About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal
>>
1986
>>
[1986] ZASCA 41
|
|
National Union of Mineworkers and Others v Hartebeesfontein Gold Mining Company Ltd. (57/86) [1986] ZASCA 41; 1986 (3) SA 53 (A); (1986) 7 ILJ 275 (A) (27 March 1986)
57/86
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(APPELLATE DIVISION
In the matter between:
NATIONAL UNION OF MINEWORKERS
MALSFETSANE NTSIHLELE AND OTHERS
NATIONAL UNION OF MINEWORKERS
EZEKIEL MODISE AND OTHERS
First Applicant Second to Ninth Applicants First
Applicant Second and further Applicants
and
HARTEBEESTFONTEIN GOLD MINING
COMPANY LIMITED
Respondent
CQRAM
: RABIE, CJ, JANSEN, HOEXTER, JJA, GALGUT et NICHOLAS, AJJA
HEARD
: 24 March 1986 D
ELIVERED
: 27 March 1986
JUDGMENT
NICHOLAS, AJA :
This.......
2
This case concerns questions of law stated by the
industrial court purporting to act under s. 17(21){a) of the
labour Relations
Act
No 28 of 1956 ("the Act"). Section 17 deals with the establishment and
functions of the industrial court. It provides in ss. (21
) :
"(21)(a) The industrial court may, of its own motion, or at the request of
any party to any appeal or other proceedings before the
industrial court reserve
for the decision of the Ap-pellate Division of the Supreme Court of South Africa
any question of law which
arises in any such appeal or proceedings, and shall
state such question in the form of a specia1 case.
(b) The question so stated may be argued before the Appel1ate Division, and
that Division shall give such decision and may make such
order as to costs as it
thinks just.
(c)......
3
(c) If any such special case is stated
at the request
of any party other than
the registrar, he shall lodge with the
registrar
of that Appellate Division
such security for any costs that he
may be ordered to pay as the said registrar may determine.
(d) Pending the decision of that Appel
late Division on any question of
law re
served in terms of paragraph (a), the
industrial court shall defer
its de
cision in the matter in connection with
which the special case was
stated ."
The questions of law were reserved in a document (hereinaf-ter referred to as
"the document") reading as follows:
In
4
IN THE INDUSTRIAL COURT
In the matter between -
(10)
NATIONAL UNION OF MINEWORKERS AND OTHERS
Applicants
and
HARTEBEESTFONTEIN GOLD MINING COMPANY LIMITED
Respondent
Having considered the request of the respondent which is supported by the
applicants herein the Industrial Court in terms of section
17(21)(a) of the
Labour Relations Act, 1956 reserves the questions of law as stated hereunder for
decision of the Appellate Division
of the Supreme Court:
(20)
1.1 Has the Industrial Court, seized of this matter in terms of Section
46(9), the power to reinstate an employee notwithstanding
the valid termination
of an employee's common law contract of employment?
1.2 Can the single act of an employer consisting of (30) the dismissal of
workers engaged in a strike, constitute an unfair labour
practice?
5
1.3 Can an employer's dismissal of employees engaged
in a strike
alternatively his failure or refusal,
consequent on dismissal, to continue
them in
employment and to accord them the benefits of
employment,
constitute a labour practice within
the meaning of those words in the
definition of
an "unfair labour practice" in section 1 of the
(10) Act?
1.4 Could the dismissal of the workers in this case
constitute an unfair
labour practice, taking into
account the following agreed facts:
1.4.1 The Individual Applicants were employees
of the Company at the time
of the ter
mination of their contracts of employ
ment . They were employed
in terms of
(20) Annexure "Al" hereto as read with the
recognition agreement between the Union and the Chamber of Mines annexed
hereto, marked "A2".
1.4.2
The Union is an
unregistered trade union.
1.4.3
The company is
a public company which carries on business as a gold
mining
operation.
(30)
6
1.4.4 During April, 1985, the Union submitted certain demands regarding wages
and terms and conditions of employment to the Chamber
of Mines ("the Chamber")
in respect of gold mines . The Chamber of Mines is an employer organisation of
which the Company is a member.
The Chamber is authorised to, and does, negotiate
on behalf of its members on issues such as wages and conditions of
employment.
1.4.5 As a result of the demands, negotiations took place between the Union
and the Chamber on the 13th and 14th June, 1985. The Chamber
and the Union were,
however, unable to reach consensus and on the 14th June, 1985, the Union
declared a dispute with the Chamber
on the question of wages. On the same date,
the Union applied for the establishment of the conciliation board, which
application
was not opposed by the Chamber.
(10)
(20)
1.4.6 The application for a conciliation board was granted on the 18th June 1985
and on
7
the 24th June 1985 the conciliation
board met. The conciliation board was, however, unable to resolve the dispute
and was formally
discharged. The outcome of the proceedings before the
conciliation board was reported in writing to the Minister of Manpower.
1.4.8 On the 3rd August, 1985, the Union decided to proceed with a strike at,
inter alia
, the Company' s mine on the 28th August, 1985 in order to
induce the Company to pay higher wages.
(10)
1.4.9 Thereafter , an improved offer was made to the Union by the Chamber on
behalf of the Company's holding company, ANGLO VAAL,
in terms whereof an
increase of in the holiday allowance was offered.
(20)
1.4.10 On the 21st August, 1985 , the First Applicant announced that it was
postponing the proposed strike until the 1st September
in order to consider
inter alia
the offer made on behalf of ANGLO VAAL.
(30;
8
1.4.11 On the 28th August, 1985 the Union again met with the Chamber and
conveyed to the Chamber its rejection of
inter alia
the offer made on
behalf of ANGLO VAAL.
1.4.12 The Company implemented its improved offer and increased the holiday
allowance with effect from 1st September, 1985, despite
the Union's rejection of
such offer. After the rejection of the Company's offer, the Union decided to
proceed with its strike on
the 1st September, 1985.
(10)
1.4.13 Prior to the commencement of the strike, the Company warned all its
employees that if they engaged in a strike, they might
be dismissed. On the 1st
September , a number of employees of the Company, including the Individual
Applicants , went on strike.
(20)
1.4.14 During the 2nd and 3rd September, a number of the Company's employees,
including some of the Individual Applicants , were dismissed.
(30)
9
1.4.15
Thereafter, on the 3rd
September, the Union suspended the strike and requested its members to return to
work. The Company has refused
to reinstate those employees, including certain of
the Individual Applicants, who were dismissed during the
strike.
1.4.16
The Union and the Individual
Applicants contend that the Company dismissed the Individual Applicants because
of the latter's participation
in a legal
strike.
(10)
The Company disputes this and contends that the contracts of the
Individual Applicants came to an end for other reasons, for example,
resignation, desertion, or gross misconduct arising out of their intimidation of
other employees. For purposes of the reference in
terms of Section 17(21)(a) of
the Labour Relations Act, 1956, (as amended), the parties are assuming that the
Company dismissed the
Individual Applicants because of their participation in a
legal strike; the parties are
(20)
(30)
10
also assuming, without the company admitting, that the
economic welfare of the Individual Applicants has been prejudiced or jeopardized
by their dismissal. The disputed facts referred to earlier in this
sub-paragraph, will be determined by the Industrial Court after
the reference to
the Appellate Division has been completed."
(10)
DATED at PRETORIA this 14th day of FEBRUARY 1986.
(Sgd) D B Ehlers.
PRESIDENT: INDUSTRIAL COURT
(Sgd) P E Roux
DEPUTY PRESIDENT
(20)
30)
11
(The "Others" among the applicants are said to be former
employees of Hartebeestfontein Gold Mining Company Limited
("Hartebeestfontein").
When the matter was called, the Court raised
two preliminary questions: Was "the document" in the form
of a special case? Did it contain all that a case stated
under s. 17(21X a) should contain?
Provision is made in rules of court and in a
number of statutes for the submission to a court of questions
of law "in the form of a special case". See for example,
rule 49(10)of the Uniform Rules of Court; proviso (i) to
Appellate Division Rule 5(4)(c); s. 3(3) of the
Admissio
n
of Persons to the Union Regulation Act, No 2 2 of 1913 ;
s
12
s. 26(1) of the
Workmen's Compensation Act
, No 30 of 1941; s. 20
of the
Arbitration Act
, No 42 of 1965; and s. 30(l)(b) of the
Stamp
Duties Act
, No 77 of 1968. In none of them is "special case" defined,
presumably because the expression has an accepted meaning.
Mozley &
Whiteley's Law Dictionary
,(7th ed.) says s.v. "Special Case" that it is
"1. A statement of facts agreed to on be-half of two or more litigant
parties, and submitted for the opinion of a court of justice
as to the law
bearing upon the facts so stated."
Stroud's Judicial Dictionary
(4th ed.} states that
"A special case is a written statement of the facts in a litigation, agreed
to by the parties, so that the court may decide these
questions according to law
... It is also known as a case stated. "
This
13
This meaning is reflected in rule 33 of the Uniform Rules
of Court. It provides in sub-rule (1) that the parties
to any dispute may, after institution of proceedings,
agree upon a written statement of facts in the form
of a special case for the adjudication of the Court, and
in sub-rule 2(a) that "such statement shal1 set forth
the facts agreed upon, the questions of law in dispute
between the parties and their contentions thereon".
It is, therefore, implicit in the expression
"in the form of a special case" that there should be a state-
ment of the facts agreed by the parties. In terms of s 17(21) (a)
something more is required. The industrial court has power to
reserve for the decision of the Appellate Division a question
of law which arises in proceedings before it. It is only
such......
14
such a question which can properly be reserved - this
Court
does not answer whatever questions the industrial court may
choose to put to it. The question must not be an abstract
or academic question. Courts of law exist for"the settle-
ment of concrete controversies, .... not to pronounce upon
abstract questions, or to advise upon differing contentions,
however important." (Per INNES CJ in Ge
ldenhuys & Neethling
v Beuthin
1918 AD 426
at 441
Consequently in order to enable this Court to
determine whether the questions of law reserved do or do not
arise in the proceedings, the industrial court should set out
in the special case something which shows what has arisen,
and how it has arisen. Cp. Windsor Rural District Council
v........
15
v Otterwa
y
and Try, Ltd
(1954) 3
All E.R. 721
(Q.B.D.) at
723.
There is nothing in "the document" to show how
the questions of law arose. It does not even appear how the industrial court
came to be "seized of this matter in terms of Section
46(9)" as stated in
question 1.1. The Court was informed from the Bar, however, that a dispute arose
out of the dismissal of some
of the respondent's employees which is referred to
in para 1.4.14, and that this dispute was referred to the industrial court, not
in terms of para (a) of s. 49(b) (that is, via a conciliation board), but in
terms of para (d) which provides -
"(d) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a) ... the parties to
the
dispute
16
dispute may agree to report to the Minister that ... they are
satisfied that ... they will not be able to settle the dispute, and
on receipt
of such a report, the dispute shall forthwith be referred to the industrial
court for determination."
There is nothing in "the document" which refers to the pleadings which
presumably were delivered in terms of the "Rules for the conduct
proceedings of
the industrial court" made under s. 17(22) of the Act. Rule 6 provides (so far
as is relevant to the present matter):
"6(1) Proceedings relating to a dispute or matter referred to in section
17(11) (a) of the Act shall be instituted in the court by
an applicant by the
delivery of a notice of application specifying the nature of the relief applied
for, and such notice shall be
supported
17
supported by -
(a)
a statement of case
containing a summary of the facts and conclusions of law on which the relief
sought is based;
(b)
documents, if any,
containing particulars in support of the relief
sought;
(c)
a list specifying the books and
documents in the applicant's possession or under his control which relate to the
application or which
the applicant intends to use in the proceedings or which
tend to prove or disprove the case of the applicant or any other
party.
( 2 ) ( a )
(b) Any party opposing the granting of the relief prayed for in the
application shall -
(i) within the period of 14 days referred to in paragraph (a)(ii) give notice
in writing to the registrar and to the applicant that
he intends to oppose
the
application .
18
application and shall state an address or addresses at which he will
accept service of all documents in the proceedings; ii) within
14 days after the
expiration of the period of 14 days referred to in paragraph (a)(iii) deliver a
statement of of his defence which
statement shall -(aa) traverse the
allegations
contained in the applicant's application;
(bb) contain a summary of the facts and conclusions of law on which the
defence is based;
(cc) be supported by documents, if any, containing particulars in support of
the defence;
(dd) be supported by a list
mu
tatis mutandis
as referred
to in subrule (1)(c);
iii)together with such statement
of
defence, deliver a counter-ap
plication
19
plication, if any, and the provisions of subrule (i) shall
mutatis muta
ndis apply in respect of such counter-application (c) The
applicant may, within 14 days
after delivery by the respondent of his statement of defence and his
counter-application, if any, deliver a replication and a statement
of defence in
relation to such counter-application and the respondent may, within 14 days
after delivery by the applicant of his
statement of defence in relation to the
counter-application, deliver a replication in relation to such statement of
defence."
(Section 17(11)(a) which is referred to in rule 6(1) provides that the
industrial court shall perform the functions which a court
of law may perform in
regard to a dispute or matter arising out of the application of the provisions
of the laws
administered
20
administered by the Department of Manpower Utilization.
There is no reference in "the document" to a notice of ap-
plication, or a statement of case, or a statement of defence
delivered in terms of this rule. Consequently this Court
does not know the nature of the relief applied for, or the
facts which were admitted, or the allegations of fact which
were in issue, or the conclusions of law on which the relief
sought was based or those on which the defence was based.
As a result it does not appear whether the questions of law
which the industrial court purported to reserve arose on the
pleadings. Nor does it appear, if they did not so arise,
how they arose, if at all.
One gathers that what happened was that at the
beginning.......
21
beginning of the proceedings before the industrial court,
and before any evidence was led, the legal representative
of Hartebeestfontein, supported by the applicants, requested
the industrial court to reserve the questions in terms of an
application which was handed in, presumably so that they could
obtain guidance as to the way in which the case was to be
presented. If that is so, the questions could hardly be
said to have arisen in the proceedings.
It appears that the industrial court had reser-
vations as to whether the question of law as framed in para
1.4 of "the document" was a proper question to reserve, and
in this Court counsel indicated that they would not seek an
answer to that question.
In.........
22
In my view the remaining questions (i.e. those
stated in paras 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3} are not proper questions.
They are abstract questions which cal1 for a general answer
,
and are not specifically related to the dispute (whatever
that may be) with which the industrial court is seized.
It was presumably for that reason that in regard to these
questions no facts at all were set out.
Faced with this difficulty, counsel for Harte-
beestfontein sought to cobble up a proper special
case by amending the word "employee" to read "an individual
applicant", "employer" to read "Hartebeestfontein" and
"a strike" to read "the strike referred to in para 1.4.13",
and by reading the facts set out in paras 1.4.1 to 1.4.15
inclusive........
23
inclusive as if they had been stated with reference to the
first three questions. I do not think that this Court can
countenance such a procedure. In terms of s. 17(21 ) (a
the statement in the form of a special case is a matter for
the industrial court, and it is not within the province
of this Court to reformulate it. Cp. Jamaludin v Principal
Immigration Offic
er
1918 TPD 58
, and
Midkon (Edms) Bpk v
Depa
r
tement van Gemeenskapsontwikkeling en Owerheidshulp-
dienste, 1983(4) SA 78 (T) at 83 D-F.
In any event I do not think that, if the course
proposed were to be adopted, the criticisms of "the document"
as a "special case" would be met.
Sub-paras 1
,2
and 3 of para 1.4 deal with the
parties.......
24
parties. Sub-paras 13,14 and 15 relate to the strike on
1 September 1983 and the dismissal of a number of employees
on the two following days and Hartebeestfontein's refusal
to reinstate them. The remaining sub-paragraphs are only
of historical interest. It is not clear how questions 1,
2 and 3 arise from or relate to the facts in sub-paras 13,
14 and 15. One does not know the nature of the relief
applied for by the applicants, or what is the relevance of
an"unfair labour practice".
In my opinion these proceedings are fatally de-
fective: "the document" is not "in the form of a special
case"; it does not appear therefrom that the questions
"arose" in the proceedings before the industrial court;
and.......
25
and the questions reserved, as framed, are
abstract questions,
of a kind upon which the Court does not pronounce. There wil1
consequently be no order on the questions reserved. It is
of course open to the parties to approach the industrial
court again,in order that appropriate questions of law may
be reserved in due form.
The question was raised in argument whether para
(d) of ss. 21 did not indicate that a question of law should
be reserved only at the conclusion of the evidence, when all
the facts could be found or agreed. In the view which I
take of the matter it is unnecessary to consider this
tion.
No order will be made in regard to the questions
reserved......
26
reserved and there will no order as to costs
H C NICHOLAS, AJA
RABIE, CJ JANSEN, JA HOEXTER, JA GALGUT, AJA
Concur