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[2008] ZAFSHC 54
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Agriven (Edms) Beperk v Martins NO (ABSA Bank Beperk Intervening) [2008] ZAFSHC 54 (19 June 2008)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(ORANGE
FREE STATE PROVINCIAL DIVISION)
Case
No. :
2771/06
In
the matter between:-
AGRIVEN
(EDMS) BEPERK
Applicant
and
PIET
JOUBERT MARTINS N.O.
Respondent
(In
sy hoedanigheid as trustee van die
SNITRAM
BELEGGINGS TRUST
and
ABSA
BANK BEPERK
Intervener
______________________________________________________________
HEARD
ON:
10
AUGUST 2006
_____________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
BY:
RAMPAI,
J
_____________________________________________________
DELIVERED
ON:
19
JUNE 2008
_____________________________________________________
[1] These
motion proceedings concerned the substantive intervention application
for leave to be granted to the second creditor to
be joined in the
sequestration proceedings
initiated by the first creditor against the common debtor. The
debtor opposed the first creditor’s primary application as
well
as the second creditor’s secondary application. The second
creditor sought an order in precisely the same terms as
prayed for by
the first creditor.
[2] This judgment is
about my reasons for granting leave to the second creditor to
intervene. The relevant cause facts are:
On 19
May 2006 the first creditor, in other words, Agriven (Edms) Beperk
filed an urgent application for the provisional sequestration
of the
debtor, in other words, Piet Joubert Martins N.O. in his
representative capacity as the sole trustee of Snitram Beleggings
Trust No. TMP3989. The primary motion proceedings were initiated
under case no. 2090/06.
[3] On
15 June 2006 the primary application was postponed for two weeks by
agreement. The reason for the postponement was to afford
the debtor
an opportunity of arranging a meeting with all its creditors. At the
proposed meeting the debtor was supposed to persuade
all its
creditors including the first creditor, Agriven, to abandon the
insolvency proceedings. The second creditor was prepared
to abide by
the unanimous decision of the creditors.
[4] By 26 June 2006 no
amicable settlement to abandon or withdraw the primary sequestration
application had been reached or conveyed
to the second creditor. It
appeared from the founding affidavit, the answering affidavit and the
replying affidavit filed in connection
with the primary sequestration
application that the second creditor was the biggest of all the
debtors’ creditors.
[5] On 28 June 2006 a
notice of motion was served and filed with the registrar under case
no. 2771/06. The notice of motion constituted
a new application by a
new party, Absa Bank Limited. This is what I earlier called a
secondary application by the second creditor.
Here, as in the
primary application, the debtor is one and the same entity.
[6] On
29 June 2006 the secondary application was allocated to me as was the
primary application. Both applications were postponed
to 10 August
2006. It was also agreed that the second creditor proceed to harvest
the potatoes on the farms leased by the respondent.
[7] On 10 August 2006 the
intervention application was argued first. Mr. Reinders, on behalf
of the second creditor, argued for
the grant of the order. Mr.
Fischer, on behalf of the debtor, argued against the grant of the
order. This then completes the
summary of the relevant common cause
facts.
[8] The crisp issue which
the intervention application raised was whether there was any valid
ground to justify the intervention
of the intervener, in other words,
the second creditor, in the main sequestration application initiated
by the applicant, in other
words, the first creditor, against the
respondent, in other words, the common debtor.
[9] Mr.
Reinders, counsel for the intervener, argued that one creditor of the
debtor was entitled to intervene at any time in the
pending
sequestration proceedings initiated at the instance of another
creditor of the same debtor. He cited
JHATAM
AND OTHERS v JHATAM
1958 (4) SA 36
(NPD) as authority for this proposition. Therefore,
he submitted that a proper case had been made out for the second
creditor
to intervene in the primary sequestration proceedings.
[10] But
Mr. Fischer, counsel for the respondent, differed. He contended that
there was no valid reason for the second creditor
to launch a
subsequent application in its own right for the same relief with the
full knowledge that such relief had already been
claimed in the
previous, but still pending, application for the same debtor’s
sequestration. He submitted that, seeing that
the intervention
application was not based on any of the recognised grounds of
intervention, it fell to be dismissed. Counsel
relied on Meskin:
Insolvency
Law
,
p. 2-45 to p.2.47 and the caselaw therein cited, in particular
FIRSTRAND
BANK LTD v WALLACE PIENAAR PROPERTIES CC (ABSA BANK LTD INTERVENING)
2002 (2) SA 758
(W).
[11] It
seems helpful to embark on a cursory overview of caselaw. In
JHATAM
AND OTHERS v JHATAM
1958 (4) SA 36
(NPD) at par. 38a Holmes J observed:
“There
are several cases dealing with intervention by another creditor after
sequestration or winding up proceedings have
been launched. See
Mohomedy
& Sons (Pty.) Ltd v Economic Clothing Manufacturers (Pty.) Ltd.,
1955 (1) SA 52
(N), and cases cited therein, and
Mayet
v Pillay,
1955 (2) SA 296
(N). They differ from the present case in that in all
of them the intervention arose after the provisional order had been
granted.
But they serve to indicate that the Court takes a practical
view in these matters, and also bears in mind the interests of the
general body of creditors. In the circumstances I granted leave to
the second creditor to join as a petitioner in these proceedings.”
[12] The
peculiar character of intervention proceedings in sequestration
proceedings was described as follows in
FULLARD
v FULLARD
1979 (1) SA 368
(TPD) at 372 B – E per Coetzee J:
“(4)
Die Hof "takes a practical view in these matters and also bears
in mind the interests of the general body of creditors"
- per
HOLMES R in die Jhatam saak op cit te 38A.
Dit is duidelik
dat hierdie praktyk 'n unieke een is wat heelwatverskil van
konvensionele toetreding. Dit is nòg 'n suiwer
toetreding nòg
substitusie van applikante en is eintlik
sui
generis
uit 'n prosesregtelike oogpunt gesien. Dit is eerder 'n selfstandige
aansoek wat, uiteraard anders as die gebruiklikeeen, aangelê
word deurdat die skuldeiser slegs opdaag by die Hof met sy eie
getuienis, gewoonlik op die keerdag. Omrede hy skuldeiser is, het
hy
locus
standi
om aangehoor te word in 'n
concursus
creditorum
wat reeds bestaan en die sogenaamde verlof om tussenbeide te tree is
eintlik 'n formaliteit. 'n Mens moet dus versigtig wees om,
by die
beoordeling van die probleem
in
casu
,
nie oorwegings wat geld in 'n konvensionele proses klakkeloos toe te
pas nie. Dit is egter handig om nie uit die oog te verloor
dat selfs
in 'n konvensionele toetreding 'n geding kan optree op enige stadium,
ook nadat uitspraak alreeds gelewer is indien daar
'n appèl
moontlik is. Kyk
Orphan
Board v Van Reenen
[1829] EngR 630
;
12 ER 252
'n gesaghebbende Geheime Raadsbeslissing wat aangehaal word
deur KRAUSE R in
Bitcon
v City Council of Johannesburg and Arenow Behrman & Co
1931 WLD 273
te 292.”
[13] The
author Meskin:
Insolvency
Law
at p. 2-45/6 says the following:
“It
is further submitted that, having regard to the implications of the
institution of a
concursus
creditorum
,
any creditor of the respondent has
locus
standi
to seek to intervene in the proceedings where a valid reason for such
intervention exists – eg. where the original applicant
is
unable for any reason to pursue his application or intends to
withdraw such and the intervener seeks to ensure that the estate
is
sequestrated, or the original applicant is protracting the
proceedings to the prejudice of other creditors (whose enforcement
of
their claims in the ordinary course is blocked) and the intervener
seeks to eliminate any sequestration proceedings. The Court
may
also, in the exercise of its discretion, on the grounds of
convenience, permit a person who is not a creditor, but who
prima
facie
has an interest in the sequestration proceedings, to intervene
therein.”
[14] The
conce
pt
of intervening in a running adjudication process in a court of law
was held to refer to a case where a party, not initially joined
as a
litigant, subsequently wanted to have a say in the
lis
pending
between the original adversaries by seeking the permission of the
court so to participate. The intervention was often,
though not
necessarily, along the lines of demonstrating, that, if the court
were to grant the relief sought by, say the applicant
or the
plaintiff, whatever the case may be, the court order would adversely
impact on the intervening party’s interest as
well, apart from
those of the original respondent or defendant –
FIRSTRAND
BANK LTD v WALLACE PIENAAR PROPERTIES CC (ABSA BANK LTD INTERVENING)
2002 (2) SA 758
(W) at 760i – 761a per Flemming DJP.
[15] In
the second place it is known that intervention proceedings are
sometimes launched for leave to allow the new party to intervene
in
preceding insolvency proceedings in a case where the new party, as an
outside observer, reckoned that the original applicant
in the
preceding insolvency case was not prosecuting such case with genuine
swiftness and firm determination to achieve the true
purpose as the
insolvency law envisages, but rather deliberately employing the legal
process to protect the respondent against
the respondent’s
creditors -
FIRSTRAND
BANK LTD v WALLACE PIENAAR PROPERTIES CC
,
supra
at 761c – e.
[16] In
the third place indirect intervention proceedings may be brought by
way of an independent application for sequestration
or liquidation
which falls beyond the
lis
between the applicant and the respondent in the preceding
sequestration application -
FIRSTRAND
BANK LTD v WALLACE PIENAAR PROPERTIES CC
,
supra
at 761e – h.
[17] In
NEL
AND OTHERS NNO v THE MASTER AND OTHERS
2000 (2) SA 728
(W) at 732a – d Blieden J had this to say about
the purpose of intervening proceedings:
“
Fr
om
the various cases which are quoted in the
Fullard
case it is plain that the dominant purpose of the intervention is:
(a) To
avoid delay and unnecessary expense. (
Mahomedy
& Sons B (Pty) Ltd v Economic Clothing Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd
1955 (1) SA 52
(D) at 53F--G;
Ex
parte Standard Trading Co (Pty) Ltd: In re Perl v Simco Clothing
Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd
1955 (3) SA 508
(W) at 509C--D.)
(b) To
avoid an hiatus occurring between an order granted at the instance of
one creditor and an order which may be granted at
the request of an
intervening creditor with a view to minimising dealings with the
estate in the meanwhile. (
Flax
v Berliner: Houndsditch Warehouse (Pty) Ltd Intervening
1950 (2) SA 259
(W);
Mahomedy
& Sons (Pty) Ltd v Economic Clothing Manufacturers (supra
at 53F--H);
Mayet
v Pillay
1955 (2) SA 296
(N) at 297A--B.)
(c) To
avoid any appreciable interval during which the debtor becomes
revested with his assets. (
Flax
v Berliner: Houndsditch Warehouse (Pty) Ltd Intervening (supra
at 260).)”
[18] The
effect of intervention was also explained by Blieden J in
NEL
AND OTHERS NNO v THE MASTER AND OTHERS
,
supra
at 731e – j:
“To
a large measure the arguments of the litigants in the present matter
centres around the significance and consequence in
law of the
intervention by the bank which resulted in the final order of
winding-up being granted at the same time as the rule
nisi issued in
the Van Niekerk application was discharged.
The
effect of intervention by creditors in applications for sequestration
and in applications for the winding-up of companies, where
the same
considerations apply, has been dealt with in a number of cases. These
have been conveniently collected in
Fullard
v Fullard
1979 (1) SA 368
(T) at 371H--372B. The effect of such intervention
is, in my view, correctly described by Coetzee J as follows:
'(1)
'n Skuldeiser kan op enige stadium tussenbei tree om
(a) 'n
voorlopige sekwestrasie bevel opgehef te kry of
(b) waar
die applikant nie voortgaan met die saak nie of sy voete sleep, 'n
vars sekwestrasiebevel in sy eie reg en naam te erlang.
(2) Waar die
applikant nie voortgaan nie kan die bestaande sekwestrasie bevel nie
bekragtig word op aandrang van enige tusssebeitredende
skuldeiser
nie. Dit moet opgehef word en 'n vars bevel kan uitgereik word met
die skuldeiser as applikant en nie as medeapplikant
nie. Hy alleen
word dus dominus litis en die oorspronklike applikant val heeltemal
weg verder vorentoe.
(3) Die
tussenbeitredende krediteur moet 'n saak vir sekwestrasie uitmaak,
sekuriteit verskaf ens asof hy aanvanklik die applikant
was, maar hy
kan steun op feite wat blyk uit die stukke in die bestaande
verrigtinge.
(4) Die
Hof "takes a practical view in these matters and also bears in
mind the interests of the general body of creditors''
- per Holmes R
in
Jhatam
v Jhatam
1958 (4) SA 36
(N).'
As
is clear from these remarks the intervening creditor cannot stand on
the back of the original applicant who is no longer proceeding
with
his application, but must bring a fresh application.”
[19] I now turn to
examine the facts and to apply the aforegoing principles. The
intervener’s application was presented on
28 June 2006 before
the provisional order of sequestration had been granted in favour of
the first creditor, that is to say the
applicant. It was a separate
though not independent application for the sequestration of the same
respondent against whom the
provisional order had already been
sought. The matter was allocated a different case number. The
intervener furnished the required
security. The Master of the High
Court issued a certificate whereby he certified that sufficient
security had been given –
vide annexure ‘q’. These
features gave the secondary application the hallmark of a substantive
and independent application.
However, it was not. It will soon
become clear why.
[20] The second creditor
sought an order in the following terms and I have paraphrased them:
20.1 That
the rules relating to formal time limits and service of applications
as prescribed in rule 6(12) be relaxed and that
the matter be heard
as an urgent application
20.2 That Absa Bank
Limited be allowed to intervene as an intervening creditor in the
primary sequestration application filed under
case no. 2090/06.
20.3 That the estate of
the respondent be placed under provisional sequestration in the hands
of the Master of the High Court together
with ancillary relief in
accordance with the wording of the notice of motion as filed under
case no. 2090/06 dated 19 May 2006.
20.4 That the costs of
the sequestration application be costs in the sequestration.
[21] It
follows from the aforegoing alone that the secondary application was
not a concurrent application brought by a new party
who was unaware
of the preceding application. See also paragraph 4 and 5 of the
founding affidavit. By 30 May 2006 Absa Bank
Limited, the
intervening creditor, was already aware of the primary application by
the first creditor, Agriven.
[22] On
behalf of the respondent, Mr. Reinders, argued that the averments of
the intervening creditor as contained in its founding
affidavit and
replying affidavit showed that, Absa as the biggest creditor of the
respondent, was throughout motivated by an honest
wish to assist the
respondent and to ensure that accurate and true facts were placed
before the court seeing that the applicant
and the respondent in the
preceding application had failed to do so. He denied the
respondent’s claim that the intervening
creditor had colluded
with certain parties to intervene for the sole purpose of running up
the costs of the respondent’s
sequestration.
[23] Mr.
Fischer argued that there were a few valid reasons, which over the
years have crystallised into recognised grounds for
intervening in a
preceding sequestration application. He contended that unless the
intervening creditor can show: that it is against
the sequestration
of the respondent on the ground that the sequestration order would,
if granted, have an adverse impact on the
interests of the
intervening creditor; or that although it was for the sequestration
of the respondent, it wanted to intervene
on the grounds that the
first creditor who initiated the sequestration proceedings was, in
fact, protecting the respondents at
the expense of the
concursus
creditorum
;
or that, although it was for the sequestration of the respondent, it
wanted to intervene on the grounds that the applicant was
delaying
the sequestration proceedings through tardiness; or that the new
party wanted to intervene on the grounds that it launched
a separate
independent and substantive application to have the respondent
sequestrated unaware that a different creditor of the
respondent had
already initiated a similar concurrent application against the same
respondent – then such a second creditor
has no business to
intervene. Accordingly counsel submitted that in this case the
intervening creditor had no valid reason to
be here and that the
whole intervention application was a disguised collusive scheme to
run the costs up.
[24] The
intervening creditor’s deponent, Mr. G. L. Botha explained the
one reason underlying the decision of Absa Bank Limited
to intervene
as follows:
“18.
Uit hoofde daarvan dat die Respondent
verskeie verwere opper teen die Applikant in die aansoek om
sekwestrasie, asook ten opsigte
van die meegaande skuldeisers het die
Bank besluit om toe te tree tot die aansoek om
sekwestrasie-verrigtinge, ten einde toe te
sien, dat dit tot die
einde toe volvoer word.”
The
idea here was to bolster the finalising hand of the applicant as the
sequestration creditor by showing that there was no substance
in the
assortment of various defences the respondent had raised against its
creditors. This was the first reaso
n
for the intervention.
[25] At
paragraph 19 of the intervening creditor’s founding affidavit
two more reasons which prompted Absa Bank Limited to
intervene were
given. The applicant’s founding affidavit which was made by a
certain Mr. Rossouw contained the allegation
that the respondent had
committed an act of insolvency in terms of section 8(c) by preferring
one creditor, namely, Absa Bank above,
its other creditors.
Vide
paragraph 13 on p. 121 founding affidavit of Agriven. Now according
to Absa Bank the allegation was incorrect. It is quite obvious
that
Absa Bank was so aggrieved by the allegation it considered untrue
that it decided to intervene in order to protect its image
unfairly
tarnished by what it regarded as false accusation. According to the
intervening creditor the respondent was commercially
insolvent and
had committed an act of insolvency in terms of section 8(g). In this
regard the intervening creditor relied on annexure
“HV6”
dated 11 April 2006 which was attached to the application of the
first creditor, Agriven. This was the second
reasons which prompted
the second creditor to intervene.
[26] The third reason
that prompted Absa Bank Limited to bring an intervention application
is to be found at paragraph 24, founding
affidavit. See p. 24 of the
record.
“24.
Ek het reeds
gehandel met die redes waarom ABSA op hierdie stadium eers toetree.
Dit was ABSA se houding deurgaans, dat die Respondent
tot en met die
laaste geleentheid gegee moet word om te poog om uit sy finansiële
penarie te kom en doen ek met eerbied aan
die hand dat die Bank se
houding deurgaans spreek van tegemoetkomendheid. Die Respondent kon
tot en met
26
Mei 2006
,
nie daarin slaag om ‘n bevredigende reëling met sy
skuldeisers te tref nie. Die Respondent het voorts opgehou met
die
bewerking van die aartappeloes. Die Bank het in voormelde
omstandighede besluit, om dringend toe te tree tot die aansoek om
sekwestrasie vir die redes hierin tevore uiteengesit.”
[27] It
was also contented on behalf of the intervening creditor that, as the
biggest of the respondent’s creditors, coupled
with the fact
that the intervening creditor was intimately involved in the
respondent’s financial affairs, it was best placed
to drive
the
sequestration proceedings against the respondent. This was the
fourth reason relied upon to justify the intervention application.
[28] The indebtedness of
the respondent to the intervening creditor as on 27 June 2006
consisted of the following five debts:
28.1 i.r.o.
acc 470146176 R1038215.05 anx “b” p. 36
28.2 i
.r.o.
acc 8059395404 R860391.42 anx “c” p. 37
28.3 i
.r.o.
acc 8059912373 R1112926.11 anx “d” p. 38
28.4 i.r.o.
acc 67808288 R110737.76 anx “e” p. 39
28.5 i
.r.o.acc
65673113 R180183.81 anx “f” p. 40
Total R3302454.10
[29] There exists a
familiar class of grounds on which the relief of intervention is
customarily sought according to caselaw. However,
the class of such
usual grounds remains just that. Such grounds are by no means
exhaustively defined. Since the remedy of intervention
is
discretionary, the list is naturally open-ended. To contend, as the
respondent did, that since, in the instant case, the reasons
advanced
by the second creditor for its decision to intervene were not covered
by the usual grounds, the intervention fell to be
refused, would
erode the discretionary nature of the remedy.
[30] In
the case of
FIRSTRAND
BANK LTD
,
supra
at par. 760h Flemming DJP said the following:
“
T
here
was no reason why the new party could not wait another three weeks or
so to see what the outcome is of the applicant's application
for
winding-up. It has not even attempted to demonstrate any reason. In
the circumstances the starting point ought to be that there
was no
justification for incurring costs to achieve a result which was
possibly or probably underway in any event.”
[31] It
must be kept in mind that in this case the respondent had been
endeavouring
,
with the backing of the intervening creditor, to reach some
compromise with its creditors. Although the creditors’ meeting
held on 26 June 2006 yielded no fruitful result, it was only one
creditor who was against the idea of accommodating the respondent
in
one way or the other. This was according to the respondent’s
own version. The setback of that day notwithstanding the
respondent
did not give up hope. He was still entertaining the hope that he
might persuade his creditors on or before 29 June
2006 to abandon the
idea of sequestrating him. If he could succeed, there was, in theory
at least, a chance, however remote, that
the primary sequestration
application might be withdrawn. However, it was not the intervening
creditor’s case that it was
prompted to seek intervention by
the fear of that remote possibility.
[32] By
13 June 2006 the second creditor, by its own version, had come to
realise and to accept that the sequestration of the respondent
was
inevitable. The process had become irreversible. It was not only to
the advantage of the general body of the respondent’s
creditors, but also to the respondent as well to accelerate the
process and to harvest the potatoes which the respondent no longer
had the capacity to harvest.
[33] The
intervention application, although it had all the attributes of an
independent application, it was not a concurrent application.
The
intervener knew about the primary application sometime before the
secondary application was launched. Therefore, the second
creditor
could not permissibly intervene on the grounds of its application
been a concurrent application. Both the notice of motion
and the
founding affidavit clearly indicate that the intervener did not rely
on its own fresh course of action and its own peculiar
facts to such
extend. The second creditor heavily relied on annexure “HV6”
of the first creditor’s application.
That annexure was a
letter by the respondent dated 11 April 2006. When the second
creditor presented its application on 28 June
2006 it was fully aware
of the particular annexure. The second creditor was left in no doubt
after reading the founding affidavit,
the answering affidavit, the
replying affidavit and all the annexures thereto pertaining to the
primary application that the respondent
had committed an act of
insolvency in terms of section 8(g). What is more important is that
it was never contended by or on behalf
of the intervening creditor
that the first creditor’s application for the sequestration of
the respondent was not likely
to succeed. It seems to me that the
sequestration of the respondent was likely to succeed with or without
the intervention of
the second creditor.
[34] The
reasons advanced by the intervener were not flimsy reasons. They
were naturally understandable. I was persuaded, at the
time the
matter was argued before me, that the reasons given by the second
creditor, collectively considered, justified the grant
of leave to
intervene. But now that I have revisited the facts and the
submissions made, I cannot with conviction say so again.
None of
those reasons advanced by the intervener, individually or
cumulatively would contribute something without which the provisional
order of sequestration was unlikely to be granted. I am now
convinced that I allowed the second creditor to intervene whereas
the
primary application was likely to succeed in securing the relief
which both the first and the second creditor wanted. Be that
as it
may, it is now an accomplish fact that the second creditor intervened
in this proceedings with the leave I granted. The
second creditor
could well have waited for the outcome of the first creditor’s
application.
[35] I
am not persuaded that the intervener’s decision was induced by
the notice to run up the costs. Elsewhere in this judgment
I was at
pains to indicate the reasons which prompted the second creditor to
come to the party. In view of my finding that I erroneously
allowed
the second creditor to intervene, it follows therefore that an
injustice will be done to the respondent if I were to burden
the
respondent with the costs pertaining to the intervention application.
Similarly, I am of the view that considerations of fairness
and
justice demand that I should not saddle the intervener with the costs
of the intervention application. In the circumstances
I am inclined
to make no order as to costs one way or the other.
[36] This
matter has doubly embarrassed. Firstly, because it took me such a
long time to get it out. Justice delayed is justice
denied.
Secondly, there are no reasons to sustain the order I made on 10
August 2006. I tender my profound apology to the parties
involved.
[37] In
the result I make the following order:
37.1 The
rules relating to formal time limits and service of applications as
prescribed in rule 6(12) are relaxed and the matter
is heard as an
urgent application.
37.2 The
second creditor, Absa Bank Limited, is hereby allowed to intervene as
an intervening creditor in the primary sequestration
application
filed under case no. 2090/06.
37.3 The
main relief sought namely, the placing of the estate of the
respondent under provisional order of sequestration in the
hands of
the Master of the High Court, stands over for later adjudication.
37.4 There
shall be no order as to costs one way or the other.
______________
M.H. RAMPAI, J
On
behalf of the
intervener : Adv.
S.J. Reinders
Instructed
by:
E
G Cooper & Sons Inc
BLOEMFONTEIN
On
behalf
of
the respondent: Adv. P.U. Fischer
Instructed
by:
Martins
Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
/sp
2008/06/11
12:49 PM
2008/06/12
09:30 AM