Motswana v MEC for Safety and Security (CA&R 147/2005) [2007] ZANCHC 71; 2008 (1) SACR 404 (NC) (28 September 2007)

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[2007] ZANCHC 71
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Motswana v MEC for Safety and Security (CA&R 147/2005) [2007] ZANCHC 71; 2008 (1) SACR 404 (NC) (28 September 2007)

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IN THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(Northern Cape
Division)
Case
number:
CA&R
147/2005
Date
heard:
17/09/2007
Date
delivered:
28/09/2007
In
the matter between:
MOTSWANA,
THYS
Appellant
and
THE
MEC FOR SAFETY AND SECURITY Respondent
Coram:
Bosielo AJP et Lacock J
JUDGMENT
LACOCK
J:
The appellant in this
matter, Mr. Thys Motswana, was the unfortunate victim of a vicious
attack by a police dog, a German shepherd
named “Rommel”. As a
result of the injuries sustained during this attack, the appellant
claimed for damages against the respondent
in the Magistrate’s
Court, Vryburg.
Before
the commencement of the trial before the magistrate, the parties
agreed to proceed to trial on the issue of liability only,
and that
the issue in regard to the
quantum
of damages suffered, was to stand over for determination at a later
stage.
The magistrate found
that the respondent proved on a balance of probabilities that the
police officer and handler of Rommel, one sergeant
Van Niekerk, was,
given the prevailing circumstances, justified in setting his dog on
the appellant for purposes of taking him into
custody, and dismissed
the appellant’s claim with costs. Hence the present appeal.
The
crisp issue argued before us on appeal was whether the magistrate was
correct in finding that Van Niekerk’s conduct was justified
within
the applicable purview of sec. 49 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Act,
no. 51 of 1977 (the Act).
Although
conflicting versions of the alleged events were presented to the
Court
a
quo
by the appellant on the one hand and the respondent on the other
hand, I am, for purposes of the appeal, prepared to accept the
version presented on behalf of the respondent as the more plausible
and probable one. That version of the relevant events together
with
the factual circumstances which were common cause between the
parties, can be summarised thus:
Spurred
by an incident at one of the schools in Vryburg, racial tension
between members of the White community and members of the
Black
community erupted in Vryburg, which tension led
inter
alia
to the petrol bombing of a certain liquor outlet in Vryburg on 24
February 1988. Members of other units of the Police Force from
elsewhere were summoned to assist the Vryburg police in maintaining
law and order in Vryburg. The two witnesses who testified
on behalf
of the respondent, sergeant Van Niekerk and inspector Botha, both
members of the dog-unit stationed at Stilfontein, were
two such
policemen summoned to assist at Vryburg.
Shortly
after Van Niekerk was informed that a liquor outlet in town had been
set on fire, he received instructions to proceed to
the taxi rank in
Moffat Street, Vryburg and to search all vehicles leaving the taxi
rank for the presence of petrol bombs. At
his arrival at the taxi
rank, two minibus taxis exited from the taxi rank into Moffat
Street. He drove his own vehicle, an Opel
Kadett, into the opposite
lane of the road, thereby blocking the road and forcing the taxis to
stop. As he approached the driver
of the front taxi, the appellant,
and who happened to be the owner of this taxi, pulled up in a Nissan
pick-up truck on the side
of the road. The appellant was visibly
agitated and shouted at Van Niekerk that he was not allowed to stop
the vehicles. Although
Van Niekerk tried to calm the appellant and
to explain his conduct, the appellant refused to listen to him, and
started to push
Van Niekerk against his chest. Van Niekerk
retreated towards his vehicle whilst the appellant was still pushing
him against his
chest. At this point in time, the appellant shouted
to the driver of the taxi to
“stamp
die Staatsvoertuig uit sy pad”
.
Van Niekerk was now on the right hand side of his vehicle, and when
pushed by the appellant for the third and last time, he went
around
his vehicle to the left hand side and opened the left rear door of
his car where he kept his police dog. Just before he
released the
dog, Van Niekerk warned the appellant that he would lock him up
(
“dat
ek hom gaan toesluit")
.
Clearly before the appellant could react to this warning, Van
Niekerk released the dog and instructed it to attack the appellant.
The
dog bit the appellant on his left lower leg, and the appellant fell
to the ground. Van Niekerk pulled the dog, which was holding
onto
the appellant’s leg, away from the appellant and clipped a leash
to its collar. Whilst holding on to the dog, Van Niekerk
instructed
two of his colleagues to put the appellant in a police vehicle. As
these two policemen approached the appellant, he
stood up and
hobbled in the direction of his vehicle. Van Niekerk again released
his dog and instructed it to attack the appellant.
This time the
dog grabbed the appellant on his right lower leg, and again forced
him to the ground. Van Niekerk pulled the dog
from the appellant
and the latter was put in a police van and driven to the local
police station.
The appellant suffered
a number of serious wounds to both legs where the dog bit into his
flesh, and received treatment in hospital
for the injuries
sustained.
At
the time of this incident, approximately 150 people were gathered
inside the taxi rank, and a few policemen prevented them from
leaving the taxi rank. The mood of these people was described as
riotous, but they posed no immediate danger to Van Niekerk when
he
was confronted by the appellant.
At
the same time, a number of people, approximately 30 in number,
gathered at the opposite side of Moffat Street where the appellant’s
truck was parked. This small crowd was also described as riotous, but
also posed no danger to Van Niekerk. Van Niekerk in fact only
became
aware of this small crowd when the appellant hobbled in the direction
of his car after the first attack of the dog on himself.
The relevant portion
of sec. 49 (2) of the Act (as substituted by sec. 7 of Act 122 of
1998) reads,
“
If
any arrestor attempts to arrest a suspect and the suspect resists the
attempt, or flees, or resists the attempt and flees, when
it is clear
that an attempt to arrest him or her is being made, and the suspect
cannot be arrested without the use of force, the
arrestor may, in
order to effect the arrest, use such force as may be reasonably
necessary and proportional in the circumstances
to overcome the
resistance or to prevent the suspect from fleeing
”
Before its
substitution, sec. 49 (1) of the Act read,
“
If any
person authorised under this Act to arrest or to assist in arresting
another, attempts to arrest such person and such person-
resists the attempt and cannot
be arrested without the use of force; or
flees when
it is clear that an attempt to arrest him is being made, or
resists such attempt and flees, the person so authorised
may, in
order to effect the arrest, use such force as may in the
circumstances be reasonably necessary to overcome the resistance
or to prevent the person concerned from fleeing.”
It
is common cause that the respondent bore the onus of proving that the
force used by Van Niekerk to apprehend the appellant was
reasonably
necessary. See
R
v Britz,
1949 (3) SA 293
(A) at 303 to 304: Sambo v Milns,
1973 (4)
SA 312
(T) at 320 D; Matlou v Makhubedu,
1978 (1) SA 946
(A) at 959 A
to B; Wiesner v Molomo,
1983 (3) SA 151
(A) at 157 C to D; Minister
of Law and Order v Monti,
1995 (1) SA 35
(A)
.
For
purposes of this judgement I will accept, without deciding, that the
appellant, whilst pushing Van Niekerk against the chest,
committed
an offence of assault, and/or contravened the provisions of
sec. 67
(1) of the
South African Police Service Act, no. 68 of 1995
, in that
he obstructed a member of the police service in the performance of
his duties; that Van Niekerk attempted to arrest the
appellant; that
the appellant resisted the said attempt; that, after Van Niekerk
pulled the dog from the appellant the first time,
the appellant
endeavoured to flee; and that it was not possible for Van Niekerk to
apprehend the appellant without the use of force.
I will
furthermore accept, again without deciding, that, had the use of a
police dog been reasonably necessary to apprehend the
appellant,
such force would have been proportional in the circumstances.
The
only remaining question for consideration is therefore whether the
respondent succeeded in proving, as the magistrate held, that
the use
of the dog to apprehend the appellant was
“reasonably
necessary”
and therefore justified.
In
considering this question, it is necessary to apply the following
dicta
:
“
I do not
think that it is necessary to review at length the authorities which
deal with the tests to be applied in determining whether
the use of
force in effecting an arrest is justified. Many of them are
conveniently reviewed in the recent decision of Sambo v Milns,
1973
(4) SA 312
(T), and, as far as I understand the argument in this
case, the following principles were agreed to be of application.
(a) The
test whether it was reasonably necessary to injure the plaintiff in
effecting the arrest is objective, namely, whether it
was reasonably
necessary for a person in the position of the second defendant to act
as he did in order to arrest the suspect.
(b)
Every
other reasonable and available step should be taken to effect the
arrest before recourse is had to conduct likely to injure
the
suspect
.
(
c) As
far as sec. 37 (1) of the Act is concerned, and assuming that it has
correctly been held to apply to cases where the suspect
is injured
but not killed, it must be shown by the defendant that the suspect
fled or resisted and that he could not be arrested
by means other
than those which caused his injury.
Counsel were agreed that there
appeared to be no statutory provisions which expressly authorise or
regulate the use of dogs by the
police and that this case therefore
falls to be decided in accordance with the above principles.”
(
Jooste,
N.O. v Minister of Police and Another,
1975 (1) SA 349
(ECD) at 352 E
to H
).
“
By die
beoordeling van die vraag wat hier ter sake is, nl. of Jonker se
besluit geregverdig was of nie, is die toets objektief, en
by die
soek na die antwoord op hierdie vraag moet 'n mens bepaal of Jonker
se optrede redelik was. (Kyk in die algemeen Wolpe and
Another v
Officer Commanding South African Police, Johannesburg,
1955 (2) SA 87
(W) .)
Dit
hoef nouliks gesê te word dat 'n mens op al die omstandighede van
die saak moet let en in die lig daarvan oor die redelikheid
al dan
nie van Jonker se besluit moet oordeel.
”
(
Minister
van Polisie v Chetty,
1977 (2) SA 855
(AD) at 897 A
).
“
Die tweede
geskilpunt, naamlik of die geweld wat deur die respondente aangewend
is, in die omstandighede redelikerwys nodig was om
die appellant te
verhinder om te vlug, word nou behandel. Ten aanvang wil ek benadruk
dat die voormelde toegewings hier ook van belang
mag wees, soos
byvoorbeeld dat die geweld aangewend is om te verhoed dat die
appellant vlug. Die Hof moes beoordeel het of die respondente
bewys
het dat die geweld in die omstandighede van die besondere saak
redelik was. Nie alleen word dit in gewysdes benadruk nie maar
dit
blyk ook uit die bewoording van die artikel. Na my mening is dit in
die beoordeling van die redelikheid van die geweld onnodig
om na art
49 (2) te verwys, behalwe
dat
die toets wat daar aangegee word ook in hierdie geval van pas is,
naamlik of die arrestant met minder ernstige geweld op 'n ander
wyse
verhinder kon word om weg te vlug.
”
Macu
v Du Toit en ‘n Ander,
1983 (4) SA 629
(A) at 635 B to D
,
where the Supreme Court of Appeal considered the provision of sec. 49
(1) of the Act prior to the amendment thereof).
“
In
licensing only such force, necessary to overcome resistance or
prevent flight, as is 'reasonable', s 49(1) implies that in certain
circumstances the use of force necessary for the objects stated will
nevertheless be unreasonable.
It
is the requirement of reasonableness that now requires interpretation
in the light of constitutional values. Conduct unreasonable
in the
light of the Constitution can never be 'reasonably necessary' to
achieve a statutory purpose.
”
(
Govender
v Minister of Safety and Security,
2001 (2) SACR 197
at 205 f)
.
“
In order to
make perfectly clear what the law regarding this topic now is, I
tabulate the main points:
(a) The purpose of arrest is to
bring before court for trial persons suspected of having committed
offences.
(b) Arrest
is not the only means of achieving this purpose, nor always the best.
(c) Arrest
may never be used to punish a suspect.
(d) Where
arrest is called for, force may be used only where it is necessary in
order to carry out the arrest.
(e)
Where
force is necessary, only the least degree of force reasonably
necessary to carry out the arrest may be used.
(f) In
deciding what degree of force is both reasonable and necessary, all
the circumstances must be taken into account, including
the threat of
violence the suspect poses to the arrester or others, and the nature
and circumstances of the offence the suspect is
suspected of having
committed; the force being proportional in all these circumstances.”
(
Ex
parte
Minister of Safety and Security:
in
re
S v Walters,
2002 (2) SACR 105
(CC) at 135 e to h
).
[Emphasis supplied]
The
testimony on behalf of the respondent reveals that, at the time when
Van Niekerk was pushed backwards towards his car, there
were at
least two other policemen in the immediate vicinity of the appellant
and Van Niekerk viz. inspectors Botha and Ferreira.
If it is
accepted that Van Niekerk, by reason of his more slender built than
that of the appellant, was, as he testified, hesitant
to physically
bring the appellant under control, the question that immediately
arises, is why he did not call on his colleagues
to come to his
assistance to apprehend the appellant. Van Niekerk explained his
failure to call his colleagues as follows:
“
Weer eens
as dit met die ander polisiemanne wat daar rond was kon u hulle hulp
ingeroep het om die man fisies te bedwing? --- Edelagbare
nee in die
sin daarvan dat daar reeds ‘n konfrontasie plaasgevind het deur die
man my so rondgestamp het en ja, daar was mense
wat gesien het wat
het gebeur maar hulle het probeer op daardie stadium, as ek daar na
kan verwys, skares van ons af weghou want
as die mense eers vir jou
toegemaak het, dan is die saak verby. Met ander woorde …
(tussenkoms).
Miskien
kan u net daaroor meer breedvoerig vir die Hof verduidelik, as u sê
hulle het die skare probeer weghou. Wat was die ander
polisiemanne
se funksie op daardie stadium? -- Hulle het bystand verleen deur
moontlik mense wat aan die buitekant uit die ‘taxi
rank’ uitkom.
Basies weg van ons af te hou dat die saak nie hande uitruk en ons, as
ek die woord kan gebruik, ‘outnumbered’
kan word. Dat ‘n mens
met ander woorde nie jouself kan verdedig nie.”
(Record p. 132 to 133).
In
cross examination he tendered the following explanation:
“
Het u dit
nie goed gedink om van u kollegas te vra om u te kom help net om die
groot eiser onder bedwang te kry nie? -- Edelagbare
nee daar was nie
tyd nie. Daar was nie tyd nie.
Hoekom
nie? U laat die man toe om u vier, vyf keer te stamp terwyl u al
rondom die kar beweeg tot u nou uiteindelik gunstig in posisie
is om
die deur oop te maak sodat die hond kan uitkom. Het u nie enige van
daardie tye gedink dis dalk raadsaam om maar een van my
kollegas se
hulp in te roep nie? --- Nee Edelagbare ek het nie.
Hoekom nie? U het mos nou al
gesien u postuur is te klein vir die eiser. --- Dit is reg. ek het
so te kenne gegee maar op daardie
stadium het ek nie daaraan gedink
om die mense wat aan die buitekant bystand te verleen te roep nie.
Ek het nou mos my ding gedoen,
om dit so te stel.
Ek
het nog altyd gedink die polisie word spesiaal opgelei om hierdie
tipe van konfliksituasies te hanteer en persone onder bedwang
te
bring ten einde hulle te arresteer. --- Ja dit is so. Is so.
Onder andere word die hondemanne ook opgelei om sy hond aan te
wend
vir sodanige situasie.
Sou u sê dat die gebruikmaking
van u hond om die eiser te arresteer is minder geweld of minimum
geweld as om een van u kollegas in
te roep om u te help? --- Uit my
oogpunt as hondegeleier, ja.”
(Record p. 157 to 158).
Van Niekerk’s initial
explanation is without substance. Botha testified that, at the time
when Van Niekerk opened the rear door
of his car to release the dog,
he and Ferreira were in the front of Van Niekerk’s vehicle
approximately the length of a car away
from Van Niekerk and the
appellant. They were not preventing people to leave the taxi rank at
that point in time. Other policemen
exercised this duty. In fact,
Van Niekerk did call on Botha and Ferreira to put the appellant in
the police van after he removed
the dog from the appellant after the
first attack. No explanation was given and nor does one present
itself why these two policemen
were not requested to assist him to
apprehend the appellant before the dog was released and instructed to
attack the appellant.
Why
Van Niekerk set his dog on the appellant the second time is even more
incomprehensible. Botha’s evidence in this regard appears
to me to
be not only logical but also reasonable. He testified as follows:
“
Goed. Nou
is dit nie, kry die polisie nooit staande orders of word hulle nooit
opgelei dat persone moet gearresteer word met die
minste geweld
sonder om beserings toe te dien nie?-- Dit is so, ja. Goed. Nou as
van Niekerk nou vir u geroep het en Ferreira voordat
die hond nou die
eerste keer vir die eiser gebyt het, sou julle darem seker baie
maklik die eiser op die grond vasgedruk het en hom
geboei het? ---
Dis korrek, ja.
En kom ons aanvaar nou die hond
nou vir die eiser die eerste keer gebyt. Nou is hy kruppel-kruppel
hier oor die straat na sy voertuig
toe,, sou u hom seker baie maklik
ingehardloop het en teen die grond vasgedruk het en hom geboei het?
Net een van julle. Ek praat
nie eers van al drie nie. --- Dit kon
moonlik wees, ja.
U sou dit waarskynlik baie maklik
kon regkry. Het van Niekerk ooit vir u geskree ‘vang die eiser, hy
ontvlug’? --- sersant van
Niekerk het vir my en konstabel Ferreira
gesê kom help my om die man in die bakkie te laai. Dis toe die
hond die eerste keer die
eiser gebyt het, sodat van Niekerk die hond
afhaal dan kan ek en Ferreira die man vat en in die bakkie laai.
Ten tye toe ons om
die voertuig kom het die eiser opgespring en
kruppel beginne weghardloop.
Goed.
Toe hardloop u toe agter hom aan? --- Nee. Toe los sersant van
Niekerk van sy hond.
Nou goed. So
het u glad nie gepoog om agter hom aan te hardloop nie? --- nee ek
gaan nie agter ‘n verdagte hardloop as sersant
van Niekerk se hond
los is nie.”
(Record p. 234 to 235).
Clearly
Botha and Ferreira would have apprehended the appellant had Van
Niekerk not released his dog.
On
the strength of the aforesaid testimony, I conclude that no
reasonable excuses prevailed for Van Niekerk not to call on his
colleagues
for assistance to apprehend the appellant. He deliberately
opted not to call for assistance, but to rather use his police dog to
apprehend the appellant.
The
next question is whether this choice of force, i.e. to use the dog
rather than to call on his colleagues for assistance, was,
objectively viewed, the option that would probably have caused the
least injuries to the appellant. The answer hereto is clearly
a
negative one.
Van Niekerk himself
described Rommel’s characteristics as follows:
“
My hond is
van so aard dat hy, hy het ‘n baie aggressiewe neiging in hom en as
hy eers gebyt het is daar nie, daar is geen bevel
van los nie.”
(Record
p. 124).
“
My
spesifieke hond kan ek vir die Hof sê het vasgebyt. In die tyd wat
hy byt vervat hy. Met ander woorde hy, soos die Engelsman
sal sê,
hy vat ‘n beter ‘grip’.
U
sê u hond was van die soort wat nou en dan vir hom ’n sterker
‘grip’ probeer kry het? --- Dis korrek.
En
elke slag as hy ‘n sterker ‘grip’ probeer kry dan herplaas hy
sy tande. --- As ‘n reël kan ‘n mens daarna kyk as ‘n
herplasing van sy tande.”
(Record p. 140).
“
Maar hoekom
sal ‘n hond nou ‘n beter ‘grip’, soos u dit nou stel, wil hê?
--- Edelagbare ek het ’n baie aggressiewe hond
gehad. Dit is maar
net in sy manier, in sy manier.”
(Record p. 142).
This
evidence justifies the inference that Van Niekerk, at the time when
he set the dog on the appellant, knew that the dog would
bite the
appellant. He in fact testified as such:
“
Nou Rommel,
die hond wat nou die eiser gebyt het, as u vir hom die bevel gee, net
op die woord kom …(tussenkoms) --- R I M. RIM.
RIM. Sy eerste reaksie is om die
persoon êrens aan sy lyf met sy tande te byt en hom op die grond
neer te plaas. Is dit reg? ---
Dis korrek. ‘n Mens kan so
aanvaar.
Dit
gebeur omtrent in 99% van die gevalle. --- Ja.
En so handeling van die hond het
noodwendig ‘n besering tot gevolg. --- Dit is korrek Edelagbare.”
(Record p. 158 to 159).
He further knew that
the dog would hold onto the part of the appellant’s body where he
bit him. This again justifies the further
inference that Van Niekerk
knew that the appellant would be seriously injured by the dog. It
goes without saying that the risk of
injury by setting a police dog
on a person by far exceeds the risk of injury by the physical
overpowering of a person by a number
of policemen.
It
therefore follows that Van Niekerk did not employ a method of
arresting or apprehending the appellant with the least risk of
injury to the appellant. His conduct was therefore not reasonably
necessary as contemplated in sec. 49 (2) of the Act and accordingly
unjustified.
A
disturbing feature in this matter needs to be addressed briefly.
When testifying in this matter, Van Niekerk and Botha both being
trained handlers of police dogs, regarded the setting of a police
dog on a person to apprehend him as
“minimum
force”
.
Van Niekerk said the following in this regard:
“
Kan ek net
vir u vra hoekom het u nie die wapen aangewend om mnr Motswana onder
bedwang te kry nie?--- Edelagbare die wapen wat wel
in my besit was,
was ‘n 9mm pistool gewees met skerppunt ammunisie as sulks en ten
opsigte van jou werksaamhede en pligte as hondegeleier,
is jou hond
basies, volgens ons spesiale magsorders, jou minimum geweld wat
aangewend word as hondegeleier. So dit is jou eerste
stap waartoe jy
sou tree sou dit, sou jy ‘n problem ondervind met wat ook al, is
die hond word aangewend.”
(Record p. 131).
“
U
sê daar is ‘n riglyn wat sê dat die gebruik van ‘n hond is
minimum geweld. --- Ja Edelagbare, as ek net die Hof duidelikheid
kan gee rondom dit. Daar is spesiale magsorders in die Hondeskool
wat deurgewerk m
oet
word en dan word daar eksamen geskryf rondom dit. Sodra jy basies
die hond toegeken word om diens te lewer in die polisie, is
dit jou
eerste stap tot geweld. As ek dalk net kan verduidelik. ‘n Gewone
patrolliewabestuurder sal op ‘n toneel kom en hy vind
‘n
konfliksituasie en daar sou aanranding te vuis plaasvind waar as, my
hond word aangewend om enige persoon, hetsy ‘n huisbreker
of ‘n
bakleiery of wat ook al onder dwang te bring en daarna word die
arrestasie basies uitgevoer na die persoon onder dwang is.
Maar hy
word beskou as minimum geweld. Nou die situasie, staande order wat u
gesê het? --- Dis ‘n spesiale magsorder verkrygbaar
by Pretoria
Hondeskool.”
(Record
p. 155).
“
En
u sê nog steeds vir die Hof dit is minder geweld of minimum geweld
as om ‘n kollega te roep om u te help om die persoon onder bedwang
te bring of om ‘n vuurwapen uit te haal, wat nie noodwendig
beserings impliseer nie? --- Edelagbare rondom ‘n vuurwapen, as jy
‘n persoon rig tot ‘n vuurwapen en daar vind ‘n struweling
plaas, kan dit lei tot ‘n skietvoorval waarin ‘n persoon
noodlottig beseer kan word. Rondom drie of vier persone, een groot
persoon probeer fisies aanvat, kan ek net vir die Hof nou waarborg
dat daar gaan gevuislanery wees en daar gaan ook beserings plaasvind.
So rondom my handeling wat die hond aangewend is, voel ek ek het
binne die regte van die spesiale magsorder wat aan my voorgehou
is,
opgetree. Ek het my hond aangewend soos wat ek opgelei is.”
(Record
p. 159).
Botha testified as
follows:
“
Terug by
die toneel, daar was vrae aan sersant van Niekerk gestel wat daarop
neerkom dat dit moontlik minder geweld sou gewees het
as hy sy
vuurwapen getrek het en dit teen die eiser se bors gehou het. Wat is
u kommentaar daarop? --- Nee dit …(onhoorbaar)
geweld gewees het.
Die vuurwapens is ons laaste uitweg. Dis maksimum geweld. Daardie
stadium was die honde aangewend. Die honde
was minimum geweld. U sê
minimum geweld. Hoekom gebruik u daardie term? --- Minimum geweld
is wanneer ons honde aanwend om ’n
verdagte in te haal en aan te
hou.
Maar verwys u na regulasies of
voorskrifte wat u het? --- Ja voorskrifte wat deur die Hondeskool
aan ons voorgelê is.”
(Record
p. 212).
”
En
die
u staande orders van die honde wat gebruik word as minimum geweld,
waar is dit? --- Dit sal by die Honde-Eenhede wees.
Het u nie gedink om dit, dis dalk
nodig om dit saam te bring vir die Hof nie? --- Nee. Hoekom nie?
--- Hondbyt is minimum geweld.
Die vraag is …(tussenkoms) --- Dis
by my ingedril”
(Record
p. 227).
These
“standing
orders”
,
if it exist at all, are, to say the least, frightening; and so are
the alleged training instructions.
To
my mind the setting of a dog on a person for arresting or
apprehending that person amounts to grave violation of such a
person’s
fundamental and constitutional rights to dignity, freedom
and security, and is an extremely humiliating act perpetrated on such
a
person. For these reasons policemen
“armed”
with police dogs should exercise the greatest of care and
responsibility before using a dog to arrest or apprehend suspects.
Any
other form of force likely to cause less serious injuries, if
any, should be considered and applied before setting a dog on a
person.
Even where the use of a dog is regarded as justified, one
would expect the handler of the dog, where this can be done, to at
least
warn the suspect that the dog would be used, and afford him or
her the opportunity or choice to submit rather than to face the risk
of an attack by a police dog. See
Jooste
N.O. v Minister of Police & Another
(supra)
at
354 B
and compare
Minister
of Police v Chetty
(supra)
at
899 F to H
.
For
policemen to regard the use of a police dog to attack a suspect as
“minimum
force”
is certainly not legally justified within the purport of sec. 49 (2)
of the Act, nor is it constitutionally justified.
Van
Niekerk made no attempt to warn the appellant that he would set the
dog on him unless he either control himself or submit to
arrest.
By
reason of the aforesaid, the magistrate erred in finding that Van
Niekerk was justified in setting the police dog on the appellant
and
thereby inflicting the relevant injuries to the appellant. The
appeal therefore succeeds and the following order is made:
The
order of the Court
a
quo
is set aside and is substituted for the following order:
The defendant is
liable for payment of such damages the plaintiff may prove to have
suffered as a result of the injuries inflicted
on him by a police
dog at Vryburg on 24 February 1998.
Costs will be costs
in the cause.”
The
respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the appeal.
_______________
HJ
Lacock
JUDGE
I
concur and it is so ordered.
_______________
LO
Bosielo
ACTING
JUDGE PRESIDENT
For
the appellant:
Adv
PJ Greyling
(Instructed
by Duncan & Rothman Att., Kimberley)
For
the respondent:
Adv
SJ Senatle
(Instructed
by The State Attorney, Mafikeng)