application in terms of rule 6(12)(c) whereby I was called upon to
reconsider the order I granted
if favour of the applicant the
previous day. According to rule 6(12)(c) notice the respondent’s
sought an order whereby the rule
nisi
I previously issued
should be reconsidered and set aside seeing that the applicant had
caused a defective notice of the application
to be given to the
respondent.
[8] Charl August Janse
van Rensburg, an attorney of Bloemfontein, deposed to a sworn
statement on behalf of the respondent in support
of the rule 6(12)(c)
application. According to his view the
diés induciae
applicable
to the facts of this case was governed not by rule 6(5)(b) or
6(12)(a) or any other rule but by section 27 of the Supreme
Court Act
No. 59/1959.
[9] The contents of rule
6(12)(c) is couched in the following terms:
¡°
(c) A person against whom an order
was granted in his absence in an urgent application may by notice set
down the matter for reconsideration
of the order”
This rule must be
distinguishable from rule 6(8) which stipulates that any person
against whom an order is granted
ex parte
may anticipate the
return day by giving at least a twenty four hour notice to the person
in favour of whom the order was given.
[10] An
exposé
of
the vital considerations which underlie a rule 6(12)(c) application
is to be found in the case of
ISDN SOLUTIONS (PTY) LTD v CSDN
SOLUTIONS CC & OTHERS
1996(4) SA 484 WLD at 486H-487B
where Faber AJ commented as follows:
¡°
The Rule has been widely
formulated. It permits an aggrieved person against whom an order was
granted in an urgent application to
have that order reconsidered,
provided only that it was granted in his absence. The underlying
pivot to which the exercise of the
power is coupled is the absence of
the aggrieved party at the time of the grant of the order.
Given this, the dominant purpose of
the Rule seems relatively plain. It affords to an aggrieved party a
mechanism designed to redress
imbalances in, and injustices and
oppression flowing from, an order granted as a matter of urgency in
his absence. In circumstances
of urgency where an affected party is
not present, factors which might conceivably impact on the content
and form of an order may
not be known to either the applicant for
urgent relief or the Judge required to determine it. The order in
question may be either
interim or final in its operation.
Reconsideration may involve a deletion of the order, either in whole
or in part, or the engraftment
of additions thereto.
The framers of the Rule have not
sought to delineate the factors which might legitimately be taken
into reckoning in determining whether
any particular order falls to
be reconsidered. What is plain is that a wide discretion is
intended.”
[11] The passage was
quoted with approval in
LOURENCO AND OTHERS v FERELA (PTY) LTD
AND OTHERS
1998(3) SA 281 TPD at 290 E-H per Southwood J and
in
CAPE KILLARNEY PROPERTY INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD v MATAMBA &
OTHERS
2000 (2) SA 67
(CPD) at paragraph 6 per Hlophe DJP, as
he then was. In the instant case I also associate myself with the
views expressed in the
aforegoing passage.
[12] The service of court
papers upon an interested party is premised on the fundamental
principle of
audi alterem partem.
This basic tenet of our law
requires a court approached by the one party for a certain relief to
hear the other party as well before
granting the relief sought. In
general a court will decline to grant a relief sought unless the
party against whom such relief is
sought has been fully and timeously
apprised that relief in a particular form would be sought and that he
has had the maximum benefit
of the
diés induciae
in other
words the fullest opportunity permissible in law of considering his
defensive options and practically dealing with the claim
for the
relief being pressed.
[13] In the ordinary
course of court proceedings, that is to say, in matters where the
relief sought is not urgent, the service of
court papers, in other
words, ordinary non-urgent applications – there are two scenarios.
Where the respondent’s resides inside
the province he is entitled
to a maximum of five court days after the service of the court papers
before he can be called upon to
appear in court for the hearing –
vide rule 6(5)(b). Where the respondent resides outside the
jurisdictional boundaries of the
provincial division out of which the
ordinary application was initiated the respondent is entitled to at
least 14 calendar days if
he resides inside a radius of 160km from
the seat of the court or 21 calendar days if he resides outside such
radius – vide section
27 Supreme Court Act No. 59/1959.
[14] In the
extra-ordinary course of court proceedings, that is to say, in
matters where the relief sought is urgent, the service
of court
papers, in other words, urgent applications – there are again two
scenarios. The first scenario applies in a case where
the respondent
resides within the jurisdiction of the court. This scenario is
governed by rule 6(12)(a) which provides that the
court may dispense
with the formal periods of service as prescribed in the rules.
However, where the respondent resides outside
the jurisdiction of the
court there is no similar provision in the aforesaid principal
legislation or statute which empowers the
court in urgent matters to
relax formal periods of service as prescribed in the principal
statute. The mere absence of such a statutory
provision
per se
does not mean that an applicant who resides within the jurisdiction
of one court cannot launch an urgent application out of such
court
against a respondent who resides outside the jurisdiction of such
court. Here rule 6(4) applies together with rule 6(12)(a).
This is
the second scenario. This uniform rule applies throughout the
country irrespective of the respondent’s residence provided
the
matter is urgent and there is one or other jurisdictional factor
which connects the respondent to the applicant’s court of
residence.
[15] The respondent’s
argument boils down to this: It is permissible in such an urgent
application for the applicant to seek and
to obtain a rule
nisi
in secrete, in haste, and in camera against the respondent who is an
outsider. But it is impermissible in such an urgent application
for
the applicant to seek and to be granted a rule
nisi
in haste
in camera but in the absence of the respondent who had been given
notice which in terms of section 27 was short or irregular
service.
Since a high court is empowered, in urgent matters, to relax the
rules of service in respect of a respondent who resides
within its
area of jurisdiction I cannot see any reason in principle or logic as
to why, in urgent matters, involving respondents
who reside outside
its area of jurisdiction, a high court should be precluded from doing
so. If this is what the legislature had
indeed intended, the
legislature would simply have enacted a provision in the principal
statute to the effect that in all urgent
matters the applicant must
follow the respondent’s court, in other words, the applicant must
initiate an urgent application for
a rule
nisi
out of the high
court where the respondent resides.
[16] A similar situation
as in the instant case arose in
TURQUOISE RIVER INCORPORATED v
McMENAMIN & OTHERS
1992(3) SA 653 NPD per Levinsohn J
where the respondent who contented that when an urgent application
was initiated it was erroneously
sought and erroneously granted
because the respondent resided outside the jurisdiction of the court
which granted the order; that
section 2 Supreme Court Act No.
59/1959 read with the definition of a “civil summons” in section
1 thereof required that an outsider
be afforded a minimum period of
21 days from the service of the application if he resided more than
160km from the court in question;
that the statutory provisions of
section 27 were mandatory and that the court had no power to dispense
with the formal
diés induciae
provided therein – vide
paragraph 656 E-G.
[17] As regards the
applicant it was contented on behalf of the respondent that by faxing
the application to the respondent a few
hours before the application
was launched on Thursday the 14
th
July 2005, the applicant
committed a fatal procedural blunder. The effect of such a telefax
was that the matter thereby ceased to
be an urgent application
brought
ex parte
and became an ordinary application brought on
notice to the respondent. Mr. Snellenburg, counsel for the
respondent, heavily relied
on the decision of this division in
CLAASSENS v ZENECA SA (EDMS) BEPERK
1996(1) SA 627 OPD
per Hattingh J and Wessels AJ. At 630 C the court held that the term
ex parte
referred to court proceedings against a person who
has not been given notice thereof. At 630 H-I the court further held
that as
the respondent had received notice of the application
beforehand, the matter was not
ex parte
and that short service
of the relevant notice could be condoned in terms of rule 60 of the
Magistrate’s Court Rules.
[19] The decision in
CLAASSENS v ZENECA
supra
is not really helpful
towards the resolution of the problem at hand for various reasons.
For instance in that case both parties
were residents within the
jurisdiction of the same court, namely the Bloemfontein District
Court. Here the applicant resides in
the Free State Province but the
respondent resides in the Western Province outside the jurisdiction
of this court. The provisions
of section 27 which are the core of
the dispute in this case, did not feature at all in that case.
[20] An argument similar
to the respondent’s was raised in
DAVY v DOUGLAS &
ANOTHER
1999(1) SA 1043 NPD at page 1060 A –E Meskin J
observed:
¡°
Mr Daley's next submission was
that there had been irregular service of the application and that for
this reason I should not entertain
it.
The application was not served at all
on either of the respondents. It was served on the respondents'
attorneys who, of course, are
located outside the jurisdiction of
this Court and in relation to such service there was no compliance
with the provisions of s 27(a)
of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959.
Mr Bezuidenhout's answer to this
submission was that the applicant never intended to present this
application on the basis of formal
service thereof on the
respondents, ie as distinct from informal notification thereof.
Under Rule 6(12)(a) of the Rules of
this Court I have power, in matters of urgency, inter alia, to
dispense with service in terms
of the Rules. In my opinion the
application was properly before me as one of urgency and was
inherently sufficiently urgent for such
power to be exercised in
favour of dispensing with formal service in terms of the Rules upon
the respondents…... Accordingly, I
rejected this submission by Mr
Daley.”
The court did not
dispense with services in terms of section 27(a) Supreme Court Act
No. 59/1959. The court correctly found that
the application was
inherently and sufficiently urgent; that the informed service of the
notice on the respondent’s attorneys
outside the jurisdiction of
the court was never intended to alter the inherent and true character
of the matter as an urgent
ex
parte
application and that as a result of such inherent and sufficient
urgency the mandatory statutory provisions of section 27 did not
apply. This is my understanding of the judgment. Contrary to the
submission by the respondent’s counsel, I am of the view that
the
case was correctly decided.
[21] As regards the
court, the respondent contented that I erroneously relaxed the
mandatory statutory provisions of sec 27 and granted
a rule
nisi
which I should not have done in view of the absolutely inadequate
notice of hardly one day notice the applicant had given to the
respondent instead of a 21 day notice. It was contented on behalf of
the respondent that since the phrase
“
a
rule nisi”
bears the same definition as
a
civil summons
in terms of section 1 of the Supreme Court Act 59/1959 the service
thereof on a respondent who resided more than 160km outside the
jurisdiction of the court was 21 days. In support of this submission
the respondent’s counsel relied on a decision in
SHIELD
INSURANCE CO. LTD v VAN WYK
1976(1) SA 770 NCD.
[22] The facts in
SHIELD
INSURANCE CO. LTD v VAN WYK
supra
were summarised from 656 H – to 657 B in
TURQUOISE
RIVER INCORPORATED v McMENAMIN & OTHERS
supra
after giving the summary of those facts Levinsohn J concluded as
follows at 657 C:
¡°
In my view the Shield Insurance Co
Ltd case is distinguishable. In that case the applicant instituted an
application claiming final
and definitive relief from a respondent.”
In the next paragraph
657 D Levinsohn J continued in the following manner:
¡°
In the present case, as I have
mentioned, the applicant sought a rule nisi. In my view this
application was in the nature of an
ex
parte
application in terms
of Rule 6(4). It was launched as a matter of urgency and it seems to
me that this course was justified as circumstances
of urgency did
exist.”
I am in respectful
agreement with those quotations.
[23] In the instant case,
like in the cases of
TURQUOISE RIVER INCORPORATED v McMENAMIN
AND OTHERS
supra
and
DAVY v DOUGLAS &
ANOTHER
supra
the appellant sought a rule
nisi
in
other words an interim relief was sought and not a final relief as
was the case in
SHIELD INSURANCE CO LTD v VAN WYK
. In
all the three matters the respondents were resident outside the
jurisdiction of the courts concerned. In all three matters
the
respondents were given short and informal notices which were not in
accordance with the statutory provisions of section 27.
In all three
matters the applicants averred and the courts accepted that there was
a measure of urgency in each. Therefore the three
matters were
urgent applications. Now what really sets
SHIELD INSURANCE CO
LTD v VAN WYK
apart from the rest was that in that decision
the applicant sought and obtained a final relief. The type of
relief, in addition
to the urgency factor, is a fundamental
consideration which distinguishes the flexible external rules of
service pertaining to exceptionally
urgent applications from the
rigid external rules of service pertaining to ordinary non-urgent
application. By external rules of
service I mean the rules of
diés
induciae
which apply to the respondents who reside outside the
jurisdiction of the court concerned.
[24] This application was
launched as a matter of urgency. I cannot accept the proposition
that its urgency simply evaporated into
thin air the moment the
applicant faxed it through to the respondent. The matter was in the
nature of an
ex parte
application in terms of rule 6(4). The
author Claassen: Dictionary of Legal Words & Phrases, volume 2,
Issue 2004 on page E-46
assigns the following meaning to the phrase
ex parte:
¡°
On behalf of; from one side. An
application to the court
ex
parte
is made by the
applicant only in the absence of the respondent. Such application
would not be
ex parte
if the respondent
had due
notice
and failed to appear
at the time appointed for its hearing. Good faith is necessary. See
Lucernvallei (Edms) Bpk v
Turner
1964 4 SA 107
(O).
”
(my own emphasis)
See also
CLAASSENS
v ZENECA
1996(1) SA 627 OPD at 630 C:
¡°
Die term 'ex parte' verwys na
hofverrigtinge teen 'n persoon wat nie daarvan in kennis gestel is
nie…”
Vide
COLLECTIVE
INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD v BRINK & ANOTHER
1978(2) SA 252 NPD at 255 G per Kriek J.
[25] Erasmus
et
ali
Supreme Court Practice page B1-41:
¡°
An
ex
parte
application is used:
….. (iv)
where immediate
relief
even though it may
be temporary in nature,
is
essential because harm is imminent
.
In such cases the applicant will often seek a rule
nisi
,
the application then being in the nature of an
ex
parte
application in terms
of this subrule;”
(my own emphasis)
In
TURQUOISE RIVER
INCORPORATED v McMENAMIN & ANOTHER
supra
at 657 D
the court held that the provisions regarding
diés induciae
contained in section 27 and rule 6(5)(b) do not apply to an
application for a rule
nisi
since such an application,
even
if brought on notice
to the respondent, is in the nature of an
ex
parte
application in terms of rule 6(4). I agree with this
submission. The connective tissue between rule 6(5)(b) in section 27
is that
both procedures are not underpinned by an element of urgency
as rule 6(4). (the emphasis is mine)
[26] I understand
Levinsohn J to be saying that once an applicant sets in motion urgent
application court proceedings in terms of
rule 6(4) then the atomic
heart and soul of such court proceedings remains the same unless the
court decides otherwise after hearing
argument – often in chambers
and in the absence of the respondent. The rule allows the applicant
who seeks an interim relief where
the circumstances show that his
interest or right is in eminent danger of being infringed to hasten
to court alone in the absence
of the respondent. An applicant in
terms of rule 6(4) is ordinarily exempted from giving the customary
notice to the respondent
provided he makes out a proper case. The
exemption is not there for the taking. The procedure in terms of
rule 6(4) is somehow
sui generic
. Its rigid foundation is a
degree of urgency. Such a quick procedure designed to provide
immediate but interim relief in emergency
situations does not loose
its intrinsic and genuine character as a fast vehicle on a fast track
to access justice merely because
the applicant gave an unnecessary
notice to the respondent.
[27] Our civil justice
system would certainly be defective if such a fast train can easily
be derailed or brought to a standstill
or slowed down because an
applicant, who is under no legal obligation, for that matter, had
informally notified or alerted the respondent
beforehand of his
intention to approach the court urgently for an interim relief. In
my view such an informal notice as was given
in the instant case was
undue and unnecessary. It had virtually no adverse impact on the
true character of an
ex parte
application. By alerting the
respondent as he did, the applicant did not thereby extinguish or
erase the urgency of his
ex parte
application. It could not
have been his intention to slow down. By faxing the application, he
did not change from the fast lane,
in other words, rule 6(4)
procedures into the slow lane, in other words, section 27 procedure.
Harms: Civil Procedure in the Supreme
Court, service issue 29 at
paragraph B6-31 on page B-150 says the following:
“Failure to
allow for the days prescribed by the rules may be condoned, but not
if the period is prescribed by statute, as is the
case for service
outside the jurisdiction of the court.
These statutory provisions
do not apply to applications for a rule
nisi
(even on notice) since such an application remains by its very nature
an
ex parte
application
.”
(my own
emphasis)
I agree with this view.
[28] Only the court
hearing and application brought in terms of rule 6(4) may direct the
applicant to give notice to the respondent
first. The court is
empowered to do so where it considers that an application brought in
terms of rule 6(4) lacked sufficient measure
of urgency to justify
the grant of even a rule
nisi
in the absence of the
respondent. Where
diés induciae
are prescribed, as in terms
of rule 6(5)(b) only the court can relax such prescribed formal time
limits – vide rule 6(12)(a).
The converse is also true and it is
implicit in rule 6(12)(a) where no
diés induciae
are
prescribed as in the case of rule 6(4) application. The court and
only the court and not a party has the power to direct the
applicant
to serve the urgent application on the respondent and to give the
respondent a specified period of time to react to the
application
prior to the hearing of argument for or against the rule
nisi.
A
litigant cannot usurp such power from the court in advance.
[29] There are degrees of
urgency. Of course each case must be determined on its own merits.
In
casu
I was satisfied that in his founding affidavit the
applicant had set forth explicitly the circumstance which rendered
the matter
urgent. Dr. E.M. Luttig, the clinical psychologist, who
interviewed H. in Bloemfontein on 13
th
July 2005 was of
the preliminary opinion:
“Die
manier waarop H. die sinne voltooi het, dui op die volgende:
Dat Henri depressief, angstig en
ongelukkig is.
Dat hy werklik vreesbevange vir
moeder en Mnr Hough is.
Dat hy ideale het wat hy eendag wil
verwesenlik
Dat hy graag by sy pa wil wees.”
My
prima facie
view
as an upper guardian of the children was that it was in the interest
of the child then that the interim relief sought by the
applicant
should be immediately granted in the circumstances. The alleged
violation of the child was, in my opinion, such that he
should not be
expected to return to the respondent to endure the anxiety further
ill-treatment or further abuse as he claimed. The
alleged fear of
the child’s continued violation created a degree of urgency which
in my view justifies the hearing of the application
not in the
ordinary course by way of notice to the respondent in terms of
section 27 – vide
PRINSLOO v RAPPORT
2003(4) SA 450
TPD at 462B-F.
[30] There has been no
compliance with section 27. However, no such compliance was required
by law since the matter originated from
rule 6(4) which by its very
nature requires no mandatory notice to be served on the respondent
before a rule
nisi
can be issued unless the court otherwise
directed. I hold the firm view that it was competent for the
applicant to have launched
an urgent application in terms of rule
6(4) for a rule
nisi
. Moreover, I also hold the firm view
that the court was not precluded from granting the interim relief by
the notice which was uncalled
for and unnecessary the applicant had
chosen to give to the respondent prior to the grant of the
provisional order. Despite such
an informal and undue notice, the
urgency of the matter remained. The respondent’s contention that
the applicant by alerting the
respondent voluntarily abandoned the
benefit of a speedy rule 6(4) procedure and instead voluntarily opted
for a slow section 27
procedure is flawed. It is a shallow argument.
It is not borne out by the facts. The definitions of phrases such
as
ex parte,
civil summons and rule
nisi
did very
little to fortify such an argument.
[31] Right from the onset
the respondent argued
in limine
that the application
instituted in these proceedings was a nullity and that the entire
proceedings fell to be set aside. As we have
seen the grounds of
this argument was that the applicant had given the respondent’s
inadequate notice. In my view, which I have
already motivated, there
is no merit in the submission that the rule
nisi
issued should
be set aside on the alleged ground that it was a fatally abortive
relief which germinated from improper proceedings.
Having
reconsidered the respondent’s rule 6(12)(c) application I have come
to the conclusion: that the interim relief was correctly
sought by
way of a proper rule 6(4) procedure; that the rule
nisi
was
correctly granted and also that section 27 did not feature anywhere
in the equation for a speedy interim relief. I would therefore
decline to set aside the order I made on the 14
th
July
2005 in favour of the applicant.
[32] Accordingly I made
the following order:
The respondent’s
application in terms of rule 6(12)(c) is dismissed.
The respondent is
directed to pay the costs thereof.
______________
M.H. RAMPAI, J
On behalf of the
applicant: Adv. C.A. Human
Instructed by:
Oelofse & Kriel
Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
On behalf of the
respondent: Adv. N. Snellenburg
Instructed by:
Rosendorff &
Reitz Barry
BLOEMFONTEIN
/em