Melnichenko v Road Accident Fund and Another (396/2001) [2006] ZANCHC 19 (17 March 2006)

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[2006] ZANCHC 19
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Melnichenko v Road Accident Fund and Another (396/2001) [2006] ZANCHC 19 (17 March 2006)

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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(Northern
Cape Division)
Case
Nr: 396/2001
Case
Heard: 20/02/2006
Date
delivered: 17/03/2006
In
the matter:
MELNICHENKO
C APPELLANT
versus
ROAD
ACCIDENT FUND 1
ST
RESPONDENT
MELNICHENKO
N THIRD PARTY
Coram:
Kgomo JP
et
Majiedt J
et
P L Tlaletsi
JUDGMENT ON FULL BENCH APPEAL
KGOMO
JP:
The
appellant is Mrs Cleone Melnichenko, the plaintiff in the
court
a quo
. She sues the
respondent, the Road Accident Fund (RAF), a statutory body
constituted in terms of
Section 2
of the
Road Accident Fund Act, No
56 of 1996
, for an amount of R3.725 million for injuries she
sustained in a vehicle accident on the 10
th
March 1997.
The
vehicle, a Toyota Conquest, in which the plaintiff was a front-seat
passenger was driven by her husband, Mr Nataniel Melnichenko.
The
RAF has joined Mr Melnichenko as a Third Party in the proceedings in
terms of Section 2 (2) (b) of The Apportionment of Damages
Act, No
34 of 1956, seeking to recover from him, as a joint wrongdoer, a
contribution in respect of his degree of responsibility
for any
damages which may have been suffered by the plaintiff.
The
said collision, just outside Kimberley, on the N12, normally
referred to as the Kimberley-Cape Town Road, occurred between Mr
Melnichenko’s car and a motor vehicle, a Jetta, driven by Mrs Jane
Elizabeth du Plessis. The latter’s is the insured vehicle.
By
agreement the merits were separated from the determination of the
quantum in terms of Rule 33 (4) of the Superior Courts Rules.
On
the 21
st
November 2003 the trial court,
Olivier
J
, dismissed the
plaintiff’s claim with costs. The appellant applied
unsuccessfully for leave to appeal to the
court
a quo
but petitioned the
President of the Supreme Court of Appeal successfully therefor.
There
was much confusion relating to the cardinal points and the
directions which the respective drivers were taking between the
submitted police sketch and what the court a quo deemed to have been
the correct directions. I will simplify the scene of the
accident
in this manner:
The
accident took place at an intersection of the N12 National Road:
The Kimberley – Cape Town Road;
The
N12 at this intersection is a through road which accords the
drivers thereon a right of way;
Plaintiff
and her husband approached the intersection from the side of the
Kalahari Lodge, where they both worked. The traffic
approaching
this intersection (as the Melnichenkos did) was controlled by a
stop sign;
The
Melnichenkos had to drive (having obeyed the stop sign) right
across the N12 to their home in the direction of Barkley-West.

This road is called the Landbou Road. The traffic approaching the
intersection from the Barkley-West side was also controlled
by a
stop sign.
Mrs
du Plessis, the insured motorist involved in the collision, was
driving on the N12 from the Cape Town direction towards Kimberley.
Only
three witnesses testified. The Melnichenkos for the plaintiff and
Mrs du Plessis for the defendant – RAF. The N12 is a
tarred road.
These witnesses are agreed that the collision occurred on Mrs du
Plessis’ correct side of the road. In other words
Mr Melnichenko
had already driven over the central line that divides the N12 into
two halves. The central line was measured at
8 meters from the
point where Mr Melnichenko had stopped on the Kalahari Lodge side of
the N12. This means that Mr Melnichenko
had driven just a little
over 8 meters from the stop line to the point of impact.
The
gravamen of Mr Nel’s, appellants’ counsel’s, argument was that
it had been raining that late afternoon; that visibility
was poor
as a result and that the cause of the accident is entirely
attributable to Mrs du Plessis’ failure to switch on her
lights
under those so-called wretched weather conditions. Allied to this
Mr Nel argued that Mrs du Plessis also failed to keep
a proper look
out, failed to apply her brakes, failed to alert Mr Melnichenko of
the impending danger by not pressing her hooter
and failed to take
evasive action by swerving left or right.
First
the weather conditions at about 17h15 on 10 March 1997
.
It was common cause that the sun was some way from setting in
Kimberley at that time of the year. Both Melnichenkos testified
that there was a light drizzle at the time of the accident. Mrs du
Plessis said she had no clear recollection on whether it was
drizzling but recalled that visibility was good and that she had not
switched on her head lights (or any lights for that matter)
because
there was no necessity for her to do so.
I
will therefore accept that there was a light drizzle at the time of
the collision. There was also some indication that when the
police
attended the scene the surface of the tarred road was still wet,
although it is not stated what time this was. The establishment
that it drizzled lightly at 17h15 on the particular day does not,
however, answer adequately the visibility question.
I
will attempt to answer this issue with the aid of the
ipsissisima
verba
of the witnesses:
Mr
Melnichenko said this in his evidence-in-chief:
“
Mr
Nel
: How was the
visibility? Was it good or bad? -- Well, I wouldn’t say that it
was like a hundred percent perfect, because of
the rain conditions
obviously. But it wasn’t like at night … Yes.
Mr
Nel
: Now the
other cars that you saw, not the car that collided with you, the
other cars, were their headlights also on or were they
off? -- As
far as I remember, cars that passed, (their) lights were on.
Why did you switch
on your headlights that day? -- That’s what you will do when it’s
raining. Even in the morning I will always
do that. And if it’s
raining, you put your lights on.
If
you think back now on that particular day, with regard to the
weather, the time of the day and so forth, do you think that the
reasonable driver, the average driver should have switched on his
headlights or not? -- Yes.
And
the car that collided with your car, was that car’s headlights on?
-- Not that I remember.
If that other car’s
headlights were on, do you think you would have seen that other car?
-- Definitely … yes.”
In
cross-examination by Mr Pohl Mr Melnichenko stated:
“
Mr
Pohl
: And those
trees were at, I think that this was about 800 m, was the distance
that was measured. Could you see that distance on
that day when you
stopped there at the stop street? -- Well, I remember looking out
on both sides.
Yes.
-- I well, I could see (indistinct).
Could
you see that far? That is what I am asking. -- Well, it wasn’t
dark, yes.”
The
plaintiff testified in this fashion on this point:
“
Mr
Nel
: Describe the
weather to us. How was that particular day? -- It was, it had been
raining, it was raining at the time. I remember
when we left the
lodge, it was (raining). We ran to the car and ja, it was overcast,
it was very cloudy, the sun was setting as
well at the time. So it
was quite covered.”
Plaintiff
went on to say:
“
Mnr
Nel
: How was the
visibility at the time of accident? -- The sun was setting and it
was overcast. It was raining. So it was quite
dusky I would say.”
Then
under cross-examination:
“
Mr
Pohl
: You see,
why I am asking is, Mrs du Plessis will testify that she was clearly
able to see, as she was approaching the intersection,
she was clearly
able to see the kombi and your vehicle behind this stop (sign) --
Okay.
So
what I am asking is, if she could see you, is there any reason why
you could not have seen her? Given the visibility at that time
in
March at quarter past five. -- Well, she definitely did not have
her headlights on.
But
your headlights were facing the other way. They weren’t facing
her. So if she could see you, is there any other reason why
you
could not have seen her? -- I don’t know.”
As
pointed out earlier Mrs du Plessis says visibility was good. Under
cross-examination she responded:
“
Mr
Nel
: En u
hoofligte was natuurlik ook nie aan nie, want u sê dit was mooiweer…
-- Nee, my hoofligte was nie aan gewees nie.
Indien dit die
betrokke dag gereën het in daardie tyd, dit is nou so kwart oor vyf
toe die botsing plaasgevind het, as dit gereën
het, sou u die
hoofligte aangesit het van u motor? -- Ja, as dit gereën het en
die sig was swak, definitief.
Sou
u dit gedoen het. – Ja.
Mnr Melnichenko het
ook getuig dat die ander motors se ligte aan was omdat die
sigbaarheid beperk was. Kan u dit onthou? -- As
u praat van ‘n
ander motor, praat u van die kombi?
Nee,
aankomende verkeer, ander aankomende verkeer. Die ander motors in
die omgewing. -- Ek dra geen kennis van enige ander motors
nie.”
Mr
Nel further put this statement to Mrs du Plessis:
“
My
kliënt maak die bewering dat daardie betrokke dag het dit gereën en
die sig was baie swak gewees. Die son was alreeds besig
om so half
onder te gaan.
En
derhalwe moes motoriste se hoofligte aan gewees het en omdat u ligte
nie aan was nie, dit is een van die redes hoekom hy u nie
raakgesien
het nie.
Wat
sê u daarvan? -- Nee Meneer. Ek is ‘n baie versigtige
bestuurder en ‘n baie veilige bestuurder. Op 10 Maart is ons nog
in somer. Die son sak nog nie vyfuur op 10 Maart nie.
Tensy
dit baie donker daar kan reën. -- Tensy dit daardie tyd be
wolk,
daar gereën het ….”
Based
on the aforegoing extracts and other aspects adverted to and taken
in conjunction with some aspects about to be dealt with,
I am
satisfied that, notwithstanding the light drizzle, visibility was
fairly good at the time of the accident. This was also the
conclusion the Learned Trial Judge came to. It need to be made
plain that Mr Melnichenko did not say that 800 m was the furtherest
he could see through the drizzle. The inspection in loco, as to
which see later, revealed that beyond 800 m there is a sudden
dip or
descent on the road enabling only car roof tops to be seen. The
Court
a quo
has therefore not misdirected itself in this regard.
I
now proceed to examine briefly how the accident took place
.
The Melnichenkos testified that whilst they had stopped for traffic
traveling towards Kimberley and in the opposite direction
towards
Cape Town on the N12 a minibus taxi approached them from behind and
passed their car on the left hand side without stopping.
There was
only a stop sign and no yield sign. The minibus should therefore
have stopped as well. The minibus turned left in
the direction of
Cape Town. It drove for a short while on the yellow barrier lane
and encroached gradually onto the driving surface
of the road on the
left and drove off, never to be seen again.
The
Melnichenkos initially were adamant that the minibus at no stage,
even fleetingly, obscured their view of the traffic traveling
in
particular to their left on the N12, ie vehicles driving from the
Cape Town direction towards Kimberley which is the path followed
by
Mrs du Plessis. However, under cross-examination both were
constrained to concede that at a particular juncture the much higher
and longer minibus must have temporarily obscured their view.
These
are some of the exchanges which explain the chain of events leading
to the accident:
“
Mr
Nel (to Mr Melnichenko)
:
Did that minibus taxi obscure your view at any time from your
left? -- I considered that. Well, he was slight, moving slow
and
obviously I have been standing and waiting from both sides, you
know and everything go past. So because he was in a slow
motion,
but still moving, I could see the road, what’s happening in the
road.
Court
:
So he did not obscure your view. -- He was moving, but no, I won’t
say that he was obscuring me.
You could see. --
Ja, I could see, because he was in a movement.
Mr
Nel
: In other
words, could you see the road to your left the whole time? -- Yes,
yes.
The whole road? --
Yes.
Court
:
And it’s also your lefthand side where the vehicle came from that
collided with you? -- Ja.”
It
must be noted that Mr Melnichenko only made the concession that his
view was impeded after he was confronted by Mr Pohl with
the
following statement in his deposition (Exhibit “B”) that he
made to the police:
“It
(the minibus)
stopped at a slight angle to the left as it intended turning left.
It thereby obscured my outlook to the left.”
“
Mr
Pohl
: Now you
also mentioned in this affidavit that is before you there, that
“The taxi pulled away and we then pulled away”,
in paragraph 3,
is that correct? -- Well, he was driving and we drove also the
same time as he was driving. We also were proceeding
across the
road.”
“
Mr
Pohl
: The
question is really did he at the time when he pulled away, you said
that you looked to your left. Did he at that time,
this taxi, this
minibus, did it obscure your view with reference to oncoming
traffic from the south? -- I saw the road is clear
from both
sides.
Court
:
Just a moment. -- At the time that I pulled … Yes?
Mr
Pohl
: And can we
accept therefore that you had a clear unimpeded view to the left and
there was no traffic there? -- You can say that
I had a clear look,
Ja.
Now,
and then you pulled straight over, you crossed 8 metres onto the next
lane, is that correct? -- You mean, I don’t know how
many metres
it were.”
“
Mr
Pohl
: Let us
analyse what you have now said. You said that your wife Cleone,
saw her (Ms du Plessis) as she hit the left, is that
right? --
Cleone shouted at me.
Yes. -- My name.
By then you had
already pulled off and you had almost reached the centre of the road,
not so? -- By then I accelerated when she
saw the car.”
“
Mr
Pohl
: You mean,
except, because of the fact that your wife saw this car
approaching, that there was nothing that impeded your view.
You
could have seen it as well. -- I could have seen it as well.”
The
plaintiff’s account relative to the movements of the minibus and
her husband’s car were the following:
“
Mr
Nel
: Did you
see the car that collided with you at any stage, apart from just
before the accident? -- Not at all. No.
Not at all. Did you
look before the accident to your left? -- Yes.
And you didn’t see
the car? -- Not at all.
What did you do when
you saw the car just before the accident? -- I shouted to Nathan.
That’s
your ex-husband. -- Ex-husband, yes.
And what did you
then, and what did he do then? -- He accelerated and pulled
forward. He accelerated to get out of the way.”
“
Mr
Pohl
: Can you
advance perhaps any reason why it is that you didn’t see this car
approaching prior to the last minute that you saw
it and the last
second that you saw it? -- Look, it was overcast, as I say. It
was cloudy, it was raining.
But let me just ask
you this way. Your husband testified that those trees that were in
the dip there where we were this morning,
they are some 800 m off and
one could see that distance clearly. I mean, this was quarter past
five, even though it was raining,
in March. Would you agree with
that? -- That we could see the cars?
Yes,
that you would be able to se a car approaching from that distance.”
(No answer was forthcoming – question avoided).
“
Mr
Pohl
: Did the
taxi, did it physically stop and then pulled off slowly as it was
waiting for the car to pass from the right? -- No,
it was just
moving all the time from when it came from behind. It did continue
to move very slowly, it edged forward and it
didn’t come to a
standstill completely.
And did your husband
pull off almost immediately as this kombi passed him? -- Ja.”
“
M
r
Pohl
: Because
you see he accelerated, that was his evidence as well and it seems
to us, if one has regard to the photo’s, they
are there in front
of you, if you want to have a look at them. That the impact was
almost slap-bang in the middle of your vehicle
where you were
sitting. So it would appear that he accelerated almost into the
point of impact. Would you agree with that?
-- Ja, I suppose.”
THE LAW
The
principle concerning the traffic flow at an intersection is
captured succinctly in the following cases:
National
Employers’ General Insurance CO Ltd v Sullivan
1988 (1) SA 27
(A
) at
36D-F whereat
Hefer JA
held:
“
The
driver in a through street, while being required to keep a general
look-out, is entitled to assume, in the absence of indications
to the
contrary, that a driver approaching from a stop street will heed the
stop sign operating against him and bring his vehicle
to a stop. It
is only when it would become apparent to a reasonable man in the
position of the driver in the through street that
the driver in the
stop street does not intend to stop, or will be unable to stop in
time, that the duty rests on the through street
driver to take
appropriate avoiding action. Until that stage is reached it is not
incumbent upon him, under normal conditions, to
regulate his driving
on the assumption that the driver in the stop street may not stop.”
In
Diale v Commercial
Union Assurance Co of SA Ltd
1975 (4) SA 572
(A
) at
576H-577A:
“
Secondly,
the arguments of counsel, for both parties, on the question as to
whether Harmsen could and should have observed the cycle
before he
did and, if so, whether he could have avoided the collision were
founded to a large extent upon mathematical calculations
similar to
those already made in seeking to determine the relative positions of
the station wagon and the cycle when Harmsen saw
the ‘flash’. In
this connection it is prudent to recall the following remarks of
Ogilvie
Thompson AJ
as he
then was, in
Van
der Westhuizen and Another v S A Liberal Insurance Co Ltd
1949 (3) SA 160
(C
)
at p168:
‘
In my opinion,
however, the strictly mathematical approach, though undoubtedly very
useful as a check, can but rarely be applied as
an absolute test in
collision cases, since any mathematical calculation so vitally
depends on exact positions and speeds; whereas
in truth these latter
are merely estimates almost invariably made under circumstances
wholly unfavourable to accuracy.’
As will have already
been apparent these cautionary observations are particularly opposite
in this case.”
The
approach that we should adopt has been set out in
R
v Dhlumayo
1948
(2) SA 677
(A
) at 705 to
the effect that where there has been no misdirection on fact by the
Trial Judge, the presumption is that the Judge’s
conclusion is
correct and that the Court of Appeal will only reverse it where it
is convinced that it is wrong. However, if the
court hearing the
appeal is merely left in doubt as to the correctness of the
conclusion that court came to, then the Court of
Appeal must uphold
it.
The
Learned Trial Judge, apart from enjoying the advantages of being
steeped in the trial, also conducted an
inspection
in loco
on the scene of
the accident. Before us Mr Nel sought to argue that this
on-the-scene-investigation was conducted in the morning
under bright
sunny skies in contrast with a 17h15 drizzling late afternoon. An
inspection loco was never meant to be a replica
re-enactment of the
scene. It is merely a reconstruction of the scene with the aid of
the witnesses to assist the Court to understand
and apply the
evidence better. The court
a
quo
duly recorded its
observations and the parties declared themselves to be satisfied
therewith after Mr Nel, no less, has made his
inputs. This makes it
even more difficult for us to interfere in the trial Court’s
finding. See
R v
Sewpaul
1949 (4)
SA 798
(A
).
Olivier
J
gave a detailed and
well reasoned judgment. In the course of the judgment and in
applying the facts of the case to the law he
expressed himself inter
alia as follows:
“
16.
To
my mind the most important, and indeed crucial, issues in this matter
are whether the minibus at any relevant stage posed an obstruction
which prevented the third party and Mrs du Plessis from observing one
another’s vehicles and actions and, if so, whether the third
party
negligently entered the intersection and whether Mrs du Plessis kept
a proper lookout and could reasonably have been expected
to take
steps to avoid the collision. …
25. There
is absolutely no evidence to the effect that Mrs du Plessis had
failed to keep a proper lookout. The fact that she did
not
specifically watch the third party’s vehicle and the minibus (after
she had initially noticed them) as she neared the intersection
does
not detract from the fact that she saw, albeit peripherally, how the
minibus passed the third party’s vehicle and turned into
the
national road towards her. There was nothing wrong for her to have
regarded the view ahead as a priority at that stage and her
evidence
certainly did not justify an inference that she no longer kept any
lookout at all on the vehicle of the third party and
the minibus. …
26. According
to the third party the minibus had already entered the national road,
and more specifically its yellow lane (the area
to the left of the
yellow line), and was already about 10 metres away from the
intersection before he pulled away and proceeded to
cross the
intersection. On this basis he contended that he had had a clear
view to the left before proceeding to cross the intersection.
The
plaintiff’s evidence in this regard was materially different.
According to her initial evidence (in chief) the third party
“edged
forward” when the minibus passed on their left. This was never
mentioned by the Third Party (Mr Melnichenko). According
to him he
kept his vehicle stationary until it was safe to cross and then
simply proceeded to cross the intersection. In cross-examination
the
plaintiff testified that the third party simply pulled away, to cross
the road, immediately as the minibus passed them. The
plaintiff’s
evidence in this regard created a strong suspicion in my mind, and
indeed justifies as a strong possibility the inference
that the third
party had pulled away and proceeded across the intersection at a
stage when his vehicle was still obscured from Mrs
du Plessis’s
view by the minibus and while the minibus was still moving forward
and to its left into the national road.
27. This
would explain why Mrs du Plessis only saw the Third Party’s vehicle
again when it was already crossing into her lane and
at a stage when
it was far too late to avoid a collision. If it had moved forward
simultaneously with the minibus the Third Party’s
vehicle would
have remained obscured from Mrs du Plessis’s view for longer than
would have been the position had it remained stationary.
…
29. To
(have expected) Mrs du Plessis to have taken precautionary measures
like hooting or swerving under these circumstances would
amount to
adopting an “armchair approach”, which would be wrong (see
Lombo
v African National Congress
2002(5)SA 668(SCA
)
at 685I-J). Even if it is to be assumed that Mrs du Plessis ought
reasonably to have noticed the Third Party’s vehicle at the
moment
when he crossed the stop-line and entered the intersection there is
no evidence to justify the inference, on a balance of
probabilities,
that there would then have been sufficient time for Mrs du Plessis to
have taken steps to avoid the collision. As
appears from Exhibit C
the Third Party’s vehicle had to move only about 8 metres before
entering into Mrs du Plessis’s lane.
It is not known at what speed
the Third Party drove across the intersection. In view of the
uncertainties in the plaintiff’s case
regarding how long the
obstruction by the minibus lasted, the plaintiff never made out a
case as (regards) at what point Mrs du Plessis
would have been able
to see the Third Party pull away.”
I
cannot fault the Trial Judge’s reasoning. It is evident that:
Although
it had been drizzling visibility was relatively good at the time of
the accident;
Mr
Melnichenko could see objects (trees) about 800 meters from the
scene of the accident at the time of the accident;
Mr
Melnichenko’s view was momentarily obscured by the minibus taxi
at the time that he drove from the stop street that operated
against him;
Mr
Melnichenko did not keep a proper look-out before he endeavoured to
cross the N12. It was not only inopportune for him to
have left
the stop but extreme risky and dangerous;
On
the account of both Melnichenkos Mr Melnichenko did not even see
Mrs du Plessis’ car approaching and would not have done
so until
after the collision if his wife, the plaintiff, had not alerted him
thereto a split second before the collision;
Surprised
by the sudden turn of events Mr Melnichenko took the wrong option
by literally accelerating into the accident whereas
slamming on his
brakes would undeniably have yielded a better result;
Mrs
du Plessis, who had the right of way and driving at 80-90 km/h and
her own view having been fleetingly obstructed by the same
minibus
taxi, could do nothing to avoid the accident. The Court
a
quo
correctly accepted
her evidence as reliable and preferred it to that of the
Melnichenkos where same were in conflict and Mrs
du Plessis did not
commit a patent error;
The
fact that Mrs du Plessis’ lights were not switched on could not
and did not contribute causally or cannot be linked causally
to the
occurrence of the accident.
Mr
Nel’s argument that the Melchenkos’ evidence to the effect that
the lights of other vehicles were switched on at the time
of the
accident was not challenged under cross-examination or later
controverted by Mrs du Plessis is correct. He also has a valid
point that therefore such evidence ought to be accepted as correct.
See:
President of the
RSA & Others v South African Rugby Football Union & Others
2000 (1) SA 1
(CC
) at
36J-37E and
S v
Boesak
[2000] ZASCA 112
;
2000 (3)
SA 381
(SCA
) at 397D-F.
However, as already pointed out, this point does not advance the
appellant’s’ case in the slightest.
I
also find it unnecessary to deal in any length with Mr Nel’s
fervent reliance on the case of
Rondalia
Assurance Corporation of SA Ltd v Page & Others
1975 (1) SA 708
(A
)
because the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable from the
present. In the
Rondalia
case
the court found
that the driver of the insured vehicle (the Mercedes Benz) in taking
his eyes off the other vehicle (the Cortina)
after he (van der
Merwe) saw it nosing forward at the edge of the intersection and not
noticing it again, until it was three-quarters
of the way across the
first-half of the road, had failed to keep a proper lookout because
he could not have predicted what the
Cortina’s next move was going
to be. This cannot be said of Mrs du Plessis
in
casu
on the facts hereof
which need not be recounted. The trial Judge correctly, as it has
now turned out, also found the
Rondalia
case
distinguishable.
The
Court
a
quo
was therefore justified in its finding that Mr Melnichenko, the
Third Party, was negligent and was the sole cause of the accident.

To find otherwise would be to impute
culpa
on Mrs du Plessis in an unjustified manner. See
South
African Railways v Symington
1935
AD 37
at p44-45; or to make driving impossible – see
Izaaks
v Schneider
1991 (3) SA 675
(Nm
)
at 678J-679A.
It
is a great pity that Mr Melnichenko (who described himself as of
Russian origin) came close to playing Russian Roulette with
the life
of his now ex-wife, despite his vehement but shallow protestations.
However this may be, maudlin sympathy has no place
in our decision
making.
Order
:
In the result: The
appeal is dismissed with costs.
________________________
F
D KGOMO
JUDGE
PRESIDENT
NORTHERN
CAPE DIVISION
I
concur:
________________________
S
A MAJIEDT
JUDGE
NORTHERN
CAPE DIVISION
I
concur:
________________________
P
L TLALETSI
JUDGE
NORTHERN
CAPE DIVISION
For
Appellant: Adv C Nel
Instructed
by: Venter van Eeden Inc
For
Respondent: Adv L Le R Pohl
Instructed
by: Haarhoffs Inc