Veneska Beleggings BK v Snyman and Another (108/2007) [2009] ZANCHC 23 (24 April 2009)

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[2009] ZANCHC 23
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Veneska Beleggings BK v Snyman and Another (108/2007) [2009] ZANCHC 23 (24 April 2009)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(Northern Cape
Division)
Case
Nr:
108/2007
Case
Heard:
14/04/2009
Date
delivered:
24/04/2009
In
the matter between:
Veneska
Beleggings BK
APPLICANT
(Registration
nr 1
998/020988/23)
and
Hendrik
Schalk Snyman
1
st
RESPONDENT
Adriaan
Johannes Cloete 2
nd
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
Henriques
AJ:
This
is an application for leave to appeal against the whole of the
judgment of Nduna AJ delivered on 28 November 2008.
For the sake of
convenience I will referred to the parties as in the main
application.
The
respondents seek leave to appeal on the following grounds:
“
1.
Die
hof a quo het fouteer deur die regshulp soos uiteengesit in die
Kennisgewing van Mosie toe te staan.
2. Die
hof a quo het gefouteer deur te bevind dat die respondente weier om
die besigheid aan applikante te oorhandig. Dit was die
respondente
se saak dat hulle bereid is en aangebied het en weereens aanbied om
dit wat hulle ingevolge die ooreenkoms tussen die
partye ontvang het,
terug te lewer maar dat hulle nie in staat is of verplig is om te
lewer dit wat hulle nie ingevolge die ooreenkoms
tussen die partye
ontvang het nie.
3. Die
hof a quo het fouteer deur te bevind dat die respondente afstand
gedoen het van die verweer dat die applikant versuim het
om
restitusie aan te bied.
4. Die
hof a quo het ‘n wanvoorligting begaan deur te bevind dat applikant
nie verplig was om te restitureer wat hy ontvang het
nie en dat
respondente hulle reg om betalings wat gemaak is, terug te ontvang
verbeur het.
5. Die
hof a quo het homself wanvoorgelig deur respondente te gelas om meer
aan applikant terug te lewer as wat respondente ingevolge
die
bepalings van die ooreenkoms ontvang het. Alternatiewelik deur nie
te spesifiseer dat sodanige items as wat die respondente
nie ontvang
het uit hoofde van die ooreenkoms nie (bv. die dranklisensies en die
perseel, ens) nie aan applikant gelewer hoef te
word nie.
6. Die hof a quo het
fouteer deur te bevind dat die respondente se verweer dat ‘n
geldige verkoping nie tot stand gekom het nie
en dat die kontrak
nietig was, nie kan slaag nie weens die bevinding van die Hof dat dit
res iudicata was en wel onder andere omdat
dit nie gepleit of bewys
is nie.
7. Die Verhoorhof
het fouteer deur nie te bevind dat die partye verplig was om te
restitueer dit wat hulle oor en weer ontvang het
uit hoofde van die
ooreenkoms nie.
8. Die hof a quo het
fouteer deur te bevind dat die respondente vals en/ of oneerlik is.
9. Die
hof a quo moes gelas het dat respondente moet restitueer dit wat
hulle ingevolge die ooreenkoms ontvang het en dat applikant
die koste
moet betaal. Deur te gelas dat respondente “
die
besigheid wat te Hoofstraat 37 Postmasburg as ‘n hotel en ‘n
buiteverbruik bedryf word onder die naam Postmasburg Hotel”
aan
applikant terug te lewer, het die hof respondente gelas om meer terug
te lewer as wat respondente ontvang het.”
The application for
leave to appeal served before me on 14 April 2009. Prior to
considering the application for leave to appeal
I dismissed an
application in terms of Rule 30 and an application for a
postponement. The reasons for dismissing such applications
form part
of the record of the proceedings.
Mr
Anderson who appeared for the respondents, then argued the
application for leave to appeal.
The
matter has a somewhat long history and served before several Judges
in this Division. On 22 June 2007 the
applicant
was successful in obtaining an order before Williams J. At the
time of the granting of her order, the first respondent
had
withdrawn his opposition to the application provided that no costs
order would be made against him. The second respondent
had consented
to paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 of the notice of motion being made an
order of Court.
Paragraphs
2.1 and 2.2 of the notice of motion in terms of which Williams J
granted her order provided as follows:
“
2.1 …
dat verklaar word dat die sluiting deur die partye van die addendum
gedateer
16
Januarie 2007
‘n nuwe ooreenkoms tussen die party daar gestel het bestaande uit
die ooreenkoms gedateer
16
Augustus 2006
soos gewysig en aangevul deur die addendum (“
die
nuwe ooreenkoms”
);
2.2 Dat
verklaar word dat die Applikante die nuwe ooreenkoms op
31
Januarie 2007
regsgeldiglik kanselleer het …
”
At
issue before Williams J was who should pay the costs of the
application and whether or not the applicant could in terms of
the
prayer for “further and/or alternative relief”, obtain an order
directing the respondents to return the business within
a specified
period of time to the applicant.
Williams J declined to
grant an order for the return of the business for reasons set out in
paragraph 25 of her judgment.
However,
when the matter was considered by Williams J,
at
no stage
was the validity of the original agreement of 16 August 2006 placed
in dispute neither was the validity of the addendum of 16
January
2007.
Nowhere
in their papers did the
respondents
raise the fact that the original agreement of 16
August
2006 did not come into existence based on non-compliance with the
suspensive conditions contained in Clause 10. The respondents
also
did not place in issue that the business was handed over to them, or
that they were the owners of the business, nor did
they indicate
that they were unable to operate the business by using the
applicant’s liquor license. Neither did they allege
that they
were unable to obtain their own liquor license. There was never an
insistence that the applicant comply with the suspensive
conditions
contained in clause 10 nor had they sought to compel the applicant
to comply therewith.
In
addition the respondents also did not challenge the terms of the
addendum to the original agreement, or allege that the original

agreement had been amended and further that the applicant had
cancelled the agreement.
In
essence the grounds of appeal upon which the
respondents
relied were based on the fact that the original agreement concluded
on 16 August 2006, which was then varied in terms
of the addendum
dated 16 January 2007, had never come into existence and was thus
never a valid and binding agreement. Mr Anderson,
in the first
instance, argued that as a result of the fact that the original
agreement of 16 August 2006, never came into existence
as a result
of the non-fulfilment of the suspensive condition in relation to the
liquor license, the addendum concluded in January
2007 could never
have amended such contract as if the original contract was invalid
and was not concluded so too would the addendum.
Thus
it followed, according to Mr Anderson, that the respondents would
not forfeit monies paid towards the purchase price and
would only be
required to restore to the applicants what they had received.
I
am unable to agree with
the
submissions advanced by Mr Anderson. The effect of the judgment of
Williams J is that a valid and binding agreement came into
existence
in respect of the agreement of 16 August 2006 as amended by the
addendum of 16 January 2007 which was validly cancelled.
Clause
2 of the addendum read with Clause 13 of the original agreement
makes provision for the
applicants
to repossess the business. In addition clause 3 of the addendum
provides that any payments made by the respondents
would be
forfeited to the applicant.
As
regards the return of the
business
I am of the view that there can be no doubt in the mind of the
respondents as to what has to be returned. The respondents
have to
return what they received (if, they are able to) at the time of the
conclusion of the original agreement. Clause 3 of
the agreement of
16 August 2006, deals with the assets of the business. In the event
of these items no longer being in the possession
of the respondents
they cannot return these items. In any event the items listed in
annexure A to the notarial contract which
are set out at pages 183
to 192 of Volume 2 in the application for the return of the business
clearly sets out the items which
the respondents would be required
to return.
Leave
to appeal should only be granted if an applicant has a reasonable
prospect of success on appeal. See in this regard
Van
Heerden v Cronwright and Others
1985 (2) SA 342
(T),
Botes
and Another v Nedbank
1983 (3) SA 27
(A),
Normkow
Administrators (Pty) Ltd v Fedsure Health Medical Scheme
2005 (1) SA 80
(W).
For
the reasons aforementioned,
I
am of the view that there is no merit in the application for leave
to appeal as there are no reasonable prospects of another
Court
coming to a different decision.
In the result I make
the following order:-
The
application for leave to appeal is
dismissed with costs.
________________________
J
I HENRIQUES
ACTING
JUDGE
NORTHERN CAPE
DIVISION
For the
Applicant:
Adv B Knoetse SC
Instructed
by:
Elliot, Maris, KIMBERLEY
For the
Respondents: Mr W Anderson
Instructed
by: Mjila and Partners, KIMBERLEY