S v Phire (257/08) [2008] ZAFSHC 31 (26 May 2008)

80 Reportability
Criminal Procedure

Brief Summary

Criminal Procedure — Special review — Conviction for trespassing and possession of unwrought metal — Accused arrested on premises of Beatrix Mine with unwrought gold — Regional Court questioned the legality of the conviction based on insufficient evidence — No proof of unlawful presence on the premises or that the metal was indeed unwrought gold — State failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt — Convictions set aside.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This was a special review in the High Court of South Africa (Orange Free State Provincial Division) arising from criminal proceedings in the magistrates’ courts. The matter reached the High Court after the Regional Court Magistrate, Welkom referred it on special review in terms of section 304 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1972 (as cited in the judgment).


The parties were the State and Moses Phire (the accused). The accused had been convicted in the magistrates’ court on two counts, namely trespassing (a contravention of section 1(1)(a) of Act 6 of 1959, as stated) and possession of unwrought metal (a contravention of section 143(3) of Act 20 of 1967, as stated). The matter was initially referred to the regional court for sentence in terms of section 116 of the CPA, apparently because the trial magistrate considered that the accused’s previous convictions might justify a sentence beyond the sentencing jurisdiction of the magistrates’ court.


The regional court was not satisfied that the proceedings were in accordance with justice and requested reasons relating to the convictions on both counts. The general subject-matter of the dispute on review was whether the convictions were sustainable on the evidence and whether the trial court had properly applied the standard of proof and evidentiary rules, particularly in relation to proof of unlawful presence for trespassing and proof that the substance was unwrought gold, including issues of admissibility and chain of custody.


2. Material Facts


The State’s case, as summarised by the High Court, was that the accused was arrested by a police officer, Dawid de Villiers, who stated that he had been a member of the South African Police Services for 17 years and dealt with cases concerning theft of unwrought gold and metal. The arrest occurred after De Villiers received information from an unspecified source. According to De Villiers, he found the accused inside the premises of Beatrix Mine.


De Villiers alleged that he took the accused to a toilet to conduct a search and found a plastic packet containing unwrought gold on the accused’s person, specifically in his underwear. The judgment indicates that the evidence was not “disputed categorically and on every allegation” by the defence representative, but it was denied by the accused when he testified.


The accused’s position, as accepted by the reviewing court as relevant to the assessment, was that he denied the allegations in his plea explanation and put the State to the proof. He also denied that he was on the mine premises when arrested.


In relation to the trespassing count, the High Court treated as materially significant that there was no evidence from any person connected to Beatrix Mine establishing that the accused was not an employee or otherwise had no right to be on the premises. The reviewing court also noted that De Villiers was purportedly with other personnel during the arrest and search, yet no other State witness was called.


In relation to the possession of unwrought metal count, the High Court treated it as important that insufficient evidence was adduced to establish that De Villiers was an expert capable of identifying or analysing unwrought metal (or that he performed any analysis). The High Court further treated as material the absence of evidence proving that the metal supposedly found in the accused’s possession was the same item that was sent for analysis and found to be gold, and it highlighted that the chain of events (chain of custody) was not proved.


The High Court also considered as material that the trial magistrate relied on a section 212 affidavit and on photographs attached to the record, but that these items were not admitted in accordance with the rules of evidence, and no proper basis was laid for their admission.


3. Legal Issues


The central questions for determination on special review were whether the convictions on each count were in accordance with justice and supported by admissible evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt.


In respect of the trespassing conviction, the key issue was whether the State had proved the elements identified as necessary for a conviction (including that the accused was unlawfully on the premises of a lawful owner or occupier, with the relevant intent), and whether the evidentiary foundation existed to show that the accused lacked any right to be on the mine premises.


In respect of the possession of unwrought metal conviction, the principal issue was whether the State proved beyond reasonable doubt that the substance allegedly found on the accused was indeed unwrought gold, including whether the proof depended on properly admitted expert or analytical evidence, and whether the chain linking the item found to any analysis result was established.


The dispute engaged mixed considerations of fact (what occurred at arrest; what was found; whether the accused was on the premises), the application of legal rules to the facts (whether the proven facts satisfied the offences charged), and compliance with evidentiary rules affecting admissibility and weight (in particular the use of a section 212 affidavit and photographs, and the proof of chain of custody).


4. Court’s Reasoning


The High Court evaluated whether the convictions could stand given the evidentiary shortcomings identified by the regional magistrate and apparent from the record. In relation to count 1 (trespassing), the court emphasised that there was no evidence from mine personnel to establish that the accused was not an employee or that he had no right to be on the premises. This deficiency was treated as particularly significant because the accused denied being on the premises at all when arrested, and the court noted that other personnel were said to be present during the arrest and search but were not called as witnesses.


The court further noted that the record disclosed no basis given by the trial magistrate for accepting De Villiers’ version and rejecting the accused’s denial. On this footing, the High Court concluded that the conviction on the trespassing count could not be supported on the evidence as presented.


In relation to count 2 (possession of unwrought metal), the High Court held that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the substance was unwrought gold. The court observed that De Villiers’ experience in policing such cases did not, on the evidence, establish that he was an expert in identifying or analysing unwrought metal, nor was there evidence that he analysed the substance in question. The court also held that the State failed to prove the necessary continuity between the item allegedly found and any subsequent analysis, noting that the chain of events was not proven.


A central aspect of the court’s reasoning concerned admissibility. The court held that the trial magistrate relied on a section 212 affidavit that was not admitted in accordance with the rules of evidence, and similarly relied on photographs attached to the record that were also not properly admitted and for which no foundation was laid. In support of the need for proper evidentiary compliance, the court referred to academic authority (CWH Schmidt & H Rademeyer: Law of Evidence, Issue 4) and case law, including S v Mvulha 1965 (2) SA 113 (O).


The High Court also reaffirmed the criminal standard of proof and the proper approach to assessing guilt. It stated that the test is not whether the court believes the accused, but whether, having regard to the totality of the evidence and the probabilities and improbabilities on both sides, the court is satisfied that the accused is guilty. The court referred to S v V 2000 (1) SACR 453 (SCA) and S v Chabalala 2003 (1) SACR 134 (SCA) in this regard. Applying these principles, the court held that the State did not prove either count beyond reasonable doubt, and that the accused was entitled to the benefit of the doubt.


5. Outcome and Relief


The High Court set aside the convictions on both counts. No separate or additional relief is reflected beyond the setting aside of the convictions, and the judgment as provided does not record a distinct costs order.


Cases Cited


S v Mvulha 1965 (2) SA 113 (O).


S v V 2000 (1) SACR 453 (SCA).


S v Chabalala 2003 (1) SACR 134 (SCA).


Legislation Cited


Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1972 (as cited), including sections 304, 116, and 212.


Act 6 of 1959, section 1(1)(a) (trespassing), as cited.


Act 20 of 1967, section 143(3) (possession of unwrought metal), as cited.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were expressly cited in the judgment as provided. The judgment referred instead to compliance with the rules of evidence relating to the admission of a section 212 affidavit and photographs.


Held


The High Court held that the proceedings were not in accordance with justice because the evidence did not establish, beyond reasonable doubt, the essential elements of either offence and because the trial court relied on materials (a section 212 affidavit and photographs) that were not properly admitted. The convictions for trespassing and for possession of unwrought metal were accordingly set aside.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A criminal conviction requires proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, assessed on the totality of the evidence with due regard to probabilities and improbabilities, rather than on whether the court subjectively believes or disbelieves the accused.


An accused person is entitled to an acquittal where the defence version is reasonably possibly true, and where doubt remains after consideration of all material factors.


Where the State relies on documentary or formal evidence such as a section 212 affidavit, it must be properly admitted in accordance with evidentiary rules; similarly, demonstrative material such as photographs must be admitted on a proper evidentiary basis. Where such material is not properly admitted, it cannot lawfully found a conviction.


For offences requiring proof of the nature of a substance (such as unwrought gold), the State must adduce sufficient admissible evidence to establish that nature, and must prove the chain of events linking the item allegedly found to any analysis or identification relied upon.

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[2008] ZAFSHC 31
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S v Phire (257/08) [2008] ZAFSHC 31 (26 May 2008)

IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
(ORANGE
FREE STATE PROVINCIAL DIVISION)
Review
No. : 257/08
In
the special review between:-
THE
STATE
versus
MOSES PHIRE
_____________________________________________________
CORAM:
VAN
ZYL J
et
MOCUMIE,
J
JUDGMENT
BY:
MOCUMIE,
J
_____________________________________________________
DELIVERED
ON:
26
MAY 2008
_____________________________________________________
SPECIAL REVIEW
_____________________________________________________
[1] The
matter was sent to this Court on special review in terms of section
304 of the Criminal Procedure Act, 51 of 1972, (“the
CPA”) by the
Regional Court Magistrate, Welkom. The matter was initially referred
to the Regional Court for sentence in terms
of section 116 of the
CPA, apparently as the Magistrate was of the view that it warranted a
sentence above the jurisdiction of the
Magistrate Court on the basis
of the accused’s previous convictions.
[2] The
Regional Court was not satisfied that the proceedings were in
accordance with justice and requested reasons for the conviction
on
counts of contravention of section 1(1)(a), Act 6 of 1959
(trespassing) and contravention of section 143(3), Act 20 of 1967
(possession
of unwrought metal).
[3] In
short the accused was arrested by a police officer, one Dawid de
Villiers, who alleged that he has been a member of the South
African
Police Services for 17 years dealing with cases of theft of unwrought
gold and metal. He arrested the accused after he had
received
information from some source. When he arrested the accused, he found
him inside the premises of Beatrix Mine. He took
him to a toilet to
search him and found a plastic containing unwrought gold on his
person in his underwear. This evidence, although
not disputed
categorically and on every allegation by the accused’s legal
representative on his behalf, was denied by the accused
when he
testified. In his plea explanation too the accused denied all the
allegations, putting the State to the prove thereof.
[4] The Regional
Magistrate’s views with regard to the correctness of these
proceedings are set out in a helpful memorandum which
accompanied the
original record when it was sent for special review. The crux of his
memorandum is that for an accused to be convicted
of contravention of
section 1 of Act 6 of 1956 (s)he must have been unlawfully on the
premises of a lawful owner or occupant with
the intent to remain
thereon. He also contended that for the accused to be convicted of
contravention of section 143(3), Act 20 of
1967 the State must prove
beyond reasonable doubt that the metal found in possession of the
accused was indeed unwrought gold.
[5] In respect of count
1, there is no evidence from any Beatrix Mine personnel to the effect
that the accused was not an employee
of the said mine or had no right
to be on the premises. Moreso because the accused denied being on the
premises when he was arrested.
De Villiers was purportedly with
other personnel when he arrested the accused, searched him and found
the particular substance on
his person. Yet no other State witness
was called. No basis is given by the trial Magistrate why he believed
De Villiers and not
the accused. On this basis alone the conviction
on this charge ought not to stand.
[6] In respect of count 2
the trial Magistrate had to deal with unwrought metal. No sufficient
evidence was placed before the trial
Court that De Villiers apart
from working for the SAPS for 17 years and attached to the unit for
an undisclosed period investigating
theft of unwrought metal, was an
expert in that field or at least had the expertise to analyse
unwrought metal and that he indeed
analysed the metal in question.
No evidence was placed before the Court to prove that the same metal
that was supposedly found in
the accused’s possession was the same
that was sent for analysis and found to be gold.
[7] As
the Regional Magistrate correctly pointed out, the chain of events
was not proven. The Magistrate relied for his or her conviction
on a
section 212 (of the CPA) affidavit which was not admitted in terms of
the rules of evidence. The Magistrate furthermore relied
on
photographs that are attached to the record but were also not
admitted in terms of the evidentiary rules nor was there any basis
laid for such admission. See
CWH
Schmidt & H Rademeyer: Law of Evidence. Issue 4
at 11-6;
S
v Mvulha
1965 (2) SA 113
(O) This conviction also ought not to stand.
[8] The
test in a criminal trial is not whether the Court believes the
accused or not. But whether the Court looking at the evidence
in
total taking into consideration the probabilities and improbabilities
on both sides is satisfied that the accused is guilty.
This
has been repeated in numerous cases including recently by the Supreme
Court of Appeal in
S
v V
2000 (1) SACR 453
SCA at 455b-c;
S
v Chabalala
2003 (1) SACR 134
(SCA) at 139i-j.
[9] The
State bears the onus, strenuous as it may sound to prove its case
beyond reasonable doubt. The accused on the other hand
needs only
give a reasonably possibly true story. In my view, the State failed
to prove its case in respect of both counts beyond
reasonable doubt.
It is trite that where there is doubt based on all factors considered
the accused is entitled to the benefit of
the doubt.
[10] In
the circumstances I make the following order:
The convictions in
respect of both counts are set aside.
_______________
B.C. MOCUMIE, J
I concur.
____________
C
VAN ZYL, J
/sp