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[2006] ZAFSHC 129
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Mohapi v S [2006] ZAFSHC 129 (9 November 2006)
IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
(ORANGE FREE STATE
PROVINCIAL DIVISION)
Case
No.: A19/2006
In the appeal between:
E MOHAPI
Appellant
and
THE STATE
Respondent
_____________________________________________________
CORAM:
VAN DER MERWE, J
et
MOLEMELA,
AJ
JUDGMENT:
MOLEMELA, AJ
_____________________________________________________
HEARD ON:
6 NOVEMBER 2006
_____________________________________________________
DELIVERED ON:
9 NOVEMBER 2006
_____________________________________________________
[1] This is an appeal
against sentence only. The appellant appeared at the Bloemfontein
Regional Court on a charge of robbery with
aggravating circumstances.
On the 8
th
July 2003 he was found guilty and sentenced to fifteen years
imprisonment, the court
a
quo
having found that there were no substantial and compelling
circumstances justifying deviation from the imposition of the
prescribed
minimum sentence in terms of the Criminal Law Amendment
Act, Act 105 of 1997.
[2] Although the
proceedings at the court
a
quo
were mechanically recorded, a transcript of the record is not
available due to technical problems encountered during the recording.
The record was therefore reconstructed by the magistrate who had
presided over the proceedings, viz Ms. N. Gela. Both parties have
agreed that the appeal be decided on the basis of the reconstructed
record.
[3] It has been argued on
behalf of the appellant that the sentence imposed on the complainant
is not an appropriate one on the following
grounds:-
The learned magistrate
erred in finding that there were no substantial and compelling
circumstances justifying deviation from
the minimum sentence as
prescribed by the Criminal Law Amendment Act, Act No. 105 of 1997;
That the learned
magistrate erred in finding that the only mitigating factors in
favor of the appellant were the fact that the
appellant was a first
offender and that he had been in custody since February 2002;
That the imposed
sentence was shockingly harsh and was inappropriate.
[4] It appeared from the
reconstructed record that the following mitigating factors were
presented on behalf of the appellant at the
trial court:-
4.1 Appellant was a first
offender;
4.2 Appellant
was 23 years old at the time of the commission of the offence;
4.3 That
the appellant only passed Standard 6 and was still at school when the
incident happened;
4.4 That
he was unmarried and had a two-year old child;
4.5 That
he pleaded guilty to the charge which was a sign of remorse;
4.6 That
he was intoxicated at the time of when he committed the offence;
4.7 That he had been in
custody since February 2002.
[5] It further appeared
from the reconstructed record that the following were the aggravating
circumstances that were considered by
the trial court:
5.1 That the complainant
was shot twice during the commission of the offence;
5.2 That the
complainantâs service pistol was taken from him;
5.3 That
there were no substantial and compelling circumstances.
[6] It was further argued
on behalf of the appellant that the learned magistrate had
misdirected herself with regards to the proven
facts as there was
nothing that justified a factual finding to the effect that the
appellant was shot twice and forcefully thrown
out of his vehicle.
It was contended that the only proven facts regarding the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence
were as set
out in Exhibit âAâ which was the appellantâs statement in terms
of section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act
No. 51 of 1977.
[7] It was further
contended on behalf of the appellant that the learned magistrate had
not taken all mitigating factors into account
and had over-emphasized
the seriousness of the offence as against the appellantâs personal
circumstances. In particular it was
argued that the learned
magistrate had not taken into account that the complainantâs motor
vehicle was recovered by the police
a short distance from the crime
scene.
[8] It was further
contended on behalf of the appellant that the accusedâs
circumstances cumulatively considered constituted substantial
and
compelling circumstances justifying deviation from the prescribed
minimum sentence.
[9] It is indeed so that
the Criminal Law Amendment Act, Act No. 105 of 1997, provides that
when an offender has been convicted of
robbery with aggravating
circumstances, such an offender shall, if he is a first offender, be
sentenced to imprisonment for not less
than 15 years unless it is
found that there are substantial and compelling circumstances that
justify deviation from such a minimum
sentence.
[10] In
S
v BLAAUW
1999 (2) SACR at 295 Borchers, J carried out an examination of the
divergent views expressed by different judges in their assessment
of
what could constitute âsubstantial and compelling circumstancesâ
as contemplated in the
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1997
. She
expressed the view that in enacting this Act, the legislature
intended that âall the circumstances found to be present in
a
particular case be viewed cumulatively and that the aggravating
circumstances be weighed against mitigating circumstancesâ.
[11] The views expressed
in
S
v BLAAUW
(supra)
were
endorsed in
S
v MALGAS
2001 (2) SA 1222
at 1231 where it was stated as follows:
â
But for the rest I can see no
warrant for deducing that the Legislature intended a court to exclude
from consideration,
ante
omnia
as it were, any or
all of the many factors traditionally and rightly taken into account
by courts when sentencing offenders. The use
of the epithets
'substantial' and 'compelling' cannot be interpreted as excluding
even from consideration any of those factors. They
are neither
notionally nor linguistically appropriate to achieve that. What they
are apt to convey is that the ultimate cumulative
impact of those
circumstances must be such as to justify a departure. It is axiomatic
in the normal process of sentencing that, while
each of a number of
mitigating factors when viewed in isolation may have little
persuasive force, their combined impact may be considerable.â
[12] The appellantâs
statement in terms of section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Act, Act
No. 51 of 1977 forms part of the reconstructed
record as exhibit âAâ.
The learned magistrate has further confirmed that no evidence was
adduced at the proceedings. I accordingly
find that there was indeed
no basis for the learned magistrate to make a factual finding that
the complainant was shot twice and
forcibly thrown out of his vehicle
in the absence of such an admission in exhibit âAâ. The learned
magistrate therefore misdirected
herself in considering this aspect
as an aggravating factor.
[13] I am of the view
that the mitigating factors that were presented before the court
a
quo,
cumulatively
viewed outweigh the aggravating factors to such an extent that they
constitute substantial and compelling circumstances
justifying a
deviation from the relevant sentence. I therefore find that the
learned magistrate erred in finding that there were
no such
substantial and compelling circumstances.
[15] In
S
v KIBIDO
1998 (2) SACR 213
(SCA) at 216 I â J Olivier JA remarked as
follows:
â
...a mere misdirection is not by
itself sufficient to entitle a Court of appeal to interfere with the
sentence; it must be of such
a nature, degree, or seriousness that it
shows, directly or inferentially, that the court did not exercise its
discretion at all
or exercised it improperly or unreasonably.â
[16] In my view the
misdirection of the court
a
quo
in
respect of the circumstances of the shooting is of such a serious
nature that it justifies interference with its sentence.
[17] Having found that
there exists substantial and compelling circumstances justifying a
departure from the minimum sentence, I must
now determine an
appropriate sentence.
[18] It is trite law that
in considering an appropriate sentence the court that is imposing
sentence must, on a balanced basis, take
account of the well-known
triad of factors into consideration, viz the nature of the offence,
the interests of the community as well
as the personal circumstances
of the offender. Having considered all these factors I find that the
appropriate sentence is 10 yearsâ
imprisonment.
[19] The appeal succeeds.
The sentence of 15 (fifteen) years imprisonment is set aside and
substituted with a sentence of imprisonment
for 10 (ten) years which
must be deemed to have been imposed on 8 July 2003.
_________________
M. MOLEMELA, AJ
I
concur.
_________________________
C. H. G. VAN DER
MERWE, J
/em