Jordan and Another v Farber (1352/09) [2009] ZANCHC 81 (15 December 2009)

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[2009] ZANCHC 81
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Jordan and Another v Farber (1352/09) [2009] ZANCHC 81 (15 December 2009)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH
AFRICA
(NORTHERN CAPE HIGH COURT,
KIMBERLEY)
Case No: 1352/09
Heardon:29-10-2009
Delivered:
15-12-2009
In the matter between:
JAMES ANDREW JORDAN 1
st
Applicant
JUNE AGNES JORDAN 2
nd
Applicant
and
CHRISTO DIRK FARBER
Respondent
CORAM: MJALI AJ
JUDGMENT
MJALI AJ:
In this application the
applicants seek a declaratory order that is couched in the following
terms.
That the lease agreements
concluded between the first applicant and the respondent, attached
to the papers as Annexures “B”
and “C” are void
alternatively are cancelled.
That the respondent and any
member of his family living with him be evicted from Portion 7 of
Weltevrede farm no. 92 in the district
of Herbert.
That in the event of the
respondent’s failure to comply with this order, the sheriff for
the district of Herbert be authorised
and ordered to remove the
respondent or any other person who occupies the farm through the
respondent together with their belongings,
from the property.
That the respondent be
ordered to pay the costs of this application.
Further and alternative
relief.
The respondent opposes the
relief sought. The following facts are common cause. The applicants
are married in community of property
and are the co-owners of
Portion 7 of Weltevrede farm no. 92 in the district of Herbert. They
had been running the farm since the
1970s but since 2002 they could
no longer manage it due to illness. Consequently they fell into
arrears with their monthly instalments
to the Land Development Bank
prompting that institution to issue a letter of demand for the
payment of the arrear instalments of
R250 000.00. The applicants
also received a letter of demand from GWK Limited for the payment of
an amount of R1 300 000.00.
They disputed any indebtedness
to GWK Limited.
Following the receipt of the
letters of demand the first applicant consulted the respondent, a
practising attorney under the name
and style Christo Faber
Attorneys, at his offices in Jacobsdal. The respondent now has
offices at Yates Singel NO. 5 Monumenthoogte,
Kimberley. Following
the consultation the respondent undertook to defend both actions on
behalf of the applicants. Indeed the respondent
communicated with
both institutions and arranged that all correspondence be directed
to him. He informed the first applicant that
he has entered into an
agreement with the Land Bank and that the applicants should leave
everything to him.
The first applicant also
instructed the respondent to find a lessee for the farm. After a
while the respondent indicated his interest
to lease the farm. The
parties agreed on a rental amount of R100 000.00 payable in
every six months commencing on 1 October
2006. Contrary to the
applicants’ intention of leasing the farm for a period of three
years, the respondent
advised them that the Land
Bank would only accept a long lease of nine years and eleven months.
The respondent drew up the lease
agreement in his capacity as the
legal representative of the applicants as well as in his personal
capacity. Relying on the advice
of his attorney the first applicant
signed the contract
on
26 July 2006
.In
terms of the contract the rent was to be paid directly to the Land
Bank.
After signing the lease
agreement for the farm, the respondent advised the first applicant
to sell all the livestock on the farm
and use the proceeds to settle
the arrears with the Land Bank. The first applicant refused and
instead suggested that 150 lambs
and 10 calves be sold to defray the
arrears. He further suggested that the respondent hire the remaining
livestock. The respondent
agreed and drew up a lease agreement in
respect of the livestock. This agreement according to the first
applicant was signed exactly
a week after the first lease and not on
the 26 July 2006 as reflected on the contract. He did not worry
about the date appearing
thereon as the respondent told him that it
did not matter.
It is worth noting that the
both lease agreements were signed only by the first applicant and
the respondent. The second applicant
who is married to the first
applicant in community of property and a co-owner of the farm did
not sign the lease agreements.
It
is common cause that the respondent
took
occupation of the farm and the livestock
in terms of the written agreements of lease (concluded between the
respondent and the first applicant) which were drawn by him
in his
capacity as the attorney for the applicants on the one hand and on
the other hand in his personal capacity.
For
the purposes of this judgment the relevant terms of the lease
agreement pertaining to the farm are the following;
“EIENDOM
Die plaas bekend as gedeelte 7
van die plaas Weltevrede no. 52 in die distrik van Herbert, ook
bekend as die plaas Vrede tesame met
die verbeterings insluitende
Huis, buitegeboue, store, arbeidershuise, die huidige drie spulpunte
met motors en pompe, pyplyne entrekkers,
implimente, gereedskap en
sprinkelpype soos op die eiendom met ondertekening van die kontrak.
HUURTERMYN
Die HUURTERMYN sal trek
vir ‘n tydperk van 9 jaar en 11 maande. Dit sal ‘aanvangs neem
met die ondertekening van die kontrak.
HUURBEDRAG
Die HUURBEDRAG beloop ‘n
bedrag van R100 000-00 (EEN HONDERD DUISEND RAND) Die bedrag sal
ses maandeliks betaalbaar wees met
die eerste betaling voor of op 1
Oktober 2006.
Alle betalings sal gemaak
word direk aan Landbank, Vryburg.
HERSTEL
Die HUURDER sal
verantwoordelik wees om alle eiendom in stand te hou en na
verstryking van die termyn aan die VERHUURDER terug te
lewer in die
toestand wat hy dit ontvang het, normale slystasie uitgesluit.
WAANPRESTASIE
Indien die HUURDER versuim
om sy HUURGELD stiptelik te betaal, of sou hy/ sy versuim om enigevan
die ander bepaalings van hierdie
HUURKONTRAK stiptelik n ate kom, sal
die VERHUURDER geregtig wees om , indien die HUURDER na ‘n termyn
van 7 (SEWE) dae na afsending
van ‘n SKRIEFTELIKE KENNISGEWING, per
Vooruitbetaalde Geregistreerde Pos, of Per Hand, steeds in versuim
verkeer met betrekking
tot die nakoming van die betrokke term(e) van
die ooreenkoms, hierdie kontrak te kanseleer sonder benadeling van sy
/ haar regte
om uitstande huurgelde en skadevergoeding
voortspruitend uit sodanige
kansellasie, van die huurder te vorder, bedrae reeds betaal sal deur
die huurder verbeur word”.
The lease agreement
pertaining to the livestock differs from that of the farm only in
respect of the following terms;
“
HUURSAAK
350 Skaapooie, 30 Melktipe
Beeste,110 Boerbokke. Met die duur van die huurkontrak sal die
Huurder die reg he om met die huursaak te
handel na goeddinke. Die
huurder sal ook die vee van sy brandmerk of tatoeermerk voosien.
HUURBEDRAG
Die Huurbedrag beloop ‘n
bedrag van R100 000-00 (EEN HONDERD DUISEND RAND), betaalbaar
voor of op 1 Augustus 2006 aan Landbank
Vryburg”.
It transpired later when the
Land Bank sued the applicants for the payment of an amount of
R400 000.00 that the respondent
did not pay Land Bank as
required in terms of the contract and did not enter into any
agreement with Land Bank pertaining to the
payment terms of the
outstanding balance. The initial balance was R250 000.00 but
had escalated to R400 000.00.
In support of this
application Mr Reinders, for the applicants presented a
three-pronged argument namely;
first that the contract is
void and of no effect as it is contra bonos mores. In support of
this contention counsel for the applicants
submitted that the
respondent acted in conflict of interests when he drew up the
contract both in his personal capacity as well
as an attorney for
the applicants. As such he acted in his own interests to
the detriment of the
applicants (his clients). He had a duty to advise the applicants to
seek independent legal advice.
He argued further that
although the applicants wanted to lease the farm for three years they
were misled into believing that the Land
Bank required them to enter
into long lease agreement of 9 years and 11 months. The applicants
relied on the advice of the respondent
as their attorney and had no
reason to disbelieve him.
secondly, the fact that the
respondent now disputes that the amount of rent was R200 000.00
per annum is indicative of the
fact the parties never reached a
consensus on a material term of the contract. For this reason Mr
Reinders submitted that the
contract never came into being as there
was never a meeting of the minds.
thirdly that the respondent
failed to pay the agreed amount of rent and by so doing effectively
cancelled the contract. In the
alternative the applicants seek an
order cancelling the contract on the ground that the respondent is
destroying the property.
For these reasons the applicants contend
that the contract cannot be enforced.
The respondent opposed the
application on the grounds that;
he had entered into a valid
contract of lease with the applicants.
he was not obliged to advise
the applicants to seek services of an independent attorney in
relation to the lease of the farm and
the livestock. For this
contention in his heads of argument, Mr. Fourie who appeared for
the respondent sought to rely on
Leite
v Leandy & Partners
1992 (2) SA 309
(D)
at p 321 where Page J stated,
“
I should not be
understood, however as holding that there is such an obligation in
law.”
I
will deal with this contention in due course.
because there are material
disputes of facts such as undue influence and misrepresentation
that cannot be decided on paper, this
matter must be referred for
oral evidence.
On the issue of referral to
oral evidence Mr Reinders submitted that whilst there are dispute of
facts nothing will be clarified
by referral to oral evidence. The
only disputes relate to the amount of rent as well as the condition
of the farm which the respondent
has now tried to clean up and taken
good photos thereof. The issue of the condition of the farm was no
longer pursued. For the
stated reasons Mr. Reinders submitted that
the matter should be decided on papers. In my view, most of the
significant and relevant
facts for the purpose of this application
are either common cause or have not been disputed. As will be
apparent in my judgment
wherever there is a real dispute of fact on
a material point, I have decided the point on the respondent’s
version, regard being
had to the principles laid down in
Plascon-Evans
Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984 (3) SA 623
(A) at
634E–635C
.
12. I turn now to consider
whether the contract is contra bonos mores. It is trite that our
c
ourts will
invalidate and refuse to enforce agreements which are contrary to
public policy.
As
to what public policy entails, the Constitutional Court
in
Barkhuizen v
Napier
[2007] ZACC 5
;
2007 (5) SA 323
(CC) at 334 par 28
recognised
that the Bill of Rights represents a reliable statement of public
policy. Thus, what public policy is and whether a term
in a contract
is contrary to public policy needs to be determined by having regard
to the Bill of Rights and the values that underlie
our constitutional
democracy (as expressed in the Constitution).
13. At
paragraph
29
in
Barkhuizen v
Napier
(supra) the majority held that;
“
A term in a contract
that is inimical to the values enshrined in our Constitution is
contrary to public policy and is, therefore,
unenforceable”.
At
paragraph
30
the
majority stated that:
“
The proper approach to
the constitutional challenge to contractual terms is to determine
whether the term challenged is contrary to
public policy as evidenced
by constitutional values, in particular, those found in the Bill of
Rights. This approach leaves space
for the doctrine of pacta servanda
sunt to operate, but at the same time allows courts to decline to
enforce contractual terms that
are in conflict with constitutional
values even though the parties may have consented to them.”
14.As against this, the
applicants face the challenge that the first applicant signed the
contract acknowledging that the terms of
such contract were
reasonable and essential for the mutual benefit of the parties. In
fact it was submitted on behalf of the respondent
that the contract
is valid and that the respondent rescued a desperate situation as no
one wanted to lease the farm. This dichotomy
enjoins the Court to
enquire whether, despite the signing of the agreement, such agreement
is consistent with the Constitution, is
reasonable and is not
contrary to public policy. One of the factors which the Court must
consider is the bargaining power of the
parties.
15.In
Afrox
Healthcare Bpk v Strydom
2002 (6) SA 21
(SCA)
the
Supreme Court of Appeal recognised that unequal bargaining power is
indeed a factor that together with other factors plays a role
in the
consideration of public policy. This is a recognition of the
potential injustice that may be
caused by inequality of
bargaining powers. Although the court found ultimately that on the
facts there was no evidence of an inequality
of bargaining power,
this does not detract from the principle enunciated in that case,
namely that the relative situation of the
contracting parties is a
relevant consideration in determining whether a contractual term is
contrary to public policy.
16. In this matter despite the
fact that the parties signed the agreement freely and voluntarily, I
would in my view be short sighted
not to acknowledge that this is an
agreement between an attorney on the one hand and a client who solely
relies on his (the attorney’s)
advice on the other. Attorneys wield
tremendous power over clients who depend on them to handle their
affairs in stressful situations.
When the applicants approached the
respondent for legal representation they were vulnerable both
emotionally and economically and
consequently were in no position to
refuse or scrutinise advice given by the respondent on whom they
relied. This is evident from
Mr Fourie’s submission that “
the
applicant was in big trouble
financially.
He
was on the verge of loosing his farm. Nobody wanted to hire the
farm”
. It
is clear that the applicants could not have been on par with, or in a
stronger bargaining position than, the respondent. To me
this is an
indication of the immense bargaining power the respondent had as
against that of the applicants.
17.Yet another reason for
holding that the contract is against public policy and of great
concern is the fact that the respondent
breached the standards of
professional ethics by knowingly entering into a business transaction
with his clients and failing to advise
them to seek independent legal
advice before concluding the lease agreements with them. Further by
misleading his clients into entering
into a long lease agreement and
then drafting a
contract without taking into
account the best interests of the clients. In this way the
respondent placed himself in a conflict of
interest situation.
18.Loyalty is an essential
element of the attorney and client relationship. I have no doubt in
my mind that the respondent placed
himself in a situation where his
loyalty was divided or he compromised the interests of the
applicants. This resulted in his failure
to perform his obligations
with the necessary care and skill reasonably expected of a legal
practitioner in his position. I am fortified
in my view by the
following;
the respondent’s averment
in his pleadings that he also had to take his own interests into
account.
his view that he was under
no obligation to advise the applicants to seek independent legal
advice. As well as
the unprofessional manner in
which the contracts are drafted. No provision is made for the
escalation of rent. There is no non-variation
clause. Certain
provisions are ambiguous. There is no inventory of the livestock as
well as the property on the farm.
19.An ethical attorney is
expected to maintain a measure of detachment from clients. The
conclusion of a business transaction with
his very own client where
that client is not independently represented in respect of that
business transaction is totally at odds
with this requirement of
detachment. By entering into such an agreement, the respondent
assumed a personal stake that in my view
affected his professional
judgment and conduct. “
An
attorney should not act for a client whose interests conflict with
his or her (the attorney’s) interests or those of another
client.
The attorney must, while holding his position of trust and
confidence, prefer the interest of the principal even to his or
her
own in case of conflict, and to his skill, diligence and zeal must be
added good faith”.
See
LAWSA vol
14(2) –“Conflict of interests”
20.The dictum of Page J in
Leite v
Leandy & Partners
1992 (2) SA 309
(D)
on which the respondent sought to rely to escape the duty to advise
the applicants is not helpful to the respondent for the following
reasons.
It is distinguishable from
the facts of this matter in that it dealt with an attorney drawing
a contract between his client and
an unrepresented third party. The
matter at hand deals with an attorney entering into a business
transaction with his own client
in the course of his professional
duty.
Read in context that dictum
can never be viewed as authority for the submission that an
attorney has no duty to advise a client
(with whom he concludes a
business transaction) to seek independent legal advice. On the
contrary and as aptly put by Mr Reinders,
it places a duty on the
attorney to be fair to client and even to an unrepresented third
party entering into a contract with
his client. He had a duty to
act in the best interests of his clients. Failure to advise them to
seek independent legal advice
when a conflict of interest arose can
hardly be regarded as acting in the best interests of the
applicants.
21.In
Law
Society of the Cape of Good Hope v Tobias and Another 1991 (1)SA 430
(CPD) at D
Berman
J dealing with a matter similar to this one stated,
“
..............., but
it was certainly the duty of Tobias (Wilson’s “family”
attorney) and of Van Biljon ( the conveyancer in
the firm who
attended to the transfer of Wilson’s property to Du Plessis) to
advise, and indeed to recommend, to Wilson that he
should consult
another attorney with regard to what was to happen with the purchase
price.”
22. An extremely
worrying feature is the respondent’s lack of appreciation of the
seriousness of the transgression of the rules
of professional conduct
he has committed. This is evident from his averment that he was under
no obligation to advise the applicants
to seek independent legal
advice as well as the submission made on his behalf by Mr Fourie that
“
He (the
first applicant) is not a zombie, he is somebody with a mind of his
own and for sure he can think about what his attorney
says to him.
Otherwise each and everybody will just sit back and say I trust my
attorney I don’t even read the papers because I
trust my attorney.
Jy kan nie net blindelings jou prokureur vertrou nie
.”
23. The fact that the conduct
of the respondent in this matter is regarded as reprehensible and
unbecoming by our courts is well documented
and is best captured in
the dictum of Kirk-Cohen J in
Law
Society, Transvaal v Mathews
1989 (4) SA 389
(T) at 395 F
where
the learned Judge stated;
“
I refer next to the duty
of an attorney in general. The attorney is a person from whom the
highest standards are exacted by the profession
and this Court. If an
attorney wishes to digress from that standard he may do so but he
must first cast aside his profession by resigning
and then pursue his
chosen course. He cannot serve two masters. In this regard the
standards are admirably dealt with in the founding
affidavit as
follows: “
An attorney is a
professional man whose independence and freedom in the conduct of his
practice are recognised and preserved. Within
the limits of the law
and the rules of professional conduct an attorney conducts, and in
fact should so conduct, his practice with
a high degree of
independence. The profession itself is not a mere calling or
occupation by which a person earns his living. An attorney
is a
member of a learned, respected and honourable profession and by
entering it, he pledges himself with total and unquestionable
integrity to society at large, to the
courts and to the profession..............only the
highest standard of conduct and repute and good faith are consistent
with membership
of the profession which can indeed only function
effectively if it inspires the unconditional confidence and trust of
the public.
The image and standing of the profession are judged by
the conduct and reputation of all its members and, to maintain this
confidence
and trust, all members of the profession must exhibit the
qualities set out above at all times. The attorneys’ profession can
only
fulfil its obligations to the community and comply with its role
in the administration of justice in the land if it inspires and
maintains the unconditional confidence of the community and if its
members devote their absolute integrity to the conduct of their
profession and to the fulfilment of all the requirements demanded of
the profession and its members. The intergrity of an attorney
should
inter alia manifest itself in a situation where he must prefer the
interests of his client above his own. It is required of
an attorney
that he observes scrupulously, and complies with, the provisions of
the Attorneys Act and the rules”
24.By any standard the
respondent conducted himself disgracefully, dishonestly and unfairly.
I am satisfied that the contracts forming
the subject matter of this
application are against public policy. I come to this conclusion
mindful of the dictum of Smalberger JA
in
Sasfin
(Pty) Ltd v Beukes
1989 (1) SA 1
(A) at 9B
,
namely
“
No court shall shrink
from the duty of declaring a contract contrary to public policy when
the occasion so demands.
The
power to declare contracts contrary to public policy should however,
be exercised sparingly and only in the clearest of cases,
lest
uncertainty as to the validity of contracts result from arbitrary and
indiscriminate use of the power. One must be careful not
to conclude
that a contract is contrary to public policy merely because its terms
(or some of them) offend one’s individual sense
of propriety and
fairness.”
(The
underlining is mine)
25. I am convinced
that this matter falls squarely within the category of the clearest
of cases that are contrary to public policy.
On this ground alone the
contracts must be declared void ab initio. For the sake of
completeness I proceed to consider the question
of the meeting of the
minds of the applicants and the respondent at the time of the
conclusion of the contract.
26. Mr Reinders submitted with
specific reference to annexure B that the fact that the respondent
now disputes that the amount of
rent was R200 000.00 per annum
is indicative of the fact the parties never reached a consensus on a
material term of the contract.
For this reason he submitted that the
contract should be declared void ab initio.
27.It is trite that a meeting
of the parties' minds must occur in order for a contract to come into
being. The definition of a contract:
". . .
postulates an
agreement that is a meeting of the minds or mutual understanding
between two or more persons as the basis of a contract,
with the
clear implication that without agreement in this sense there can be
no contract"
(LAWSA,
Volume 5(1)(r), paragraph [127]).
The
relevant clause of annexure B reads;
“
Die HUURBEDRAG beloop ‘n
bedrag van R100 000-00 (EEN HONDERD DUISEND RAND) Die bedrag sal
ses maandeliks betaalbaar wees met
die eerste betaling voor of op 1
Oktober 2006”.
28. Mr Fourie argued that this
term can only be interpreted to mean that the amount of rent is
payable in instalments of R50 000.00
every six months. He
argued further that annexures B and C are not the true reflection of
what the parties agreed to as the contracts
were partly
written and partly oral and
that it was the intention of the parties to enter into only one
agreement in respect of the livestock
and the farm. The respondent
did not pursue the issue of ratification that was foreshadowed in his
pleadings.
29.In reply Mr Reinders argued
that nowhere on the contract is it stated that the rent should be
paid in instalments of R50 000.00
in every six months instead
the contract stipulates that R100 000.00 every six months. He
contended further that the parol evidence
rule should apply. He
argued further that there are two separate agreements and that the
applicants expected to get R100 000.00
per year for the animals
in addition to the R200 000.00 for the farm.
30.I agree. On a proper
reading of the relevant term of the contract (annexure B) the
conclusion that an amount of R100 000.00
is payable in every six
months is inescapable. The term does not stipulate that the
R100 000.00 “per jaar” which is payable
in instalments of
R50 000.00 in every six months. Instead it stipulates that “die
bedrag” meaning the (stipulated) amount
shall be payable every six
months. This is a fact that Mr Fourie was constrained to concede.
Annexures B and C are separate contracts
specifically drawn up in
respect of separate entities and nowhere on any of the contracts is a
cross reference made to the other.
Each contract specifically
describes the property which forms the subject matter of the lease.
Also nowhere on any of the contracts
is any mention made of the other
contract replacing an earlier agreement entered into by the parties.
It cannot therefore be said
that the parties entered into one
agreement in respect of the farm and the livestock.
31.In terms of the time tested
parol evidence rule where an agreement is embodied in writing, the
written document is conclusive as
to its terms. No
evidence, save the document
itself, is admissible to prove them. Nor may the contents of the
document be contradicted, altered, added
to or varied by oral
evidence. This rule was formulated as follows by Watermeyer JA in
Union
Government v Vianini Ferro-Concrete Pipes (Pty) Ltd
1941 AD 43
at 47:
“
Now this Court has
accepted the rule that when a contract has been reduced to writing,
the writing is, in general, regarded as the
exclusive memorial of the
transaction and in a suit between the parties no evidence to prove
its terms may be given save the document
or secondary evidence of its
contents, nor may the contents of such document be contradicted,
altered, added to or varied by parol
evidence.”
See also
Dreyer
NO and Another v AXZS Industries (Pty) LTD
2006 (3) ALL SA 219
(SCA).
32. Bearing in mind
that the respondent is an attorney of long standing he should have
known better that a written contract should
reflect the intention of
the parties and should have exercised diligent care to clear any
ambiguity on the material terms. He should
have deemed it prudent to
state clearly that the latter contract replaces the earlier
agreement. The absence of the non variation
clause that the
respondent now seeks to rely on does not assist his case as it is
clear that two separate agreements were concluded
and each contract
stipulates the amount of rent, the commencement date different from
each other. This matter turns on the interpretation
of a clause
written on the contract and not on whether or not the parties were
could vary the clauses and the procedure of such variation.
He is
therefore precluded from varying the written contracts by oral
evidence. The respondent failed to perform in terms of the
contracts
prompting the applicants to take steps to cancel the contracts which
they eventually did. I am satisfied that the steps
taken constituted
a valid
cancellation of the contracts.
For that reason the contracts cannot be enforced.
33. If I am wrong to conclude
that the written contracts were validly cancelled, still the contract
cannot be enforced for the following
reasons.
if the version of the
respondent that he has at all material times laboured under the
impression that amount of rent is R100 000.00
per annum ,
payable in R50 000.00 instalments, is to be believed it cannot
be said that there was any meeting of the minds
between the
parties.
Further the fact that the
according to the respondent states it was the intention of the
parties to conclude one agreement in
respect of livestock and the
farm whereas the applicants state the contrary indicates that there
was no consensus. For these
reasons I find that the contract should
be declared void ab initio.
34. Mr Reinders applied that I
order that a copy of my judgment be referred to the Law Society of
the respondent. In view of my finding
that the respondent conducted
himself disgracefully, dishonestly and unfairly in this matter and in
order to stem an erosion of professional
ethical values, I deem it
appropriate and necessary to order that relevant Law Society be
informed of my judgment.
35. On the question of costs
both parties applied that an order be made for costs on an attorney
and own client scale. I am of the
view that such an order is
justified in the circumstances of this case. In the result I make the
following order.
ORDER
The application succeeds.
The
lease agreements concluded between the first applicant and the
respondent, attached to the papers as Annexures “B” and “C”
are declared void alternatively are cancelled.
The respondent and any
member of his family living with him at Portion 7 of Weltevrede farm
no. 92 in the district of Herbert must
vacate the premises together
with their belongings within a period of 1 month of the issue of
this order.
In the event of the
respondent’s failure to comply with this order, the sheriff for
the district of Herbert is hereby authorised
and ordered to remove
the respondent or any other person who occupies the farm through the
respondent together with their belongings,
from the property.
That the respondent is
ordered to pay the costs of this application on an attorney and own
client scale.
The Registrar is ordered
to forward a copy of this judgment to the Law Society of which the
respondent is a member.
_______________
G N Z MJALI
ACTING JUDGE
NORTHERN CAPE HIGH COURT.
On
behalf of the Appellant
Adv S J
Reinders
Instructed
by
Haarhoff’s
Attorneys
On
behalf of the Respondent
Adv J A
Fourie
Instructed
by
Christo
Faber Attorneys