Mohapi v S [2006] ZAFSHC 129 (9 November 2006)

80 Reportability
Criminal Law

Brief Summary

Criminal Law — Sentencing — Minimum sentence for robbery with aggravating circumstances — Appeal against sentence of 15 years imprisonment imposed by the Regional Court — Appellant contended that the court a quo erred in finding no substantial and compelling circumstances justifying deviation from the minimum sentence — Court found that mitigating factors, including the appellant's youth, first offender status, and guilty plea, cumulatively constituted substantial and compelling circumstances — Sentence reduced to 10 years imprisonment.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The matter concerned an appeal against sentence only arising from a conviction for robbery with aggravating circumstances. The appellant, E Mohapi, appealed to the High Court (Orange Free State Provincial Division) against the sentence imposed by the Bloemfontein Regional Court. The respondent was the State.


The appellant had been convicted in the regional court on 8 July 2003 and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment, the regional magistrate having held that no substantial and compelling circumstances existed to justify a departure from the prescribed minimum sentence under the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997.


A material procedural complication was that, although the trial proceedings were mechanically recorded, a transcript could not be produced due to technical recording problems. The magistrate who presided, Ms N Gela, therefore reconstructed the record, and both parties agreed that the appeal should be determined on the basis of the reconstructed record.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was whether the regional court had correctly applied the minimum sentencing regime for robbery with aggravating circumstances, and whether it had properly assessed aggravation and mitigation when deciding that the prescribed sentence should be imposed.


2. Material Facts


The following facts relating to sentence were common cause on the reconstructed record and were treated as the material background to the appeal. The appellant was convicted of robbery with aggravating circumstances, and he was a first offender. His personal circumstances placed before the trial court included that he was 23 years old at the time of the offence, had education up to Standard 6, and was still at school when the incident occurred. He was unmarried, had a two-year-old child, and had been in custody since February 2002. It was also advanced in mitigation that he had pleaded guilty, which was relied upon as a sign of remorse, and that he was intoxicated at the time of the offence.


The record further reflected that the trial court treated certain aspects as aggravating. It proceeded on the footing that the complainant was shot twice during the commission of the offence, and that the complainant’s service pistol was taken.


A critical factual issue on appeal was whether the regional court was entitled, on the reconstructed record, to find as an aggravating feature that the complainant had been shot twice (and, as argued, forcibly thrown out of his vehicle). The High Court treated this as not supported by the proved or admitted facts because, on the reconstructed record, no evidence had been led at trial. The appellant’s admissions were contained in a section 112 statement (Exhibit “A”) under the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, and the High Court found that this statement did not provide a basis for the finding that the complainant was shot twice (or forcibly removed from the vehicle). The magistrate confirmed that no evidence was adduced.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether the trial court:


Applied the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 correctly in concluding that no substantial and compelling circumstances existed to justify a deviation from the prescribed minimum sentence for a first offender convicted of robbery with aggravating circumstances, and whether the appellant’s personal circumstances and other mitigating factors, considered cumulatively, met that threshold.


Committed a material misdirection by taking into account aggravating facts (notably that the complainant was shot twice) that were not established on the record, and, if so, whether that misdirection was sufficiently serious to justify appellate interference with the sentence.


If deviation from the prescribed minimum sentence was warranted, what sentence would be appropriate in light of the conventional sentencing approach, including the triad of the nature of the offence, the interests of society, and the offender’s personal circumstances.


The dispute involved the application of legal principles to the proved/admitted facts (particularly the minimum sentence framework and the concept of “substantial and compelling circumstances”), as well as an evaluation of whether the sentencing discretion was properly exercised in light of the factual foundation available on the reconstructed record.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The High Court confirmed the statutory starting point: for robbery with aggravating circumstances, a first offender must ordinarily receive at least 15 years’ imprisonment under the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, unless substantial and compelling circumstances justify a lesser sentence. The court approached the inquiry in line with authority that the legislature did not intend sentencing courts to ignore the factors traditionally considered in sentencing, but rather to require that their combined weight must be sufficiently weighty to warrant departure from the prescribed sentence.


In this regard, the court referred to the approach that all relevant circumstances must be viewed cumulatively, weighing mitigating factors against aggravating factors. It endorsed the principle (as articulated in the cited cases) that circumstances which may appear individually modest can, taken together, have a significant combined impact when deciding whether the statutory threshold has been met.


A decisive aspect of the court’s reasoning related to the factual foundation for aggravation. The court held that the appellant’s section 112 statement formed part of the reconstructed record and that the presiding magistrate had confirmed that no evidence was led. On that basis, the High Court found that there was no proper basis for the trial court’s factual finding that the complainant was shot twice and forcibly thrown from the vehicle, because those facts were not contained in the admissions recorded in Exhibit “A” and were not otherwise proved. The trial court was therefore found to have misdirected itself by treating the alleged shooting as an aggravating factor in the absence of an evidential or admitted foundation in the record.


The High Court then considered whether that misdirection justified interference on appeal. Applying the principle that not every misdirection warrants appellate intervention, but only one of sufficient seriousness to show that the sentencing discretion was not properly exercised, the court concluded that the misdirection regarding the shooting was serious and therefore justified interference with the sentence.


Turning to the substantive minimum-sentence inquiry, the court evaluated the mitigating circumstances placed before the trial court, including the appellant’s youth, first-offender status, educational background, family responsibilities, guilty plea and claimed remorse, intoxication at the time of the offence, and lengthy period in custody awaiting finalisation. The court held that these mitigating factors, viewed cumulatively, outweighed the aggravating considerations to such an extent that they constituted substantial and compelling circumstances. On that basis, it found that the trial court had erred in concluding that no such circumstances existed.


Having determined that deviation from the prescribed minimum sentence was justified, the High Court proceeded to determine an appropriate sentence by applying the conventional sentencing approach and taking into account, in a balanced manner, the nature of the offence, the interests of the community, and the personal circumstances of the offender. On that overall assessment, it determined that a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment was appropriate.


5. Outcome and Relief


The appeal was upheld.


The sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment imposed by the regional court was set aside and replaced with a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment.


The substituted sentence was ordered to be deemed to have been imposed on 8 July 2003.


No separate costs order was recorded in the judgment.


Cases Cited


S v Blaauw 1999 (2) SACR 295


S v Malgas 2001 (2) SA 1222


S v Kibido 1998 (2) SACR 213 (SCA)


Legislation Cited


Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997


Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (section 112)


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The High Court held that, on the reconstructed record, the trial court had misdirected itself by treating as aggravating the fact that the complainant was shot twice (and forcibly thrown from the vehicle) where this was not supported by the appellant’s section 112 statement and where no evidence had been adduced. That misdirection was sufficiently serious to justify appellate interference with sentence.


The High Court further held that the mitigating factors placed before the trial court, considered cumulatively, constituted substantial and compelling circumstances justifying a departure from the prescribed minimum sentence for robbery with aggravating circumstances. The prescribed 15-year sentence was accordingly replaced with 10 years’ imprisonment, backdated to the date of the original sentence.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The minimum sentencing regime under the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 requires imposition of the prescribed sentence for robbery with aggravating circumstances unless substantial and compelling circumstances justify deviation, and such circumstances must be assessed by considering all relevant factors cumulatively, with mitigation weighed against aggravation.


A sentencing court may not treat alleged aggravating facts as established where they are not proved by evidence or admitted on the record; doing so constitutes a misdirection.


An appellate court will not interfere with sentence for every misdirection, but will do so where the misdirection is sufficiently serious to indicate that the sentencing discretion was exercised improperly or unreasonably, thereby vitiating the sentencing outcome.


Where deviation from a prescribed minimum sentence is justified, the appropriate sentence must be determined with reference to the established sentencing triad, namely the nature of the offence, the interests of the community, and the personal circumstances of the offender, applied in a balanced manner.

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[2006] ZAFSHC 129
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Mohapi v S [2006] ZAFSHC 129 (9 November 2006)

IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
(ORANGE FREE STATE
PROVINCIAL DIVISION)
Case
No.: A19/2006
In the appeal between:
E MOHAPI
Appellant
and
THE STATE
Respondent
_____________________________________________________
CORAM:
VAN DER MERWE, J
et
MOLEMELA,
AJ
JUDGMENT:
MOLEMELA, AJ
_____________________________________________________
HEARD ON:
6 NOVEMBER 2006
_____________________________________________________
DELIVERED ON:
9 NOVEMBER 2006
_____________________________________________________
[1] This is an appeal
against sentence only. The appellant appeared at the Bloemfontein
Regional Court on a charge of robbery with
aggravating circumstances.
On the 8
th
July 2003 he was found guilty and sentenced to fifteen years
imprisonment, the court
a
quo
having found that there were no substantial and compelling
circumstances justifying deviation from the imposition of the
prescribed
minimum sentence in terms of the Criminal Law Amendment
Act, Act 105 of 1997.
[2] Although the
proceedings at the court
a
quo
were mechanically recorded, a transcript of the record is not
available due to technical problems encountered during the recording.
The record was therefore reconstructed by the magistrate who had
presided over the proceedings, viz Ms. N. Gela. Both parties have
agreed that the appeal be decided on the basis of the reconstructed
record.
[3] It has been argued on
behalf of the appellant that the sentence imposed on the complainant
is not an appropriate one on the following
grounds:-
The learned magistrate
erred in finding that there were no substantial and compelling
circumstances justifying deviation from
the minimum sentence as
prescribed by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, Act No. 105 of 1997;
That the learned
magistrate erred in finding that the only mitigating factors in
favor of the appellant were the fact that the
appellant was a first
offender and that he had been in custody since February 2002;
That the imposed
sentence was shockingly harsh and was inappropriate.
[4] It appeared from the
reconstructed record that the following mitigating factors were
presented on behalf of the appellant at the
trial court:-
4.1 Appellant was a first
offender;
4.2 Appellant
was 23 years old at the time of the commission of the offence;
4.3 That
the appellant only passed Standard 6 and was still at school when the
incident happened;
4.4 That
he was unmarried and had a two-year old child;
4.5 That
he pleaded guilty to the charge which was a sign of remorse;
4.6 That
he was intoxicated at the time of when he committed the offence;
4.7 That he had been in
custody since February 2002.
[5] It further appeared
from the reconstructed record that the following were the aggravating
circumstances that were considered by
the trial court:
5.1 That the complainant
was shot twice during the commission of the offence;
5.2 That the
complainant’s service pistol was taken from him;
5.3 That
there were no substantial and compelling circumstances.
[6] It was further argued
on behalf of the appellant that the learned magistrate had
misdirected herself with regards to the proven
facts as there was
nothing that justified a factual finding to the effect that the
appellant was shot twice and forcefully thrown
out of his vehicle.
It was contended that the only proven facts regarding the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence
were as set
out in Exhibit “A” which was the appellant’s statement in terms
of section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act
No. 51 of 1977.
[7] It was further
contended on behalf of the appellant that the learned magistrate had
not taken all mitigating factors into account
and had over-emphasized
the seriousness of the offence as against the appellant’s personal
circumstances. In particular it was
argued that the learned
magistrate had not taken into account that the complainant’s motor
vehicle was recovered by the police
a short distance from the crime
scene.
[8] It was further
contended on behalf of the appellant that the accused’s
circumstances cumulatively considered constituted substantial
and
compelling circumstances justifying deviation from the prescribed
minimum sentence.
[9] It is indeed so that
the Criminal Law Amendment Act, Act No. 105 of 1997, provides that
when an offender has been convicted of
robbery with aggravating
circumstances, such an offender shall, if he is a first offender, be
sentenced to imprisonment for not less
than 15 years unless it is
found that there are substantial and compelling circumstances that
justify deviation from such a minimum
sentence.
[10] In
S
v BLAAUW
1999 (2) SACR at 295 Borchers, J carried out an examination of the
divergent views expressed by different judges in their assessment
of
what could constitute “substantial and compelling circumstances”
as contemplated in the
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997
. She
expressed the view that in enacting this Act, the legislature
intended that “all the circumstances found to be present in
a
particular case be viewed cumulatively and that the aggravating
circumstances be weighed against mitigating circumstances”.
[11] The views expressed
in
S
v BLAAUW
(supra)
were
endorsed in
S
v MALGAS
2001 (2) SA 1222
at 1231 where it was stated as follows:
“
But for the rest I can see no
warrant for deducing that the Legislature intended a court to exclude
from consideration,
ante
omnia
as it were, any or
all of the many factors traditionally and rightly taken into account
by courts when sentencing offenders. The use
of the epithets
'substantial' and 'compelling' cannot be interpreted as excluding
even from consideration any of those factors. They
are neither
notionally nor linguistically appropriate to achieve that. What they
are apt to convey is that the ultimate cumulative
impact of those
circumstances must be such as to justify a departure. It is axiomatic
in the normal process of sentencing that, while
each of a number of
mitigating factors when viewed in isolation may have little
persuasive force, their combined impact may be considerable.”
[12] The appellant’s
statement in terms of section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act
No. 51 of 1977 forms part of the reconstructed
record as exhibit “A”.
The learned magistrate has further confirmed that no evidence was
adduced at the proceedings. I accordingly
find that there was indeed
no basis for the learned magistrate to make a factual finding that
the complainant was shot twice and
forcibly thrown out of his vehicle
in the absence of such an admission in exhibit “A”. The learned
magistrate therefore misdirected
herself in considering this aspect
as an aggravating factor.
[13] I am of the view
that the mitigating factors that were presented before the court
a
quo,
cumulatively
viewed outweigh the aggravating factors to such an extent that they
constitute substantial and compelling circumstances
justifying a
deviation from the relevant sentence. I therefore find that the
learned magistrate erred in finding that there were
no such
substantial and compelling circumstances.
[15] In
S
v KIBIDO
1998 (2) SACR 213
(SCA) at 216 I – J Olivier JA remarked as
follows:
“
...a mere misdirection is not by
itself sufficient to entitle a Court of appeal to interfere with the
sentence; it must be of such
a nature, degree, or seriousness that it
shows, directly or inferentially, that the court did not exercise its
discretion at all
or exercised it improperly or unreasonably.”
[16] In my view the
misdirection of the court
a
quo
in
respect of the circumstances of the shooting is of such a serious
nature that it justifies interference with its sentence.
[17] Having found that
there exists substantial and compelling circumstances justifying a
departure from the minimum sentence, I must
now determine an
appropriate sentence.
[18] It is trite law that
in considering an appropriate sentence the court that is imposing
sentence must, on a balanced basis, take
account of the well-known
triad of factors into consideration, viz the nature of the offence,
the interests of the community as well
as the personal circumstances
of the offender. Having considered all these factors I find that the
appropriate sentence is 10 years’
imprisonment.
[19] The appeal succeeds.
The sentence of 15 (fifteen) years imprisonment is set aside and
substituted with a sentence of imprisonment
for 10 (ten) years which
must be deemed to have been imposed on 8 July 2003.
_________________

M. MOLEMELA, AJ
I
concur.
_________________________
C. H. G. VAN DER
MERWE, J
/em