Bhagwandas and Others v Dr Goolam Mahomed Omar Inc and Another, Bhagwandas and Others v GMO Imaging (Pty) Ltd and Others (2009/07656, 2009/7655) [2009] ZAGPJHC 95 (30 November 2009)

80 Reportability

Brief Summary

Companies — Liquidation — Just and equitable grounds — Applicants sought liquidation of two companies due to irreconcilable differences with co-shareholder, Dr Omar, regarding the buyout of his shareholding — Court found that the breakdown of trust and communication rendered the companies unmanageable, and that liquidation was the only viable option despite the companies being solvent and able to pay debts — Liquidation granted as just and equitable under section 344 of the Companies Act.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The judgment concerned two related applications for the liquidation (winding-up) of companies brought in the South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg. The applications were heard together because they arose from the same underlying dispute involving a radiology practice and its associated corporate vehicles.


In case number 2009/07656, the applicants (Dr Verash Kumar Shantilal Bhagwandas, Dr Ashesh Ishwarlal Ranchod, and Dr Dipesh Himatlal Jogino) sought the liquidation of Dr Goolam Mahomed Omar Inc (the first respondent) and Dr Goolam Mahomed Omar (the second respondent). In case number 2009/7655, a broader group of applicants (including Dr Bhagwandas and other individuals and entities) sought the liquidation of GMO Imaging (Pty) Ltd, GMO Holdings (Pty) Ltd, and Goolam Mahomed Omar.


The procedural posture was that of motion proceedings in which the court was required to decide whether it was just and equitable to grant winding-up relief. The applications followed failed negotiations concerning the proposed buy-out of Dr Omar’s shareholding and a complete breakdown in the relationship between the opposing shareholder groupings.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was a shareholder deadlock and collapse of trust in a closely-held corporate structure that functioned in substance like a professional partnership, coupled with disagreement about the value and terms on which one faction would exit the business.


2. Material Facts


The court treated the dispute as arising from a radiology practice originally established by Dr Omar and later conducted through two different corporate entities, with associated ownership arrangements.


It was common cause that Dr Omar, on occasion, indicated that he wished to retire. The applicants (his co-practitioners) indicated that they wished to buy out his shareholding in the relevant companies. These interactions were reflected in correspondence, the detail of which the court did not consider necessary to traverse in the judgment.


It was also material and not genuinely disputed that the buy-out negotiations stalled because Dr Omar set conditions before a valuation could be undertaken. In particular, he demanded a guarantee of R15 million as proof that the applicants could pay the purchase price ultimately to be determined by a valuation process. There was also a material divergence in the parties’ positions about value, with Dr Omar at one stage indicating that his shareholding was worth at least R21 million, while the applicants’ correspondence reflected the view that this was “totally unrealistic.”


In relation to Dr Goolam Mahomed Omar Inc (the incorporated radiology practice), the shareholding was evenly balanced. The applicants collectively held 50% of the issued shares and Dr Omar held the other 50%. Directorship reflected this division, with Dr Omar and Dr Bhagwandas being directors. The court treated this structure as creating an effective decision-making deadlock between two evenly matched factions.


In relation to the other entities, GMO Imaging (Pty) Ltd owned radiology equipment which was leased to the incorporated practice in return for rentals. The papers indicated that rentals differed widely from month to month, which raised doubt about the reality of the leasing arrangement; however, the court expressly regarded it as unnecessary to resolve that issue for purposes of deciding the winding-up relief.


A central material fact relied upon by the court was that it was common cause that the relationship between the applicants, on the one hand, and Dr Omar and his son (a shareholder in at least the imaging company), on the other, had broken down completely. The court characterised the two groups as being so distrustful of one another that proper conduct of the companies’ business appeared highly unlikely.


The court also noted, as part of the factual matrix evidencing the depth of distrust, that the papers contained accusations and counter-accusations including references to criminal charges brought and threatened, and an instance where a bank account was frozen due to fears of pilfering. The court did not attempt to resolve these disputes of fact on the papers and treated them as demonstrating the extent of acrimony rather than as findings on wrongdoing.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether, given the deadlock and collapse of trust between the shareholder factions, it was just and equitable to wind up the respective companies under section 344 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973.


A connected question was whether liquidation was the only viable and practical remedy, or whether alternative court interventions could appropriately resolve the impasse. In that context, the court considered proposals including judicial management, an inquiry into irregularities under statutory machinery, and a court-directed valuation and buy-out mechanism.


The dispute required the court primarily to make an evaluative judgment and to exercise a broad discretion based on established principles governing the “just and equitable” ground for winding-up. Although factual conflict existed on the papers regarding alleged misconduct, the judgment treated the outcome as turning on the undisputed reality of deadlock and irretrievable breakdown of trust, rather than on contested findings of fraud or other wrongdoing.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter on the basis that the “just and equitable” ground for winding-up confers a wide discretion and is not confined to circumstances analogous to the other grounds listed in section 344. The judgment emphasised that the provision “postulates no facts” but involves a broad conclusion grounded in justice and equity, and that no general rule can be laid down for the circumstances that fall within the phrase.


In applying these principles, the court relied on Apco Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another v Apco Worldwide Incorporated as authority that the just and equitable provision applies particularly to companies that are, in substance, conducted as partnerships. The court treated the incorporated radiology practice as being akin to a partnership between professionals, with mutual confidence and workable cooperation being essential to the continued functioning of the enterprise.


The judgment accepted that, on the papers, the mutual relationship of confidence and trust had been destroyed. It considered the accusations and counter-accusations (including references to threatened or actual criminal allegations and financial control disputes) as demonstrating a level of mistrust incompatible with the cooperative relationship contemplated when the parties entered their arrangement. The court held that, in a situation of this kind, a practical approach is required, and that common sense indicates that parties who have reached such a state of acrimony cannot reasonably be expected to continue working together in the conduct of the business.


The court then dealt with whether a remedy short of liquidation would be appropriate.


Judicial management was rejected because it is ordinarily aimed at circumstances where a company is mismanaged and/or unable to pay its debts, whereas it was common cause that both companies were able to pay their debts, no liquidation was being driven by outside creditors, and the companies were still operating at a profit. The court thus found that judicial management did not fit the factual setting presented.


The possibility of ordering an inquiry into irregularities was also rejected. Although the papers contained numerous allegations, the court held that the requirements for an inquiry in terms of section 442 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 were not set out in the papers, and therefore this was not a route it could adopt on the case as presented.


The principal alternative advanced was a court-directed process involving the appointment of an independent valuator to value the shares, followed by a buy-out at that value, and, if necessary, an auction between the parties to determine which side would acquire the other’s shares. The court considered this option seriously but concluded that it would not resolve the core problem: the total breakdown and mistrust between the two groups.


In rejecting the valuation/buy-out mechanism, the court reasoned that valuation disputes are inherently prone to disagreement because shares and businesses can be valued on different bases, creating scope for further disputes and further applications to court about methodology and assumptions. The court also anticipated the potential for renewed dispute about Dr Omar’s insistence on guarantees as a precondition to a buy-out, which could derail any process and lead to further litigation.


The court further emphasised that the imaging and holdings structures involved additional parties beyond the core three applicants and Dr Omar, including Dr Omar’s son and other family members with interests in the relevant companies. The court considered it likely that these additional parties would assert rights requiring protection, thereby complicating any court-ordered buy-out mechanism and fostering further disputes.


The interdependence between the operating incorporated practice and the imaging company was also treated as significant. The imaging company’s only source of income was common cause to be the rental received from the incorporated practice. While it was suggested that the imaging company could rent equipment to third parties, the court considered that the continuing entanglement and deadlock between the factions would prevent the practical resolution of the imaging company’s future without liquidation, and that an order concerning one company would necessarily affect the other.


On the cumulative facts, and guided by the deadlock principle articulated in the cited authority, the court concluded that liquidation was the only feasible and practical solution. Profitability was not treated as decisive; the court reasoned that the relevant inquiry is whether the business can be carried on given the degree of distrust and acrimony, and that the just and equitable ground exists to address precisely such situations undermining effective management.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court granted provisional liquidation orders in both applications. The orders were made returnable on 12 January 2010.


The court ordered that the costs of the applications would be costs in the cause of the liquidation.


Cases Cited


Apco Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another v Apco Worldwide Incorporated [2008] ZASCA 64; 2008 (5) SA 615 (SCA).


Legislation Cited


Companies Act 61 of 1973, section 344.


Companies Act 61 of 1973, section 442.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that the companies were, in substance, operated in a manner analogous to a partnership and that the relationship of confidence and trust between the opposing shareholder factions had broken down completely. The even split in control in the incorporated practice and the pervasive mistrust between the factions created a deadlock undermining the practical ability to conduct the companies’ affairs.


The court held further that proposed alternatives to liquidation were not appropriate on the case as presented. Judicial management was not justified because the companies were not shown to be unable to pay their debts and were operating profitably. An inquiry into irregularities under section 442 was not available because the requirements were not pleaded or established on the papers. A valuation-and-buy-out mechanism was rejected as impractical and likely to generate further disputes, especially given the presence of additional interested parties in the imaging and holdings structures.


Accordingly, the court held that it was just and equitable to grant provisional winding-up orders in respect of the companies.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that the “just and equitable” ground for winding-up under section 344 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 confers a broad discretion on the court and is not confined to predefined categories or to circumstances analogous to the other statutory grounds for winding-up.


The judgment applied the principle that where a company is in substance a quasi-partnership, the destruction of the relationship of confidence and trust between participants—especially in a small domestic company with an arrangement requiring personal cooperation—may justify liquidation on the just and equitable ground (the deadlock principle as recognised in the authority relied upon).


The judgment further applied the principle that the appropriateness of liquidation in such cases does not turn solely on whether the company is profitable or solvent. The decisive consideration is whether the company’s business can practically be carried on given the extent of acrimony and the inability of those in control to cooperate, communicate, or make decisions.


The judgment also reflected a practical principle of remedial selection: where alternatives to winding-up are not feasible on the facts presented—because they do not fit the statutory purpose, are not properly pleaded, or are likely to foster further disputes rather than resolve the impasse—the court may conclude that liquidation is the only workable remedy consistent with justice and equity.

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[2009] ZAGPJHC 95
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Bhagwandas and Others v Dr Goolam Mahomed Omar Inc and Another, Bhagwandas and Others v GMO Imaging (Pty) Ltd and Others (2009/07656, 2009/7655) [2009] ZAGPJHC 95 (30 November 2009)

NOT REPORTABLE
IN THE SOUTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO
:
2009/07656
DATE
: 30/11/2009
In
the matters between:
VERASH
KUMAR SHANTILAL BHAGWANDAS
.........................
1
st
Applicant
ASHESH
ISHWARLAL RANCHOD
................................................
2
nd
Applicant
DIPESH
HIMATLAL JOGI
NO
..........................................................
3
rd
Applicant
and
DR
GOOLAM MAHOMED OMAR INC
.......................................
1
st
Respondent
GOOLAM
MAHOMED OMAR
.....................................................
2
nd
Respondent
A
s
well as in the matter between
CASE
NO
:
2009/7655
VERASH
KUMAR SHANTILAL BHAGWANDAS
..............................
1
st
Applicant
MYSTIC
BLUE TRADING 193 (PTY)
LTD
...........................................
2
nd
Applicant
VIRESH
BHAGWANDAS (PTY)
LTD
..................................................
3
rd
Applicant
DIPESH
HIMATLAL JOGI
NO
...............................................................
4
th
Applicant
HEMA
HIMATLAL JOGI
NO
...................................................................
5
th
Applicant
MAYA
NATHU PATEL
NO
......................................................................
6
th
Applicant
and
GMO
IMAGING (PTY) LTD
…...............................................................
1
st
Respondent
GMO
HOLDINGS (PTY) LTD
…..........................................................
2
nd
Respondent
GOOLAM
MAHOMED
OMAR
..............................................................
3
rd
Respondent
______________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________
C. J. CLAASSEN
J
:
I have before
me two liquidation applications. The one is case number 2009/7655
and the other is case number 2009/07656. The two applications
arise
from a radiology practice established by Dr Omar many years ago and
currently incorporated in two different companies.
Dr Omar on
occasion intimated that he wanted to retire. His three
co-practitioners, who are the applicants in both cases, indicated
to
him that they would want to buy out his shareholding in the two
companies. All of this is documented in a series of letters
which
are contained in the papers. I need not refer to them.
Dr Omar responded
to the request to buy him out by setting certain conditions before a
valuation of the shareholding could be
made. These are also
documented in the correspondence. He demanded a guarantee of R15
million as proof that they were capable
of paying the price of his
shareholding which would ultimately be determined by a process of
evaluation.
On another occasion Dr Omar indicated
that the value of his shareholding in the practice was at least R21
million. In this regard
I refer to a letter dated 12 November 2008,
being annexure VV33 attached to the founding affidavit, where in
paragraph 2 the
following is said:

We do not consider
it likely that you would locate the potential purchaser at or near to
your asking price i.e. R21 million for
your shares in the entities,
which we consider totally unrealistic.”
As a result of these differing views
between the shareholders, being the applicants on the one hand, and
Dr Omar and his son on
the other, the shares were never valued and
the negotiation of a buyout agreement came to a halt. As a result of
this state of
affairs, the applications for the liquidation of the
two companies were instituted.
I have to say
something about the nature of the two applications for liquidation.
In the first, the three applicants, Dr Bhagwandas,
Dr Ranchod and Dr
Jogi, apply for the liquidation of Dr Goolam Mahomed Omar
Incorporated (the “
Incorporated
company”). This is the incorporated version of what is, in
effect, a radiology partnership between the three
applicants and Dr
Omar. The shareholding in this Incorporated company is evenly
balanced. The total shareholding of the three
applicants amounts to
50 percent of the issued shares, Dr Omar owns the other 50 percent.
Dr Omar is a director of the company
as well as Dr Bhagwandas. The
two sides are therefore on even keel as far as the ability to make
decisions in regard to the future
conduct of this company’s
business is concerned. The nature of the company’s business is
to render professional radiology
services to the public. On the
other hand, in the other application for liquidation the three
applicants are seeking the liquidation
of GMO Imaging (Pty) Ltd
(“Imaging”) and GMO Holdings (Pty) Ltd (“Holdings”).
The
Imagaing
company owns the radiology equipment which is leased to the
Incorporated company. In return the Incorporated company
pays a
rental. The papers, however, indicate that the rentals differ widely
from month to month, which places some doubt as to
the reality of
this particular leasing arrangement. However, it is not necessary
for me to resolve that issue.
Suffice to say, it
is common cause on the papers in both these applications that the
relationship between the applicants on the
one hand and on the other
Dr Omar and his son (also a shareholder in the Imagaing company),
has broken down completely. The two
antagonists in regard to these
companies are so distrustful of one another that the likelihood of
these companies being properly
conducted, seems highly unlikely.
That being the
case, it then remains to be decided whether indeed liquidation is
the only option to resolve this deadlock. Mr
Bagwa has submitted
that there are various options other than liquidating the companies
which this court can implement.
He first suggested that this court
could consider issuing a judicial management order in regard to the
two companies. However,
in my view, judicial management does not fit
the facts of these cases. The appointment of a judicial manager is
only permissible
in instances where the companies are being
mismanaged and/or cannot pay their debts. It is common cause on the
papers before
me that up till now both companies have been able to
pay their debts and that there are no creditors waiting in the wings
to
apply for their liquidation. As Mr Bagwa correctly submitted, the
companies are still operating at a profit.
He also suggested
that this court could order an inquiry into irregularities which may
have been perpetrated by either of the
two groups of antagonists.
The papers bristle with accusations and counter accusations of
irregularities having been committed
by the two sides. However, the
requirements for an inquiry in terms of section 442 of the Companies
Act were not set out in the
papers. In my view, that is not a route
which this court can adopt.
Finally, the main submission of Mr
Bagwa was that an order should be made for the appointment of an
independent valuator, such
as a senior auditor, to value the shares
and then for the parties to buy one another out at that value.
However, if they cannot
agree which party is to buy out the other,
then an auction is to be held between the parties. The highest
bidder will buy out
the other at the auction price.
I have seriously
considered this option as a possibility, but I have come to the
conclusion that it will not resolve the total
breakdown and mistrust
existing between the two groups of antagonists. There are too many
imponderables which could cause further
disputes along the way of
ultimately arriving at a price at which one party will buy out the
other. The mere fact that shares
and the value of company can be
valuated on a number of different bases is fertile ground for
further disputes between the parties.
This might result in further
court applications in order to determine the correct basis for
valuating the shares.
I can also foresee
the possibility that a further dispute may arise in regards to Dr
Omar setting as a precondition the delivery
of certain guarantees if
the applicants are to buy him out. If such a dispute does arise it
may very well scuttle the whole process
and lead to further
litigation.
There is
a further problem. The Imagaing company involves further parties,
the Holdings company, Dr Omar’s son, who is also a shareholder

in both the Imaging and the Holdings Companies, as well as certain
of Dr Omar’s family members. It is not unlikely that
disputes
will occur with all these additional parties involved.
These various
further individuals will wish to claim rights to be protected in any
order granted in regard to the buying out of
the respective
shareholdings. In my view, it is likely to result in further
disputes, which may cause further court applications
and ultimately
leaving the matter unresolved and dragging on endlessly.
The applicants came to court on the
basis that it is just and equitable for this court to wind up the
respective companies. They
have the right to do so in terms of
section 344 of the Companies Act which provides:

A company may be
wound up by the court if:-

it appears to
the court that it is just and equitable that the company should be
wound up.”
This subsection postulates no facts,
but only a broad conclusion of the law, namely justice and equity,
as a ground for winding
up a company. It is also trite that the
power given to a court to wind up a company on a just and equitable
ground is not confined
to cases in which there are grounds similar
to those mentioned in the rest of section 344.
Nor can any
general rule be laid down as to the nature of the circumstances that
fall within the phrase “just and equitable”.
The courts
are given a very wide discretion to order the liquidation of
companies in regard to facts and circumstances which
would make it
just and equitable to liquidate a company.
1
The case of
Apco
Africa
was also an instance where the shareholders in a company were
conducting a business akin to a partnership.
In the present
case the Incorporated company in case number 2009/7655 is a service
rendering company. It renders professional
radiology services to the
public. As such, should the company be liquidated, these doctors
would be able to continue their profession
elsewhere. There is no
real prejudice if it were to be liquidated.
The
Imagaing
company is only a property holding company. It owns radiological
equipment. Should the Incorporated company be liquidated
no further
“rentals” will be received by the Imagaing company. It
is common cause on the papers that the Imagaing
company’s only
source of income is the rental received from the Incorporated
company. It was suggested in the papers that
should the Incorporated
company be liquidated it does not necessarily follow that the
Imagaing company is to be liquidated, because
it can rent out the
radiological equipment to other takers.
However, that
possibility is prevented by the entanglement of the antagonists in
the two companies. The Imagaing company will,
as of necessity, have
to seek new renting clients for its property. Up until now they have
only leased the property out to one
entity and that is the
Incorporated company.
Thus
,
the main problem remains. If the Imagaging company is not liquidated
the deadlock between the two groups of shareholders will
continue.
It will have to be resolved in one way or the other. I am therefore
of the view that any order in regard to the one
company will as of
necessity affect the future existence of the other.
I return to the
question whether liquidation is the only viable option. In the
Apco
case at paragraph [18] Ponnan JA specifically stated that the just
and equitable provision also applies to instances where a
company is
in effect being conducted as a partnership as in the present case.
Circumstances which would under the law of partnership
entitle one
or more of the partners to seek termination thereof by way of
liquidating the partnership assets would equally be
grounds for
liquidation of the company which is run like a partnership, under
the “just and equitable” provision.
In paragraph [19] at
page 625B – D the following is stated by Ponnan JA:

The
second, usually called the deadlock principle, is derived from the
Yenidje
Tobacco Company
case. It is founded on the analogy of partnership and is strictly
confined to those small domestic companies in which, because
of some
arrangement, express, tacit or implied, there exists between the
members in regard to the company’s affairs a particular

personal relationship of confidence and trust similar to that
existing between partners in regard to the partnership business.
If
by conduct which is either wrongful or not as contemplated by the
arrangement, one or more of the members destroys that relationship,

the other member or members are entitled to claim that it is just and
equitable that the company should be wound up.”
In the present
instance the papers bristle with accusations and counter accusations
by the
antagonist
parties, all of which I need not resolve, as indeed I cannot on the
papers in motion proceedings. However, it clearly
indicates the
extent of distrust and lack of confidence in one another at which
the parties have arrived.
The papers disclose that criminal
charges have been brought and threatened; in another instance the
bank account was frozen because
of fears that another party had been
pilfering the funds. I need not go into all the various accusations
and counter accusations,
suffice to say it is clear that the parties
have fallen out of a trustful arrangement existing at the time when
the partnership
business between them commenced.
In a deadlock of
this nature a court must adopt a practical approach to arrive at a
feasible solution. In this regard Ponnan JA
stated in paragraph [29]
at page 628 of the
Apco
case as follows:

It
is plain
that a relationship of trust and integrity between the shareholders
is integral to the success of the business of the company,
as well as
the continuation of that relationship. That much is evidenced from
the nature of the company’s business as well
as the fact that
the parties are all privy to sensitive and confidential information.
When one of two partners threatens civil
or criminal action,
including prosecution for fraud, is it reasonable to suppose that
those two partners can work together in the
manner in which they
ought to work in the conduct of the partnership business? Can they do
so when things have reached such a pass
as we have here? Common sense
seems to dictate that the answer has to be a resounding ‘no’.
In those circumstances
it seems to me that it is just and equitable
that a court should intervene, for plainly this is not what the
parties contemplated
by the arrangement into which they entered. On
the contrary, they assumed that each would conduct itself reasonably
and with basic
courtesy towards the other. Having regard to the fact
that the directors and shareholders cannot communicate with each
other and
that no business of the company can be carried on, one is
inclined to the conclusion that, if there were a state of deadlock,
it
exists here. If, as Arcay claims, there was fraud by Kamerling and
a calculated design to wreck the company and it can establish
that in
due course, it will have a remedy in damages. In those circumstances
there can be no reason to seek to protect Arcay’s
rights, as it
sought to contend, by sustaining the corporate form.”
In the present
case there were also charges of fraud between the two
antagonist
groups and it seems to me that the facts of the present matter are
analogous to the facts in the
Apco
case. Mr Bagwa sought to distinguish the
Apco
case on the basis that the company in that case was dormant and not
functioning. In my view that is not a distinguishing feature.
What
is at stake is not whether the company is currently making a profit
or not. The question is whether business of the company
can be
carried on while there is such a large measure of distrust and
existing acrimony between the respective groups of shareholders.
In any event, the “just and
equitable” provision was included over an above all the other
grounds for liquidation
to cater specifically for this kind of
situation where a wide variety of circumstances can result in the
effective management
of the company being undermined. That, of
course, threatens the future of the company, whether it is currently
making a profit
or not.
It is quite clear
that a court will liquidate a company not only when there is an
actual deadlock, as in the present case, but
also when it is
satisfied that it is impossible for the parties to place such
confidence in each other, which each has a right
to expect, provided
such impossibility was not caused by the person seeking to take
advantage of it. In the present case both
parties are actually
alleging that the other has caused this impossibility to arise,
which in my view strengthens the case that
a deadlock is in
existence undermining the future of the company. All the other
avenues suggested by Mr Bagwa are just not feasible
and not
practical in the current state of affairs existing between the two
groups of shareholders and directors.
I am therefore of the view that the
only solution would be, in fact, to grant a provisional liquidation
order in both these instances.
I therefore make the following order
in both cases as follows:
1.
A
provisional liquidation order is issued, returnable on 12 January
2010;
2.
The
costs of this application will be costs in the cause of such
liquidation.
THUS SIGNED AT JOHANNESBURG ON THIS
DAY OF JUNE 2011.
_________________________
C.J.CLAASSEN
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
1
See
in this regard
Apco
Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another v Apco Worldwide Incorporated
[2008] ZASCA 64
;
2008 (5) SA 615
(SCA) at para
[16]
.