S v Mahlasela (CC97/2008) [2009] ZAGPJHC 106 (27 March 2009)

80 Reportability
Criminal Law

Brief Summary

Criminal Law — Sentencing — Minimum sentences for murder and robbery with aggravating circumstances — Accused convicted of murder, robbery, unlawful possession of a firearm, and unlawful possession of ammunition — No substantial and compelling circumstances found to justify lesser sentences than those prescribed by law — Accused sentenced to life imprisonment for murder and additional concurrent sentences for other convictions.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The proceedings concerned the sentencing phase of a criminal trial in the South Gauteng High Court of South Africa (Delmas Circuit Division). The matter was brought by the State against Prestage Lungelo Mahlasela (accused 1), with a co-accused, Ntsikelelo Collen Hlakuva, who had been acquitted.


The judgment followed upon the court’s convictions of the accused on four counts arising from events on 11 May 2007, namely murder (count 1), robbery with aggravating circumstances (count 2), unlawful possession of a firearm (count 3), and unlawful possession of ammunition (count 4). The judgment addressed the application of the minimum sentencing regime under the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997.


On sentence, the State led no viva voce evidence in aggravation. The accused also did not testify and led no viva voce evidence in mitigation, but mitigation was addressed through submissions by counsel from the Bar. The court also obtained and received a pre-sentence report from a probation officer, handed in by agreement between the parties. The dispute at sentencing centred on whether the court should impose the prescribed minimum sentences, including life imprisonment, or whether substantial and compelling circumstances justified lesser sentences.


Material Facts


The court relied on a core set of largely undisputed facts concerning the commission of the offences. On 11 May 2007 at approximately 23h00, the deceased, Siphiwe Phakati, answered a call on his cellular phone outside Zock’s Tavern. The accused approached him and demanded the cellular phone. The deceased refused to hand it over.


The accused then produced a firearm and shot the deceased once in the abdomen. After the deceased fell, the accused took the deceased’s cellular phone. The deceased died as a result of the gunshot wound.


In relation to sentence, the court treated as material the personal circumstances placed before it through the probation officer’s report and counsel’s submissions. The accused was a first offender, was born on 21 January 1978, and was 29 years old at the time of the offences. The accused had been in custody awaiting finalisation of the trial for about one year and ten months. The accused had testified at trial that he had consumed a considerable volume of alcohol on the evening in question; the court did not accept his claimed level of impaired sobriety as probable, but accepted in his favour that alcohol played a role in the commission of the offences.


Legal Issues


The central legal issue was whether the court was obliged to impose the prescribed minimum sentences under the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, specifically life imprisonment for murder committed in the course of a robbery with aggravating circumstances, and 15 years’ imprisonment for robbery with aggravating circumstances for a first offender.


This required the court to determine whether “substantial and compelling circumstances” existed which justified imposing sentences lesser than the prescribed minimum. The dispute was primarily an application of law to fact, involving an evaluative judgment in which the accused’s personal circumstances and other potentially mitigating factors had to be weighed against the seriousness of the offences and the interests of society.


Court’s Reasoning


The court set out the applicable statutory framework. It held that section 51(1) read with section 51(3)(a) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, together with Part I of Schedule 2, prescribed life imprisonment where a person is convicted of murder and the victim’s death was caused by the accused in the course of committing, attempting to commit, or after committing or attempting to commit robbery with aggravating circumstances, as defined in section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.


In addition, the court noted that section 51(2)(a)(i) read with section 51(3)(a) of the Act, together with Part II of Schedule 2, prescribed a minimum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment for a first offender convicted of robbery with aggravating circumstances, unless substantial and compelling circumstances justified a lesser sentence. The court recorded that aggravating circumstances for robbery include, among other things, the wielding of a firearm or the infliction of grievous bodily harm.


The court explained that in deciding whether substantial and compelling circumstances existed, the traditional objectives of punishment remained applicable, namely prevention, retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation. It stated that it was required to weigh the accused’s personal circumstances against the seriousness of the crimes and the interests of society.


Applying these principles to the facts, the court characterised the offences as very serious, emphasising that the deceased’s death occurred in the course of a robbery with aggravating circumstances. It placed weight on the fact that the deceased was killed because he refused to comply with a demand for a cellular phone, and that the accused had shown no remorse. It further considered the broader social context of violent crime and the expectation that courts deal seriously and severely with violent offenders.


Against these considerations, the court evaluated the mitigating factors placed before it: the accused’s status as a first offender, his age at the time of the offences, the role alcohol played, and the time spent in custody awaiting trial. Although the court accepted that alcohol played a role, it did not regard the personal circumstances and other mitigating factors, whether individually or cumulatively, as meeting the statutory threshold of substantial and compelling circumstances. It concluded that, when balanced against the seriousness and senselessness of the murder, the seriousness of the robbery, and the public interest in severe punishment, the prescribed minimum sentences were not unjust.


The court expressly recognised that life imprisonment is the most severe sentence a person can be obliged to serve, but was satisfied on the particular facts that imposing the statutory minimum sentences would not be disproportionate to the crimes, the offender, and the legitimate interests of society.


Outcome and Relief


The court imposed the prescribed minimum sentence of life imprisonment for murder (count 1). It further sentenced the accused to 15 years’ imprisonment for robbery with aggravating circumstances (count 2), three years’ imprisonment for unlawful possession of a firearm (count 3), and one year’s imprisonment for unlawful possession of ammunition (count 4).


The court ordered that the sentences on counts 2, 3, and 4 run concurrently with the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on count 1. No separate order as to costs was recorded in the judgment.


Cases Cited


No reported cases were cited in the judgment.


Legislation Cited


Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (sections 51(1), 51(2)(a)(i), 51(3)(a), Part I of Schedule 2, Part II of Schedule 2)


Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (section 1, definition of aggravating circumstances)


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that the applicable minimum sentencing provisions required life imprisonment for the murder committed in the course of a robbery with aggravating circumstances, and a minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment for the robbery with aggravating circumstances, unless substantial and compelling circumstances were present.


The court held that the accused’s personal circumstances, including being a first offender, his age, the role of alcohol, and the period spent in pre-sentence custody, did not cumulatively amount to substantial and compelling circumstances. The court accordingly imposed the prescribed minimum sentences and directed concurrency of the lesser sentences with the life sentence.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The minimum sentencing regime in the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 requires the imposition of prescribed minimum sentences, including life imprisonment for certain categories of murder, unless a court finds substantial and compelling circumstances justifying departure.


In determining whether substantial and compelling circumstances exist, a court applies the conventional purposes of punishment, including deterrence, prevention, retribution, and rehabilitation, and weighs the offender’s personal circumstances against the seriousness of the offence and the interests of society.


Where aggravating circumstances are present in a robbery, including the use of a firearm and the infliction of serious violence, the offence attracts prescribed minimum sentences, and personal mitigating factors will not justify a lesser sentence unless they meet the statutory threshold of substantial and compelling circumstances.


A sentencing court may order that multiple sentences run concurrently, particularly where they arise from the same criminal episode and where concurrency is necessary to give effect to the overall sentencing outcome imposed for the principal offence.

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[2009] ZAGPJHC 106
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S v Mahlasela (CC97/2008) [2009] ZAGPJHC 106 (27 March 2009)

SOUTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
DELMAS CIRCUIT DIVISION
Case No: CC97/2008
Date:27/03/2009
In the matter of:
THE STATE
versus
PRESTAGE LUNGELO
MAHLASELA
.......................................................
Accused
1
SENTENCE
[1] I have convicted accused 1, Prestage Lungelo Mahlasela, of the
murder on 11 May 2007 of the late Siphiwe Phakati (count 1),
of the
robbery of the late Siphiwe Pakathe (“the deceased”) of
his cellular phone with aggravating circumstances (count
2), of the
unlawful possession of a firearm (count 3), and of the unlawful
possession of ammunition (count 4). His co-accused
,
Ntsikelelo Collen Hlakuva,
was acquitted. I further on refer
to accused 1 as “the accused”.
[2] The State, represented by Adv Russell Sibara,
led no
viva voce
evidence
in aggravation of sentence. The accused did not testify and led no
viva voce
evidence
in mitigation of sentence, but Adv Robin Stransham-Ford, who
represents the accused, placed facts before me from the Bar
in
mitigation of sentence. Counsel for the State and for the accused
addressed me on the matter of sentence. I have requested
a
pre-sentence report from a probation officer. Such report was handed
in by agreement between the parties.
[3] On 11 May 2007, at around 11 pm, the deceased answered a call on
his cellular phone outside Zock’s Tavern when he was
approached
by the accused who demanded his cellular phone. The deceased refused
to give it to him. The accused produced a firearm
and shot the
deceased once in the abdomen. The deceased fell down and the accused
took the deceased’s cellular phone. The
deceased died as a re
sult of the gunshot wound to his abdomen.
[4
] Section 51(1), read
with subsection 51(3)(a) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of
1997 (“the Act”) and with Part
I of Schedule 2 to the
Act, prescribes imprisonment for life where a person is convicted of
murder when the death of the victim
was caused by the accused in
committing or attempting to commit or after having committed or
attempted to commit robbery with aggravating
circumstances as defined
in
section 1
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
, and
section
51(2)(a)(i)
, read with subsection 51(3)(a) of the Act and with Part
II of Schedule 2 to the Act, prescribes a minimum sentence of 15
years
imprisonment for a first offender convicted of robbery when
there are aggravating circumstances, unless ‘substantial and
compelling circumstances exist justifying the imposition of a lesser
sentence’. The wielding of a firearm or the infliction
of
grievous bodily harm constitutes such defined aggravating
circumstances in relation to robbery or attempted robbery.
[5] In considering whether or not substantial and compelling
circumstances exist which would justify the imposition of lesser
sentences than those prescribed, the traditional objectives of
punishment, namely prevention, retribution, deterrence and
rehabilitation,
still apply, and I am enjoined to weigh the personal
circumstances of the accused against the seriousness of the crimes
committed
by him and the interests of society.
[6] The murder and robbery crimes committed by the
accused in this matter are very serious. The death of the deceased
was caused
by the accused in committing robbery with aggravating
circumstances. The deceased’s life was taken simply because he
refused
to comply with the accused’s demand for his cellular
phone. The accused has shown no remorse for his actions. Our
country
at present suffers an unacceptable and distressing incidence
of violence and the community demands that courts deal seriously and

severely with such offenders and for appropriately severe punishments
to be imposed for such crimes as the ones the accused committed.
[7] The personal circumstances of the accused appear from the
probation officer’s report and, as I have mentioned, Adv
Stransham-Ford also placed certain facts on record on behalf of the
accused. I do not intend to repeat all such facts and circumstances

herein, but I have duly considered and taken them into account in the
determination of appropriate sentences for the accused.
[8] The accused is a first offender. He testified at the trial that
he was born on 21 January 1978. He was accordingly 29 years
of age
at the time of the commission of the offences of which he was
convicted. He also testified at the trial that he had consumed
a
considerable volume of alcohol on the evening in question. I found
his evidence about the level of his sobriety improbable in
the light
of the volume of alcohol he claimed to have consumed during the
course of the evening in question. I accept in his favour
that
alcohol had played a role in the commission of the offences. The
accused has been in custody awaiting the finalization of
his criminal
trial for about 1 year and 10 months.
[9] The personal circumstances of the accused, the role that alcohol
played in the commission of the offences, the fact that he
is a first
offender, and the time spent in custody awaiting the finalization of
these proceedings cumulatively do not, in my judgment,
amount to
substantial and compelling circumstances which would justify the
imposition of lesser sentences than the minimum prescribed
ones when
balanced against the seriousness and senselessness of the murder, the
seriousness of the robbery, and the public interest
in appropriately
severe punishments being imposed for such crimes. I arrive at this
conclusion in full recognition that life imprisonment
is the heaviest
sentence a person can legally be obliged to serve. A consideration
of all the circumstances of this particular
case satisfies me that
the imposition of the minimum sentences prescribed by the Act would
not be unjust. Such sentences would
not be disproportionate to the
crimes, the criminal and the legitimate interests of society in the
case of the accused.
[10] In the result the accused is sentenced to:
1. Imprisonment for life pursuant to his conviction on count 1
(murder);
Imprisonment for a term of fifteen years pursuant to his conviction
on count 2 (robbery with aggravating circumstances);
Imprisonment for a term of three years pursuant to his conviction on
count 3 (unlawful possession of a firearm); and
Imprisonment for a term of 1 year pursuant to his conviction on
count 4 (unlawful possession of ammunition).
B. The sentences of fifteen years imprisonment, three years
imprisonment, and 1 year imprisonment run concurrently with the
sentence
of imprisonment for life for the murder conviction.
P.A.
MEYER
JUDGE OF
THE HIGH COURT
27 March
2009