Solani v Liquor Board: NC and Another (950/2004) [2006] ZANCHC 20; [2006] 4 All SA 628 (NC) (30 March 2006)

About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: High Court, Northern Cape Division, Kimberley
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: High Court, Northern Cape Division, Kimberley
>>
2006
>>
[2006] ZANCHC 20
|

|

Solani v Liquor Board: NC and Another (950/2004) [2006] ZANCHC 20; [2006] 4 All SA 628 (NC) (30 March 2006)

Reportable:
YES / NO
Circulate
to Judges: YES / NO
Circulate
to Magistrates: YES / NO
Circulate
to Regional Magistrates: YES / NO
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(Northern
Cape Division)
Case
Nr: 950/2004
Case
Heard: 24/03/2006
Date
delivered: 30/03/2006
In
the matter:
K
S Solani Applicant
versus
Liquor
Board: NC 1
st
Respondent
Chairman
of the Liquor Board: NC 2
nd
Respondent
Coram:
Kgomo JP
et
Williams J
JUDGMENT
KGOMO
JP:
The
applicant, Ms Keitemogetse Susan Solani, an adult female of Stand No
12300, Phomolong, Galeshewe, Kimberley, brings a Rule 53
Review
Application in which she seeks the following relief (rephrased for
better comprehension):
That
it be declared that the re-hearing by the Northern Cape Liquor
Board (First Respondent) of the applicant’s application
for a
Special Liquor Licence (on-consumption) (on the 14
th
April 2005) was
ultra
vires
the powers of the
Liquor Board;
That
the decision of the Liquor Board of the 14
th
April 2005 in respect of which it re-heard the applicant’s
application in para 1.1 (above) be reviewed and set aside;
That
a declaratory order be issued that the (initial) decision of the
Liquor Board by virtue whereof it issued a Special Liquor
Licence
(on-consumption) on the 22
nd
February 2005 is still valid;
That
the Liquor Board and/or the Chairman of the Liquor Board (Second
Respondent) be ordered to issue the Final Special Liquor
Licence
which the applicant applied for in that the applicant has complied
with all the conditions prescribed by the Liquor Board
in Annexure
“C” to the Founding Affidavit;
That
the respondents be ordered to pay the costs of this application
jointly and severally.
The
conditional Special Liquor Licence alluded in para 1.4 (above) as
contained in Annexure “C” and issued by the Liquor Board
is
dated the 23
rd
February 2005 and reads as follows:
“
Dear
Ms Solani
Application in terms
of section
19, Act 27
of 1989: Lerato’s Tavern, Phomolong,
Galeshewe
The abovementioned
application has reference.
The
Special Licence (Tavern) will be issued upon receipt of a certificate
by the designated police officer, within 24 months from
date hereof,
certifying that-
The premises have been
completed in all respects in accordance with the plan submitted with
the application or any other plan subsequently
approved and that it
has been completely furnished and equipped to conduct the business
for which the premises will be licensed;
and
The
conditions/requirements regarding the premises as indicated below (if
any) have been complied with.
The
following conditions/requirements have been imposed and shall be
complied with before the licence will be issued: Structural
Alterations must be affected within six months from date hereof.
Kindly
note: The following general/special conditions will be imposed if
the licence is issued: As stipulated in Annexure ‘A’”.
The
Annexure “A” of the Liquor Board referred in the closing
paragraph of the letter of authority quoted in para 2.1 immediately
above has been omitted by the applicant from her papers.
Applicant’s counsel could not advance any cogent reason why Rule
35 (13) of the Rules of Court was not invoked to procure the
missing document. See:
Pieters
v Administrateur, Suidwes Afrika
1972 (2) SA 220
(SWA)
at 228A. We are accordingly left in the dark as to what these
envisaged conditions were.
Section
32 of the Intoxicating Liquor Act, No 27 of 1989, does empower the
Liquor Board to attach suitable conditions to the licence
issued.
This section stipulates that:
“
32
Licences
(excluding temporary liquor licences and occasional licences)
(1) After
the Board has granted an application under section 15(1)(a) (iii) or
22(1)(b), the chairperson shall, subject to sections
33 and 35, issue
the licence to a person named in the licence, to sell any liquor, or
the kind of liquor provided for in this Act
in respect of the kind of
licence concerned, or in the case of a special licence, the kind of
liquor determined by the Board, on
premises the plan of which has
been approved by the Board, but which premises shall not for the
purposes of the licence include such
place or places thereon as it
has in its discretion specifically excluded therefrom.
(2)
A
licence issued under subsection (1) shall be subject to such
conditions set out in the licence as the Board may in its discretion
impose
.
(3) The
Board may, in respect of a sorghum beer licence, special licence or
producer's licence, in addition to the imposition by it
of any
condition or further condition under this section, declare in the
licence concerned or in a notice delivered or tendered to
the holder
of the licence that such provisions of this Act as do not in
themselves relate to the licence concerned and as are set
out in the
licence or notice, shall mutatis mutandis apply to that licence.
(4) The
chairperson may at any time after the issue of a licence under
subsection (1) or section 32A (1), by a notice delivered or
tendered
to the holder of the licence concerned-
(a) declare
the licence to be subject to such conditions or further conditions
set out in the notice as he or she may in his or her
discretion
impose;
(b) suspend,
withdraw or amend any condition or declaration imposed or made by him
or her or the Board under this section. …
33
Incomplete
premises
(1) If
an application for a licence (excluding a temporary liquor licence
and an occasional licence) is granted by the Board in respect
of
premises not yet erected, or premises requiring any structural
alteration, addition or reconstruction to be effected so as to
make
them suitable for the purposes for which they will be used under the
licence, the chairperson shall issue a notice to the applicant
concerned in which he or she shall be ordered to comply with such
conditions or requirements, referred to in the notice, with regard
to
those premises as the chairperson may determine, within such period
as may likewise be determined and referred to.
(2) The
chairperson may at any time after the issue of such a notice, on
application by the applicant concerned-
(a) withdraw or
amend any condition or requirement determined under subsection (1);
(b) extend the
period determined under subsection (1); ……….
(c) ……………………………………………………………………………………………….
(d) approve an
amended plan in respect of the premises.
(3) ……………………………………………………………………………………………….
(4)
When the chairperson is satisfied that the premises in respect of
which a notice has been issued under subsection (1), have been
completed in accordance with the plan thereof approved by the
chairperson or the Board, as the case may be, the conditions and
requirements
determined by the chairperson have been complied with
and the premises are suitable for the purposes for which they will be
used
under the licence concerned, he or she shall issue the licence
in accordance with section 32 (1)-. ………………………………………………………………………….
After
the applicant was granted the conditional authority quoted in para
2.1 (above) acting in terms of section 32 (above) members
of the
local community strenuously objected to the issuing of the licence
to the applicant. The designated police officer, Capt
M P Dikgetsi,
incorporated these objections in his report dated the 8
th
March 2005, to the Board. The impediments that he raised as regards
the building are peripheral and will be ignored for purposes
of this
application as same may be remedied. However, the contentious
issues in his report read:
“
3. This
office is having an objections to the granting of the licence.
There had already been three murders at the premises as
it is
operating as a shebeen. The operator of this is playing loud music
throughout the week and does not to reduce (the volume)
if
requested.
4. There is no
school in the immediate vicinity of the premises.
5. Find attached
copies of meetings held by the community and letters from the The
Free Reformed in SA and The Bird’s of Church
and a petition from
the community of Phomolong.
6. The
following types of licences already exist in the Kimberley District:
Club Drink Licences: 2
7. This office is
opposed to the granting of the licence.”
Symptomatic
of this application the applicant has, once again, omitted these
very material annexures through which objections
are raised. Adv W
Coetzee, on behalf of the applicant, had no explanation for this
conspicuous omission. I have no doubt that
the reason why the
annexures have not been appended has to do with their unfavourable
tenor. The applicant has therefore failed
to make a full and frank
disclosure in this application, which reflects very badly on the
applicant’s
bona
fides
.
In
the light of these complaints the Liquor Board convened a meeting of
the Board on the 14
th
April 2005 at which the applicant was represented by one Mr
Lodewikus Jacobus Smith, a liquor consultant and former section 139
designated officer. Mr Smith raised three worthwhile points
in
limine
:
Firstly,
that the period for raising objections, in terms of the Regulations
proclaimed pursuant to the Liquor Act, has expired
(in January 2004
because the application was filed with the Magistrate’s office in
December 2003) and that the objections came
more than a year late;
Secondly,
that the Liquor Board was
functus
officio
because it has
already made a determination in terms of the already quoted section
32 of the Liquor Act;
Thirdly,
that the only option open to the Board was to authorize the issue
of the final licence and could later invoke its powers
in terms of
section 11 and 15 of the Liquor Act or suspend or withdraw the
final licence.
As
to point 5.1 Regulation 7 (1) States:
“
7(1)
Not later than 28 days after the application was lodged with the
magistrate, any person may lodge-
a
written objection to or petition against; or
written
representations or a petition in support of,
any such application
with him and shall provide conclusive proof that a copy has been
forwarded to-
the
person who prepared the application; and
(ii) the designated
police officer.”
As has been shown in
section 32 (para 3 above) and will be demonstrated hereinafter,
certain provisions of the Liquor Act allow for
complaints etc to be
lodged with the Liquor Board even after a final liquor licence has
been issued.
At
the hearing on the 14
th
April 2005 the Liquor Board ruled that it was invoking its powers
set out in section 12 of the Act to hear further representations
and/or evidence and denied that it was
functus
officio,
pointing out
that the initial authority (of 23/02/2005) was “informal” and
“conditional” and the subsequent hearing (of
14/04/2005) was
“formal” and “final”. It is unclear what the Board meant by
“informal” and “formal”, but this
is of no moment really.
What is significant is the conditional authority granted because the
applicant’s contention is that
the condition precedent to the
completion of the building was fulfilled as the work was done
according to the required specifications.
At
the hearing of the 14
th
April 2005 part of the exchange between the Board and Mr Smith went
as follows:
“
Board
member: The Board if it decided to withdraw the conditional
authority if it finds that … there is substance in these
allegations.
Mr
Smith: Meneer die Voorsitter, ja maar my punt is dat om net summier
die lisensie terug te trek … om die goedkeuring terug te
trek is
nie die regte proseudre nie. Die regte procedure sal om in artikel
11 [onhoorbaar]. Maar dan moet u eers … moet hierdie
lisensie eers
in bedryf kom en dan daarna gekyk word. Ek voel rêrigwaar, meneer
die Voorsitter, ek meen dit is … ek rus by u
besluit, maar dit is
my standpunt.
Chairperson:
Okay, I understand your standpoint. But the Board already has got
allegations put before it. So we cannot say: We’ve
granted the
licence, let’s … (perhaps “ignore” them?) …, that would be
totally wrong.”
Adv
E Mokutu who appeared for the Liquor Board argued that the Board was
not
functus officio
as no final decision had been taken yet and submitted that it acted
within its mandated powers.
The
Liquor Board called one Ms Rachel Mathaba and the designated officer
to give evidence on the police report belatedly produced.
It is
unnecessary to dwell on the contents of the entire report. I am
prepared to accept that some of the allegations were not
substantiated by them. However, the following matters were either
common cause or not disputed or substantiated (Mr Smith did
not call
any witnesses in rebuttal):
The
proposed premises have been run as a shebeen (an illegal liquor
trade) for a considerable time;
Three
people were murdered on the premises (and three other murders were
committed in its immediate vicinity);
Loud
music is played almost throughout the night and no amount of
negotiations and complaints by the community, church leaders
and
other community based organizations quelled the noise or had the
desired effect. The overwhelming evidence points to “the
owner
of the premises”, being the applicant’s husband as
unco-operative, rude and confrontational and the applicant taking
no responsibility.
Underage
children patronize the shebeen and the applicant’s husband’s
attitude is that
“die
kinders bring geld”
.
At
the conclusion of the hearing the Chairman, on behalf of the Liquor
Board gave these ex-tempore reasons for refusing to grant
applicant’s final licence:
‘
The
Board, during the break, deliberated on the merits of this case. ….
Now, this is an
application where actually these objections are out of time. But
that, and [inaudible words] that does not mean that
the Board cannot
call those people who have objected if it feels those people, are
both objectors, will help, you know, in … like
licensing issues and
coming to a [inaudible] decision.
Now,
the Board had during February granted a conditional authority to the
applicant. The conditional authority is not an authority
to sell
liquor, it relates to, in most cases, the applicant having to put up
the premises in accordance with a plan, so that when
the police come
with a final report, the Board will be put in a position where it
will say, the premises satisfy the requirements,
and the Board can
then grant a licence. So conditional means on certain conditions.
If those conditions are met then the Board
can do that.
But in the meantime
we have heard now, I mean during this period, or after the
conditional authority was granted, the police came
up with a report
in March. The report is not positive, the report is not positive in
the sense that attached to it was a document
involving all these
objections that were put forward on behalf of the different
structures by Rachel Mathaba.
And,
lastly, the report mentions that the police are opposed to the
granting of the licence. That is one leg of the whole matter.
The
second leg, which I think is very much important, is the concerns
raised by the community. It is not necessary for me to repeat
all
those concerns, but all what these concerns boiled down to is that
the community is not interested in having this outlet licensed.
And
the concerns of the community means in terms of the Liquor law,
public interest.
Now
whilst we were deliberating, all members of the Board, the unanimous
feeling was that who are we, as members of the Board, from
the
comfort of our offices, to deny, or to disregard, or not to consider
what the people on the ground are experiencing. Because
if we are
asked to give reasons why we disregarded the concerns of the
community, I don’t think we’ll be in a position to give
any
satisfactory explanation.
So, basically what I
am saying is that the interest of the community always outweigh the
interests of the individual.
So it is, therefore,
unfortunate for the applicant, that the Board cannot see its way
clear in granting this application. And it
is accordingly refused.”
The
Liquor Board, as a creature of statute, must act within the four
corners of such an empowering statute. Consequently, and as
a
general principle of legality, it is required that an administrative
act performed by it must fall within the scope of the conferred
powers and the prescripts embodied in the empowering legislation or
else fall foul of the
ultra
vires
principle. See:
Fedsure Life Assurance
Ltd & Others v Greater Johannesburg Transituional Council &
Others
[1998] ZACC 17
;
1999 (1)
SA 374
(CC
) at 400D-401A
(paras 58 and 59);
Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association of SA & Another: In re Ex Parte
President of the RSA
[2000] ZACC 1
;
2000 (2) SA 674
(CC
).
I
now proceed to examine more closely what it is that the relevant
provisions of section 11 of the Liquor Act permits the Liquor
Board
to do:
A
meeting must be convened to consider applications for licences made
in terms of sections 22 (1) of the Liquor Act;
If
a report worthy of consideration has been submitted to the
chairperson of the Board in terms of sections 141 and 142 of the
Liquor Act a meeting must be convened. Section 141 enjoins a
designated police officer to report promptly to the Board any

failure by a licence holder to discharge obligations attached to
its licence or becomes disqualified or incompetent to hold same
or
may report “any other matter” of substance;
A
meeting may also be convened if a complaint is received in respect
of the licensed premises or an objection is raised from members
of
the local community or a lincence holder in the same district;
The
Board is also entitled to convene a meeting “on any matter which
(it) may of its own accord consider necessary”.
I
am therefore satisfied that the Board was not only entitled but in
fact duty-bound, in the circumstances of this case, to convene
the
meeting of the 14
th
April 2005 and to consider both the report of the designated officer
and the complaints emanating from members of the community.
The
requisite notices and/or summonses contemplated in sections 12 of
the Act were issued to the interested parties, they were
afforded
sufficient time to attend the hearing and, as reflected
hereinbefore, a due process was instituted. Counsel for the

applicant indeed raised no objection before us as regards the
propriety or impropriety of the Board’s adopted procedure. Of

course, the nature of the decisions the Board is entitled to make
consequent upon such a hearing is a different matter, which falls
to
be examined shortly.
The
Liquor Board of a province is a very important and a responsible
body which fulfils a significant function. It is empowered
to exert
substantial control over the liquor trade. In terms of section 6 of
the Liquor Act it has to advise the MEC under whom
it resorts and
even furnish him/her with prescribed reports or make recommendations
to the MEC for consideration arising from the
application of the Act
or relating to the distribution or control of liquor in the
province. In terms of section 15 of the Act
the Board may also:
After
the consideration of an application for a liquor licence grant or
refuse the application concerned;
Suspend
a licence for an indefinite time or such period as it may determine
or withdraw it from a specific date. These powers
also relate to a
licence which is the subject of a police report, a complaint or an
objection;
Declare
the licence concerned to be subject to such conditions or further
conditions as it may in its discretion impose or take
such steps as
it may think fit.
The
question which arises is if the Board is authorized and empowered to
do all the things enumerated hereinbefore even where a
final licence
has been issued what provision or impediment then is there in the
Liquor Act and Regulations or the Common Law which
prohibits it from
taking appropriate measures or steps when evidence is brought or
comes to its attention that premises in respect
of which the Board
has given conditional approval is in fact “a den of iniquity”
and lawlessness as already adverted to. Counsel
could refer me to
no provision or impediment nor am I aware of any.
It
was common cause that the Liquor Board had not yet issued a final
liquor licence in the sense that the issue thereof was contingent
upon the fulfilment of the condition stipulated in the letter of
authority of the 23
rd
February 2005 to the effect that the “Special Licence (Tavern)
will be issued upon receipt of a certificate by the designated
police officer” which required that the premises be complete in
every respect in relation to structure and furnishing. I agree
with
Mr Coetzee that a re-hearing of the matter on the same facts was
impermissible. However, as has been shown hereinbefore,
this was
not the case. New facts had come to light to the effect that:
The
applicant is not of good character and was otherwise not fit to be
the holder of a licence (See section 22 (2)(d)(i)(dd));
The
granting of the licence was not in the public interest – as
expressly stated by the chairman in his reasons quoted in para
11
of this judgment. See section 22 (2)(d)(i)(ee) and
Maharaj
v Chairman Liquor Board
1997 (1) SA 273
(N)
at
281 H-J.
J
R de Ville, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa
(2003) under the subheading “Preliminary Decisions” at
p69 para
2.2.2.2 states:
“
As
stated above an official is regarded as being functus officio only
once a final decision has been taken. Before the actual exercise
of
the power in terms of the empowering provision, the public authority
in question may at any time revoke a decision. [In
In
Re War Damage Act
1943:
Re 56
Denton Road, Twickenham, Middlesex
[1952]
2 All ER 799
(CH)
802A-B
the principle was expressed as follows: [W]here Parliament confers
upon a body such as the War Commission the duty of deciding
or
determining any question, the deciding or determining of which
affects the rights of the subject, such decision or determination
made and communicated in terms which are not expressly preliminary or
provisional is final and conclusive, and cannot, in the absence
of
express statutory power or the consent of the person or persons
affected, be altered or withdrawn by that body’
.
]
In
President of
the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby
Football Union and Others
2000
(1) SA 1
(CC
) para
37-128 it was alleged that the President had abdicated or unlawfully
delegated his powers of appointing a commission of enquiry
and of
making the provisions of the Commissions Act 8 of 1947 applicable to
the commission of enquiry so appointed, to the Minister
of Sport.
The court held that there was insufficient proof for this allegation.
The court furthermore held that even should he
have done so, the
President would at any time before the actual appointment of the
commission (by publishing a notice to this effect
in the Government
Gazette) have been able to revoke the delegation or abdication of
powers. [
Administrator,
Cape v Associated Buildings Ltd 1957 (2) SA
317 (A
) 323F-H]
Another example of the exercise of the power to revoke preliminary
decisions is to be found in
Union
of Teachers’ Associations of South Africa and Another v Minister
of Education and Culture, House of Representatives and
Another
;
Isaacs and
Others v Minister of Education and Culture House of Representatives
and Another
1993 (2) SA 828
(c) at 840H-841D
.
In this case the court held that the decision to permit the
appointment of substitute teachers had been a preliminary decision
which conferred no rights on the applicants. [See also
Brown
v Klerksdorp Town Council
1955 (3) SA 599
(A
)
602C-D;
Philipstown
Divisional Council v du Toit
1964 (4) SA 796
(C
)
800D-F.] The decision was conditional (ie not final) and could
therefore be revoked. However, in revoking the decision, the
minister
had not acted in a procedurally fair manner and the decision
was set aside.”
By parity of reasoning
the same situation obtains in the matter at hand.
Even
if I were to be wrong in my conclusion reached in para 18 (above) I
have another fundamental problem with Mr Coetzee’s suggestion
that
the Liquor Board ought to have approved the final issue of the
licence and instituted steps only thereafter to nullify the
licence.
He submitted that in view of the Liquor Board’s aforesaid failure
we should do so by granting the relief sought in
the Notice of
Motion. In other words, the court is being brazenly asked to
sanction or to give its stamp of approval to conduct
that is
evidently immoral or inimical to public policy or interest or expose
the patrons of the tavern to potential but serious
danger. Our
courts have never done it in the past, are not doing so now and will
not do so as long as we remain a civilized jurisdiction
and a
democracy with a doctrine entrenching the separation of powers.
See:
S v Lawrence;
S v Negal; S v Solberg
1997 (4) SA 1176
(CC)
at
1199F – 1200A (paras 54 & 55) whereat
Chaskalson
P
(in a different
context) said:
“
[54]
The excessive consumption of liquor is universally regarded as a
social evil. It is linked to crime, disturbance of the public
order,
impairment of road safety, damage to health, and has other
deleterious social and economic consequences. These are legislative
facts of which this Court can take judicial cognizance.
[55]
The Liquor Act describes itself as an Act '(t)o provide for control
over the sale of liquor; and for matters connected therewith'.
The
appellants did not dispute that the excessive consumption of alcohol
is harmful and that some control over the sale of intoxicating
liquor
is needed. This much was common cause.”
The
Liquor Board says that if it was aware of these most serious
allegations belatedly drawn to its attention in the police report
it
would not have granted the conditional licence. Why should they?
In
Pepcor Retirement
Fund v Financial Services Board
2003 (6) SA 38
(SCA)
at
48A (para 10) the Court held:
[10]
This Court has already held that if an administrative act has been
performed irregularly - be it as a result of an administrative
error,
fraud or other circumstance - then, depending upon the legislation
involved and the nature and functions of the public body,
it may not
only be entitled but also bound to raise the matter in a court of
law, if prejudiced:
Transair
(Pty) Ltd v National Transport Commission and Another
1977 (3) SA 784
(A
)
at 792H - 793G.”
At
58G – 59C (paras 46 and 47) the Court went on to hold:
“
[46]
The national legislation envisaged in s 33(3) of the Constitution has
now been enacted in the Promotion of Administrative Justice
Act 3 of
2000; … s6(2)(e)(iii) provides that a Court has the power to review
an administrative action, inter alia, if 'relevant
considerations
were not considered'. It is possible for that section to be
interpreted as restating the existing common law; it is
equally
possible for the section to bear the extended meaning that material
mistake of fact renders a decision reviewable.
[47]
In my view, a material mistake of fact should be a basis upon which a
Court can review an administrative decision.
If
legislation has empowered a functionary to make a decision, in the
public interest, the decision should be made on the material
facts
which should have been available for the decision properly to be
made. And if a decision has been made in ignorance of facts
material
to the decision and which therefore should have been before the
functionary, the decision should (subject to what is said
in para
[10] above) be reviewable at the suit of, inter alios, the
functionary who made it - even although the functionary may have
been
guilty of negligence and even where a person who is not guilty of
fraudulent conduct has benefited by the decision
.
The doctrine of legality which was the basis of the decisions in
Fedsure, Sarfu
and Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
requires that the power conferred on a functionary to make decisions
in the public interest, should be exercised properly, ie on
the basis
of the true facts; it should not be confined to cases where the
common law would categorize the decision as ultra vires.”
(My emphasis)
If
we had found that that the decision of the Liquor Board was not
conditional or provisional but final the Liquor Board would have
been functus officio and its remedy would have been to bring an
application to have its own decision reviewed and set aside on
the
Pepcor Retirement Fund
principle
.
Alternatively, it may have brought a counter-application based on
the same principle. However, for the reasons already adverted
to
the Liquor Board was fully entitled to revoke its interim or
conditional or provisional decision of the 23rd February 2005

without offending against the
functus
officio
principle. The
Liquor Board’s decision is therefore not reviewable.
THE DISOLUTION OF
THE LIQOUR BOARD
It
was common cause during the hearing that the MEC of Finance and
Economic Affairs who administeres the Liquor Act in this province
has dissolved the Liquor Board on the 27
th
September 2005 for reasons he deemed necessary and has hitherto not
appointed a new Liquor Board. Such a vacuous situation, for
reasons
that suggest themselves, is untenable and undesirable. The MEC is
urged to remedy the vacuum without further delay.
THE REPEAL OF THE
LIQOUR ACT 27 OF 1989 WITH THE
LIQUOR ACT NO 59 OF 2003
The
Liquor Act 27 of 1989 has been repeal by the
Liquor Act 59 of 2003
.
The latter Act was assented to on the 20
th
April 2004 with its commencement date being the 13
th
August 2004. However, as far as could be established Act 59 of 2003
has not been made applicable to the Northern Cape by the MEC
as
contemplated by the transitional provisions of the new Law. The
responsible MEC may wish to look into this matter as well,
for the
sake of uniformity.
ORDER
:
In
the result the decision of the Northern Cape Liquor Board taken on
the 14
th
April 2005 is not reviewable.
The
applicant, Ms Keitemogetse Susan Solani’s, application is
dismissed with costs.
________________________
F
D KGOMO
JUDGE
PRESIDENT
NORTHERN
CAPE DIVISION
I
concur:
________________________
C
C WILLIAMS
JUDGE
NORTHERN
CAPE DIVISION
For
the Applicant: Adv W Coetzee
Instructed
by: Engelsman Mangabane
For
the Respondents: Adv E Mokutu
Instructed
by: Thiso Cengcani & Ass