Diamond Core Resources (Pty) Ltd v River Corporate Finance (Pty) Ltd (642/2009) [2009] ZANCHC 78 (11 December 2009)

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[2009] ZANCHC 78
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Diamond Core Resources (Pty) Ltd v River Corporate Finance (Pty) Ltd (642/2009) [2009] ZANCHC 78 (11 December 2009)

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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(Northern
Cape High Court, Kimberley)
Case
No: 642/2009
Heard:
13 & 20/11/2009
Delivered:
11/12/2009
In
the matter between:
DIAMOND
CORE RESOURCES (PTY) LTD Applicant
(IN
LIQUIDATION)
and
RIVER
CORPORATE FINANCE (PTY) LTD Respondent
JUDGMENT
ON: (A) LEAVE TO APPEAL
(B) COSTS DE BONIS
PRORIIS
KGOMO
JP
This
is a two-pronged application. In the first, Diamond Core Resources
(Pty) Ltd (in liquidation), the respondent in the liquidation

application, seeks leave to appeal against my order made on 03 July
2009, and the judgment giving reasons for that order delivered
on 07
August 2009, whereby I refused Diamond Core Resources’ application
to reopen its case before the reserved judgment in
the liquidation
matter was delivered at 09h00 on Friday 03 July 2009.
In
the second stanza of the application Diamond Core Resources seeks to
appeal against my order and judgment delivered on 03 July
2009
placing Diamond Core Resources under final liquidation.
It
need to be pointed out for record purposes that Diamond Core
Resources brought an abortive application on urgency on 10 July
2009
(during recess) in which it sought an order:
“
That
the judgment of his Lordship Kgomo JP delivered on 03 July 2009
placing the Applicant [Diamond Core Resources] in liquidation
be
suspended pending the Applicant’s [Diamond Core Resources’]
appeal of the aforesaid judgment.”
There
was an allied application which the application in para 3 was
contingent to which was brought by BRC Diamond Core Resources
Ltd
(“BRC”), Diamond Core Resources’s holding company. What it
sought is best reflected in the order made by Madam Acting
Justice
Henriques who heard these matters jointly on 10 July 2009 and
delivered judgment on 17 July 2009. The order reads:
“
1. In
application A [the BRC Diamond Core Resources Ltd application], the
application to stay and or set aside the winding up order
in terms of
s354, the application is dismissed and BRC is directed to pay the
costs occasioned by such application.
2. In
relation to application B [the Diamond Core Resources application],
the application to suspend the liquidation order pending
an appeal,
such application is also dismissed and such costs should form part of
the costs in the liquidation.”
It
is not necessary to set out in this judgment the numerous grounds of
appeal listed in the Notice of Leave to Appeal. I will
confine
myself to the grounds on which emphasis was laid by counsel or
identified as raising important issues or raised for the
first, time
as a result of which such issues may not be covered or sufficiently
covered in the judgments.
THE
REFUSAL TO ALLOW DIAMOND CORE RESOURCES LEAVE TO REOPEN ITS CASE.
In
his written Heads of Argument and oral presentation Adv R A Solomon
SC, for Diamond Core Resources, discusses the reopening
under the
following heads: (a) The KIG agreement; (b) the inability of Diamond
Core Resources to disclose the KIG agreement prior
to hearing
argument on 19 June 2009; (c) KIG agreement prejudiced by the
liquidation order of 03 July 2009; (d) Diamond Core
Resources
prejudiced as a result of the KIG agreement being placed on hold;
and (e) The date to determine inability to pay.
There
is no need to encumber this judgment by rehashing issues
comprehensively addressed in the reopening judgment. As far as
the
matters raised in 6(a), 6(b) and 6(e) (above) are concerned see
paras 13 to 19.4 of the reopening judgment. As far as paras
6(c)
and 6(d) go all that need to be said is that it is a natural
consequence that an astute KIG, knowing that Diamond Core Resources

is under liquidation, would be reticent or even unwilling to throw
good money after the bad.
Mr
Solomon argued that the fact that the KIG funding was not going to
be paid directly to Diamond Core Resources is not a relevant
factor
“because the ability of the company to pay its debts may be
demonstrated by its ability to obtain the necessary finance
from an
exterior source.” For this proposition he invoked as authority
Helderberg
Laboratories CC v Sola Technologies
2008(2) SA 627(C) at 632D-E and contended that I misdirected myself
in my approach to the agreement between KIG and BRC Diamond
Core
Resources Limited. Diamond Core Resources was obviously not a party
to this agreement. See paras 15 and 16 of the reopening
judgment.
The
Helderberg-matter
is distinguishable from the case at hand. In that case the court
a
quo
held that as the tender and payment of the admitted indebtedness was
made by a third party on behalf of first to fourth appellants
the
latter did not make payment in respect of their admitted
indebtedness to the respondent. The court had inferred that
therefore
first to fourth appellants were themselves unable to pay
their debts. The full bench on appeal decided that (at 632 D-E):
“
[16]
I respectfully disagree with the finding of the court a quo, that the
fact that the payment of the admitted indebtedness was
made by a
third party on behalf of first to fourth appellants, justifies the
inference that the said appellants were unable to
pay their debts. In
my view, the ability of a company or close corporation to pay its
debts may be demonstrated by itself making
payment or by its ability
to obtain the necessary finance from an exterior source. In the
latter instance the creditworthiness
of the debtor would normally
enable it to raise the necessary funds. As submitted by Mr Brusser,
the emphasis in determining the
ability of a company or close
corporation to pay its debts should be on the fact of payment and not
on the source of the payment.”
In
casu
Diamond Core Resources had declared on numerous occasions and had
been stating in writing for over a year that it cannot pay
River
Corporation Finance (Pty) Ltd. From Diamond Core’s Heads it
concedes that the money it seeks to borrow or garner won’t
be
forthcoming. Even if it does there is no suggestion that they would
settle their debt with their creditor. Having regard
to the eight
considerations formulated by the Appellate Division in
Mkwanazi
v Van der Merwe
1970(1) SA 609(A) at 616G-617D
I
am satisfied that the application on this point must fail.
THE
WINDING UP ISSUE.
There
is only one issue which Diamond Core Resources did not raise during
the liquidation argument on 19 June 2009 which it is
now broaching.
It claims that River Corporate Finance (Pty) Ltd’s claim against
it was discharged due to supervening impossibility.
Mr Solomon
makes,
inter
alia
,
the following points in his Heads for this proposition:
11.1 That
river Corporate Finance’s claim against Diamond Core Resources is
for payment of R5 066 400.00 of the success fee which
River Corporate
Finance contends became payable to it on 23 January 2008 (seven
working days after Diamond Core Resource’s shareholders
approved
the transaction) in terms of clause 10.2 of the agreement;
11.2 That
it was common cause that Diamond Core Resource’s only assets
constitute the shares it holds in its subsidiary companies;
11.3. That
arising from BRC Diamond Corporation’s Consolidated Statements of
Operations and deficit for the years ended 31 December
2007 and 2008,
prior to the merger, and at the commencement of the 2007 financial
year (i.e. on 1 January 2007), BRC Diamond Corporation
commenced the
year with an operating loss of C$ 056 027.00 and at 31 December 2007
recorded a net operating loss of C$1 832 891.00.
11.4 The
only sources of future funds for further exploration programmes
presently available to the company were the sale of equity
capital,
or the offering by the company of an interest in its properties to be
earned by another party carrying out further exploration,
but that
there was no assurance that such sources of funding would be
available on acceptable terms, if at all;
11.5 Even
if commercial quantities of minerals were found on the company’s
properties, the company did not have the financial
resources at the
time to bring a mine into production;
11.6 All
of the company’s properties were in the exploration stage only and
none of the properties contained a known body of commercial
ore; and
11.7 The
company operated at a loss and did not generate any revenue from
operations.
12. In
the circumstances, Mr Solomon argued, River Corporate Finance was
aware that through no fault of Diamond Core Resources it
became
objectively impossible for it to pay the success fee. Accordingly,
as a result of supervening impossibility of performance,
the
respondent’s obligation to pay the success fee to the applicant was
extinguished, the submission went.
13. According
to Mr Solomon should the Court of Appeal find that the respondent’s
obligation to pay the success fee was indeed
rendered impossible of
performance as contended for, it would mean that the applicant has no
claim against the respondent which
would disqualify it from having
locus
standi
to succeed in the winding-up application.
14 Mr
Solomons further submitted that the defence of supervening
impossibility may be raised for the first time on appeal because:
14.1 The
material facts underlying the defence were canvassed in the pleadings
and arose primarily from the objective facts advanced
by the
applicant;
14.2 There
would therefore be no unfairness to River Corporate Finance to
contest the point on appeal;
14.3 Diamond
Core Resource’s objective inability to pay River Corporate
Finance’s success fee is common cause; and
14.4 There
are no grounds upon which to assert that any other or further
evidence would have been produced which could have materially

affected the defence.
Adv
A N Kruger, for River Corporate Resources, contends that the raising
of the supervening impossibility issue is belated, ill-conceived
and
prejudicial to his client and that the postulated novelty of the
question of law raised “lies in its absurdity.”
When
the liquidation application was launched by River Corporate Finance
the indebted Diamond Core Resources should have been
candid enough
in its papers to adopt the attitude contained in its counsel’s
submissions adverted to in paras 11 to 14 (above)
relating to the
defence of supervening impossibility of performance. It should
simply have stated: yes there was this agreement;
yes the company
owes the money claimed; yes it is unable to pay; but the company
pleads supervening impossibility of performance,
instead of the
persistent spurious denial. As matters stand Diamond Core Resources
is adopting two conflicting stances. It is
blowing hot and cold
which a party or litigant is not allowed to do.
Be
that as it may, if Diamond Core resources was impecunious on the
occasion of the conclusion of the contract the inescapable

conclusion can only be that it acted deceitfully in representing to
River Corporate Finance that it is sufficiently solvent to
pay the
success fee upon due performance by the creditor and has through
this subterfuge induced River Corporate Finance to perform
its
obligation and discharge its mandate. A court cannot countenance
such fraudulent conduct.
I
am in any event not persuaded that the scenario sketched by Mr
Solomon accords with the applicable principles of our law on

supervening impossibility.
18.1 In
Peters,
Flamman & Co v Kokstad Municipality
1919 AD 427
at 434 – 437 the defendant partners contracted with
Kokstad Municipality (the plaintiff) to provide it with acetylene gas
lighting
for a period of years. Whilst the contract had several
years still to run the partner defendants were incarcerated as enemy
subjects.
Their business was ordered by the State (the Treasury) to
be wound up. In carrying out this order the liquidator cut off the
power
supply. The municipality brought an action for damages and
ancillary relief. The court held that if a party to a contract is
prevented from performing his contract by
vis
major
or casus
fortuitus
,
under which was included the compulsory winding-up of that party as
an act of the State that party is discharged from liability.
The
rule is that the supervening impossibility has to be absolute.
18.2 In
Orda
AG v Nuclear Fuels Corporation of South Africa (Pty) Ltd
1994(4) SA 26(W) the Head Note at 29G-H captures the principle
relating to the impossibility defence in these terms:
“
As
to impossibility, great difficulty and great expense in performance
did not amount to impossibility. (At 82C.) However, given
the
prohibition of delivery and export of uranium oxide of South African
provenance and given the fact that delivery to and export
of uranium
oxide of non-South African provenance from Durban port would still be
subject to potential prohibition by the South
African authorities,
absolute
impossibility had been proved on a clear balance of probabilities
.
(At 82D, E, G.) Although the general rule was that, if performance
was impossible through no fault of the debtor, the debtor's

obligations under the contract were extinguished, whether this would
in fact be the effect would depend upon the nature of the
contract,
the relationship between the parties, the
circumstances
of the case and
the
cause of the impossibility
.
(At 82J-83A.) If the causes of the impossibility were in the
contemplation of the parties, they were in general bound by the
contract; if, however, the causes were such that no human insight
could have foreseen them, then their obligations under the contract

were extinguished. (At 83B.)
The
dictum
in
Bischofberger
v Van Eyk
1981
(2) SA 607 (W)
at
610
in
I
fine
-611F
approved and applied.
”
(My
emphasis)
18.3 In
Unibank
Savings and Loans (formally Community Bank) v ABSA Bank
2000(4)
SA 191(W) at 198D-E the Court stated:
“
[9.3.1]
Impossibility is furthermore not implicit in a change of financial
strength or in commercial circumstances which cause compliance
with
the contractual obligations to be difficult, expensive or
unaffordable. Deteriorations of that nature are foreseeable in the

business world at the time when the contract is concluded.
Yodaiken
v Angehrn and Piel
1914
TPD 254
at 260 and 262;
Macduff
& Co Ltd (in Liquidation) v Johannesburg Consolidated Investment
Co Ltd
1924
AD 573
at 600; and cf
Van
Diggelen v De Bruin and Another
1954
(1) SA 188
(SWA)
at
193D.”
I
am therefore satisfied that the supervening impossibility perceived
by Diamond Core Resources is genetically generated.
In
the premises I envision no reasonable prospect of success on appeal
nor that another court may come to a different conclusion.
THE
COSTS DE BONIS PRORIIS ISSUE.
I
intend to award cost
de
bonis proriis
on an attorney and client scale against attorney Stephen Thomson of
the firm Thomson-Wilks Inc, Johannesburg, Diamond Core Resources’

instructing attorney. The reasons emanate from the brief history
that follows. The costs portion of this judgment must be read
in
conjunction with paras 1-12, 20 and 22 of the reopening judgment
(heard on 03/07/2009 and delivered on 07/08/2009). I will
follow
the chronology of events for better comprehension.
Having
heard the liquidation application on 19 June 2009 I reserved
judgment and informed the parties that judgment will be delivered
on
Friday 03 July 2009. On 30 June 2009 I received a lengthy faxed
letter (fully quoted in para 4 of the reopening judgment)
written by
Mr Stephen Thomson (without knowing the opponent) requesting me not
to deliver the winding-up judgment on 03 July
2009 because Diamond
core Resources intended to reopen its case for the reasons stated in
that letter.
Immediate
upon receipt of this letter (30/06/2009) I issued this directive to
the Registrar of the High Court (also quoted in
para 5 of the
reopening judgment):
“
Registrar,
RE:
APPLICATION: RIVER CORPORATE FINANCE (PTY) LTD / DIAMOND CORE
RESOURCES (PTY) LTD: CASE NO. 642/09.
1. Inform
Thomson-Wilks Inc through their Kimberley correspondent attorneys
that it is inappropriate for them to have approached
me in the manner
that they did. Unless a substantive application is brought by
Thursday 02 July 2009 at 10h00 the judgment, which
is ready, will be
delivered as scheduled on Friday 03 July 2009 at 10h00.
2. The
applicant’s [River corporate Fincance’s] attorneys must be
furnished with a copy of this directive.”
In
the so-called substantive application ostensibly brought on urgency,
purporting to comply with the directive in para 21 (above)
there was
no formulation by Diamond Core Resources of its own rules relating
to the time allowed for answering and replies (para
10 of reopening
judgment expounds). There was no appearance on 02 July 2009 at
10h00 by Diamond Core Resources either. I summoned
the local
attorneys of both parties to my chambers and issued the following
further directive (see para 11 and 12 of reopening
judgment as
well):
“
Registrar
Following
the discussion with Mrs Monica Du Toit (attorney for Diamond Core
Resources (Pty) Ltd) and Mr Gerrie Van Der Merwe (attorney
for River
Corporate Finance (Pty) Ltd) with you also present I direct as
follows:
1. That
the application for the reopening of its case brought by Diamond Core
Resources (Pty) Ltd be heard at 09h00 on Friday 03
July 2009.
2. It
is noted that River Corporate Finance (Pty) Ltd have not yet filed a
notice of opposition or an Answering Affidavit to the
reopening
application.
3. If
no appearance is made the reopening application will be struck from
the roll and the main judgment will be delivered in my
Court.”
During
the late afternoon of Thursday 02 July 2009 Mr Thomson, who else,
undaunted by my prior warning, once more wrote directly
to me with
no courtesy being paid to the counterpart. The request was that
“the urgent” application must stand down indefinitely
because
his counsel Adv Solomon SC, was abroad. This was another irregular
proceeding – an application for a postponement
by letter. Even
Diamond Core Resource’s own counsel, Adv Willem Coetzee, was
unaware of the letter and was, understandably,
embarrassed.
On
the costs issue I remarked in the reopening judgment that the
statement in Mr Thomson’s letter of 02 July 2009
“demonstrates,
sadly, the attorney’s failure to have familiarized himself with
the Rules of Court”
;
and went on to say: “I am therefore not surprised by Mr Gerrie
Van der Merwe’s request that this conduct be visited with
a cost
order
de
bonis proriis
.”
(See paras 12 and 22 of the reopening judgment).
On
the first working day of term (Monday 03/08/2009) an Application for
Leave to Appeal relating to the current matter this judgment
is
dealing with awaited me on my desk. On 05 August 2009 I issued the
following directive:
“
Registrar,
Inform
parties that the Application for Leave will be heard on Thursday 13
August 2009 at 10h00. Short Heads must be prepared.
If the date is
not suitable then several dates in September must be suggested.”
The Registrar
transmitted the directive on the same day.
On
12 August 2009 both sets of attorneys approached me in chambers and
intimated that the 13
th
August 2009 was not suitable. They undertook to revert with new
dates.
On
10 September 2009 Mr Thomson addressed a letter through my secretary
to me, in person, para 2 thereof reads:
“
2. Kindly
provide our offices with dates on which the Honourable Judge will be
available to hear the Leave to Appeal. We anticipate
being in a
position to argue the Leave to Appeal Application during
November
2009
.”
On
my instruction my secretary responded to Mr Thomson as follows:
“
The
Judge President states that he is not accepting the letter and that
you must write to the Registrar.
The
Judge President also does not understand why your local correspondent
attorneys are being bypassed.”
It
is immediately noticeable that Mr Thomson’s letter (in para 27
above) does not accord with my directive in para 25 (above)
or the
undertaking by the parties in para 26 above. What is also evident is
that Mr Thomson did not communicate with his correspondent
attorneys.
On
23 October 2009 the implacable Mr Thomson wrote a three-page letter
to me in which he accused me of various things, one of
which was
tardiness. The tone of the letter, which was inexcusably not copied
to the other party, as it is Mr Thomson’s wont,
is disturbing and
contains a number of inaccuracies some of which can be dispelled
with a mere reference to the texts of the
judgments already
delivered with reliance mainly on objective facts pertaining to
procedural aspects. In order to avoid emulating
the author of the
said controversial letters I chose to issue the following directive
on 30 October 2009:
“
Registrar,
RE:
DIAMOND CORE RESOURCES (PTY) LTD v RIVER CORPORATE FINANCE (PTY) LTD
(IN LIQUIDATION): CASE NO. 1450/09.
LETTER
FROM THOMSON-WILKS DATED 23 OCTOBER 2009:
REF
MR S THOMSON/SH/D00050.
1. The
parties’ attorneys have not provided me with dates suitable to them
as requested. The Application for Leave to Appeal
is set down for
Friday 13 November 2009 at 09h00. Short Heads of Argument must be
filed by not later than 16h00 on Wednesday 11
November 2009. The
date and times will not be changed.
2. [Thomson-Wilks]
wrote a letter to me of the abovequoted reference and date marked
“private and confidential” which goes herewith
marked “D00050”.
In light of certain accusations and insinuations levelled against me
I direct that you provide the attorneys
of both parties with copies
thereof. Their counsel must deal in their Heads with the
allegations.
”
When
the matter was heard on 13 November 2009 Mr Solomon was only
prepared to argue that costs should be costs in the winding-up.
He
contended that there is no justification to call for my recusal and
did not share Mr Thomson’s views. On being asked to
address me on
the contents of the letter and the specific allegations Mr Solomon,
surprisingly, said he had not received instructions
on the contents.
Asked why Mr Thomson should not be ordered to pay the costs
de
bonis propriis
on account of his untoward conduct he urged that the matter rather
be postponed so that Mr Thomson could explain himself.

Notwithstanding Mr Kruger’s opposition I granted the postponement
for a week to 20 November 2009.
Mr
Michiel De Wit who describes himself as the president of BRC Diamond
Core Limited deposed to the affidavit (and not Mr Stephen
Thomson)
and steered well clear of the accusations levelled against me by Mr
Thomson in the letter dated 23 October 2009. On
20 November 2009 Mr
N B Pye, in the absence of Mr Solomon, argued the costs issue and in
essence adopted the same approach as
predecessor.
Mr
Pye stated that the letter of 23 October 2009 should not have served
before the Court. Pressed on how he proposes the process
should
have been dealt with, moreso that Diamond Core Resources did not
favour River Corporate Finance with a copy thereof, he
conceded that
there was no other option, but urged that costs be ordered to be
costs in the winding-up and that Mr Thomson should
rather be
reported to his Law Society. It suffices to state that a puerile
letter from Mr Thomson dated 02 November 2009 followed
the same
deprecated channel of communication. Stunning.
Mr
Kruger on the other hand was forthright in his Heads on the costs
issue. He had spoken to his Heads on 13 November 2009.
On 20
November 2009 Mr Van Tonder stood in for Mr Kruger and essentially
reiterated the latter’s submissions. These submissions
by Mr
Kruger commend themselves more to me. I quote them
in
extenso
:
“
Costs
de bonis proriis
61. Such
costs are ordinarily paid by the estate, which leaves less for
creditors.
62. It
is submitted that this case warrants a special order for costs on the
scale between an attorney and his own client, payable
by Mr Thomson
de bonis proriis, on the following grounds.
62.1 Mr
Thomson is a director of the respondent’s holding company and has a
personal interest;
62.2 He
has allowed his personal interest in the matter to cloud his
professional judgment as an attorney and officer of the court,
which
is evident inter alia from:
62.2.1 The
facts set out in the two judgments;
62.2.2 His
contradictory evidence in his affidavit supporting this application
for leave to appeal. Mr Thomson blows hot and cold
on the question
of respondent’s ability to pay its debts;
62.2.3 Mr
Thomson’s scandalous behaviour in writing the disrespectful 23
October 2009 letter to the learned Judge President and
that after
being previously admonished in this regard;
62.2.4 The
reckless disregard of professional ethics and the cavalier approach
adopted by Thomson;
62.2.5 The
patently unfounded allegations in support of the desperate attempt to
raise a new defence on appeal.
CONCLUSION
63. It
is submitted that an order should be made:
63.1 Dismissing
the application for leave to appeal;
63.2 Ordering
that the costs of the application be paid on the scale as between an
attorney and his own client, such costs to be
paid de bonis propriis
by Mr Stephen Thomson of the firm Thomson Wilks of Johannesburg;
63.3 Directing
the Registrar to forward a copy of the judgment and order, together
with previous judgments and the Thomson letter
and these heads of
argument, to the Law Society responsible for attorneys practicing in
Johannesburg”
It
must be clearly understood that the costs order that I propose
making is not so much about the contents of the “scandalous”

letter the contents whereof have not been regurgitated because
neither Mr De Wit (deponent) nor Mr Thomson (the offender) or
their
counsel (Adv Solomon SC and Adv Pye) attempted to justify the
contents of the letter. The penalty has more to do with
the
repeated irregular procedures adopted by Mr Thomson: the persistent
flouting of the Rules of Court; See Rules 30 and 6.
His conduct
also caused at least two more seatings than was necessary: on 02
and 03 July 2009 (if 02 July 2009 can be called
that) and 23 and 30
November 2009. Some wasteful expenditure was incurred. Mr Thomson
did not care because he banked on Diamond
Core Resources (Pty) Ltd
(In Liquidation) bearing the costs. He miscalculated. See:
Venter
v Bophuthatswana Transport Holdings (Edms) Bpk
1997(3) SA 374(H) at 390G – 391A;
Jeebhai
v Minister of Home Affairs
2009(4)
SA 662 (SCA) at 666E – 668A (para 8 – 15).
Adv
Solomon SC undertook (in court)
“to
whisper”
in Mr Thomson’s ear to refrain from further conduct of this
nature. I will therefore refrain from reporting Mr Thomson’s

shenanigans to his Law Society because the penalty and punitive
costs order will address what borders on unprofessional conduct

adequately. His directorship in the law firm and the company in
liquidation have created a conflictual situation which he may

resolve by having himself substituted by a colleague in the law firm
if further steps in exhausting the company’s remedies
are
envisaged.
I
therefore make the following order
:
1.
As
to A
:
The applications for leave to appeal in respect of both the reopening
and the winding-up orders are refused.
2.
As
to B
:
The costs of hearing of the applications for 13 and 20 November 2009
are to be borne by Mr Stephen Thomson of the firm Thomson-Wilks
of
Johannesburg
de
bonis propriis
on the attorney and client scale.
_____________________
F
DIALE KGOMO
JUDGE
PRESIDENT
Northern
Cape High Court, Kimberley
On
behalf of the Applicant
:
Adv R A Solomon SC
(13/11/2009)
Adv.
W.B Pye
(20/11/2009)
Instructed
by: Du Toit Attorneys
On
behalf of the Respondent
:
Adv. A.N Kruger
(13/11/2009)
Adv
A Van Tonder
(20/11/2009)
Instructed
by: Van Der Waal & Partners