FH Swanepoel Plant Hire CC v PMG Mining (Pty) Ltd (342/09) [2009] ZANCHC 61 (26 June 2009)

80 Reportability
Commercial Law

Brief Summary

Interim Relief — Interdict — Application for interim interdict to prevent respondent from removing and selling manganese ore — Applicant claimed entitlement to sell ore based on agreement with respondent — Dispute arose regarding the authority of respondent's representatives to enter into the agreement — Court found applicant established a prima facie right to the ore, a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favored granting the interdict — Interim interdict granted pending resolution of main action.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This matter concerned an application in the High Court of South Africa, Northern Cape Division, Kimberley, for interim relief in the form of a temporary interdict (pendente lite). The applicant sought an order compelling access to the respondent’s mining premises and authorising the applicant to remove and sell a specified quantity of manganese ore, with consequential relief aimed at preserving the proceeds pending the determination of a contemplated action.


The parties were FH Swanepoel Plant Hire CC (the applicant), a mining contractor, and PMG Mining (Pty) Ltd (the respondent), the mine owner. Their relationship arose from a written mining contract in terms of which the applicant undertook mining operations at the respondent’s premises known as Bishop Mine.


Procedurally, the application was preceded by an order granted by agreement between the parties prohibiting the respondent from removing and/or selling the relevant 10 000 tons of manganese ore (or any portion of it) from the mine. The applicant also brought an application to amend the notice of motion because the second part of its notice of motion had been incorrectly framed; the amendment (unopposed) introduced relief directing that the sale proceeds be paid into the applicant’s attorneys’ trust account pending the institution of an action. In addition, the respondent sought condonation for the late filing of its answering affidavit; this was unopposed and granted.


The underlying dispute concerned contractual performance and payment in a mining relationship, with a particular disagreement about the quality (grade) of manganese ore mined and the parties’ respective responsibilities under the contract, together with the consequences for payment and disposal of the ore already extracted.


2. Material Facts


It was common cause, or treated as established on the papers for purposes of interim relief, that the parties were bound by a written agreement in terms of which the applicant acted as mining contractor on the respondent’s mine property at Bishop Mine on the Kuruman–Postmasburg road. It also appeared from the minutes relied upon by the applicant that, by October 2008, approximately 10 000 tons of manganese ore had already been mined and was ready for sale.


The papers reflected that disputes arose between the parties, particularly relating to the grade of the manganese ore mined. This dispute led to meetings between representatives of the parties aimed at resolving operational and payment problems. A meeting was held on 11 October 2008, attended by several of the respondent’s employees including the mine manager, and minutes of this and other meetings were placed before the court.


On the applicant’s version, supported by the minutes and the document attached as “FHS 1”, an agreement was reached at the 11 October 2008 meeting that the applicant could sell the 10 000 tons of manganese ore to an available buyer, with an arrangement concerning the allocation and/or advancing of portions of the proceeds. The respondent, however, challenged the authority of its employees to conclude such an agreement, and raised concerns regarding the authenticity and form of “FHS 1” (including that it appeared on the applicant’s letterhead and that the respondent’s signatory name did not appear, only the words “Bishop PMG Mine”).


The court accepted, for purposes of the interim-relief enquiry, that the applicant had demonstrated significant difficulties in obtaining payment from the respondent for its mining services, and that the applicant faced a risk of prejudice if the ore were dealt with in a manner that would prevent effective accounting for or recovery of the proceeds pending the contemplated action.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether the applicant satisfied the requirements for an interim interdict pendente lite, authorising the applicant to access the mine, remove, and sell the ore, and securing the proceeds pending the institution and finalisation of an action.


The dispute primarily required an application of established legal principles to the facts presented on affidavit. It involved mixed questions of fact and law, including whether the applicant had established a prima facie right (even if open to some doubt) arising from the alleged agreement and/or the contractual framework, and whether the risk of harm and the balance of convenience justified interim relief. It also required an evaluative judgment on the probabilities and the adequacy of alternative remedies, as is typical in interim interdict proceedings.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter on the basis that the relief sought amounted to an interim interdict pending the outcome of future action proceedings. It applied the well-established requirements for interim interdictory relief as formulated in LF Boshoff Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1969 (2) SA 256 (C), namely a clear right or a prima facie right open to doubt, a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm (where the right is only prima facie), the balance of convenience, and the absence of an adequate alternative remedy. The court also referred to Eriksen Motors Welkom Ltd v Protea Motors Warrenton 1973 (3) SA 685 (A).


In considering whether the applicant had shown a prima facie right, the court focused on the written record relied upon by the applicant (including the minutes and the “FHS 1” agreement). The respondent’s stance was that its employees lacked proper authority to bind it and that the agreement was suspect. The court was not persuaded that the respondent’s objections displaced the applicant’s case at the interim stage. It emphasised that the meeting minutes, together with the broader pattern of meetings reflected in the papers, showed ongoing engagement by representatives on both sides to address “chronic” operational and payment issues. On that material, the court concluded that the applicant had at least established a prima facie right, albeit one open to some doubt, and noted that the test at this stage was not proof on a balance of probabilities.


On the requirement of a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm, the court accepted that the respondent experienced serious difficulties in paying the applicant for its services. It accepted that the applicant was at risk of substantial prejudice if the ore could be disposed of without a mechanism ensuring traceability and preservation of the proceeds. The court rejected criticism directed at the applicant for not producing affidavits from the respondent’s employees referenced in the meeting minutes, holding that it was unrealistic to expect employees to depose to affidavits supporting a counterparty against their employer, and noting that the respondent could have placed such affidavits before the court if it wished.


Regarding the balance of convenience, the court reasoned that the applicant’s proposed mechanism (sale by the applicant, with proceeds paid into an attorneys’ trust account on an interest-bearing deposit pending the action) was designed to preserve the value of the ore while protecting both parties’ positions. The court considered that the respondent would suffer no material prejudice because, if successful in the action, it could claim entitlement to the preserved proceeds. Conversely, if interim relief were refused, the respondent might dispose of the ore and the applicant would be left without reliable information or evidence about what became of it and what proceeds were realised.


The court further held that the applicant had no other satisfactory remedy. Interim relief was considered necessary to preserve the subject matter and the value represented by the ore and its proceeds until the parties’ underlying contractual disputes could be determined in action proceedings.


In assessing the merits to the extent necessary for interim relief, the court adopted the approach in Webster v Mitchell 1948 (1) SA 1186 (W), which requires consideration of the applicant’s facts together with those facts put up by the respondent that the applicant cannot dispute, and then an assessment whether the applicant could obtain final relief at trial, taking into account inherent probabilities and any serious doubt cast by the respondent’s version. Applying this approach, the court held that the respondent had not raised more than bare denials on authority, and that its challenges lacked supporting factual detail.


The court also dealt with the respondent’s contention that disputes over ore grade undermined the applicant’s prospects. It reasoned from the terms of the main contract, specifically clause 6.4 read with Appendix A, that the contract differentiated between size, for which the contractor bore responsibility, and grade, which the contract allocated to the mine owner (the respondent). On this contractual footing, the court was satisfied that the applicant had reasonable prospects of success in the contemplated action sufficient to support interim relief. The court further noted that the respondent’s asserted cancellation of the contract appeared not to have followed the agreed contractual cancellation procedures (clauses 7.1 and 7.2), though it considered this an issue to be fully determined in the main action.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court granted the interim relief sought in the amended notice of motion. It ordered the respondent to provide the applicant access to the Bishop Mine premises and to permit the applicant to remove and sell 10 000 tons of manganese ore mined by the applicant. It directed that the proceeds of sale be paid into the trust account of Jordaan & Mans (Kuruman) and invested in an interest-bearing account pending the finalisation of an action to be instituted by the applicant within 30 days of the order.


The respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the application.


Cases Cited


LF Boshoff Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1969 (2) SA 256 (C)


Eriksen Motors Welkom Ltd v Protea Motors Warrenton 1973 (3) SA 685 (A)


Webster v Mitchell 1948 (1) SA 1186 (W)


Legislation Cited


No legislation was cited in the judgment.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that the applicant met the requirements for an interim interdict pendente lite. The applicant established a prima facie right (though open to some doubt) to remove and sell the ore based on the meeting record and the contractual context, demonstrated a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm if the ore were disposed of without preservation of proceeds, showed that the balance of convenience favoured interim relief, and established that there was no adequate alternative remedy.


Accordingly, the court ordered access to the mine, authorised removal and sale of the identified ore, required preservation of sale proceeds in attorneys’ trust pending a timely instituted action, and awarded costs against the respondent.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the settled requirements for an interim interdict, namely that an applicant must show a clear right or a prima facie right open to some doubt, a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm where the right is only prima facie, that the balance of convenience favours the relief, and that the applicant has no other satisfactory remedy, as articulated in LF Boshoff Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1969 (2) SA 256 (C) and supported by Eriksen Motors Welkom Ltd v Protea Motors Warrenton 1973 (3) SA 685 (A).


It further applied the approach to disputes of fact in interim interdict proceedings as described in Webster v Mitchell 1948 (1) SA 1186 (W), requiring the court to consider the applicant’s version together with the respondent’s facts that cannot be disputed, and then to assess whether, on inherent probabilities, the applicant could obtain final relief at trial; if the respondent’s version casts serious doubt on the applicant’s case, interim relief should not be granted.


Finally, the judgment illustrated that where interim relief is sought to preserve the subject matter of a dispute, the court may craft relief that protects both parties by directing that proceeds be preserved in a trust account pending litigation, particularly where there is a risk that the subject matter may be dissipated and where the respondent’s denials are found to be largely bare or unsupported on the papers.

About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: High Court, Northern Cape Division, Kimberley
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: High Court, Northern Cape Division, Kimberley
>>
2009
>>
[2009] ZANCHC 61
|

|

FH Swanepoel Plant Hire CC v PMG Mining (Pty) Ltd (342/09) [2009] ZANCHC 61 (26 June 2009)

Verslagwaardig:
Ja / Nee
Sirkuleer aan
Regters: Ja / Nee
Sirkuleer aan
Landdroste: Ja / Nee
IN DIE HOË
HOF VAN SUID-AFRIKA
[Noord-Kaap
Hoë Hof, Kimberley]
Saaknommer: 342/09
Datum
Verhoor: 2009-06-12
Datum
Gelewer: 2009-06-26
In
die saak van
:
FH
SWANEPOEL PLANT HIRE CC
APPLIKANT
versus
PMG
MINING (PTY) LTD
RESPONDENT
Coram:
MAJIEDT
R
UITSPRAAK
MAJIEDT R:
Die Applikant het
aansoek gedoen vir ‘n bevel ingevolge waarvan gelas word dat die
Respondent toegang
aan
die Applikant verleen tot die Respondent se perseel te Bishop Myn en
dat die Applikant toegelaat word om 10 000 ton mangaanerts
wat
hy ontgin het, te verwyder en te verkoop. Verdere regshulp waarna ek
tegelegenertyd sal verwys is ook aangevra..
B
y
ooreenkoms tussen die partye is daarna ‘n bevel uitgereik
waarvolgens die Respondent verbied is om die 10 000 ton
mangaanerts,
of enige gedeelte daarvan, vanaf die Respondent se
mynperseel te verwyder en/of te verkoop.
Die tweede
gedeelte
van die Applikant se Kennisgewing van Mosie was verkeerd bewoord en
daarom is daar ‘n aansoek gebring om die Kennisgewing
van Mosie te
wysig om bykomend voorsiening te maak vir die inbetaling van die
opbrengs van die voormelde verkoping in die Applikant
se prokureur
se trustrekening, hangende die instel van ‘n aksie deur die
Applikant. Aangesien daar geen opponering teen hierdie
aansoek was
nie, is die wysiging toegestaan.
‘
n
Kondonasie-aansoek deur die Respondent ten aansien van die laat
liassering van sy antwoordende eedsverklaring is nie deur die

Applikant opponeer nie en is eweneens toegestaan.
Die geskil tussen
die partye spruit voort uit ‘n skriftelike ooreenkoms tussen hulle
aangegaan met die Applikant as mynkontrakteur
en die Respondent as
myneienaar. Daarvolgens is die Applikant gekontrakteer om te myn by
die Respondent se mynperseel, Bishop
Myn, op die Kuruman-Postmasburg
pad. ‘n Dispuut het tussen die partye ontstaan, meer bepaald
aangaande die kwaliteit van mangaanerts
wat deur die Applikant gemyn
is. Ek sal later weer daarna verwys.
Ten einde die
geskil wat ontstaan het by te lê is daar verskeie vergaderings
gehou deur ve
rteenwoordigers
van die partye. Ek moet nou alreeds uitwys dat die Respondent
ontken dat die persone wat by die vergadering hier
ter sake en
waarna ek aanstons sal verwys, behoorlik gemagtig en bevoeg was om
namens die Respondent sekere besluite te neem,
welke die onderwerp
vorm van dié aansoek deur die Applikant. Een sodanige
vergadering is gehou op 11 Oktober 2008. Verskeie
van die
Respondent se werknemers was daar teenwoordig, onder andere ook die
mynbestuurder. Die notule van hierdie en ander vergaderings
is
aangeheg tot die stukke as aanhangsels. By die voormelde
vergadering van 11 Oktober 2008 is ‘n ooreenkoms, wat as “FHS 1”

tot die Applikant se funderende stukke aangeheg is, aangegaan. Dit
blyk uit dié betrokke notule dat daar op daardie stadium

ongeveer 10 000 ton mangaanerts gemyn was en wat gereed was om
verkoop te word. Die Respondent het egter klaarblyklik ‘n

wesenlike probleem gehad met die graad van die mangaanerts. Daar is
toe deur ene Mnr. Swanepoel jnr namens die Applikant ‘n
voorstel
gemaak om die reeds ontginde mangaanerts te verkoop aan ‘n
beskikbare koper. Daar is volgens die notule ooreengekom
dat die
Applikant dié 10 000 ton mangaanerts kon verkoop en dat
die Respondent 50% van die opbrengs sou betaal aan
die Applikant op
sy rekening en dat die ander 50% aan die Applikant voorgeskiet sou
word as ‘n lening.
Nie net het die
Respondent die bevoegdheid van sy werknemers aangeval om dié
bepaalde ooreenkoms
(“FHS 1”)soos
voormeld aan te gaan met die Applikant nie, maar is vraagtekens ook
geplaas agter die egtheid van dié
ooreenkoms aangesien dit op
een van die Applikant se briefhoofde verskyn. Verder is kritiek
uitgespreek daarop dat die persoon
wat namens die Respondent sou
onderteken het op dié ooreenkoms se naam nie daar verskyn
nie. Daar verskyn bloot die woorde
“
Bishop
PMG Mine”
.
Die regshulp
aangevra deur die Applikant kom neer op ‘n tussentydse interdik
pendente
lite
.
Die vereistes vir ‘n tussentydse interdik is as volg neergelê
deur Corbett R, soos hy toe was, in
LF Boshoff
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality
1969(2)
SA 256 (C) te 267 A-F:
“
(a) that the right which is
the subject-matter of the main action and which he seeks to protect
by means of interim relief is clear
or, if not clear, is prima facie
established, though open to some doubt;
(b) that, if the right is only prima facie
established, there is a wellgrounded apprehension of irreparable harm
to the applicant
if the interim relief is not granted and he
ultimately succeeds in establishing his right;
(c) that the balance of convenience favours the
granting of interim relief; and
(d) that the applicant has no
other satisfactory remedy.”
Sien verder ook:
Eriksen Motors
Welkom Ltd v Protea Motors Warrenton
1973(3)
SA 685 (A) te 691.
Ek bespreek
vervolgens nou hierdie voorvereistes
seriatim
met
verwysing na die beweringe in die stukke voor my.
Wat betref die
prima
facie
reg
steun die Applikant, soos aangedui hierbo, op ‘n geskrewe
ooreenkoms ingevolge waarvan ‘n ooreenkoms bereik is tussen
die
partye dat die Applikant 10 000 ton mangaanerts mag verkoop.
Die Respondent se ontkenning van die bevoegdheid en magtiging
van
die persone om sodanige besluit namens die Respondent te neem by die
betrokke vergadering en om die ooreenkoms (“FHS 1”)
te
onderteken namens die Respondent gaan eenvoudig net nie op nie. Uit
die notule van dié bepaalde vergadering, sowel
as die notules
van ander vergaderings, blyk dit duidelik dat sommige van hierdie
werknemers by al die vergaderings teenwoordig
was en dat daar ‘n
indringende soeke was deur beide partye om ‘n oplossing vir die
kroniese probleme wat daar toe ontstaan
het te vind. Ek is tevrede
dat die Applikant ten minste ‘n
prima
facie
reg
gevestig het wat weliswaar oop is vir ‘n mate van twyfel. Die
toets is op hierdie stadium egter nie of die Applikant op
‘n
oorwig van waarskynlikhede sodanige reg bewys het nie.
Die volgende
aspek wat behandel word is die vereiste van ‘n gegronde vrees van
onherstelbare skade. Uit die stukke is dit duidelik
dat die
Respondent ernstige probleme ondervind om die Applikant te betaal
vir sy dienste as mynkontrakteur. Die situasie is
só kritiek
dat een van die Respondent se eie werknemers, ene “
Nooientjie”,
volgens die notules herhaalde kere daarop gewys het tydens sodanige
vergaderings dat Applikant erg benadeel word deurdat hy behoorlik

presteer ingevolge die partye se ooreenkoms, maar dat die Respondent
nie sy deel van die kontrak nakom nie. Uiteraard kon die
Applikant
nie ‘n eedsverklaring van dié bepaalde werknemer en andere
bekom nie en is die Respondent uitgenooi om sodanige
eedsverklarings
voor die Hof te plaas. Hiervoor het die Respondent se advokaat, Me.
Botha, die Applikant gekritiseer in haar
betoogshoofde. Sodanige
kritiek gaan nie op nie, want die betrokke potensiële
verklaarders is uiteraard in die Respondent
se diens en kan daar
beswaarlik van hulle verwag word om as’t ware die hand wat hulle
voed te byt deur namens die Applikant
in hierdie onderhawige geding
eedsverklarings te maak. Ek is daarvan oortuig dat op die stukke
voor my die Applikant wel ‘n
gegronde vrees het dat hy
onherstelbare skade berokken sal word.
Wat betref die
balans van gerief is ek die mening toegedaan dat die balans van
gerief ongetwyfeld die Applikant bevoordeel. Al
wat die Applikant
verlang is dat die mangaanerts verkoop word deur hom en dat die
opbrengs daarvan by sy prokureur se trustrekening
inbetaal word
,
hangende die beslegting van die geskil in die hoofaksie tussen hom
en die Respondent. Daar kan na my mening geen benadeling
vir die
Respondent wees nie, want sou hy suksesvol wees in die hoofaksie,
sou hy geregtig wees op die opbrengs in die prokureur
se
trustrekening. Aan die ander kant weer, indien die aangevraagde
regshulp nie toegestaan word nie, is dit vir die Respondent
moontlik
om die mangaanerts te vervreem en sou die Applikant geen inligting
of getuienis kon voorhou wat daarvan geword het en
wat die opbrengs
daarvan is nie. Gevolglik is ek tevrede dat die Applikant ook
hierdie vereiste bewys het.
Daar is na my
mening geen ander bevredigende remedie
,
anders as hierdie tussentydse interdik hangende die instel van die
hoofgeding, beskikbaar aan die Applikant nie.
Dit is tot ‘n
mate nodig om die meriete in die voorgenome hoofaksie te oorweeg
wanneer oorweging daaraan geskenk moet word of
aan die Applikant wel
‘n tussentydse interdik toegestaan moet word. Hierdie aspek is as
volg geformuleer in die saak van
Webster
v Mitchell
1948(1)
SA 1186 te 1189 deur Clayden R:
“
The proper manner of
approach I consider is to take the facts as set out by die applicant,
together with any facts set out by the
respondent which the applicant
cannot dispute, and to consider whether, having regard to the
inherent probabilities, the applicant
could on those facts
obtain
final relief at a trial. The facts set up in contradiction by the
respondent should then be considered. If serious doubt
is thrown on
the case of the applicant he could not succeed ..”
Die Respondent
het gepoog om twyfel op die Applikant se saak te
werp
deur twee aspekte te berde te bring, naamlik die aspek waarna ek
alreeds verwys het, te wete die gebrek aan bevoegdheid van
die
persoon wat die ooreenkoms waarop die Applikant hierin steun te
onderteken namens die Respondent. ‘n Tweede aspek wat
geopper is
is die kwessie van die dispuut wat daar bestaan tussen die partye
aangaande die kontraktuele bepalings en die nakoming
daarvan aldan
nie deur die Applikant. Daar is namens die Respondent deur Me Botha
die submissie gemaak dat op die Applikant
se eie weergawe die
Applikant nie die graad van mangaanerts kan bepaal nie en dat daar
derhalwe ‘n dispuut daaraangaande bestaan.
Tóg blyk dit
duidelik uit die partye se hoofooreenkoms, te wete die mynkontrak en
wel klousule 6.4 daarvan, saamgelees
met par. 1 en 2.1 van
Aanhangsel A daartoe, dat die graad (kwaliteit) van die mangaanerts
die myneienaar (Respondent) se
kontraktuele verantwoordelikheid is.
In klousule 6.4 word uitdruklik ooreengekom tussen die partye dat
die Applikant sal verseker
dat ‘n minimum van 10 000 ton per
maand van finale produk (ystererts/ mangaanerts) ontgin sal word.
Klousule 1 sit uiteen
die vereiste produkspesifikasies en dit word
uitdruklik onderverdeel as volg:
“
1. REQUIRED PRODUCT SPECIFICATIONS
SIZE (CONTRACTOR)
1.1 40 – 8- mm
1.2 8 – 40 mm
1.3 – 8 – waste fines
GRADE (PMG)
1.4 +42% Grade A
1.5 + 37 – 42% Grade B
1.6 + 32 – 37% Grade C”
Daar word derhalwe
voorsiening gemaak dat
wat
die grootte van die produk aanbetref, dit die kontrakteur (Applikant)
se verantwoordelikheid sal wees en dat daar ‘n minimum
maandelikse
produksie van 10 000 ton moet wees. Verder word dit uitdruklik
ooreengekom dat wat die gehalte van die erts aanbetref,
dit die
Respondent se verantwoordelikheid sal wees. Gevolglik op die
ooreenkoms alleen is ek die mening toegedaan dat die Applikant

redelike vooruitsigte op sukses het in die voorgenome hoofgeding en
behoort die tussentydse interdik in sy guns toegestaan te word.
Ek ag dit nodig
om laastens kortliks daarop te wys dat Mnr. Coetzee namens die
Applikant korrek is in sy submissie dat die Respondent
se
ontkennings aangaande die bevoegdheid van die persone wat die
besluite geneem het by die vergadering en van die persoon wat
die
ooreenkoms ten aansien van die verkoop van die 10 000 ton
mangaanerts namens die Respondent onderteken het, slegs blote

ontkennings is. Daar word geen verdere feite verskaf of redes
aangevoer waarom sodanige bevoegdheid in geskil geplaas word nie.

Met nalees van die baie volledige notules
kom
mens onafwendbaar tot die gevolgtrekking dat dié bepaalde
werknemers van die Respondent behoorlik wel bevoegd was om
sekere
besluite te neem ten einde die probleme te ondervang wat daar
ondervind is.
‘
n Tweede aspek
wat tot ‘n mate van belang is
,
is dat Mnr. Coetzee eweneens korrek is in sy submissie dat die
Respondent daarop steun dat hy die kontrak gekanselleer het,
maar
dat dit nêrens blyk uit sy stukke dat die ooreengekome
prosedure ten aansien van kansellasie van die kontrak, soos
neergelê
in ondermeer klousules 7.1 en 7.2 daarvan, gevolg is nie. Dit wil
dus voorkom asof dit bloot ‘n eensydige,
onprosedurele kansellasie
van die kontrak was deur die Respondent. Hoe dit ookal sy, hierdie
is aspekte wat by die hoofaksie
uitgepluis sal moet word, maar is ek
op dié stadium tevrede dat daar voldoen is aan die
voorvereistes vir ‘n tussentydse
interdik
pendente
lite
.
Ek reik gevolglik die volgende bevel
uit ooreenkomstig die regshulp aangevra deur die Applikant in sy
gewysigde Kennisgewing van
Mosie:
17.1 Die Respondent word gelas om
toegang aan die Applikant te verleen tot die Respondent se perseel te
Bishop Myn en om die Applikant
toe te laat om 10 000
(tienduisend) ton mangaanerts, welke erts deur die Applikant ontgin
is, te verwyder en te verkoop.
17.2 Dit word gelas dat die
inkomste verkry uit die voormelde verkoping van die 10 000 ton
mangaanerts in die trustrekening
van prokureurs Mnre Jordaan &
Mans, Kuruman, inbetaal sal word en op ‘n rentedraende rekening
gedeponeer sal word hangende
die afhandeling van ‘n aksie ingestel
te word deur die Applikant, welke aksie ingestel moet word binne 30
(dertig) dae vanaf
datum van hierdie bevel.
17.3 Die Respondent word gelas om
die koste van die aansoek te betaal.
____________
SA MAJIEDT
REGTER
NAMENS
APPLIKANT : ADV
WJ COETZEE
IN
OPDRAG VAN :
ENGELSMAN
MAGABANE ING
NAMENS
RESPONDENT : ADV E BOTHA
IN
OPDRAG VAN :
HAARHOFFS