De Klerk v S (AR 326/2009) [2009] ZAKZPHC 48; 2010 (2) SACR 40 (KZP) (8 October 2009)

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[2009] ZAKZPHC 48
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De Klerk v S (AR 326/2009) [2009] ZAKZPHC 48; 2010 (2) SACR 40 (KZP) (8 October 2009)

20
REPORTABLE
IN THE KWAZULU-NATAL HIGH COURT,
PIETERMARITZBURG
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
APPEAL NO. AR 326/2009
In the matter between:
WILLEM ABRAHAM DE KLERK Appellant
and
THE STATE Respondent
_______________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
_______________________________________________________________
GORVEN J
The appellant in this matter, who was 39 years old at the time of
sentence, was charged with three counts of indecent assault
on
sisters aged 6, 7 and 11 years old respectively committed during
2007. He pleaded guilty to all three counts and submitted
a
statement in terms of s112 of the Criminal Procedure Act, No 51 of
1977 (“the Act”). This statement was accepted as accurate
by the
State and the appellant was duly convicted. No previous convictions
were proved.
The learned magistrate in the regional division of Durban sentenced
the appellant to 10 years’ imprisonment on each count which

provided an effective sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment. The
appellant was granted leave to appeal against the sentence but
has
been in prison since being sentenced on 17 November 2008.
The appellant called Dr Lynette Roux (“Roux”) as a witness on
sentence. She is a Clinical Psychologist with 22 years’
experience, including specialisations in child psychology and
psycho-social matters with respect to criminal matters, divorce
and
sexual abuse. Her experience included conducting sex-abuse
assessments on children, preparing reports and testifying in court

as well as assessing sexual offenders, preparing reports and
testifying in court to assist in sentencing. She gave evidence that

she had compiled a report and this was introduced as exhibit B. She
had conducted an assessment on the appellant by way of at
least
three interviews and a number of tests which took place over a six
week period. She had read the statements of the three
children and
their parents (which were never introduced in evidence). She gave
evidence of the findings at which she arrived.
Among the most important findings were that a distinction must be
drawn between fixated and regressed offenders. Fixated offenders

have a persistent, continual and compulsive attraction to children,
have not developed past the point where they find children

attractive and have a high incidence of recidivism. Regressed
offenders, on the other hand, have the behaviour emerge in
adulthood.
The behaviour is a departure from the offender’s
attraction to adults. The children victimised are those to whom the
offenders
have easy access. They are not fixated on children and are
at a lower risk of re-offending if treated. They are capable of
feeling
remorse for their actions. The appellant fitted into the
category of regressed offender.
She testified that the distinction must also be drawn between an
opportunistic and predatory sexual offender. The latter place

themselves in a position where they can meet potential victims and
have the opportunity to interact with them in an unsupervised
way.
Opportunistic offenders do not specifically place themselves in a
position to identify victims but use the opportunity to
engage in
criminal sexual activity after an opportunity arises. The appellant
fell into the category of opportunistic offender.
She also testified that, according to the tests, the appellant is
able to accept and exhibit socially acceptable norms and has
the
personality structure to control his behaviour accordingly most of
the time. He is not a physically aggressive person although
he feels
some hostility to authority figures. He is suffering from chronic
depression which has not been treated. He has poor
coping skills. He
understands that what he did was wrong and feels remorse and a
strong sense of guilt for his behaviour. This
remorse was borne out
by his guilty plea.
She summarised her findings as follows:
As Mr de Klerk has admitted to being repeatedly sexually
involved with three pre-pubescent girls he can be classified as a
paedophile.
Furthermore, as he has previously been sexually attracted
to and involved with adult women and as there is evidence that he had

been under stress during the period of time that he committed the
crimes, he can be classified as being a regressed sexual offender.
It
is evident from the children’s statements as well as Mr de Klerk’s
account of the events that the criminal behaviour was
of a nonviolent
type and he furthermore fits the category of a nonviolent child
molester. Lastly from the statements obtained from
the three victims
as well as their parents and Mr de Klerk’s account of the events,
it appears that he did not actively seek
out his victims but found
himself in circumstances that made his victims available to him.
Therefore he can be classified as being
an opportunistic paedophile.
She went on to testify that studies have shown that paedophiles do
not respond well to being incarcerated and that some who
had been
incarcerated had later started to resort to violence. The conclusion
in the studies is that the incarceration itself
acts as a catalyst
for the later aggression on victims. It is not possible to cure
paedophilia – at best it is possible to
rehabilitate offenders in
the sense that they are forever in a state of rehabilitation. The
prognosis is therefore a controversial
issue. Research shows that
certain characteristics make their rehabilitation more successful,
in particular the ability to feel
and show compassion towards
others. She found that the appellant demonstrated these
characteristics, along with insight into
his behaviour and some
understanding of the negative effect that it had on the children.
Treatment programmes were most successful
when they involved group
therapy within the context of a supportive family. This was
confirmed by therapists who run the Child
Abuse Treatment and
Training Services (“CATTS”) programme. She considered the
appellant to be a good candidate for that programme.
She testified that incarceration, whilst it may serve the short-term
need for society to be protected, may result in the appellant
being
more of a threat to society than he was previously. Incarceration
would be likely to exacerbate some of the issues requiring

therapeutic intervention and would rule out family therapy. As
regards recidivism, this is lessened where offenders attend and

co-operate with treatment programmes. Since the appellant had
voluntarily sought to enter the CATTS programme, for which he had
to
pay himself, and since he was remorseful and had insight into his
behaviour, there were indications that therapeutic interventions

could succeed and minimise the possibility of recidivism. Further
factors in lowering the rate of recidivism are the support
of a
family or family members and whether the offender was gainfully
employed. The appellant had a supportive brother and was
employed by
him. In addition, he had voluntarily removed from Durban where the
offences were committed having told the mother
of the children and
was living with his brother and working on a construction site where
contact with children was minimal.
She recommended three interventions, viz.:
Psychopharmacological intervention for the appellant’s
depression.
That he be given the opportunity to participate in a sexual
offender’s programme of a group therapy nature and strongly
recommended the CATTS programme.
Individual psychotherapeutic intervention of an intensive nature
for a period of three years.
The State cross-examined Dr Roux but no features emerged which
detracted from her evidence. The State accepted a report on the

suitability of the appellant for a sentence of correctional
supervision by a psychologist in the employ of the department of

correctional services, Durban which confirmed that the appellant was
a suitable candidate for correctional supervision. In addition
the
appellant’s attorney handed up a letter from CATTS stating that
the appellant had attended two assessment sessions and
had been
admitted to the adult sexual offender programme which would commence
with group sessions in January 2009. The State
called no witnesses.
The learned magistrate misdirected himself in certain respects. He
stated that Dr Roux had conceded that she only considered
the
personal circumstances of the appellant. This is not correct. She
testified that the incarceration of the appellant was likely
to be
to the detriment of society as increasing the possibility of
recidivism. She also dealt exhaustively with the best way
to avoid
recidivism and applied this to the appellant. The magistrate also
held that Dr Roux had only been aware of some of the
allegations in
the charges. Her evidence, however, was that she had read the
statements of the children and their parents and
that the appellant
had himself informed her of the allegations in the charges. He found
that, because Dr Roux cited authority
for that part of her report
dealing with rates of recidivism, she could not herself conclude
that the appellant fell into a certain
category. This has no
foundation whatsoever. He said that he had not been persuaded to
consider a non-custodial sentence when
it was clear that he was of
the view that a non-custodial sentence equated to a lenient
sentence. He emphasised that only a sentence
of incarceration would
act as a deterrent without considering other means of deterrence.
For these and other misdirections, this
court is at large to set
aside the sentence and impose an appropriate sentence.
In addition to the misdirections, I am of the view that the sentence
is so shockingly inappropriate as to warrant interference
on appeal.
The learned magistrate claimed to have looked at comparative cases
in arriving at sentence. In reality, he appears
to have considered
only one unreported case without saying anything more than that this
involved one count, the accused in that
matter did not plead guilty
and had received a sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment which had
been upheld on appeal. He did not
mention whether, in that matter,
similar expert evidence had been led or point to any other factors
which would provide a proper
comparison. There was a clear bias to
the punitive and deterrent aspects in his reasons for sentence.
The Constitutional Court has held that, whilst deterrence was
previously considered the main purpose of punishment with other

objects being accessory
1
,
the introduction of correctional supervision as a sentencing option
has resulted in a shift from retribution to rehabilitation
2
.
This still requires an assessment of the traditional triad of the
personal circumstances of the appellant, the nature of the
crimes
under review and the interests of society. It is geared to punish
and rehabilitate the offender within the community leaving
his or
her work and domestic routines intact, and without the negative
influences of prison.
3
The learned magistrate, in addition to the positive misdirections
referred to above, overlooked at least four factors. First,
the fact
that correctional supervision was introduced in order to distinguish
between two types of offenders, those who should
be removed from
society and imprisoned and those who, although deserving of
punishment, should not be so removed.
4
He failed to make this initial enquiry at all. In the second place,
he characterised correctional supervision as being lenient.
His
rejection of it saw it as having no deterrent effect. Our courts
have held that it is not a lenient option but one meeting
different
factors.
5
There are aspects of correctional supervision which are highly
punitive, including a condition of house arrest where the offender

lives within the community but, to everyone’s knowledge, is
allowed to leave the property only in limited circumstances. In

addition, most sentences of correctional supervision require
community service to be rendered which, again, exposes the offender

to the gaze of members of the community in trying circumstances.
Thirdly the learned magistrate overlooked the positive measures

which can be used to require active co-operation in his
rehabilitation on pain of being sent to prison. These measures also
reduce the long-term danger to society of recidivism by allowing for
the rehabilitation of the offender. In so doing, he overlooked
the
evidence of Dr Roux to the effect that the interests of society
would be better served by a sentence of correctional supervision

coupled with conditions requiring the appellant to take advantage of
the interventions recommended by her than would incarceration.

Fourthly, he overlooked the provisions of s276(3)(a) of the Act
which provides that a court is not prohibited from imposing a

suspended period of imprisonment along with correctional
supervision. This can be used to act as a deterrent to recidivism.
During argument it was pointed out to both sets of counsel that they
had not dealt with other comparable cases and had not even
made
available the one case referred to by the magistrate. An opportunity
was given to them to address these issues and I am
grateful that
each provided supplementary written argument which was more helpful
in this regard. Ms Kander also provided a copy
of the judgment to
which the magistrate referred.
In the light of the above, I now turn to consider sentences passed
in some comparable cases. In doing so I am aware that each
case has
its own set of unique facts and cannot serve as anything more than a
rough guide to what might be an appropriate sentence
in the present
matter.
In
Naicker v S
6
the appellant was convicted on three counts. The first was of
indecent assault on his 7 year old step daughter, the second of

assaulting her as a means of ensuring that she did not disclose the
sexual abuse and the third of assault of her brother. He
pleaded not
guilty and maintained his innocence even on appeal. Ms Kander
submitted that the appellant in the present case had
no option but
to plead guilty since there were three competent child witnesses.
She also submitted that the disclosure took place
when the matter
was reported to the police but not by the appellant. What she
overlooks, however, is that the appellant made
the disclosure to the
mother of the complainants and voluntarily left for Johannesburg.
The fact that three witnesses were available
does not mean that a
conviction was guaranteed. As was said by Van den Heever JA
7
:
Even where an offence is brought to light, our
adversarial system often results in the courts failing the victims.
In
S v E
8
the appellant was a compiler and organiser of musical programmes at
a broadcasting corporation who had been convicted in a regional

court of 10 counts of immoral or indecent acts. The convictions
related to the period between 1983 -1988 at the start of which

period the appellant was 35 years of age. The appellant's modus
operandi was to invite teenage boys (all complainants were between

the ages of 14 and 17) to his home where he would show them
pornographic videos and then indulge in masturbation with them. The

appellant was a first offender. The regional magistrate was of the
opinion that in spite of the mitigating factors and the appellant's

urgent need for non-custodial treatment a prison sentence was called
for as nothing less would be a sufficient deterrent to others.
The
magistrate accordingly took the 10 counts as one for the purpose of
sentence and sentenced the appellant to four years' imprisonment
all
of which, save for six months, was conditionally suspended. The
Appellate Division held that the magistrate had misdirected
himself
in finding that the appellant's problem resulted in him having no
control and was not in the nature of an illness and
that his
prognosis was not good. These findings were not justified on the
evidence and led the magistrate to find aggravation
where he should
have found mitigation. The aggravating circumstances were that the
appellant had over the years not sought help
for his problem; that
the offences had not been committed in sudden temptation; that he
had told one of the complainants not
to assist the police; that he
had abused the reliance placed in him by one of the complainants
whose music career he had promised
to advance; and that he had
employed pornographic films to arouse the complainants. The court
held that correctional supervision
in terms of
s 276(1)(h)
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
seemed appropriate in the
circumstances and the matter was remitted to the regional court for
the imposition of correctional
supervision.
In
S v R
9
the appellant was a 25 year old primary school teacher who
pleaded guilty and was convicted on 6 counts of indecent assault of
his male pupils aged between 11 and 13 years over a period of 5
months. The precise nature of the offences did not appear from
the
report except that on one occasion he made a video recording of a
naked boy while he masturbated. He also stood by while
the boys
committed indecent acts with each other. Despite a report by a
clinical psychologist that he might be rehabilitated
with
comprehensive psychotherapy, which the court accepted, the court
held that there could be no certainty of the possibilities
of
rehabilitation. In the circumstances a sentence of correctional
supervision was possible but not appropriate. His convictions
had
been taken together for the purpose of sentence. The sentence of 5
years’ imprisonment of which 2 were conditionally suspended
was
held to be severe but not so inappropriate that it could be
interfered with and was confirmed on appeal with an additional
order
that the appellant receive the proposed psychotherapy within the
prison environment if possible.
In
S v Gerber
10
a 30 year old first offender who pleaded guilty had sucked the
private parts of his 10 year old daughter. No evidence was led
to
prove that he suffered from any psychological defects. No evidence
was led to show that the complainant had suffered from
psychological
problems. The social worker testified that correctional supervision
was not appropriate and this was not challenged
on appeal. A
sentence of 6 years’ imprisonment of which 2 was suspended was
reduced to 3 years’ of which 1 was suspended
for 5 years on the
basis that it differed to such an extent that interference was
justified.
In
S v Mohlakane
11
the accused was the complainant’s teacher and had indecently
assaulted her in his office where he saw her under pretext of

assisting her in passing an examination. He was sentenced to 18
months’ imprisonment by the trial court. He appealed against
both
conviction and sentence. He approached the complainant, who was 21
years old at the time, on a Friday, told her that she
had failed her
geography examination but that the position could be rectified and
told her to come to see him on the following
Monday. She did so and
he then suggested that they have sexual intercourse and proceeded to
touch her breasts, thighs and elsewhere
on her body. She avoided
the suggestion of sexual intercourse by suggesting that they
postpone that to the following day but
then reported the incident to
the principal. On appeal the court found mitigating circumstances
including his being a first offender,
married with 3 children, had
rendered valuable service to the community as a teacher, had
resigned his position, had suffered
shame, humiliation and contempt
in the eyes of his colleagues, pupils, the community at large and
possibly also his family. The
probation officer had recommended
correctional supervision. The trial court was held to have
overemphasised the seriousness
of the offence. The matter was
referred back to the trial court to impose a sentence of
correctional supervision and determine
appropriate conditions.
In
S v McMillan
12
the appellant, a 32 year old, had pleaded guilty and was convicted
of indecent assault on three young boys with ages ranging
around 9
to 12. On 5 occasions he had “die geslagsdele van jong seuns
betas en gevryf”. He was a first offender, was married,
his early
youth was unhappy and he was himself molested as a child. The
complainants were not sodomised or physically injured.
He suffered
from a sexual deviance and had an urgent need for intensive
psychiatric treatment over a long term. Expert witnesses
for the
State and the appellant had disagreed on the desirability of a
prison sentence. The forensic criminologist called by
the appellant
testified that correctional supervision was appropriate but conceded
that, in his unrehabilitated state, the appellant
would be a danger
to young boys and that any sentence, such as correctional
supervision, which placed the appellant back in the
community held a
risk for this vulnerable part of the community. The social worker
called by the State testified that psychotherapy
would be available
to the appellant in prison and recommended a prison sentence. The 5
counts were taken together for purposes
of sentence. He was
sentenced by the trial court to 10 years’ imprisonment. This
sentence was replaced with one of 5 years’
imprisonment in terms
of
s 276(1)(i)
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
.
The unreported judgment of
Coetzee v S
13
dealt
with a pastor who had been convicted of 5 counts relating to
indecent assault of three young female parishioners who were
16, 19
and 21 years old at the time of the offences. All of them were
sexually active at the time and had gone to the appellant
for
counselling. He pleaded not guilty and maintained his innocence
throughout. He was a first offender. A probation officer’s
report
and a correctional supervision report had been obtained. One deduced
remorse although it had not been articulated by the
appellant, the
other found no signs of remorse. One recommended correctional
supervision and the other said he was not a suitable
candidate and
raised practical difficulties. The magistrate sentenced him to six
years’ imprisonment of which two were conditionally
suspended. The
provincial division confirmed both the conviction and sentence. The
appellate division, to whom leave to appeal
against sentence only
had been granted, set aside the sentence and substituted it with
four years imprisonment in terms of s276(1)(h)
of the Act.
The Supreme Court of Appeal reviewed other similar cases and no
purpose would be served in repeating these here. Suffice it to
say
that, whilst one of the motivating factors in
Coetzee’s
case appears to have been that there was no evidence of permanent
psychological damage and that the complainants were no longer
young
and immature. The court, in imposing this sentence, stressed the
serious nature of the offences, despite reducing the sentence
on
appeal. It also took all the counts together for the purposes of
sentence even though they were separate offences committed
on
different occasions.
In
S v D
14
the appellant was convicted of one count of indecent assault and
sentenced to 6 years imprisonment of which 2 years were
conditionally
suspended. He was a 37 year old married man with two
children and a first offender. He had approached a group of street
children
and offered one of the group R10 to procure a woman for
him. The group of children drove with him to a lonely spot where he
took
one of the children, an 8 year old girl, into the cab of his
vehicle and, despite her struggles, gratified himself between her

legs. The court on appeal held that, since correctional supervision
did not contain a denunciatory element, a sentence of only

correctional supervision would not be adequate. The majority of the
court felt that this could be addressed by combining effective

incarceration in terms of s 276(1)(i) of the Act with suspended
imprisonment. He was sentenced to three years correctional

supervision and an additional two years suspended imprisonment.
There is no doubt that the appellant in this matter committed
heinous crimes on vulnerable young girls who had been left in his

care. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996,
entrenches the rights of children and the courts must do all in

their power to protect children and those rights. The crimes were
abhorrent and the learned magistrate was entirely correct to

emphasise how serious they were. There was, unfortunately, no
evidence led or submissions made concerning any psychological
harm
suffered by the children. That they have suffered psychological harm
is not to be doubted. I do not know why the State did
not make
investigations in this regard and bring such information to the
attention of the court prior to sentencing. It can only
be hoped
that the children and their parents have been offered psychotherapy
to address this and minimise it. As has often been
stated by our
courts, “[c]hildren are vulnerable to abuse, and the younger they
are, the more vulnerable they are. They are
usually abused by those
who think they can get away with it, and all too often do.”
15
Ms Kander, on behalf of the respondent, submitted in her
supplementary written argument, that the matter should be remitted
back to the magistrate for evidence of the state of the children to
be led. After anxious consideration, that course of action
does not
commend itself to me. No specific indication was given of what, if
any, evidence might be available and why it was not
led at the
trial. In addition, I am of the view that the evidence of Dr Roux
shows that there is a prospect of rehabilitation.
The appellant,
having pleaded guilty, showed further remorse. Contrary to what was
submitted by Ms Kander, he is the one who
informed the mother of the
children of his conduct and voluntarily removed himself from the
situation. He acted on his remorse.
He took steps to seek help and
would have commenced and possibly have completed the CATTS course
had the magistrate not imprisoned
him. That imprisonment and any
further period of imprisonment whilst awaiting the referral back to
the magistrate may well increase
the risk of recidivism and
therefore not be in the interests of the community at large. Whilst
I am aware that Dr Roux is an
expert witness whose opinions are
given in order to assist the court in arriving at its own
conclusions, I find her evidence
to be well researched and reasoned
and the conclusions correct and compelling.
Taken all of the above into account, I am of the view that the
counts should be taken together for purposes of sentence. I am
also
of the view, in the light of the evidence, that the appellant does
not fall into the category of offender who must be removed
from
society. Whilst there is a risk of recidivism, it is a highly
limited one which can be addressed within the ambit of correctional

supervision. I am therefore confident that correctional supervision
is appropriate in this instance. Having said this, it should
be
coupled to a suspended period of imprisonment which will be put into
effect if the appellant commits a similar offence during
the period
of suspension. As in
S v D
the denunciatory aspect and that
of deterrence, both of the appellant and of potential offenders, can
be adequately catered for
by this and stringent conditions for the
period of correctional supervision with which the appellant would
have to comply on
pain of incarceration.
In the event, I would propose that the appeal against sentence be
upheld and that the sentence imposed by the learned magistrate
be
set aside and substituted with the following sentence, the three
counts to be taken together for the purposes of sentence:
The accused is sentenced to a period of correctional supervision of
5 years in terms of
s276(1)(h)
of the
Criminal Procedure Act, No.
51 of 1977
.
Such correctional supervision is subject to the following
conditions in terms of s84 of the Correctional Services Act, No.
8
of 1959:
The accused, with due consideration of his work / general
co-operation and other relevant circumstances is placed under
house arrest for the duration of his sentence in order that the
accused is made aware of the element of punishment of the
sentence
option and by attempting to combat further criminality by means of
strict control or supervision.
The accused may not leave his residential or work address or
magisterial district without prior approval except for purposes
of
essential work or other reasons as the Commissioner of
Correctional Services my deem fit.
In order to meet the community’s expectations in terms of
retribution and compensation for crime, it is recommended that
the
accused does sixteen hours of free community service for each
month of the sentence of correctional supervision.
The accused shall attend the Orientation and Drug Information
Programme and participate in a sexual offender’s programme
of a
group therapy nature, preferably the Child Abuse Treatment and
Training Services (CATTS) programme, and shall be obliged
to
submit for an assessment and attend other programmes aimed at
improving his identified problem areas which may seem necessary

during the serving of the sentence.
The accused shall consult with the relevant persons who would be
able to provide psychopharmacological intervention for the

appellant’s depression.
The accused shall consult with a clinical psychologist with a
view to receiving individual psychotherapeutic intervention
of an
intensive nature for the period recommended by that psychologist.
The accused shall refrain from using alcohol and / or drugs and
not make himself guilty of criminal or other behaviour.
The Commissioner shall ensure that the conditions are complied
with and will act in terms of s 84B of the Correctional Services

Act if the conditions are breached.
The accused is, in addition, sentenced to a period of imprisonment
of five years which is wholly suspended for a period of
five years
on condition that the accused is not convicted of the offence of
rape or indecent assault committed during the period
of suspension.
________________________
GORVEN J
I agree and it is so ordered.
________________________
SWAIN J
Subsequent to this judgment being handed down, it has been brought
to our attention that the provisions of s276A(1)(b) provide
that no
period imposed in terms of s276(1)(h) may exceed three years. The
imposition of 5 years was therefore incompetent and
a patent error.
Paragraph 30.1 of the order is therefore amended to read:
30.1 The accused is sentenced to a period of correctional supervision
of 3 years in terms of
s276(1)(h)
of the
Criminal Procedure Act, No.
51 of 1977
.
_________________________
GORVEN J
I agree and it is so ordered.
_________________________
SWAIN J
Date of Appeal : 17 September 2009
Date of Judgment : 8 October 2009
Counsel for the Appellant : Adv E Zaca
Counsel for the Respondent : Adv C Kander
1
R v Karg
1961 (1) SA 231
(A).
2
S v Williams
1995 (2) SACR 251
(CC).
3
S v E
1992 (2) SACR 625
(A) at 633
a-b
.
4
S v R
1993 (1) SA 476
(A) at 488G. This dictum was approved
by the Constitutional Court in
S v M (Centre for Child Law as
Amicus Curiae)
[2007] ZACC 18
;
2007 (2) SACR 539
(CC) at para
[58]
.
5
S v R (supra)
at 488C-D,
S v M (supra)
at para [63]
6
The unreported judgment referred to by the magistrate, NPD Appeal
No. 1128/04.
7
In
S v D
1995 (1) SACR 259
(A) at 260g-h.
8
1992 (2) SACR 625
(A)
9
1995 (2) SACR 590
(A)
10
2001 (1) SACR 621
(W)
11
2003 (2) SACR 569
(O)
12
2003 (1) SACR 27
(SCA)
13
SCA Case No. 502/08, handed down on 30 September 2009.
14
1995 (1) SACR 259
(A) – referred to in fn 7.
15
S v D
at 260g.