Kruger and Another v Shoprite Checkers (65/05) [2006] ZANCHC 114 (26 May 2006)

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[2006] ZANCHC 114
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Kruger and Another v Shoprite Checkers (65/05) [2006] ZANCHC 114 (26 May 2006)

Reportable: Yes /
No
Circulate to
Judges: Yes / No
Circulate
to Magistrates: Yes / No
IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
(Northern
Cape Division)
Case
no
:
65 /05
Date
heard
: 15
& 18/05/2006
Date
delivered
:
26/ 05/ 2006
In
the matter between:
WESSEL
KRUGER
First Plaintiff
GROOT
GARIEP WINKEL CC
Second
Plaintiff
and
SHOPRITE
CHECKERS (PTY) LIMITED
First Defendant
HONEY
& ASSOCIATES ATTORNEYS
Second Defendant
JUDGMENT
TLALETSI J:
INTRODUCTION
[1] The first plaintiff is cited in
the particulars of claim as an adult business man of Orange
Verspreiders, Ferros Street, Keetmanshoop
Industrial Area, Namibia.
The second plaintiff is Groot Gariep Winkel CC, a Close Corporation
duly incorporated in terms of the
laws of the Republic of South
Africa, with its main place of business and registered address at 30
Voortrekker Street, Kakamas, Northern
Cape. It is not disputed that
the first plaintiff (“Kruger”) is a member of the second
plaintiff (“the close corporation”).
The first defendant is Shoprite
Checkers (Pty) Ltd a company incorporated and registered in terms of
the company Law of the Republic
of South Africa with its main place
of business at corner of Old Paarl Road and William Dabs Street,
Brackenfell, Western Cape.
The second defendant is Honey &
Partners Incorporated a firm of attorneys of Waterval Sentrum,
Aliwal Street, Bloemfontein.
The plaintiffs have jointly
instituted action against the defendants on 25 January 2005. They
are seeking an order against the
first defendant on the following
terms:-
“
Derhalwe
vorder die eerste eiser, alternatiewelik die tweede eiser, vonnis
teen die eerste verweerder in die volgende terme:
Betaling
van die bedrag vna R189 929-36;
Rente
a tempore morae op die bedrag van R 189 929-36;
Koste
van die geding; en
Alternatiewe
regshulp.”
It is not necessary to set out the
prayers sought against the second defendant as the plaintiffs
withdrew their claim against the
first defendant by Notice on 16
November 2005 and tendered party and party costs.
At the inception of the trial Adv
Jordaan SC, who appeared on behalf of the first defendant raised a
point
in
limine
of
res judicata
.
He contended that the parties’ dispute was determined at the
interpleader proceedings which were instituted under case no:

1017/04 and which were finalised on 29 October 2004 before
Musi
AJ
, as he then was. The
file relating to these proceedings was made available to me at the
hearing of this matter. It is appropriate
to briefly deal with the
issues at the interpleader proceedings.
INTERPLEADER PROCEEDINGS.
The applicant in those proceedings
was the second defendant. The first claimant was the second
plaintiff in
casu,
and the second claimant was the first defendant in the present
proceedings. The court was called upon to decide to whom of the
two
claimants should the sheriff of the court should pay an amount of
R 192 735-33, and who should be responsible
for the
payment of the applicant’s costs.
The deponent to the founding
affidavit was Rudolf Johannes Britz, (”Britz”), a practicing
attorney at the applicant firm of
attorneys. They were also the
attorneys for the second claimant in the negotiations pertaining to
the dealings between the parties.
In the founding affidavit, Britz
stated
inter alia
,
that the first claimant had paid into the applicant’s trust
account, an amount of R 192 735-33. The money was kept in an
interest
bearing account. That, both claimants, he continued, laid
adverse claims demanding payment of the money.
According to the Sheriff’s return
of service the interpleader Notice and supporting affidavit was
served on 21 September 2004
on Louw Coetzee attorneys, who were
first claimant’s attorneys of record, as well as on the second
claimant at its main business
address. Only the second claimant
filed an affidavit deposed to by Jacobus Barnard (“Barnard”) in
support of its claim.
In the affidavit Barnard states as
follows in the paragraphs that are relevant for the purposes of the
present proceedings:-
“
2
. O
p
die 6de April 2004 en te Kakamas het die aanspraakmakers ‘n
ooreenkoms gesluit waarkragtens ‘n sekere Mnr Wessel Kruger in sy
hoedanigheid as Direkteur van Oranje Verspreiders (Namibië) die
besigheid genaamd OK Foods Kakamas aankoop en word ‘n afskrif
van
die hoofde van ooreenkoms hierby aangeheg soos dit deur die partye
onderteken was op die 6de April 2004 as aanhangsel “JB1”.
7. Op
die 26ste April 2004 was daar verdere onderhandelinge tussen die
partye gewees en was ‘n mondelinge ooreenkoms bereik gewees
dat die
tweede aanspreekmaker se prokureur ‘n bedrag van R500 000,00 sal
inbetaal op die 26ste April 2004 en op 30 April 2004 ‘n
verdere
R500 000,00. Ek heg hierby aan as Bylae “JB5” ‘n skrywe van
Honey Prokureurs.
13.1 Ek
bestig die Agbare Hof se aandag eerbiediglik daarop dat die eerste
aanspraakmaker in besit van die besigheid was vanaf die
8ste April
2004 tot en met die 12de Mei 2004 en gehandel het met die voorraad.
13.2 Daar
was toe reëlings getref gewees dat die tweede aanspraakmaker
herbesit van die besigheid sal geneem het op die 12de Mei
2004 en was
daar inderdaad ‘n vergadering gehou gewees te die besigheidspersele
te Kakamas op die 12de Mei 2004.
13.3 Daar
was teenwoordig gewees namens die eerste aanspraakmaker Mnr Wessel
Kruger, Mnr J Conradie die bestuurder in diens van die
eerste
aanspraakmaker en ander personeel van die eerste aanspraakmaker wie
se name nie bekend aan my was nie. Namens die tweede
aanspraakmaker
was ekself teenwoordig gewees, Mnr R J Britz van die firma Honey
Prokureurs, Mnr Francois Koen, die streekbestuurder
van tweede
aanspraakmaker en personeellede van die tweede aanspraakmaker. Die
eerste aanspraakmaker was verteenwoordig gewees deur
Prokureur Le
Roux van die firma Le Roux en Gennote Ing, Kakamas.
13.4 Tydens
hierdie samespreking te die besigheidsperseel het die eerste
aanspraakmaker bylae “JB13” laat toekom aan my synde
dokumentasie
wat die eerste aanspraakmaker voorberei het om aan te toon die
verkope van die voorraad en aankope van voorraad tydens
die
handelsperiode van die eerste aanspraakmaker soos hierbo uiteengesit.
13.5 Volgens
bylae “BJ13” het die teoretiese balans van die voorraad op die
12de Mei 2004 die bedrag van R1 299 652,56 beloop
en na sekere
afskrywing die werklike voorraad van R1 183 263,48. Volgens bylae
“JB13” het die eerste aanspraakmaker toe op daardie
stadium ‘n
kredietsaldo gehad in die bank van R146 600,88 en was dit die eerste
aanspraakmaker se houding tydens die vergadering
gewees aanvanklik
dat tweede aanspraakmaker die bedrag van R146 600,88 moet aanvaar
tesame met die voorraad soos aangetoon op bylae
“JB13”
14.1 Ek
was hoegenaamd nie bereid gewees om bylae “JB13” se korrektheid
te aanvaar nie en het aangedring dat ‘n fisiese voorraad
opname
gedoen word om fisies vas te stel wat die voorraad op die 12de Mei
2004 beloop het.
14.2 Na
onderhandelinge tussen die partye soos hierbo uiteengesit was daar
toe ‘n ooreenkoms bereik gewees dat die partye ‘n fisiese
voorraad opname sal doen om die werklike voorraad vas te stel.
14.3 Die
ooreenkoms was voorts gewees dat die eerste aanspraakmaker die
verskil tussen R1 427 016,70 synde die aanvangswaarde van
die
voorraad soos uitgeengesit in Bylae “JB2” en die werklike waarde
van die voorraad wat terug oorhandig word aan tweede aanspraakmaker
sal betaal.
14.4 Die
was voorts ook ooreengekom gewees dat die personeel van tweede
aanspraakmaker in samewerking met Mnr Jack Conradie en Cobus
Malan
wie die eerste aanspraakmaker verteenwoordig het, ‘n fisiese
voorraadopname sal gedoen het.
14.5 Die
ooreenkoms het verder behels dat die eerste aanspraakmaker dan aan
die tweede aanspraakmaker sal betaal die verskil tussen
die
aanvangswaarde van die voorraad en die voorraad wat dan terugbesorg
word aan tweede aanspraakmaker en dat die deponent Britz
dan die
afhandeling doen van die R500 000,00 wat op trust gehou word deur
hom.
17. Ek
heg ook hierby aan as Bylae “JB17” ‘n skrywe van Honey
Prokureurs aan Le Roux en Gennote ter bevestiging van die ooreenkoms
wat bereik was op die 12de Mei 2004. Die ooreenkoms wat aangegaan
was op die 12de Mei 2004 het behels dat met die R500 000,00 wat
op
trust gehou word deur Honey Prokureurs gehandel sal word na die
bepalinge van die voorraad opname en dat die tekort dan daaruit
aangesuiwer sal word.
”
In conclusion Barnard request the
court to order that the second claimant is entitled to the amount
held by the sheriff and that
the first claimant be ordered to pay
the costs of the proceedings. Britz also filed a replying affidavit
in terms whereof he confirmed
the averments made by Barnard about
him as well as the contents of the letters exchanged between his
office and the claimant’s
attorneys office as correct.
I have not been referred to any
written or transcribed record of the reasons for the order by the
learned Judge. However, the order
that he made was after he read
all the papers filed of record as well as the submissions by Mr
Pretoruis on behalf of the applicant
and Mr Van der Merwe who
appeared on behalf of second claimant. The learned judge had to
consider the undisputed evidence on the
papers and ordered that
second claimant is entitled to the amount held by the Registrar.
The order reads:-
“
WORD
GELAS
:
DAT
die 1ste Aanspraakmaker se aanspraak en enige een wat deur hom eis
se aanspraak verval het teenoor die applikant vir die bedrag
van R
192 735.33.
Dat
die Griffier die bedrag van R 192 735.33 aan die 2de Aanspraakmaker
betaal.
DAT
die 1ste Aanspraakmaker die koste van die applikant en die 2de
Aanspraakmaker ten opsigte van die Tussenpleit geding betaal.”
It is significant to note that the
claim by the first claimant, as well as any person claiming through
him against the applicant is
being declined.
THE PRESENT ACTION
It is convenient, for the better
understanding of the plaintiffs claim to refer to the following
relevant experts from the particulars
of claim. At paragraph 5:-
“
5.1 Op
6 April 2004 en te Kakamas het die eerste eiser, handeldrywende as
“Oranje Verspreiders” en handelende in persoon, en die
eerste
verweerder, verteenwoordig deur Mnr Gabriel Gerhardus Kriel
(“Kriel”), `n skriftelike ooreenkoms gesluit (“die eerste
ooreenkoms”).”
At
paragraph 11 and 12:
“
11.4 die
eerste eiser sal die koopprys van die voorraad van
R 1,427,016.76 (BTW uitgesluit) minus vervalle en
onbruikbare
voorraad aan die eerste verweerder betaal in twee paaimente van R
500,000.00 elk, betaalbaar op onderskeidelik 26 April
2004 en 30
April 2004, en die balans in vier gelyke paaimente oor vier maande
plus rente teen prima rentekoers; en
Op
26 April 2004 het die eerste eiser die eerste bedrag van
R 500,000 soos beoog in paragraaf 11.4 hierbo aan die eerste
verweerder, verteenwoordig deur die tweede verweerder, betaal.”
And
further on:
”
15. Op
12 Mei 2004 het die eerste eiser die bates en oorblywende voorraad
aan die eerste verweerder terug oorhandig.
Alternatiewelik
tot die eerste eiser se eis
,
of 12 Mei 2004 is die tweede eser geïnkorporeer en is die tweede
eiser mondelings,
alternatiewelik
stilswyend, deur die eerste eiser genomineer as nuwe kontrakparty
tot die tweed ooreenkoms in die plek van die eerste verweerder,
vertenwoordig deur Kriel, aanvaar is.
Enige
verwysing hieroner na “eerste eiser” is `n verwysing na die
“eerste eiser, alternatiewelik die tweede eiser.”
At
paragraph 18.2 and further on:
“
18.2 dat
die eerste verweerder die bedrag vna R 146 600.88 in die geoormerkte
rekening by Standard Bank van Suid Afrika Bpk, Kakamas
tak, waar die
netto opbrengs van die verkope vanaf 13 April 2004 tot 12 Mei 2004
inbetaal is, aan die eerste verweerder oorbetaal;
en
Die
eerste verweerder het die ooreenkoms nie nagekom nie deur die weier
om die bedrag van R 500,000.00 aan die eerste eiser terug
te betaal,
en slegs die bedrag van R 163,469.76 of 3 Junie 2004 aan die eerste
eiser terugbetaal.
In
die vooropstelling het die eerste eiser skade gely in die bedrag van
R 189,929.36, bereken as die bedrag van R 500,000.00
minus
die gedeeltelike betaling van R 163,469.76
minus
die bedrag wat die eerste eiser aan die eerste verweerder moes
terugbetaal van R 146,600.88.
Nieteenstaande
aanmaning weier die eerste verweerder om die bedrag van R
189,929.36,of enige gedeelte daarvan, aan die eerste eiser
terug te
betaal.”
In its plea the first defendant
admits that the first plaintiff was substituted by the close
corporation and as a result the latter
became the ‘purchaser’ in
terms of the initial agreement. It is also admitted that an amount
of R 500 000-00 was paid as a
deposit on or about 26 April 2004 to
second defendant for and on behalf of the first defendant and that
the second defendant paid
an amount of R 163 469-76
to the plaintiffs on behalf of first defendant on or about 3 June
2004. This latter
amount represented the difference between the
original amount of R 500 000-00 held in trust by second defendant
plus an amount
of R 2 805-97 representing the interest accrued on
the original amount less the amount of R 339 336-31 owed
by first
and second plaintiffs. In substantiation of its plea,
first defendant refers to and incorporates the plea entered on
behalf of
the second defendant. In this plea the second defendant
refers to the interpleader proceedings and the order made in those
proceedings.
How the amount of R 192 735-33 is arrived at, the plea
states:-
“
19.2.4 Die
bedrag van
R
192 735,33
is as volg bereken: Die aan vanklike deposito her die bedrag van
R
500 000,00
beloop waarby rente gevoeg moes word in die bedrag van
R
2 805.97
.
Uit daardie bedrag is die bedrag van
R
146 600,88
(vermeld in paragraaf 18.2 van die Besonderhede van Vordering) namens
en ten behoewe van eerste en/of tweede eisers aan eerste verweerder
betaal, latende `n balans van
R
192 735,33
.”
This
computation is the same as the one provided by the first defendant.
THE
ISSUES.
The issue to be decided is whether
the point
in
limine
has merit. Both parties are in agreement that should the defendant
succeed with the
res
judicata
point
in
limine
, plaintiff’s
action will be brought to an end. It will therefore not be
necessary to traverse the merits. It is therefore logical
to deal
with the point
in limine
first and avoid exposing the parties to an unnecessary protracted
trial which may proof not necessary.
THE LAW.
It is a trite principle of our law
that it is for the defendant to allege and prove all the elements
underlying the defence of
exceptio
res iudicata
.
(See:
Hochfeld
Commodities (Pty) Ltd v Theron
2000(1) SA 551 (O) at 566-567 and the authorities therein cited).
In
Consol Ltd t/a
Consol Glass v Twee Jonge Gezellen
(2)
2005 (6) SA 23
(CPD) at 45D-F Blignault J, correctly held that:
“
The
gist of the defence of
res
iudicata
is that the matter or question which is being raised by one's
adversary has previously been finally adjudicated upon in proceedings
between the parties and that it cannot be raised again. A classic
formulation of the requirements for the defence of
res
iudicata
in our law is that of
Maasdorp
JA
in
Mitford's Executor v Ebden's Executors and Others
1917 AD 682
at 686:
“
Are
the first defendants entitled to set up that decision as
res
judicata
in the present action? To determine that question, it will be
necessary to enquire whether that judgment was given in an action (1)
with respect to the same subject matter, (2) based on the same
ground, and (3) between the same parties.”
The judgment or order relied upon
must be a final and definite judgment or order on the merits of the
matter by a competent court.
(See:
African
Wanderers Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Wandereres Football Club
1977(2) SA 38 (A) at 48H). Such judgment must be a judgment given in
litigation to which the present parties or their privies were
parties
except in case of a judgment
in
rem
. The cause of action
in both instances must be the same, and the same thing must have been
claimed or may have been claimed in both
cases. (See:
Amler’s
Precedents of Pleadings
:
6
th
Edition, LTC Harms, Butterworths at p302 – 303). I now proceed to
consider whether on the circumstances of this particular case
these
requirements have been met.
IS IT THE SAME PARTIES?
It is common cause that the first
plaintiff was not cited as a party in the interpleader proceedings.
It was therefore contended
on behalf of the plaintiff that for this
reason, and for the fact that Kruger is not a
‘legal
predecessor’
to the
second plaintiff, it cannot be found that the parties in the
interpleader proceedings are the same as in
casu
.
In order to decide this aspect, it was argued, it would be
necessary to lead evidence pertaining to the relationship if any,
between Kruger and second plaintiff. In
MAN
Truck and Bus (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Dusbus Leasing CC and Others
2004(1) SA 454 (WLD) at 472B-I it was held:
“
The
requirement of the
exceptio
that the prior action should have been between the 'same persons'
does not mean only the identical individuals who were parties to
the
proceedings in which the judgment which is raised as
res
iudicata
,
was given. Joubert (ed)
The
Law of South Africa vol 9
1st re-issue at 274 para 434, refers to this issue of 'same persons'
as follows:
'.
. . (T)hey include persons who are in law identified with those who
were parties in the proceedings.
Voet
gives various examples of persons who are identified with one another
for the purpose of the
exceptio
rei
iudicatae
.
Some of the examples given are: a deceased and his heir; a principal
and his agent; a person under curatorship and his curator;
a pupil
and his tutor; a creditor and debtor in respect of a pledged article
if the debtor gave the article in pledge after losing
a suit in
which a third party claimed it. (See also
Voet's
Commentarius
,
44.2.5;
Amalgamated
Engineering Union v Minister of Labour
,
1949 (3) SA 637
(A) at 654;
Kethel
v Kethel's Estate
1949 (3) SA 598
(A) at 603'.)
[34]
A consideration of the authorities and especially the approach in
Kommissaris
van Binnelandse Inkomste v ABSA Bank Bpk
(supra), makes it clear that the list of so-called privies should,
however, not be limited only to those listed by
Voet
.
The question as to whether a person should be so regarded, should
depend upon the facts of each particular case and should not only
apply to the specific person or persons against whom judgment had
been obtained.
[35]
Mr Mahlong (fifth defendant) and Mr Bonthuys (third defendant) were
the sole members respectively of Dusbus and VTC (second defendant)
who are both close corporations. The close corporation is a new and
unique concept in our law (Joubert (ed)
The
Law of South Africa vol
4 1st re-issue vol 4 part 3 at 498 para 416). Close corporations
differ from companies in certain material respects. Unlike companies,
it is possible for close corporations to have only one member. Such a
member would be both shareholder and director and unlike shareholders
in a company, the shareholder of a close corporation owes a fiduciary
duty to the corporation and to its creditors. Such a member
of a
close corporation is in greater control of, and more involved with,
the business of the close corporation. Furthermore, a close
corporation is not subject to the same financial control as
companies. There exists, consequently, a much closer or more intimate
relationship between the
persona
of the close corporation and the
persona
of its member or members.
In
the present circumstances, both the first and second defendants are
close corporations with only one member, being the third and
fifth
defendants respectively. These individual members are the controlling
minds of their close corporations and the only persons
empowered to
act on its behalf.”
In this case Kruger is the sole
member of the close corporation. The interpleader summons were
properly served on the close corporation.
There can be no doubt
that Kruger was aware of these interpleader proceedings. He did
nothing to place his case or that of the
close corporation before
the court in the interpleader proceedings. His position is not
distinguishable from the circumstances
described in the
Man
Truck
case (supra).
He is a privy of the close corporation. One does not require
evidence in trial to determine the position of Kruger
in relation to
close corporation. I is explicit form the pleadings themselves what
his position at all material times was. It
is evident from the
pleadings that Kruger was, at al times, acting in his personal
capacity and also on behalf of the close corporation.
Furthermore,
it is common cause that Kruger was substituted by the second
plaintiff as a party to the agreement. He was at all
times aware of
the surrounding facts and circumstances of the proceedings, the
allegations made by defendants, and the consequences
of an order
against his close corporation. The following passage from
Man
Truck case
(supra) at
474H-J is apposite:
“
To
permit them now, acting through the very same attorneys to deny that
they are personally bound by the judgment against their close
corporations of which they were the sole members, and in respect of
which they were the sureties, would, in my view, allow them to
abuse
the separate juristic personality of their close corporations.”
It is again significant to not that
the firm of attorneys
which accepted service of the interpleader proceedings papers on
behalf of the close corporation is the same
firm of attorneys through
which the plaintiff have instituted the present proceedings. It is
in fact the plaintiff(s) who instructed,
through their attorneys by a
letter, that service of the interpleader documents be served on their
attorneys urgently and, failing
which they (the plaintiffs) will
proceed to issue summons themselves. They, however, failed to keep
to their promise to defend the
interpleader proceedings. In my view
it does not, matter whether a judgment relied upon for a plea of
res
indiatae,
was given in
default of the relevant party. In the absence of a successful
application for rescission of a judgment by default,
such a judgment
is enforceable and is binding and is capable of being executed. (See:
Jacobson v Havinga t/a
Hanvingas
2001(2) SA
177 (T) at
180A-C).
IS THE CAUSE OF ACTION THE SAME?
It was contended on behalf of the
plaintiffS that although the cause of action in the interpleader
proceedings is the same as in
this action, the claims are not the
same. The claim is differently formulated from that in the
interpleader proceedings and, it
was argued, evidence will have to
be led to determine whether the claims are the same. From the
extracts of the interpleader proceedings
and plaintiff’s
particulars of claim, it is abondantly clear that both proceedings
pertain to the balance of R 500 000-00 which
was paid into the trust
account of the defendant’s attorneys. It is the same balance for
which the court granted judgment in
the interpleader proceedings in
favour of the first defendant, and in which the court declined the
close corporation’s claims
as set out in the founding affidavit of
the applicant. What make the amount claimed by the plaintiff’s to
be different and lesser
from the one ordered in the interpleader
proceedings, is that the plaintiffs have not added an amount of R 2
805-97 representing
interest accrued to the amount which was held in
the interest bearing account.
It is not necessary that the two
proceedings should be identical. The issues to be decided in this
action are substantially the
same as those which were to be
considered in the interpleader proceedings. (See:
Consol
Ltd t/a Consol Glass v Twee Jonge Gezellen
(2)
2005 (6) SA 23
(CPD) at 46A – 47F). Mr Jordaan correctly
submitted that it makes no difference whether at the time of the
interpleader proceedings
the plaintiffs’ claim(s) were formulated.
The claims already existed at the time and would have formed an
integral part of the
issues to be determined at the interpleader
proceedings.
The plaintiffs, in my view, were
too casual by not placing their claim(s) before the court during the
interpleader proceedings.
To now seek an order entitling them to
the same thing that was claimed will be a disguised requesting for
the reversal of the
order made by the learned judge at the
interpleader proceedings. It is not my understanding that the
plaintiffs are challenging
the authority of the interpleader
proceedings. The order was in any case made by a competent court
with jurisdiction. The position
is put succinctly as follows in
Amler’s Precedents of
Pleadings
: (supra) page
302:-
“
The
exceptio
rei iudicatae
is based on the irrebuttable presumption that a final judgment on a
claim submitted to a competent court is correct. This presumption
is
founded on public policy, which requires that litigation should not
be endless; and on the requirement of good faith, which does
not
permit of the same thing being demanded more than once.”
I am satisfied that the plaintiff’s
claim is merely a relabelling of the claim that formed the subject
matter of the interpleader
proceedings. The first defendant has in
my view satisfied the requirements for the
exceptio
rei indicatae
. The
point
in limine
should therefore succeed with costs.
ORDER
In the result, I order as follows:-
The point
in
limine
is upheld
with costs
.
_______________
L P TLALETSI
JUDGE
(NORTHERN
CAPE DIVISION)
Counsel for the Plaintiffs
Instructed
by
Adv. P.A Myburgh
Elliott,
Maris, Wilmans &Hay
Counsel for the First Defendants
Instructed
by
Adv. A.F Jordaan SC
Van
de Wall & Venote