S v Tilo (185/2005) [2006] ZANCHC 15; 2006 (2) SACR 266 (NC) (10 March 2006)

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[2006] ZANCHC 15
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S v Tilo (185/2005) [2006] ZANCHC 15; 2006 (2) SACR 266 (NC) (10 March 2006)

Reportable:
YES / NO
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to Judges: YES / NO
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to Magistrates: YES / NO
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to Regional Magistrates: YES / NO
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(Northern
Cape Division)
Case
Nr: 185/2005
Case
Heard: 09/03/2006
Date
delivered: 10/03/2006
In
the matter:
DIRK
TILO APPELLANT
versus
THE
STATE RESPONDENT
Coram:
Kgomo JP
et
Tlaletsi J
JUDGMENT ON APPEAL
KGOMO
JP:
This
is one of those perennial so-called prison appeals. The appellant
initially appeared in the district court. The case was
transferred
to the regional court for an unspecified reason because the regional
court record is silent and the district court
proceedings have not
been incorporated therein. It is, however, safe to infer that the
transfer by the State was motivated by
the catalogue of previous
convictions that appellant has accumulated over the years, in that
the Regional
Magistrate,
Mr S O du Plessis
, at
the conclusion of the trial, declared him a habitual criminal.
Regional
Magistrate du Plessis
is
named because the irregularities that he has committed were so
patent that I can only ascribe them to complacency and a total
disregard for the appellant’s constitutional right to a fair trial
as enshrined in section 35 of the Constitution. I make these
remarks because I cannot accept that a Regional Magistrate of
several years’ standing, even on the 11
th
August 2003 when the case was disposed of, fluffled his Criminal
Procedure and the Law of Evidence through sheer inadvertence or
blissful ignorance. What happened follows.
The
prosecutor informed the court that he is ready to commence with the
trial and has four of his six witnesses available. The
other two,
he said, are fingerprint experts who have been subpoenaed for the
following day because they were in the process of
preparing their
court-charts (for presentation in Court as evidence or exhibits). I
now translate what the Court imparted to the
appellant:
“
Court
:
Very well. Mr Tilo, I notice that you informed the District
Magistrate on the occasion of the transfer of your case to the
Regional
Court that you will conduct your own defence in this Court
and that you do not require any legal aid.
I have taken up this
issue earlier with the Magistrate concerned after the prosecutor
explained the position to me. The magistrate
has confirmed to me
that he has explained your right to legal aid several times to you
and that you were adamant that you will undertake
your own defence.
Now, the witnesses are available today. The Court-hours can
therefore be utilized today. I therefore direct
(‘gelas’) that
the case be proceeded with.
State
:
Count 1: Housebreaking with the intent to steal and theft …”
What
the aforegoing proceedings illustrate vividly is that:
The
appellant was not afforded the opportunity to address the Court and
give his version of what transpired in the District Court
in
respect of what the Regional Magistrate said;
The
Regional Magistrate had absolutely no right to discuss the case
with the prosecutor and the District Magistrate in the absence
of
the accused. The proceedings commenced a mere twelve lines before
the prosecutor addressed Court as stated in the first two
sentences
in para 3 (above). There is nothing reflected on record in those
twelve lines that the Regional Magistrate’s discussion
aforesaid
took place
in curiae
facie
. What the
Regional Magistrate has done was grossly irregular. See:
R
v Maharaj
1960
(4) SA 256
(N
) at
258A-C whereat
Broome JP
said:
“
It
is a principle of justice as administered in this country that trials
must take place in open court and that judicial officers
must decide
them solely upon evidence heard in open court in the presence of the
accused. If that principle is violated, then, quite
apart from the
question as to whether the accused is manifestly guilty, the
proceedings are bad because it might be supposed that
justice was
being administered in a secret manner instead of in open court. It is
elementary that a judicial officer should have
no communication
whatever with either party in a case before him except in the
presence of the other, and no communication with any
witness except
in the presence of both parties. For that reason the conviction must
be set aside.”
See also
S v Mmatli
1988 (2) SA 533
(T
) at
536F-537E;
S v
Rousseau
1979 (3)
SA 895
(T
) at 898A-899E
and
S v Sejake
1981 (1) SA 1215
(O
).
If
the prosecutor or the Magistrate deemed it vital to have the
information, of what the District Magistrate imparted to the

Regional Magistrate, on record they should have called for the
record, duly proved. See
section 235
of the
Criminal Procedure
Act, 51 of 1977
. If the record lacked the required information
either one of them could have called the Magistrate to testify on
how precisely
he explained the appellant’s rights to him. This
would have enabled the appellant to cross-examine the Magistrate on
disputed
aspects and give rebutting evidence and/or call a witness,
if so advised: See:
S
v Ndlovu
1987
(3) SA 827
(D) at 828E-I
where
Page J
remarked:
“
Counsel
for the defence further contended that, once it was not clear from
the record that the accused's rights had been adequately
explained to
him, this shortcoming could not be rectified by viva voce evidence
and that the statements recorded were inadmissible.
It was likewise
contended, on the strength of the authorities quoted, that the
accused's alleged admissions in terms of
s 115(2)(b)
of the Act were
obtained by irregular means and were accordingly inadmissible.
Further reliance was placed upon the fact that it
did not appear ex
facie the record that the accused was warned before making the
admissions that he was under no obligation to do
so.
It was not disputed
by the State that the warnings and explanations recorded by the
magistrate were insufficient to enable the Court
to determine from
the record alone whether the accused had been properly warned or
apprised of his rights. It was further conceded
that, in the light of
this shortcoming, it would not be permissible for the Court to
receive the record in evidence on the mere production
thereof in
terms of
s 235.
It was pointed out, however, that this was not what
the State was asking the Court to do. What the State was proposing to
do was
to prove the statement and admissions made to the magistrate
by way of viva voce testimony of the magistrate, after laying the
basis
for their admissibility in that testimony.
In
my judgment, there is nothing in the decisions quoted nor in the Act
itself which renders this procedure impermissible.”
See also
Thole
Olehile
: Case No
833/2000
(Northern Cape)
Delivered 15/09/2000, Unreported.
In
my view the whole cumbersome procedure could have been very easily
resolved. All that the Regional Magistrate had to do was
to
explain the appellant’s right to him afresh because it is his
responsibility to ensure that the appellant was accorded a
fair
trial and not that of the District Magistrate. Logic and common
sense dictates that even if the appellant elected to conduct
his
own defence in the District Court he may have undergone a change of
mind. It must also have dawned upon the Regional Magistrate
that
if the charges merited the attention of the Regional Court then
they ought to be serious. Unfortunately the Regional Magistrate
could not have received the assistance of the prosecutor in terms
of
section 150
of the
Criminal Procedure Act relating
to the
seriousness of the charges because it was inopportune and
impermissible to have disclosed the appellant’s encounters
with
the law previously. In fact the Regional Magistrate could even
have taken the safe route to encourage the appellant to
appoint a
legal representative on private brief but if he was indigent then
through legal aid funding. See:
S
v Manale
2000
(2) SACR 666
(NC
) at
668h-672f;
S v
Mbambo
1999 (2)
SACR 421
(W
) at 426b-d;
S v Mabaso &
Another
[1990] ZASCA 24
;
1990 (3)
SA 185
(A
) at 203B-G
and
S v Nkondo
2000 (1) SACR 358
(W
)
at 360b-e.
In
my view the Magistrate displayed an intemperate disposition because
in his own words
“die
hoftyd kan benut word vandag”.
He was not going to postpone the case, hence his failure to explain
appellant’s rights to him.
On
another aspect the Magistrate misguided the appellant and may even
have inhibited his cross-examination. When the appellant
cross-examined Ms Sizeka Mgadana who said she saw the appellant as
she was going home, not far from her parental home, bleeding
from an
arm and clutching it with the unaffected hand the Magistrate
interrupted his very first question. The Magistrate also
lost sight
of the fact that the appellant was not only putting his version to
the witness but he also did what was to be done when
pleading an
alibi. These were the exchanges:
“
Hof
:
Het u enige vra vir haar?
Beskuldigde
:
Ja Meneer
Hof
: Vra
maar
Beskuldigde
:
Ek hoor Mevrou sê, Mevrou ken vir my. Hoe lank ken Mevrou my?
Hof
:
Nee, sy’t gesê sy ken jou nie. Sy’t jou maar daar gesien toe
jy verbyloop.
Beskuldigde
:
Nou, ek sê ek dra geen kennis van huisbraak, waar ek ingebreek het
by die mense se huis nie.
Hof
:
Nee, maar, luister, sy’t nie gesê u het ingebreek nie. Kan u
onthou? U’t mos nou geluister wat sy getuig het?
”
The
appellant’s question was incorrectly disallowed because the
witness said in her evidence-in-chief that she knew the appellant.
“
Staat
:
Ken u vir beskuldigde wat hier staan?
Me
Mgadana
: Ja
Staat
:
Hoe ken u vir hom?
Me
Mgadana
: Nadat my
broertjie geskree, vir my geskree het, het hy by (onhoorbaar) verby
gegaan. Hy het vir my gekyk en ek het hom gekyk.
Hy het sy hande so
vasgehou, aan sy arm vasgehou, want hy’t gebloei.”
It was in fact the
Magistrate who was inattentive.
On
the 31
st
July 2000 my unreported judgment (
Majiedt
J
concurring)
viz
S v Sipho Makheta
,
Case No 1070/99
(Northern Cape) was circulated amongst Magistrates in the Northern
Cape. This was a wide ranging judgment dealing with how and
why the
rights of the accused must be properly explained to them and the
proceedings properly recorded. The judgment also bears
testimony to
the efforts taken to guide Magistrates but more importantly to
safeguard the rights of accused persons, more particularly
the
unrepresented ones. It is a long quotation that follows but it is
excusable and meant to re-orientate some newly appointed
Magistrates
who also fall into lapses from time to time.
In
the aforesaid judgment I remarked:
“
A.
Verduideliking
van Beskuldigde se regte
Ek
het onder andere die volgende navraag aan die betrokke landdros
gestuur:
“
Wat
was die presiese terme van beskuldigde se ‘regte met betrekking tot
regsverteenwoordiging asook regshulp’ wat glo aan beskuldigde
verduielik is? Waarom kom hierdie terme nie in die oorkonde voor
nie, soos die gesag bepaal?”
Die
landdros antwoord hierop as volg:
“
In
die praktyd waar notules per hand afgeneem word, word die inhoud wat
aan beskuldigde verduidelik word nie genotuleer nie. Die
terme
waarvan beskuldigde deeglik in kennis gestel was, was die volgende.
‘Dat u geregtig is om gebruik te maak van die dienste
van ‘n
regsverteenwoordiger van u eie keuse wat u kan bystaan met die
verhoor. U kan ook gebruik maak van regshulp indien u nie
oor
genoegsame fondse beskik nie, m.a.w. u kan by die regshulpbeampte
aansoek doen waarna ‘n regsverteenwoordiger vir u gratis
aangestel
sal word.’ Beskuldigde word ook meegedeel dat indien hy dit nie so
verkies mag hy sy eie verdediging waarneem. Hierna
word beskuldigde
gevra of hy verstaan wat aan hom verdeuidelik is. Sy antwoord en sy
keuse word hierna genotuleer soos wat die hof
dit in die onderhawige
saak wel gedoen het.”
Die
Staatsadvokaat aan wie die Direkteur van Openbare Vervolgings (DOV)
die saak toevertrou het het hieromtrent die volgende mening
op die
reaksie van die landdros gelug:
“
4. Daar is ‘n
magdom van beslissings wat bepaal dat ‘n beskuldigde se regte met
betrekking tot regsverteenwoordiging en regshulp
behoorlik aan hom
verduidelik moet word. Dat dit wel gedoen is moet ook met voldoende
besonderhede op die rekord aangeteken word.
S
v Evans
1981 (4) SA 52
(KPA) op 58H
;
S v Daniëls
en ‘n ander
1983
(3) SA 275
(A) op 299G-H
;
S v Moos
1998 (1) SASV 372 (K) op 379j
.
5. In
S v Evans
,
wat eintlik handel oor artikel 115 van die Strafproseswet, sê Vivier
R op 58H:
‘
Wat
betref die formulering van die waarskuwing wat aan ‘n beskuldigde
gegee moet word moet, na my mening, gewaak word teen ‘n
te
formalistiese benadering tav art 115. So lank daar by die
verduideliking aan die aangeklaagde in gedagte gehou word die
opmerking
van
Hiemstra
HR
in
S
v M en Andere
(supra) ten opsigte van die karakter van die pleitverduideliking
waarna ek heirbo verwys het, en mits aangeklaagde duidelikheid het
aangaande sy regte, is die presiese wyse waarop dit aan hom duidelik
gemaak word, nie van belang nie. Dat sy regte wel aan hom
verduidlik is, moet natuurlik uit die oorkonde blyk;
op
so ‘n wyse en met voldoende besonderhede, dat beoordeel kan word of
dit wel voldoende was
.’
In
die onderhawige geval blyk dit uit die oorkonde dat die beskuldigde
se regte met betrekking tot regsverteenwoordiging en regshulp
wel
verduidelik is, maar dat die ipsissima verba van die landdros nie op
rekord geplaas is nie.
Die
landdros het bloot genotuleer dat die beskuldigde ‘in kennis
gestel is van regte met betrekking tot regsverteenwoordiging
asook
regshulp
’. Die
notule bevat klaarblyklik nie voldoende besonderhede om ex facie die
document self te bepaal of die verduideliking korrek
en voldoende
was nie.” (My onderstreping)
Daar
bestaan geen sodanige praktyk in hierdie afdeling soos wat die
landdros in paragraaf 3 (hierbo) voorhou nie. Die landdros
het dit
goed gevind om geen gesag vir sy standpunt aan te haal nie
nieteenstaande my versoek dat hy dit moet doen nie. So ver
my
kennis strek is daar slegs vier of vyf ander landdroste wat hierdie
ongewenste metode soos in die onderhawige geval gebruik.
In
S
v Moses Sebeela
:
Saakno: CA&R 542/2000 (Kimberley), gelewer op 30/06/2000
(ongerapporteer) spreek ek myself as volg op ‘n soortgelyke

versuim uit:
‘
The
magistrate merely recorded that the rights of the accused concerning
legal aid and legal representation were explained to him.
The exact
terms of what was explained are not reflected on record. The
magistrate, to my query, justifies this procedural defect
by stating
that it is a longstanding procedure that has been followed. It is a
wrong procedure which is strongly deprecated. It
must be stopped
forthwith. If the terms cannot be fully recorded manually due to
time (constraints) a properly worded pro forma
may be used and
incorporated as part of the record.’
In
S v Moses
Sebeela
(supra) reageer hierdie selfde landdros soos volg op ‘n navraag
met dieselfde strekking:
‘
Die
beskuldigde is van al sy regte voor die aanvang van die verrigtinge
verwittig. In my hof word konsekwent die volgende aan die
beskuldigde verduidelik wanneer daar aangeteken word dat beskuldigde
in kennis gestel word van sy reg op R/V en R/H: dat beskuldigde
geregtig is om gebruik te maak van ‘n prokureuer van sy keuse.
Indien hy nie fondse het mag hy gebruik maak van die dienste van
‘n
prokureuer wat die Staat gratis aan hom sal verskaf. Dit word
benadruk dat dit sy reg is. Hy word nie verplig nie en mag ook
sy
eie verdediging waarnaam as hy so verkies.’
As
die verduideliking van beskuldigdes se regte deur dieselfde landdros
in die twee sake vergelyk word sal dit opgemerk word dat
die wese
van die verduideliking dieselfde is. Daar is niks verkeerd daarmee
nie. Wat egter opvallend is is dat die bewoording
nie dieselfde is
nie. Die gevolgtrekking wat dus daaruit gemaak kan word is dat die
landdros nie die regte uit ‘n voorbereide
dokument lees nie.
Indien dit die geval is is dit vir my onverstaanbaar hoe die
landdros in die onderhawige saak die verduideliking
in
aanhalingstekens plaas asof hy die einste woorde gebruik het en uit
sy geheue onthou. Dit skep die verkeerde indruk.
Die
versuim om die verduideliking van die beskuldgide se regte behoorlik
te boekstaaf is ongewens en veroorsaak die volgende probleme:
Die
navrae en die reaksies daarop neem onnodiglik waardevolle tyd van
die landdros en die hersieningsregter(s) in beslag;
Die
proses in par 7.1 hierbo neem gewoonlik ‘n redelike lang tyd om
af te handel. Hierdie vertraging kan tot nadeel van ‘n
beskuldigde strek veral waar die skuldigbevinding tersyde gestel
word of die vonnis aansienlik verminder word.
In
sommige gevalle was beskuldigdes se regte nie deur die
verhoorlanddros self verduidelik nie. Die verhoorlanddros sal dus

sy kollega wat die verduideliking gemaak het moet nader ten einde
op die navraag of van die navrae te beantwoord. Dit kan
vertragings
of onoplosbare probleme veroorsaak soos, onder andere,
hieronder in par 7.4 uiteengesit, waar ‘n beskuldigde se insette
noodsaaklik
geag word.
Die
vraag ontstaan soms of sommige verduidelikings deur ‘n landdros
die rekord aanvul,alternatiewelik of die aanvulling op ‘n
eensydige rekonstruksie neerkom. My opmerking in
S
v Patrick Mbuzwane
:Hiersieningsaakno
1050/99 (Kimberley): gelewer 30/06/2000 (ongerapporteer) op bls
5-6 is hier matuatis mutandis van toepasing:
‘
Landdroste
moet versigtig wees om nie na willekeur ‘n rekord aan te vul nie.
Dit kom hier neer om rekonstruksie van die rekord
wat ongeoorloof is.
Dit benadeel ook die beskuldigde aangesien die rekonstruksie
eensydiglik gedoen is. Dit is ‘n growwe onreëlmatigheid.
Daar
bestaan goedgevestigde voorskrifte wat berus op
R
v Wolmarans
TPD
279
oor wat gedoen
moet word om oorkonde wat onvolledig is in orde te kry. Sien ook
S
v Joubert
[1990] ZASCA 113
;
1991 (1) SA 119
(A)
.
Ek wil dan ook net onderskryf wat
Pickard
HR
gesê het in
In
re Appeal: S v Stofile and Others
1989 (2) SA 629
(CK
) op
630I:
‘
I find in
practice that, by the time a judgment is submitted for revision,
(one’s) recollection of the case generally is often no
longer clear
enough … to render a reliable contribution.’
Op
631F-H van die saak rig
Pickard
HR
die volgende
waarskuwing:
‘
I
do believe that, not only Judges but also magistrates, are, at times,
required to revise judgments and have access to records of
proceedings after their transcription but prior to the final
certification and submission. Only fairly recently, in the case of
S
v Visser
,
heard in the Eastern Cape Division of the Supreme Court of South
Africa at Grahamstown (unreported), a magistrate was convicted
as a
result of his having materially altered the records of the
proceedings over which he presided prior to the matter being heard
on
appeal and having inserted facts and allegations that never occurred
in his court. This conviction was confirmed on appeal by
the
Appellate Division in Bloemfontein. It seems to me that the
temptation to which this magistrate succumbed could have been avoided
if the recording contractors accepted the sole responsibility for
which they are employed and presumably paid and if this magistrate
was not given an opportunity to tamper with the record.’
Ek wil nie hiermee
voorgee dat die landdros iets onwettigs gedoen het nie. Maar ek kan
ook nie verstaan hoe die landdros iets wat
so belangrik is nie sal
boekstaaf nie. Daar berus ‘n plig op die landdros om ‘n
volledige record van sy hof aan te hou. Waar
dit ‘n handgeskrewe
oorkonde is soos hier (en nie ‘n meganiese opname nie) is daar geen
sprake van die landdros se notas wat
hy kan naslaan nie.”
Sien
verder
S v
Kester
1996
(1) SAVS 46 (B)
op
473g - 474a waar
Friedman
RP
himself so
uitlaat:
‘
(3) It
is a salutary practice that the explanation of the rights of the
accused by the presiding officer should appear on the record
with
adequate and satisfactory particularity to enable a judgment to be
made on the adequacy thereof. See
S
v Daniels en 'n Ander
1983 (3) SA 275
(A
);
S v Modiba
1991 (2) SACR 286
(T
)
per
Goldstein J
at 286i-j.
(4) The
aforesaid duty resting upon a magistrate cannot and should not be
delegated to an interpreter. It is the duty of the magistrate.
See
the remarks of
Eloff
AJP
(as he then
was) in
S v
Mahooa
1991
(1) SACR 261
(T
)
at 264a-f.
(5) If
roneod forms are used, care should be taken to ensure that the said
forms contain all the necessary explanations, together
with the
import thereof. In some cases, an accused has to be informed of
special defences and presumptions. The court must also be
alerted to,
and cognizant of the fact, that the circumstances of a case may
require that more be explained to an accused by the magistrate
than
what is contained in the said roneod form. In addition to the
aforegoing, a magistrate should ensure that the accused understands
what he has been informed of by a question or statement confirming
the same. See the remarks of
Eloff
AJP
in
S
v Mahooa
(supra at 264f-h).
In
breë trekke is die voorafgaande die gesonde praktyk en nie die
praktyk waarvan die landdros melding gemaak het nie.
Die
versuim om behoorlik ‘n beskuldigde se regte te notuleer kan in
sekere gevalle ongelukkig tot die tersydestelling van ‘n
skuldigbevinding en vonnis lei waar twyfel bestaan en moontlike
skuldiges laat loop moet word. Sien:
S
v Moos
1998 (1) SASV 372 (K
)
op 380h-j.
Gedagtig
aan alles wat hierbo bespreek is sal ek nietemin die landdros se
verduideliking met groot teensinnigheid aanvaar. Die
landdros en
die ander paar van sy kollegas wat sy werkswyse volg moet dit
onverwyld staak en die korrekte praktyk, soos in die
aangehaalde
gesag, volg.”
Hard
as I may have tried, I could not fathom why some magistrates seem to
prefer that accused prosecute their own defences. I find
it to be
extremely burdensome because not only must the accused’s rights be
explained to him at all appropriate stages, which
could number over
thirteen to the conclusion of the trial, but the Court also has a
duty to assist the unrepresented accused who
is out of his depth.
Failure to do that may lead to the result that will follow. At the
inception of the trial the prosecutor
informed the Court that two
fingerprint experts will be called. See para 3 of this judgment.
The alarm bells should immediately
have alerted the Magistrate that
the appellant was unlikely to wrap his mind around the very
intricate impending evidence of these
experts and should have warned
and encouraged him that a legal representative will serve his
interests better. This is a further
failure on the part of the
Regional Magistrate. See
Shabalala
& Others v Attorney-General of TVL & Another
[1995] ZACC 12
;
1996 (1) SA 725
(CC
) at
740H-741G and cases quote in para 4.4 of the judgment at hand.
On
a different matter
: I
do not know on what basis the Magistrate discriminated against Mrs
Fourie and the appellant in addressing them. For example
at p16
line 10 of the record he enquired from Mrs Fourie:
“Het
u versekering gehad?”
Thereon the same page a mere seven lines later he address the
appellant contemptuously and disrespectfully as follows:
“Goed.
Beskuldgde
,
het
jy
enige vrae vir die dame?”
(Sight should not be lost of the fact that Regional Court
Magistrate S O du Plessis is Afrikaans speaking):
In
1988, long before the democratic South African Constitutions were
ushered in
S v
Gwebu
1988 (4)
SA 155
(W
) at 158F-G
Goldstone J
warned:
“
It
is perhaps as well also to say something about the habit which a
number of magistrates, and some prosecutors in the magistrate's
courts, have developed in recent years, of addressing accused persons
by the appellation 'accused' or 'beskuldigde'. And, one sees,
too, in
many records that some magistrates (not in this case) refer to
witnesses as 'witness' or 'getuie'.
This
depersonalising of people is disrespectful and degrading. It is no
cause for difficulty for people to be called by their proper
names. I
can find no reason for the appellant, in this case, when addressed
directly by the magistrate, not being called 'Mr Gwebu'.
Members of
the public who appear in our courts, whether as accused or as
witnesses, are entitled to be treated courteously and in
a manner in
keeping with the dignity of the court.”
In
S v Malatji &
Another
1998 (2)
SACR 622
(W
) at 624b-d
Cameron J
(as he then was) cautioned:
“
Both
appellants were unrepresented. After the prosecutor put the charges
to them, the magistrate asked them what they pleaded. In
doing so,
and throughout the record, he referred to them with the familiar form
of the Afrikaans personal pronoun, 'jy' and 'jou'.
In a formal
context this is not merely inappropriately familiar, but discourteous
to the accused. Such language is in any event inconsistent
with the
dignity and propriety which is required of a judicial officer. If
judicial officers expect the dignity of their office to
be recognized
and respected by those appearing before them, they must conduct
themselves with the reciprocal courtesy appropriate
to that
expectation.”
See
further
S v Abrahms
& Another
1989
(2) SA 668
(E
) and
S
v Kok
: Case
CA&R 162/99
,
(Northern Cape) Delivered 08/09/2000, Unreported.
Neither
Adv A T Medupe of the Justice Centre, Kimberley, instructed by the
Legal Aid Board nor Adv M Mpofu, State Counsel, dealt
with these
irregularities in their Heads. However, both agreed that the
irregularities are of such a material nature that it cannot
be
argued with any measure of justification that the irregularities did
not vitiate the fairness of the trial.
As
far as the merits are concerned the appellant is “dead in the
water”. He was linked to the crime scene through his finger
and
palm prints. Both offences were committed in the same vicinity on
the 4
th
and 11
th
of April 2002. The
modus
operandi
appears to have
been the same and although there was no DNA testing done, the
appellant clearly injured himself whilst gaining
entry into the
house of Ms Mgadana. It is a great pitty that he must now walk free
through the Magistrate’s aforediscussed ineptitude.
The appellant
is a serial thief and a habitual criminal, having regard to his
criminal records. It is probable that he will strike
again in due
course whereas the community should have been rid of him for some 7
– 15 years. This court can unfortunately not
come to the
society’s rescue under these circumstances: See
Carmichelle
v Minister of Safety and Security
[2001] ZACC 22
;
2001 (4) SA 938
(CC
) an
Minister of Safety and
Security v Carmichelle
2004 (3) SA 305
(SCA
).
Order
:
In
the result the appeal succeeds on a technicality. The conviction and
sentence are set aside.
________________________
F
D KGOMO
JUDGE
PRESIDENT
NORTHERN
CAPE DIVISION
I
concur:
________________________
P
L TLALETSI
JUDGE
NORTHERN
CAPE DIVISION
For
the Appellant: Adv A T Medupe
On
behalf of: Legal Aid Centre, KIMBERLEY
For
the Respondent: Adv M Mpofu
On
behalf of: Director of Public Prosecutions, KIMBERLEY