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[2008] ZAFSHC 88
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Nel and Another v Minister of Safety and Security and Others (1686/2006) [2008] ZAFSHC 88 (28 August 2008)
IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
(ORANGE FREE STATE
PROVINCIAL DIVISION)
Case
No.: 1686/2006
In the
matter between:
FERDINAND
WILHELMUS NEL
1
st
Plaintiff
ETIENNE
BRITZ
2
nd
Plaintiff
and
MINISTER
OF SAFETY AND SECURITY
1
st
Defendant
SENIOR
SUPERINTENDENT L. S. MOFOKENG
2
nd
Defendant
CAPTAIN
W. BOSHOFF
3
rd
Defendant
SENIOR
SUPERINTENDENT M. L. NGOBENI
4
th
Defendant
SERGEANT
M. NTSHIDI
5
th
Defendant
_________________________________________________
_____
JUDGEMENT:
MABESELE, AJ
____________________________
__________________________
HEARD
ON:
19 AUGUST 2008
______________________________
________________________
DELIVERED
ON:
28 AUGUST 2008
______________________________________________________
[1]
This
is a special plea of prescription and non-joinder raised by the
defendants against the plaintiffs’ claim insofar as is
based on
their wrongful, unlawful and malicious arrest and detention and
malicious prosecution.
[2] The
defendants contend, first; that the plaintiffs are debarred from
bringing their action inasmuch as they have failed to commence
their
action within six (6) months after their cause of action has arisen
as required by the Institution of Legal Proceedings Against
Certain
Organs of the State Act.
1
Second; the plaintiffs failed to comply with the provisions of the
Prescription Act.
2
Third; they failed to join the Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development and such a failure constitute a material
non-joinder.
[3] The plaintiffs and
the defendants (except first defendant) are in the employ of the
South African Police Services.
[4] According
to the Particulars of Claim, the plaintiffs were arrested on 28
th
January 2003 at Odendaalsrus, and were detained in an office at the
Odendaalsrus Police Station for two hours.
[5] The
plaintiffs were charged and prosecuted for fraud, alternatively
theft. They applied for a discharge in terms of section
174 of the
Criminal Procedure Act,
3
and were so discharged on 1 April 2004.
[6] In
paragraph
8
of the Particulars of Claim, the plaintiffs,
inter
alia
,
said:
“
Op ongeveer
28
January 2003 en te Odendaalsrus onder verwysingsnommer MAS499/1/2003
het Tweede, Derde, Vierde en Vyfde Verweerders die reg in
beweging
gebring deurdat:
6.1 Vierde
Verweerder en/of Vyfde Verweerder onregmatiglik en kwaadwilliglik
‘n
vals klagte by die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisie te Odendaalsrus gelê
het teen Eisers ten opsigte van ‘n klagte van
bedrog
alternatiewelik diefstal van bewysstukke in die SAP13-stoor, te wete
drank wat Eiser in opdrag moes vernietig het;
6.2 Op die stadium wat Vierde
Verweerder en/of Vyfde Verweerder gemelde klagtes teen Eisers gelê
het, het Vierde Verweerder
en/of Vyfde Verweerder sonder redelike en
geregverdigde grondslag opgetree het en was daar ‘n gebrek aan
die redelike geloof
in die waarheid van die bewerings vervat in die
klagtes;
6.3 In en as gevolg
van voormelde klagtes deur Vierde Verweerder en/of Vyfde Verweerder
gelê, het Derde Verweerder in opdrag
van Tweede Verweerder
sonder redelike of geregverdigde grondslag, onregmatiglik en
kwaadwilliglik Eisers gearresteer en aangehou
te die Suid-Afrikaanse
Polisieselle, Odendaalsrus, vir twee ure;
6.4 Tweede en Derde
Verweerders het Eisers gearresteer nieteenstaande die feit dat daar
nie enige redelike geloof in die waarheid
van die inligting wat die
Vierde Verweerder verskaf is, geleë was nie;”
[7] A
t
the commencement of the proceedings Counsel for the plaintiffs and
the defendants accepted that the arrest of the plaintiffs on
28th
January 2003 was a malicious arrest.
[8] The
plaintiffs addressed a letter dated 17 September 2004, in terms of
Act 40 of 2002, to the National Commissioner of the South
African
Police Services wherein they claimed damages arising out of alleged
unlawful arrest. The letter was received by the defendants
on the
28th September 2004.
[9] The letter reads:
“
Ons plaas op rekord:
Op of ongeveer 28 Januarie 2003 en te
Odendaalsrus het ‘n Kaptein Bailey en/of Kaptain N. B. A.
Boshoff en/of Kaptain Anthony
Motaung en/of Sers Moses Ntsidi en/of
Senior Superintendent M. L. Ngobeni, Polisiebeamptes wat te alle
relevante tye in diens
van die Suid-Afrikaanse Polisiediens was en
opgetree het binne die aard en bestek van hulle diens aldaar,
wederregtelik en kwaadwillig
die reg in werking gestel het en wel
deur skrywer se gemelde kliënte hierinbo genoem onregmatig te
arresteer en aan te kla
van diefstal, en/of korrupsie en/of bedrog
en vervolging ten opsigte daarvan in te stel, in die hand te werk en
voort te sit.
Daar het geen
redelike of waarskynlike grond bestaand vir die handelinge soos in
die vooropstelling nie en is skrywer se kliënte
as ‘n
resultaat van die gemelde optrede onregmatig gearresteer, aangekla
en moes ook voor ‘n geregshof gebring word
op ‘n klagte
van diefstal en bedrog.
Na verhoor van die geleentheid het
skrywer se kliënte in ‘n geregshof ontslag ontvang gekry
aan die einde van die staatsaak
op 1 April 2004.
As gevolg van
hierdie handelinge het skrywer se kliënte skade gely in die
bedrag van R1 000 000,00 (een miljoen rand) elk,
welke
skadevergoeding vir
contumelia,
skade vergoeding as gevolg van die ontneming van hulle vryheid en
die ongemak en ongerief wat skrywer se kliënt moes verduur.
U word hiermee in terme van die
bepalinge van Artikel 3 van Wet 40 van 2002 aangemaan tot betaling
van voormelde bedrae binne
dertig (30) dae na datum hiervan, by
ontstentenis waarvan skrywer instruksies het om die skade soos deur
skrywer se kliënte
gely geregtelik van u te verhaal.”
[10] Mr.
Nxusani
,
who appeared on behalf of the defendants, argued that such notice of
intended legal proceedings must be served on the organ of
the state
within six (6) months from the date on which the debt arose.
4
[11] He
argued that failure by the plaintiffs to serve such a notice within
the prescribed period debar the plaintiffs from proceeding
with their
claims.
[12] It
was argued that the summons in respect of the plaintiffs’
claims was served on the 9th May 2006. This was after a
prescribed
period of three (3) years from the date on which a debt became due.
5
[13] It was accordingly
submitted that the plaintiffs’ claim was extinguished by
prescription.
[14] Mr. Nxusani argued
that the plaintiffs should have joined the Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development for any damages
which they sustained as a
result of the decision to prosecute them. He said failure by the
plaintiffs to join the Minister as
a party to the proceedings
constitutes a material non-joinder.
[15] The
plaintiffs deny that their claim prescribed. They deny also that
their decision not to join the Minister as a party to
the proceedings
constitutes a material non-joinder.
[16] Mr.
Zietsman argued on behalf of the defendants that prescription starts
to run on the date from which a claim became due.
6
[17] He
argued that although the plaintiffs were arrested on the 28th January
2003 a debt became due on 1 April 2004, the date on
which the
y
were discharged. He sought relience on
THOMPSON
AND ANOTHER v MINISTER OF POLICE AND ANOTHER.
7
[1
8] In
the above-mentioned case, Eksteen J, held that in an action based on
malicious prosecution and malicious arrest and detention
no action
will lie until the criminal proceedings have terminated in favour of
the plaintiff.
[19] The
learned Judge said:
8
“
In an action
based on malicious prosecution it has been held that no action will
lie
until the criminal proceedings have terminated in favour of the
plaintiff. This is so because one of the essential requisites
of the
action is proof of a want of reasonable and probable cause on the
part of the defendant, and while a prosecution is actually
pending
its result cannot be allowed to be prejudged by the civil action.
The action therefore only arises after the criminal
proceedings
against the plaintiff have terminated in his favour or ..... decline
to prosecute. To my mind the same principles
must apply to an action
based on malicious arrest and detention where a prosecution ensues on
such arrest, ...... The proceedings
from arrest to acquittal must be
regarded as continuous, and no action for personal injury done to the
accused person will arise
until the prosecution has been determined
by his discharge.”
From the above it
follows that the plaintiffs’ claim in respect of the alleged
malicious arrest and detention became due
on 1 April 2004, the date
on which they were discharged.
[
20] The
plaintiffs gave notice in terms of section 3 of Act 40 of 2004 in a
letter dated 17th September 2004 which was received
by the first
defendant on 28th September 2004. Quite clearly, notice was given
within a period of six (6) months from the date
on which a debt
became due. The plaintiffs, undoubtedly, acted within a prescribed
period. The result is that the defendants’
first special plea
must fail.
[21] The
summons commencing the plaintiffs’ action was issued on the
21st April 2006 and served on the defendants on 24th
April 2006; 8th
May 2006 and 9th May 2006, respectively. This was approximately two
(2) years from the date on which a debt became
due, that is, 1 April
2004. The plaintiffs acted within a prescribed period of three (3)
years. Therefore, the second special
plea must also fail.
[22] Mr.
Zietsman argued that only the police (4th and 5th defendants)
instigated the arrest or set the wheels of the criminal law
in motion
by effecting the arrest of the plaintiffs, the consequences of which
act the police were aware would necessarily be to
hurt the plaintiffs
in regard to their person, dignity or reputation. He argued that on
this basis alone there was no need to
join the Minister.
[23] A
further argument raised by Mr. Zietsman is that even the Director of
Public Prosecutions, who is an employee of the Minister
of Justice
and Constitutional Development, has no interest in the outcome of
this case. Therefore he cannot be joined.
In
UNITED
WATCH AND DIAMOND CO v DISA HOTELS
9
Corbett J, (as he then was) said the right of a defendant to demand
the joinder of another party and the duty of the court to order
such
joinder or to ensure that there is a waiver of the right to be joined
are limited to cases of joint owners, joint contractors
and partners
10
and where the other party has a direct and substantial interest
11
in the issues involed. In my view, therefore, the Minister of
Justice and Constitutional Development does not have any direct
and
substantial interest in the present case. Therefore, a special plea
on non-joinder must fail.
I am fortified, in my
view, by the manner in which both counsel presented argument in this
matter.
[2
4] In
view of the above, I make the following order:
Each special plea is
dismissed with costs.
____________________
M. M. MAB
ESELE,
AJ
On
behalf of the plaintiffs: Adv.
P.
Zietsman
Instructed
by:
M.
Volschenk,
Naudes
Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
On
behalf of the defendants: Adv. J. Nxusani
Instructed
by:
S.
Chetty
State
Attorney
BLOEMFONTEIN
/em
1
Act 40 of 2002
2
Act 68 of
1969
3
Act 51
of 1977
4
Section 3(2) provides: “ A notice must –
within six months
from the date on which the debt became due, be served on the organ
of the state in accordance with section
4(1); and
briefly set out –
the facts giving
rise to the debt; and
such particulars of
such debt as are within the knowledge of the creditor.”
5
See
Prescription Act, 68 of 1969
6
Section 12(1)
of the
Prescription Act provides
:
“….,
prescription shall commence to run as soon as a debt is due.”
7
1971(1) SA 371
8
371; A - C
9
1972(4) SA 409 (CPD) at 415
10
The Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development does not fall within this category.
11
What constitutes a direct and substantial interest is a legal
interest in the subject-matter of the action
which could be
prejudicially affected by the judgment of the court. (See United
Watch and Diamond
Co, supra, par. H)