Hoogstander v S (CA&R 58/09) [2009] ZANCHC 69 (20 November 2009)

80 Reportability
Criminal Law

Brief Summary

Criminal Law — Appeal against conviction and sentence — Appellant convicted of robbery and attempted rape — Incident involved armed attack on complainants under a bridge — Appellant challenged the reliability of witness testimony citing contradictions and the influence of alcohol — Court found that contradictions did not undermine the overall credibility of the witnesses, and evidence supported the convictions — Appeal dismissed, affirming both conviction and sentence.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This was a criminal appeal in the High Court of South Africa, Northern Cape Division, Kimberley, against both conviction and sentence imposed by the regional court at Kimberley. The matter arose from an incident that occurred under the first Transvaal Road Bridge in Kimberley during the morning of 11 December 2005.


The appellant, Christopher Hoogstander, appealed against his convictions for robbery (in relation to a cellphone) and attempted rape, as well as the sentences imposed for those offences. The respondent was the State. The appeal was heard by Kgomo JP and Mjali AJ, with the judgment delivered by Mjali AJ (Kgomo JP concurring).


In the regional court, the appellant and a co-accused were prosecuted on two counts of robbery, assault, and attempted rape arising from the same incident. The appellant was ultimately convicted on one count of robbery and attempted rape, and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for robbery and three years’ imprisonment for attempted rape. The appeal concerned the reliability of the State’s witnesses, the proper characterisation of the appellant’s conduct (attempted rape and robbery versus lesser offences), and whether the sentencing court misdirected itself in its approach to prescribed minimum sentences and the appropriateness of the punishment imposed.


2. Material Facts


The complainants, Hester Salmon and Hans Siro, were in a romantic relationship and had spent the night at a tavern consuming alcohol. In the morning, while walking home, they stopped under the bridge to talk. The appellant and his companion approached them. The appellant was armed with a beer bottle, while the companion was armed with a screwdriver.


The companion demanded money from Hans. Hans showed an empty wallet; the companion threw it down and chased Hans, then returned to where Hester and the appellant were located. Hans later turned back and followed.


While Hans was being chased, the appellant remained with Hester and instructed her to undress and turn around so that he could have sexual intercourse with her. When she refused, the appellant threatened to assault her with the beer bottle, lifted her skirt, and pulled her underwear (panty) down to her knees. Hester resisted by holding onto her skirt. During this struggle, the appellant noticed a cellphone in her skirt pocket. The appellant and Hester grappled over the cellphone, and the appellant ultimately took it and fled. Hester pursued him, demanding its return.


When Hans followed the appellant, the companion again chased Hans. Hans screamed for help and shouted that people were raping his girlfriend. A passer-by telephonically informed the police that a rape was in progress at the bridge. Police immediately attended the scene and found Hester traumatised and crying. Hester pointed out the appellant and his companion, who were arrested close to the scene.


The court treated certain factual themes as effectively common cause or corroborated in material respects, including that the appellant and his companion were present at the scene at the relevant time, that there was a confrontation involving the complainants and the assailants, and that at least one assailant was armed with a beer bottle and that the presence of a screwdriver was admitted by the defence.


The court also identified discrepancies among the witnesses’ accounts, including differences between Hester’s and Hans’s versions about what was said when the attackers approached, whether Hans was present when the appellant expressed a sexual intention, and aspects of whether weapons or the cellphone were found in the accused’s possession at arrest. The court nevertheless regarded these discrepancies as not materially undermining the State’s case when considered in context.


3. Legal Issues


The appeal required determination of whether the regional magistrate was correct to accept the State’s evidence notwithstanding alleged contradictions and the complainants’ alcohol consumption, and whether the magistrate was correct to reject the defence version. This primarily concerned the application of legal standards to factual assessment, including credibility evaluation, the treatment of inconsistent testimony, and the approach to evidence given by a complainant who may be a single witness on a particular element.


A further central question was whether the proved conduct met the legal requirements of attempted rape (as opposed to indecent assault) and whether the taking of the cellphone constituted robbery (as opposed to theft, including so-called “grab-and-run” theft). This involved applying the definitions and inferential requirements for intent and use of force to the established facts.


In relation to sentence, the court had to decide whether the magistrate’s apparent error in treating the matter as subject to a particular prescribed minimum sentence amounted to a material misdirection warranting appellate interference, and whether the sentences imposed were nevertheless appropriate having regard to the appellant’s personal circumstances and criminal history. This was largely a question of sentencing discretion and appellate review of that discretion.


4. Court’s Reasoning


On the contradictions in the State’s case, the court applied the principle that contradictions per se do not necessarily justify rejecting a witness’s evidence. The court emphasised that credibility assessment requires evaluating the number, importance, and effect of discrepancies in the context of the evidence as a whole. It considered that the incident unfolded quickly, was stressful, and involved the complainants viewing events from different positions as they were separated when Hans was chased. The court treated certain alleged contradictions as either immaterial or a natural product of different vantage points and a fluid sequence of events. It further reasoned that the existence of some discrepancies could point away from collusion.


Regarding perceived inconsistencies between Hester’s account and that of the arresting officer, Inspector Esterhuizen, the court accepted that Esterhuizen did not see Hans on arrival, but held that this did not undermine the State’s case given that it was common cause that Hans was present; the omission was ascribed to mistake. The court also relied on Esterhuizen’s evidence that he attended the scene following a report of a rape in progress, found Hester traumatised and crying, and that she immediately pointed out the appellant and his companion, who were arrested nearby. This evidence, together with concessions in the defence version about presence and confrontation, was treated as materially corroborative.


On the complainants’ alcohol consumption, the court held that, although it was put to them that they were drunk, the record supported that they were only mildly under the influence and able to appreciate what was happening. The court applied the approach that guilt must be determined on a conspectus of all the evidence, and that incriminating and exculpatory evidence must be evaluated together rather than in isolation. It concluded that there was substantial common cause on material aspects, and that the combined corroboration from the police evidence and the defence version provided a sufficient safeguard for the reliability of the complainants’ testimony.


In relation to deference on appeal, the court stressed that a trial court has advantages in assessing credibility and demeanour, and that an appellate court should be slow to interfere with factual findings absent misdirection. It found no basis to conclude that the magistrate misdirected himself or reached a wrong conclusion in accepting the State’s version and rejecting the appellant’s.


On the contention that Hester was a single witness regarding the removal of her underwear (relevant to attempted rape), the court applied the cautionary approach to single-witness evidence. It held, however, that there is no mechanical formula; the evidence must be weighed with common sense, considering merits and demerits, and deciding whether it is trustworthy despite defects or contradictions. The court found that the magistrate expressly recognised the single-witness issue, approached it with caution, and identified corroboration for material parts of Hester’s account. It endorsed the magistrate’s conclusion that Hester made a good impression and testified satisfactorily.


On whether the conduct constituted attempted rape, the court reasoned that the evidence established an expressed intention by the appellant to have sexual intercourse with Hester, followed by threats of assault with a beer bottle and active steps to undress her by lifting her skirt and pulling down her underwear. It held that this conduct went beyond indecent assault and amounted to attempted rape, with the attempt being halted by Hester’s resistance.


On the robbery conviction, the court found cogent evidence of resistance and force in the struggle over the cellphone, distinguishing the incident from “grab-and-run” cases. It considered that the appellant succeeded in taking the phone through force exerted during grappling, and that any subsequent return of the cellphone did not alter the character of the taking, particularly given the circumstances described (including the influence of the co-accused and the arrival of police).


Turning to sentence, the court accepted that the magistrate erred in treating the applicable prescribed minimum sentence as 15 years, and that the correct prescribed minimum for robbery (as contended on appeal and conceded for the State) was seven years under the relevant provision. However, the court applied the principle that not every misdirection warrants interference; it must be material and must show that discretion was not exercised properly or reasonably. It concluded that the error had no bearing on the outcome because the real question was whether the misdirection vitiated the sentencing decision, and because the magistrate had in any event found substantial and compelling circumstances justifying a departure from the prescribed minimum.


The court placed significant weight on the appellant’s extensive record of previous convictions, including multiple convictions for theft, robbery, and housebreaking with intent to steal, and the fact that he committed the present offences within months of being released on parole. Given this history and the nature of the offences, the court held that the robbery sentence of five years’ imprisonment was not inappropriate, and that if the magistrate erred, it was on the side of leniency. The court also warned the appellant regarding the risk of being declared a habitual criminal under the cited statutory provision.


5. Outcome and Relief


The appeal was dismissed. The High Court confirmed both the appellant’s convictions (robbery and attempted rape) and the sentences imposed by the regional court (five years’ imprisonment for robbery and three years’ imprisonment for attempted rape). The court further recorded a warning that the appellant risked being declared a habitual criminal in terms of section 286 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. The judgment, as provided, did not set out a distinct costs order in relation to the appeal.


Cases Cited


S v Mkohle 1990 (1) SACR 95 (A); S v Jochems 1991 (1) SACR 208 (A); S v Safatsa and Others 1988 (1) SA 868 (A); S v Van Aardt 2009 (1) SACR 648 (SCA); S v Van Der Meyden 1999 (2) SA 79 (W); S v Van Aswegen 2001 (2) SACR 97 (SCA); S v Chabalala 2003 (1) SACR 134 (SCA); R v Dhlumayo and Another 1948 (2) SA 677 (A); S v Webber 1971 (3) SA 754 (A); S v Sauls and Others 1981 (3) SA 172 (A); R v Mokoena 1932 OPD 79; R v Bellingham 1955 (2) SA 566 (A); Ntaka v S [2008] ZASCA 30; (2008) 3 All SA 170 (SCA).


Legislation Cited


Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, section 51(2)(c)(ii); Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 286.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment as provided.


Held


The court held that the regional magistrate was entitled to accept the State’s evidence despite discrepancies, because the contradictions were not materially destructive when assessed in context, and because the evidence was corroborated in important respects by the police witness and aspects of the defence version. The complainants’ alcohol consumption did not render their evidence unreliable on the record, and the appellate court found no misdirection warranting interference with the trial court’s credibility findings.


The court held further that the appellant’s conduct—expressing an intention to have sexual intercourse, threatening assault with a beer bottle, and forcibly pulling down the complainant’s underwear—constituted attempted rape, not merely indecent assault. It also held that the taking of the cellphone after grappling and resistance constituted robbery, not mere theft.


On sentence, the court held that although the magistrate erred regarding the applicable prescribed minimum sentence, the error was not shown to be materially vitiating. In light of the appellant’s extensive prior convictions and the magistrate’s finding of substantial and compelling circumstances resulting in a sentence below the applicable minimum, the sentences imposed were upheld as appropriate. The appeal against sentence was dismissed, and the appellant was warned about potential habitual criminal consequences under section 286 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that contradictions in witness testimony do not automatically justify rejection of that evidence. The effect of discrepancies must be evaluated with reference to their materiality, their number and importance, and their relationship to the evidence as a whole, taking into account that witnesses may observe events from different vantage points and under stressful, fast-moving conditions.


It reaffirmed that criminal adjudication requires consideration of a conspectus of all the evidence, and that the conclusion reached must account for the totality of the evidentiary material rather than selectively treating incriminating and exculpatory evidence in isolation. The operative standard remains proof beyond reasonable doubt, with acquittal required where it is reasonably possible that the accused may be innocent.


The judgment reiterated that an appellate court is generally slow to interfere with factual and credibility findings by the trial court, absent misdirection, because the trial court has advantages in observing witnesses and assessing demeanour.


It applied the cautionary approach to single-witness evidence, emphasising that there is no rigid formula and that caution must not displace common sense; the court must weigh the witness’s evidence, consider its merits and defects, and decide whether it is trustworthy, including whether there is corroboration.


On the substantive offences, the judgment treated attempted rape as established where there is an expressed intention to have sexual intercourse coupled with threats and active steps toward execution (such as forcibly undressing), even if the attempt is not completed due to resistance. It treated robbery as established where property is taken through force in the face of resistance, distinguishing such circumstances from opportunistic “grab-and-run” theft scenarios.


On sentence, the judgment applied the principle that a misdirection regarding sentencing facts or prescribed minima does not automatically justify appellate interference; the misdirection must be material in the sense that it shows the sentencing discretion was not properly or reasonably exercised. The appellate enquiry remains focused on whether the sentence is appropriate in light of all relevant factors, including prior convictions and the sentencing court’s approach to substantial and compelling circumstances.

About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: High Court, Northern Cape Division, Kimberley
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: High Court, Northern Cape Division, Kimberley
>>
2009
>>
[2009] ZANCHC 69
|

|

Hoogstander v S (CA&R 58/09) [2009] ZANCHC 69 (20 November 2009)

Reportable:
YES / NO
Circulate
to Judges: YES / NO
Circulate
to Magistrates: YES / NO
Circulate
to Regional Magistrates: YES / NO
IN THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTHERN CAPE
HIGH COURT, KIMBERLEY)
Case No: CA&R
58/09
Heard on:
09-11-2009
Delivered:
20-11-2009
In the matter between:
CHRISTOPHER
HOOGSTANDER
Appellant
and
THE STATE
Respondent
CORAM: KGOMO JP et
MJALI AJ
JUDGMENT
ON APPEAL
MJALI AJ:
Arising out of an
incident which occurred under the first Transvaal Road Bridge (“the
bridge”), Kimberley, in the morning
of 11 December 2005, the
appellant and his co-accused (“companion”) were prosecuted in
the regional court, Kimberley, on
two counts of robbery, assault and
attempted rape. He was convicted on one count of robbery as well as
attempted rape and was
sentenced to 5 years imprisonment for robbery
and 3 years for attempted rape. He now appeals against both his
conviction and
the sentence.
The complainants, Hester
Salmon and Hans Siro, were lovers and walking from a tavern where
they had spent the night consuming
alcohol. They stopped and had a
chat under the bridge when the appellant and his companion appeared.
The appellant was armed
with a beer bottle whilst the companion was
armed with a screw driver.
The co-accused demanded
money from Hans and when he showed him his empty wallet he threw it
down and chased Hans for a while and
then returned to where Hester
and the appellant were. Hans also turned and followed him. Meanwhile
the appellant who remained
behind with Hester had instructed her to
undress and turn around so that he can have sexual intercourse with
her. When she refused
the appellant threatened to assault her with
the beer bottle and forcefully lifted her skirt whilst pulling her
panty to the
knees. She held tight onto her skirt. In the process
the appellant noticed a cellphone in her skirt’s pocket. They
grappled
over it and the appellant eventually took possession of it
and fled with the cellphone. She went after him demanding that he

return it.
When he noticed that
Hans had followed him, the co-accused again chased him and as he was
running Hans screamed for help and shouted
that some people were
raping his girlfriend. The police who were informed telephonically
by a passerby about a rape that was
in progress at the bridge
immediately rushed to the scene. On their arrival they found a
traumatized and crying Hester who immediately
pointed out the
appellant and his co-accused who were promptly arrested.
Mr Van Tonder, for the
appellant, launched a wide-ranging attack on the evidence and the
findings of the Regional Magistrate.
First in relation to the
evidence of the complainants, Van Tonder argued that the state
witnesses contradicted each other in
material aspects and as such
could not be relied on. Secondly he contended that because Hans and
Hester had spent the whole night
prior to this incident consuming
alcohol their evidence was untrustworthy as they were under the
influence at the crucial time.
Thirdly, that Hester Salmon was a
single witness in so far as the removal of her panty by the
appellant was concerned. For this
reason her evidence should have
been approached with more caution. Lastly, he contended that at most
the appellant could have
been convicted of indecent assault and
theft instead of attempted rape and robbery as the evidence does not
establish an intention
to rape as well as robbery.
There are of course a
number of contradictions between the versions of the witnesses. In
considering their effect one must bear
in mind that contradictions
per se do not necessarily lead to the rejection of the evidence of a
witness. Not every error made
by the a witness affects his
credibility and a court has to make an evaluation, taking into
account the contradictions, their
number and importance, as well as
their bearing on other parts of the witness’s evidence:
S
v Mkohle
1990 (1) SACR 95
(A) at 98 f-g;
S v
Jochems
1991 (1) SACR 208
(A) at 211 g-i
.
Bearing that in mind, I turn to deal with the contradictions.
Hester testified that
when their attackers approached them they enquired if they did not
see anyone going past. Hans testified
that when the two greeted them
and the appellant asked how much money he had on him he replied that
he used his money at Oriental
Tavern. Hans testified that he ran
away because the appellant said they were going to finish him off as
he was wasting their
time. Hester testified that the appellant
ordered Hans to go so that they can have sexual intercourse with
her. According to
Hester whilst Hans was being chased by the
co-accused, the appellant ordered her to remove her panty. According
to Hans he was
present when the appellant told Hester that he wanted
to have sexual intercourse with her. Hans testified that the
appellant
returned the cellphone to Hester in the presence of the
police and that the co-accused had the screwdriver in his possession

during the arrest. On the other hand Inspector Gherhadus
Esterhuizen’s testimony is that the two had nothing in their
possession
when he arrested them. Esterhuizen testified that Hester
reported to him that the appellant gave the cellphone back to her
when
he (Esterhuizen) appeared under the bridge.
In my view, there is
nothing in these discrepancies which should have caused the
magistrate to reject the state’s evidence in
its entirety. The
events unfolded quickly and would have caused the witnesses
considerable stress. In the light of the fluid
and mobile nature of
the incident and the fact that the witnesses observed the events
from different positions, it is not surprising
that there may be
contradictions. These discrepancies, which are not materially, on
the contrary may point away from any possibility
that they had
colluded to give false evidence against the appellant.
Some
of these alleged discrepancies are merely perceived. For example
Van Tonder contended that Hans mentioned that the appellant
threw
his wallet on the ground when he discovered that it did not contain
any money whereas Hester makes no mention of this fact.
The
evidence illustrates clearly that the complainants could not always
be together. When Hans was chased twice and raised
the alarm the
two were separated. See
S
v Safatsa and Others
1988(1)
SA 868 at 890 G
at which point the Court states
:
“
The fallacy in the
argument for the accused is that it presupposes that either or both
of the witnesses must be untruthful or unreliable
simply because
their observations did not coincide. Such an approach to the evidence
is unsound.”
In
S
v Van Aardt 2009(1) SACR 648 (SCA) at 657b-d
the Court
observed:
“
Secondly, it is not
sufficiently appreciated by the defence that the witnesses were not
always in each other’s presence as the
events unfolded and they
therefore occupied different vantage points. For example the tractor
driver was mixing the animal feed
elsewhere; one of the milkers
milked one of the cows that could not walk outside the shed, others
were milking the cows in the
shed; another heard the commotion in
Koert’s house when he went to fetch a pair of pliers at the
appellant’s residence; another
watched a different stage of the
assault when he went to feed the calves and yet another when he
kraaled the cattle.
It
follows that the witnesses could not necessarily corroborate each
other on all points. They merely recounted what they observed
at a
particular stage. What is essential is that there is no suggestion
that they were not present on the farm and observed some
assault. In
fact the evidence emanating from the appellant as well suggests that
he interacted with his workers in the ordinary
course of them
performing their duties.”
A further attack on the
evidence of the state is that Hester’s version contradicts that of
Esterhuizen. According to Hester
when the police arrived at the
scene the appellant and his companion were walking. They were
arrested by the police together
with Hans. According to Esterhuizen
when he arrived at the scene Hester said to him “daar haardloop
hulle”. He saw the appellant
and the other man running at a
distance of approximately 15 -20 metres from him. At no stage did he
see Hans Siro. I hasten to
say that given the fact that it is common
cause between the defence and the state that Hans Siro was at the
scene, the fact that
Esterhuizen did not see Hans can only be
ascribed to a mistake on his part.
I turn now to the issue
of the drunkenness of the witnesses. Although it was put to them
during cross-examination that they were
drunk, it is clear from the
record that they were only mildly under the influence of liquor and
fully appreciated what was taking
place. Their evidence must not be
viewed in isolation. In order to decide upon the guilt of the
appellant, it is necessary to
have regard to a conspectus of all the
evidence. As was said by Nugent J in
S
v Van Der Meyden
1999 (2) SA 79
(W) at 81F–82D
:
“
Evidence which
incriminates the accused, and evidence which exculpates him, cannot
both be true – there is not even a possibility
that might be true –
one is possibly true only if there is an equivalent possibility that
the other is untrue. There will be
cases where the state evidence is
so convincing and conclusive as to exclude the reasonable possibility
that the accused might
be innocent, no matter that his evidence might
suggest the contrary when viewed in isolation…
The proper test is
that an accused is bound to be convicted if the evidence establishes
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt and the
logical corollary is that
he must be acquitted if it is reasonably possible that he might be
innocent. The process of reasoning
which is appropriate to the
application of that test in any particular case will depend on the
nature of the evidence which the
court has before it. What must be
borne in mind, however, is that the conclusion which is reached
(whether it be to convict or
to acquit) must account for all the
evidence. Some of the evidence might be found to be false; some of it
might be found to be
unreliable; and some of it might be found to be
only possibly false or unreliable; but none of it may be simply
ignored.
Part of this dictum is
quoted with approval in
S
v Van Aswegen 2001(2) SACR 97 (SCA)
at
101b-e. See also
S
v Chabalala
2003 SACR 134
(SCA) at 139 I – 140 b.
11. The complainant’s
evidence is corroborated to a large extent by Esterhuizen as well as
the defence evidence. Esterhuizen rushed
to the scene because of a
report of a rape that was taking place at the first Transvaal Bridge.
When he arrived at the scene he
found a traumatised Hester crying.
Hester immediately pointed out the appellant and his companion. The
two were arrested not far
from the scene. It is the defence version
that the appellant and the companion were at the scene at the
relevant times and that
there was a confrontation between Hans and
the companion albeit for different reason. The testimony of the state
witnesses that
the attackers were armed with a beer bottle was not
disputed and that one of them had a screw driver was admitted by the
defence.
Having considered the totality of the evidence I am of the
view that the evidence on all material aspects was substantially
common
cause.
12. In my view, the
testimony of Esterhuizen and the defence in relation to the incident
affords a sufficient safeguard to the reliability
of the testimony of
Hester and Hans notwithstanding their alcohol consumption. As is
apparent from his judgment, the magistrate
was impressed with the
manner in which the state witnesses testified. He was obviously
unimpressed with the quality of the evidence
of the appellant when he
stated: “
Bygevolg
is ek nie tevrede dat hulle weergawes enigsins die waarheid is nie en
verwerp ek dit”
.
13. A trial court has
advantages which a court of appeal does not enjoy, especially in
regard to the evaluation of the credibility
and demeanour of the
witnesses. Accordingly, appeal courts are slow to disturb factual
findings made by courts of first instance
and, absent the Magistrate
having been shown to have misdirected himself, his conclusions are
presumed to be correct and must stand
unless they are shown to have
been wrong. See
R
v Dhlumayo and another
1948 (2) SA 677
(A) at 706
.
I have not been persuaded that the Magistrate misdirected himself or
that he reached the incorrect conclusion.
14. I turn now to the
issue of Hester being a single witness with regard to attempted rape.
It is a well-established judicial practice
that the evidence of a
single witness should be approached with caution. His or her merits
as a witness must be weighed against
factors which militate against
his or her credibility. See in this regard
S
v Webber
1971 (3) SA 754
(A) at 758G–H
.
The correct approach to the application of this so-called “cautionary
rule” was set out by Diemont JA in
S
v Sauls and others
1981 (3) SA 172
(A) at 180E–G
as
follows:
“
There is no rule of
thumb test or formula to apply when it comes to a consideration of
the credibility of the single witness (see
the remarks of Rumpff JA
in S v Webber . . .). The trial judge will weigh his
evidence, will consider its merits and
demerits and, having done so,
will decide whether it is trustworthy and whether, despite the fact
that there are shortcomings or
defects or contradictions in the
testimony, he is satisfied that the truth has been told. The
cautionary rule referred to by De
Villiers JP in 1932 [in R v Mokoena
1932 OPD 79
at 80] may be a guide to a right decision but it does not
mean ‘that the appeal must succeed if any criticism, however
slender,
of the witnesses’ evidence were well-founded’ (per
Schreiner JA in R v Nhlapo (AD 10 November 1952) quoted in R v
Bellingham
1955 (2) SA 566
(A) at 569.) It has been said more than
once that the exercise of caution must not be allowed to displace the
exercise of common
sense.”
15. On a proper analysis
of the Magistrate’s judgment in this case the conclusion can safely
be reached that he was alive to the
applicability of the cautionary
rule and that he approached Hester’s evidence with the necessary
caution, having stated the following:
“
Vir sekere aspekte
van haar getuienis is Hester, ‘n enkele getuie en sal die hof haar
getuienis in daardie lig beoordeel en dan
vir vedere aspekte is daar
stawing vir haar weergawe te vinde”,
The magistrate proceeded
to weigh the merits and demerits in her evidence and was satisfied
that there was sufficient corroboration
for her version. She made a
good impression on the court and gave her evidence in a satisfactory
manner. As stated earlier, the
trial court is in a better position to
make these determinations
16. I come now to the
contention by Van Tonder that at most the appellant should have been
convicted of indecent assault and theft
instead of attempted rape and
the robbery of a cellphone. The evidence establishes that the
appellant voiced his intention to have
sexual intercourse with
Hester. This is the reason why he ordered her to turn around and
remove her panty. When she refused he
threatened to hit her with the
beer bottle and forcefully lifted her skirt and pulled her panty to
her knees. In my view the expressed
intention accompanied by the
threats of assault and the active act of undressing go beyond the act
of indecent assault and constitutes
attempted rape which was halted
by Ms Salmon’s resistance.
17. On the question of
robbery of the cellphone there is cogent evidence that there was
resistance from Hester as they grappled
over the cellphone which the
appellant eventually succeeded to take from her. Because of the
resistance and the amount of force
that was exerted to get the phone
from her this matter is distinguishable from the grab-and-run cases.
Appellant only returned
the instrument because his co-accused told
him to and because these assailants were aware that they were
surrounded by the police.
It seems clear to me therefore that the
Magistrate was perfectly correct in convicting the appellant as he
did on this count and
the appeal against his conviction must fail.
18. Turning to the
question of sentence. Van Tonder argued that the Magistrate
misdirected himself in finding that the minimum sentence
of 15 years
imprisonment was applicable in this matter. He contended further that
the appellant was convicted of robbery and not
robbery with
aggravating circumstances. In terms of section 51(2)(c)(ii) of Act
105 of 1997 a minimum sentence of 7 years imprisonment
was
applicable. This is a fact that was conceded by Mr. Mashuga for the
state. However for an appeal court to interfere the misdirection
must
be material. As was said by Maya JA in
Ntaka
V S
[2008] ZASCA 30
;
(2008) 3 All SA 170
(SCA) at 173 para 13
“
That said, however,
it must be borne in mind that an error committed by a court in
determining or applying the facts for assessing
the appropriate
sentence does not necessarily spell the end of the enquiry. A mere
misdirection is not by itself sufficient to
entitle the appeal court
to interfere; it must be of such a nature, degree or seriousness that
it shows directly or inferentially,
that the court did not exercise
its discretion at all or exercised it improperly or unreasonably such
as to vitiate its decision
on sentence.
Assuming, without
deciding, that the misdirections are not of a vitiating nature when
proper regard is had to all the relevant factors,
it must nonetheless
be considered whether the sentence was appropriate in the
circumstances of the case”.
19. Whether the
Magistrate was right or wrong in holding that the prescribed sentence
of 15 years is applicable, has no bearing
on the outcome because what
has to be decided is whether the misdirection vitiated his decision
on sentence. Together with the
other relevant factors before passing
sentence, the magistrate had to consider the fact that the appellant
has numerous previous
convictions. He had his first brush with the
law as early as 17 May 1994 when he was convicted of Housebreaking
and sentenced to
5 strokes with a light cane. In November 1994 he was
sentenced to 7 strokes with a light cane for theft. On 16 February
1995 he
was again sentenced to 7 strokes with a light cane for theft.
On 10 November 1995 the imposition of sentence for theft was
postponed
for 3 years. On 7 February 1996 he was convicted on two
counts of robbery which were taken together for the purposes of
sentence
and was referred to a reformatory school. In September 1996
he was sentenced to 30 months imprisonment for theft. On 28 May 1999

he was sentenced to 8 years imprisonment for housebreaking with
intent to steal and theft. On 17 June 2005 he was released on parole

supervision until 27 November 2008. Within months of his release on
parole he committed the present offences.
20. With the long list of
previous convictions that the appellant has, all relevant to the
charge of robbery for which he has been
convicted, it cannot be said
in my view that the sentence of 5 years imprisonment is
inappropriate. This is so particularly when
one considers the fact
that the Magistrate found in his favour that there were substantial
and compelling circumstances to justify
the departure from the
prescribed minimum sentence of 7 years imprisonment. I am satisfied
that the Magistrate did not exercise
his discretion improperly. If he
erred, it was on the side of leniency.
21. The appellant’s
record of previous convictions shows that he has a propensity for
committing crimes involving dishonesty.
He must be warned that he
risks being declared a habitual criminal in terms of
section 286
of
the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
or worse. There is no merit in
the appeal against sentence.
In the result I make the
following order.
1. The appeal is
dismissed.
2. The conviction and
sentence are confirmed.
3. The appellant is
warned that he risks being declared a habitual criminal in terms of
section 286
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
.
_________________
G. N. Z. MJALI
ACTING JUDGE
NORTHERN CAPE HIGH
COURT
I concur
_________________
F.DIALE KGOMO
JUDGE PRESIDENT
NORTHERN CAPE HIGH
COURT.
On behalf of the Appellant
Adv A Van Tonder
Instructed by
Kimberley Justice Centre
On behalf of the Respondent
Adv Mashuga
Instructed by
Director Public Prosecutions