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[1986] ZASCA 20
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Nkondo and Others v Minister of Law and Order and Another (22/86) [1986] ZASCA 20 (20 March 1986)
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(
APPELLATE DIVISION
)
In the matters between:
CURTIS EPHRAIM NKONDO AND 7 OTHERS
Appellants
and
MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER AND ANOTHER
Respondents
ARCHIB
ALD JACOB GUMEDE AND 5 OTHERS
Appellants
and
MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER AND ANOTHER
Respondents
MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER
Appellant
and
EDITH GUMEDE AND 6
OTHERS
Respondents.
Coram: RADIE, CJ, TRENGOVE, HOEXTER, BOTHA et VAN HEERDEN,
JJ
Heard
:
Delivered
:
18 February 1986.
JUDGMENT
RABIE, CJ
:
2
RABIE, CJ:
This judgment is concerned with
three appeals which were argued in this Court on the same day. The judgments
given by the Courts a
quo
in the three matters, which came before them by
way of urgent applications, have all been reported. See -
(1)
Nkondo and Others v. Minister of Law and Order
and Another
, 1985(2) S.A. 720 (W);
(2)
Gumede and Others v. Minister
of Law and Order
,
1985(2)
S.A. 529 (N); and
(3)
Gumede and Others v. Minister
of Law and Order
and
Another
, 1984(4) S.A. 915 (N).
The issue in the first and third of these cases was the validity of notices
which the Minister of Law and
Order/,
3 Order, purporting to act in terms of sec. 28(1) of the Internal
Security Act, No. 74 of 1982, had caused to be served on the various
applicants.
In both these cases an order setting aside the notices and ordering the release
of the applicants from detention was
sought. (The second respondent in these
cases was the member of the Prison Service who was in charge of the prison in
which the applicants
were detained.) In the second case the applicants
challenged the validity of notices which the Minister had issued under the
provisions
of sec. 28(1) of the Act, but which had not yet been served on the
persons for whom they were intended. The order sought in
that/
4 that case was that the notice be set aside.
The applicants in
the first and third cases have long since been released from detention, but it
remains necessary to decide whether
the notices which were issued in those cases
- and also the notices in the second case - were validly issued and, depending
on the
outcome of the appeals, to make appropriate orders as to costs.
Sec. 28(1) of the aforesaid Act reads as follows:
"28(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law or the common law
contained, the Minister may -
(a) if in his opinion there is reason
to apprehend that a particular person will commit an offence referred to in
section 54(1), (2) or (3);
(b) if he is satisfied that a particular
person engages in activities
which
endanger or are calculated to endanger
the/
5
the security of the State or the maintenance of law and order or that he
propagates or promotes or is likely to propagate or promote
such activities or
(c) if he has reason to suspect that a
particular person who has been convicte of an offence specified in schedule
2, engages or is likely to engage in activities which
endanger or are calculated
to endanger the security of the State or the maintenance of law and order, or
propagates or promotes or
is likely to propagate or promote such activities, by
a written notice signed by him and addressed to a member of the Prisons Service,
as defined in section 1 of the Prisons Act, 1959 (Act No 8 of 1959), who is in
charge of a prison referred to in section 20(1)(a)
of the said Act, direct that
the said person be detained in that prison."
Subsec. 2 of the section provides that a notice issued
under subsec. (1)
shall be deemed to be a warrant as referred
to/
6 to in sec. 27(2)(e) of the Prisons Act, No. 8 of 1959, and
that the person to whom the notice relates "shall be detained, in accordance
with the provisions of regulations made by the Minister of Justice, in the
prison in question for the period during which the notice
is in force." Sec.
28(3)(a) provides that a copy of a notice issued by the Minister under sec.
28(1) is to be delivered or tendered
by a police officer to the person
concerned, and that it "shall serve as a warrant for his arrest and
removal
to the prison in question by that police
officer." The copy of the notice
that is served on a person has to be accompanied by a written statement by the
Minister as provided
for in subsec. (3)(b) of
sec/
7
sec. 28, which reads as follows:
"(3)(b) A copy referred to in paragraph
(a) shall be accompanied by a written statement
by the Minister setting forth the reasons
for the detention of the person concerned and
so much of the information which induced the
Minister to issue the notice in question as
can, in the opinion of the Minister, be disclosed
without detriment to the public interest."
Subsec. (9)of the section provides that a person who has
been detained by
virtue of a notice issued by the Minister
may make representations and submit
information to the
Minister. It reads as follows:
"(9) Any person detained by virtue of the provisions of subsection (2) may at
any time within a period of fourteen days as from the
date upon which the copy
of the notice in question, referred to in subsection (3), was
delivered/
8
delivered or tendered to him, make representations in writing
to the Minister relating to his detention or release, and may within
the said
period in writing submit to the Minister any other information relating to the
circumstances of his case."
Subsec. (10) provides that the Minister may at any time
withdraw a notice
issued by him in terms of subsec. (1).
The statements by the Minister which accompanied
the notices in issue in
the first and second case mentioned
above were, save for the names of the
persons concerned, all
in the same terms. They read as follows:
"STATEMENT BY THE MINISTER OF LAW AND ORDER IN TERMS OF SECTION 28(3)(b) OF
THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT, 1982 (ACT 74 OF 1982)
(a) REASON FOR THE DETENTION OF (name of
person) IN ACCORDANCE WITH A NOTICE ISSUED IN TERMS OF SECTION 28(1) OF THE
INTERNAL
SECURITY/
9
SECURITY ACT, 1982:
I am satisfied that the said (name of person) engages in activities which
endangen the maintenance of law and order.
(b) INFORMATION WHICH INDUCED ME TO ISSUE THE SAID NOTICE:
By acts and utterances the said (name
of person) did himself and in collaboratior
with other persons attempt to create a
revolutionary climate in the Republic of
South Africa thereby causing a situation
endangering the maintenance of law and
order.
No other information can, in my opinion, be disclosed without detriment to
the public interest."
The statements in issue in the third case were the same as
in the first
and second case, save that they did not contain
the final sentence thereof,
viz. "No other information can,
in my opinion, be disclosed without detriment to the
public interest."
Mr/
10
Mr
Mahomed
, who appeared for the appellants
in the first two
appeals and for the respondents in the
third appeal - i.e. for all the persons against whom
notices of detention
were issued by the Minister - attacked
the notices issued by the Minister on
several grounds.
The first of these grounds - a ground which pertains
to
all three of the appeals - is that the statement by the
Minister which
accompanied each of the notices issued by
him did not comply with the
provisions of sec. 28(3)(b)
and that the notices were accordingly invalid.
Counsel
for the Minister conceded that if the Minister's statement
which
accompanied the notices did not comply with the
requirements of sec. 28(3)(b), the notices would be invalid.
The concession was, in my opinion, rightly made. Sec.28
(1)/......
11
(1) confers very wide powers on the Minister. He can, under paragraph (b) of
sec. 28(l) - the paragraph in issue in this case - order
the detention of a
person if, in his judgment, that person is a person as described in the said
paragraph, and it is to be noted
that he can issue such an order without first
giving the person concerned an opportunity of answering accusations that might
have
beer made against him. That no duty of
audi alteram partem
rests on
the Minister, appears clearly, in my opinion, from the opening words of sec.
28(1), and also from the fact that sec. 28(9)
provides for the making of
representations to the Minister only after a person has been detained under a
notice issued by the Minister.
In the light of these considerations it should be
concluded, in my view, that it is the intention of the Legislature that when
the
Minister/
12
Minister issues a notice of detention in the exercise of
the powers conferred on him by sec. 28(l), he must comply
with what sec.
28(3)(b) requires him to do, and that his
failure to do so will render the notice ineffective in law.
As was said by
Centlivres, C.J,, in
R. v. Sachs
, 1953(1)
S.A. 392 (at p. 400 C-D), a
case in which an order by the
Minister of Justice under sec. 9 of the
Suppression of
Communism Act, No. 44 of 1950, was in issue -
"... the Courts will treat as invalid the act
of persons to whom powers are entrusted when they
have not observed the procedure prescribed
by the statute which confers such powers."
See also
Sachs v. Minister of Justice
,
1934 A.D. 11
(a case to which
fuller reference will be made below), where Stratford, A.C.J., after stating (at
p. 37) that -
"In/
13
"In this division, at all events, no decision
affirms the right of a Court to interfere with
the honest exercise of a duly conferred discretion.'
went on to say:
"For the sake of greater caution I should perhaps add, that in exercising a
conferred discretion, the procedure laid down in terms
of its grant must, of
course, be observed as essential conditions of its exercise."
In submitting that the statement by the Minister which accompanied the
notices issued by him did not comply with the provisions of
sec. 28(3)(b), Mr
Mahomed
contended that the "reason" furnished therein for the detention
of the persons concerned did not constitute "reasons" within the
meaning of that
term in sec. 28(3)(b). He contended, also, that the "information" set out in the
Minister's
statement/
14 statement was not "information" within the meaning of that
term in sec. 28(3)(b). The "reason" set out in the statement counsel
submitted,
was merely a statement of the statutory ground on which the Minister purported
to act when he issued the notices, and
not a statement of his reasons for
issuing the notices. It was, counsel also submitted in this regard, merely the
Minister's "conclusion"
that the person concerned was a person as described in
sec. 28(l)(b), and not the Minister's reason, or reasons, for ordering such
person's detention. It is common cause between the parties that, in issuing the
notices with which we are concerned in these appeals,
the Minister purported to
act in terms of the provisions of sec. 28(1)(b) of the Act.
Sec./
15 These provisions, it will be recalled, empower the Minister to
order the detention of a person if he is "satisfied" that such person
"engages
in activities which endanger or are calculated to endanger the security of the
State or the maintenance of law and order
or that he propagates or promotes or
is likely to propagate or promote such activities", and it is clear that the
Minister, in setting
forth the "reason" for each of the detentions ordered by
him in the cases with which we are here concerned, followed part of the
wording
of sec. 28(1)(b). Counsel for the Minister contended that the word "reasons" in
sec. 28(3)(b) of the Act should be given
its ordinary grammatical meaning, and
that, when the Minister informed the persons concerned that he was detaining
them because he
was satisfied that they
engaged/
16 engaged in activities which endangered the maintenance of law
and order, he was stating his reason, within the ordinary grammatical
meaning of
that word, for ordering their detention, and not merely his "conclusion"
concerning them, or the statutory ground on which
he issued the notices. Counsel
contended, furthermore, that even if the "reason" furnished by the Minister
could be said to be a
"conclusion", or statutory ground, as submitted by Mr
Mahomed
, there was no reason why it could not also be regarded as the
"reason" for the detention of the persons concerned as envisaged by
sec.
28(3)(b), particularly since the Minister indicated on which of the several
grounds mentioned in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c)
of sec. 28(1) he issued the
notices.
To/
17 To determine the meaning of sec. 28(3)(b), and, more
particularly, of the word "reasons" occurring therein, one must examine the
wording of sec. 28 and have regard to the purpose and scheme of preventive
detention as they appear therefrom. (See
Rossouw v. Sachs
, 1964(2) S.A.
551 at p. 563H-564A). Sec. 28 provides, briefly put, for the detention of
persons in prison in order to prevent the
commission of certain offences or the
endangering of the security of the State or the maintenance of law and order.
The power to
detain persons for the purposes mentioned was conferred by
Parliament upon the Minister of Law and Order. He was entrusted with vast
powers. He can order the detention of a person without first giving that person
an opportunity of being heard.
It/
18 It is not difficult to conceive of circumstances in which it
might, for reasons of security, be unwise to let it be known to a
person that
the Minister was considering the possibility of taking action against him under
sec. 28(1), but the fact remains that
a person may, by the issue of a detention
order under sec. 28(1), be deprived of his freedom without having had an
opportunity of
answering allegations against him. The Minister cannot, of
course, act arbitrarily or capriciously. He must make his decision on
the basis
of information laid before him. This not only speaks for itself, but it also
appears clearly from sec. 28(3)(b), which
provides that the Minister must
furnish the person whom he has decided to detain with
so/
19 so much of the information which induced him to order the
detention as can, in his opinion, be disclosed without detriment to the
public
interest. (See also sec. 38 (2)(b), which requires the Minister to submit to the
board of review established under sec. 35
of the Act "all information" which
induced him to issue the detention order under review.) Sec. 28(9) provides that
a person who
has been served with a copy of a notice of detention (which copy
must be accompanied by the Minister's statement as referred to in
sec. 28(3)(b))
may make "representations in writing to the Minister relating to his detention
or release". These provisions show,
in my view, that the Legislature intended
that the person on whom a notice
has/
20 has been served should have a fair opportunity of
dealing with the reasons furnished by the Minister for his detention and of
persuading
the Minister that the issue of the order was unjustified. Merely to
be informed of the statutory ground on which the Minister found
against him
would hardly give the person concerned a fair opportunity of making
representations to the Minister as envisaged by sec,
28(9). In the written
statement which accompanied each of the notices issued by the Minister in the
three cases with which we are
here concerned, the Minister informed the person
concerned on what statutory ground he had ordered his detention, but in doing
that
he did not, in my opinion, inform that person of his reasons for doing so,
as required by sec. 28(3)(b).
My/
21
My aforesaid view is, I think, supported by
the judgment of this Court in
Sachs v. Minister of Justice
,
1934 A.D. 11.
Two statutory provisions were in issue in
that case, viz., subsections (12) and (13) of sec. 1 of the
Riotous
Assemblies and Criminal Law Amendment Act, No. 27
of 1914. (Both subsections
were inserted in the Act as
originally passed by sec. 1 of the Riotous
Assemblies
(Amendment) Act, No. 19 of 1930.) The Minister of Justice,
acting in terms
of the provisions of sec. 1(12), caused a
notice to be served on Sachs which
prohibited him from
being in certain areas for a period of one year.
The
subsection read as follows:
"1.(12) Whenever the Minister is satisfied that
any person is in any area promoting feelings
of hostility between the European inhabitants of
the Union on the one hand and any other section
the inhabitants of the Union on the other
hand/
22
hand, he may by notice under his hand, addressed and delivered or tendered to
such person prohibit him, after a period stated in such
notice being not less
than seven days from the date of such delivery or tender, and during a period
likewise stated therein, from
being within any area defined in such notice:
Provided that the Minister may at any time withdraw or modify any such notice
or grant such person permission in writing to visit
temporarily any place where
he is not permitted to be in terms of such notice."
Sachs, relying on the provisions of sec. 1(13), thereupon
requested the
Minister to furnish him with the reasons
for the notice and with a statement
of the information
which induced the Minister to issue the notice. Sec.
1(13) read as follows:
"1/
22 (a)
"1.(13) If any person to whom a notice has been delivered
or tendered under sub-section (12) requests the Minister in writing to furnish
him with the reasons for such notice, and with a statement of the information
which induced the Minister to issue such notice, the
Minister shall furnish such
person with a statement in writing setting forth his reasons for such notice and
so much of the information
which induced the Minister to issue such notice as
can, in his opinion, be disclosed without detriment to public policy."
The Minister furnished Sachs with five reasons why he
issued the notice,
but refused to furnish him with the
information which induced him to issue
the notice, saying
that it would in his opinion be detrimental to
the
public interest to disclose any of that information.
The Minister
later amplified his reasons and supplied
Sachs/
23
Sachs with some information. Sachs petitioned the
order Transvaal Provincial Division for an/setting aside the
notice, and it was contended on his behalf that the
reasons and
information furnished by the Minister did
not comply with the provisions of
sec. 1(13). See
Sachs v. Minister of Justice
,
1933 T.P.D. 141.
Tindall,
J., said the following in his judgment (at p. 162) as
to the
meaning of the words "reasons" and "information"
in sec. 1(12):
"The Legislature has not defined the two terms 'reasons' and 'information'
and they have to be interpreted in the light of the context.
There is no
difficulty about the meaning of the expression 'information which induced ...
(etc).' The Minister, in such matters acts
on information (either oral or
documentary/
24
documentary or both) laid before him. The information is what he has been
informed; in other words, the evidence conveyed to the Minister
and its source.
The 'reasons for such notice' are the reasons for the conclusion that the person
is promoting feelings of hostil
Accordingly, a mere reiteration of the finding
that the person is promoting feelings of hostil would not be sufficient to
constitute
reasons. On the other hand, the word 'reasons' does not imply an
enumeration of all the details of the person's conduct; such details
would be
covered by the word 'information which induced the Minister to issue such
notice.'"
Applying this view as to the meaning of the terms "reasons" and "information"
in sec. 1(13), Tindall, J., found that the Minister
had complied with the
provisions of the subsection. (De Waal, J.P., in a separate judgment, came
to/
25
to the same conclusion. Barry, J., agreed with them.
The judgments
delivered in the Transvaal Provincial
Division also appear at pp. 12-29 of
the 1934 A.D. report.)
On appeal to the Appellate Division Stratford,
A.C.J.,
dealing with counsel's argument that the reasons and
information
furnished by the Minister did not comply with
the provisions of sec. 1(13),
said
inter alia
(at p. 40):
"The last point raised necessitates an appreciation of the meaning of the
words
'reasons' and 'information' which are used in sub-sec. (13). On this subject
TINDALL, J., expressed himself thus: 'The information
is what he has been
informed; in other words, the evidence conveyed to the Minister and its source.
The 'reasons for such notice'
are the reasons for the conclusion that the person
is promoting feelings of hostility.' I agree with this, if the words 'and its
source' are omitted. The source of the information is not, in my view, part of
the information."
It/
26
It follows from this that in
Sachs
' case this
Court
approved of the view of Tindall, J., that the "'reasons'
for such
notice are the reasons for the conclusion that
the person is promoting
feelings of hostility", and that
"a mere reiteration of the finding that a
person is promoting
feelings of hostility would not be sufficient to
constitute
reasons."
There is a general similarity between the
power which sec. 1(12) of Act 27 of 1914 conferred on
the Minister of
Justice and the powers which sec. 28(1)
of Act 74 of 1982 confers on the
Minister of Law and Order.
In relation to the duty of the Minister concerned
to
furnish "reasons" for an order made by him in the
exercise of his
powers, there is a striking similarity
between/
27 between the language employed by the Legislature in sec.
1(13) of Act 27 of 1914 and sec. 28(3)(b) of Act 74 of 1982. In these
circumstances I am of the opinion that, unless grood grounds exist for holding
otherwise, the view expressed in Sachs' case as to
the meaning of "reasons" in
sec. 1(13) of Act 27 of 1914 should be held to be of application to the term
"reasons" in sec. 28(3)(b)
of Act 74 of 1982. Counsel for the Minister, arguing
that each Act must be considered in the light of its own context, contend that
there are indeed good reasons why the reasoning of the Court in
Sachs
'
case should not be followed in interpreting
sec/
28 sec. 28(3)(b). In sec. 1(12) of Act 27 of 1914, they submit,
there was only one ground on which the Minister could act against
a person, and
a mere repetition by him of the wording used in the subsection when furnishing
his "reasons" could, therefore, not
qualify as "reasons" within the meaning of
the subsection. In sec. 28(1) of Act 74 of 1982, however, so it is argued, each
of its
paragraphs sets out several grounds on which the Minister can issue a
notice. When, therefore, counsel submit, in the three cases
with which we are
here concerned the Minister let it be known to the persons concerned that he had
ordered their detention under
sec. 28(1)(b), and not under sec. 28(1)(a) or sec,
28(1)(c), and, furthermore,
with/
29
with regard to sec. 28(1)(b) that he was satisfied that they were
engaged in activities which endangered the maintenance of law and
order and not
e.g. that they were engaged in activities which were calculated to
endanger
the maintenance of law and order, he did not merely repeat
the terms of the subsection which empowered him to issue the
notices, but set out the reason why he issued the notices.
In advancing
this argument, counsel adopted the reasoning
of Nestadt, J., in the first of
the three cases mentioned
above, and of Van Heerden, A.J.P., in the second
case:
see 1985(2) S.A. 720 at p. 724 F-H and 1985(2) S.A. 529
at p. 536
H-I. I do not agree with these views.
Paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of sec. 28(1) set out various
grounds on which
the Minister can act, and I cannot accept
the/
29 (a)
the proposition that if the Minister acts on one of these grounds and informs
the person concerned of that fact by repeating the relevant
words in the
relevant paragraph, that ground thereby assumes the character of "reasons"
within the meaning of that term in sec. 28(3)(b).
In view of the aforegoing I
am of the opinion that the ''reason" furnished by the Minister in paragraph (a)
of the statement which
accompanied each of the notices
issued by him, viz. "I
am satisfied that the said ----
engages in activities which endanger the
maintenance of law and order", did not constitute "reasons" within the meaning
of that term
in sec. 28(3)(b) of the Act.
There/
30 There is one further point to consider in connection with the
question whether the Minister furnished "reasons" as required by
sec. 28(3)(b).
Mr
Mahomed
, in the course of an argument in which he submitted that the
Minister appears to have been confused as to the meaning of the concepts
"reasons" and "information" in sec. 28(3)(b) and that this confusion indicates
that the Minister could not properly have applied
his mind to the matters he had
to decide, suggested that paragraph (b) of the Minister's statement could
perhaps be regarded as "reasons",
but not as "information", and that the
Minister therefore did not furnish information as required by sec. 28(3)(b). I
should add
that I did not understand counsel to submit in this Court that the
"information"
supplied/
31
supplied by the Minister in fact constituted
"reasons",
whatever submissions he might have made in any of the Courts
a
quo
(cf. 1985(2) S.A. at p. 537 B-C), but be this as it
may. If the "information" furnished by the Minister in
paragraph (b) of his statement could possibly qualify as
"reasons", the question would arise whether it could be
said that the statement, read as a whole, furnished reasons
as required by sec. 28(3)(b). For easy reference I
repeat paragraph (b) of the statement:
"Information which induced me to issue the said notice: By acts and
utterances the said (name of person) did himself and in collaboration
with other
persons attempt to create a revolutionary climate in the Republic of South
Africa thereby causing a situation endangering
the maintenance of law and
order."
It is clear that the Minister did not consider the
"information"/.
32 "information" supplied by him in paragraph (b) of his
statement to be "reasons". He stated that it was "information" which induced
him
to issue the notices. Furthermore, the words "No other information can, in my
opinion, be disclosed without detriment to the
public interest", which appeared
in the statement in the first and second case mentioned above, clearly related
to his statutory
duty to supply the information on which he acted, save for such
information as would, if disclosed, in his opinion be detrimental
to the public
interest. My view of the matter is that, quite
irrespective/
33 irrespective of the fact that the Minister intended that
paragraph (b) should set out "information" and not "reasons", the paragraph
cannot be said to set out "reasons" within the meaning of sec. 28(3)(b). The
Minister did not therein inform the persons concerned
why he ordered their
detention. What he did, was to inform them - in every vague and general terms -
that at some time in the past
(note the use of the past tense) they "did ....
attempt to create a revolutionary climate in the Republic of South Africa
thereby
causing a situation endangering the maintenance of law and order". What
the Minister did not do, was to set forth the reasons for
their detention. The
purpose of a detention order is to prevent the commission of certain crimes, or
the endangering of the maintenance
of law and order, etc., as set out in
sec/
34 sec. 28(1), and the Minister did not inform the persons
against whom he issued notices in the cases with which we are here concerned
why
he had ordered their detention on the ground of what they had said or done at
some unspecified time in the past.
In view of all the aforegoing I hold that the Minister did not furnish the
persons against whom he issued notices of detention with
reasons for their
detention as required by sec. 28(3)(b), and that the notices were accordingly
invalid. It is therefore unnecessary
to decide whether the "information"
supplied by the Minister was "information" within the meaning of sec. 28(3)(b).
It is also unnecessary
to set out and discuss the other
grounds/
35 grounds on which Mr
Mahomed
attacked the
notices issued by the Minister.
The following orders are made:
(A)
In the first
appeal
(
A.D.Case No. 350/84
):
(1)
The appeal is upheld with
costs, including the costs of two counsel.
(2)
The order of the Court
a quo
is set aside and the following
order is substituted therefor :
''(a) The orders of detention issued by the
Respondent
against the Applicants are declared to
be invalid.
(b) The Respondent is to pay the Applicants' costs, including the costs of two
counsel."
(B)
In the second
appeal (
A.D.
Case No. 484/84
):
(1)
The appeal is upheld with
costs, including the costs of two counsel.
(2)
The order of the Court a quo is set aside and the following order is
substituted therefor :
"(a)/
36
"(a) The notices of detention issued by the Respondent are
declared to be invalid.
(b) The Respondent is to pay the Applicants'
costs, including the costs of two counsel.'
(C)
In the third appeal
(
A.D. Ca
se No.
439/84
)
The appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs of two counsel.
P J RABIE CHIEF JUSTICE.
TRENGOVE, JA.
HOEXTER, JA.
BOTHA, JA. Concur.
VAN HEERDEN, JA. ,