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[2009] ZAGPJHC 106
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S v Mahlasela (CC97/2008) [2009] ZAGPJHC 106 (27 March 2009)
SOUTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
DELMAS CIRCUIT DIVISION
Case No: CC97/2008
Date:27/03/2009
In the matter of:
THE STATE
versus
PRESTAGE LUNGELO
MAHLASELA
.......................................................
Accused
1
SENTENCE
[1] I have convicted accused 1, Prestage Lungelo Mahlasela, of the
murder on 11 May 2007 of the late Siphiwe Phakati (count 1),
of the
robbery of the late Siphiwe Pakathe (“the deceased”) of
his cellular phone with aggravating circumstances (count
2), of the
unlawful possession of a firearm (count 3), and of the unlawful
possession of ammunition (count 4). His co-accused
,
Ntsikelelo Collen Hlakuva,
was acquitted. I further on refer
to accused 1 as “the accused”.
[2] The State, represented by Adv Russell Sibara,
led no
viva voce
evidence
in aggravation of sentence. The accused did not testify and led no
viva voce
evidence
in mitigation of sentence, but Adv Robin Stransham-Ford, who
represents the accused, placed facts before me from the Bar
in
mitigation of sentence. Counsel for the State and for the accused
addressed me on the matter of sentence. I have requested
a
pre-sentence report from a probation officer. Such report was handed
in by agreement between the parties.
[3] On 11 May 2007, at around 11 pm, the deceased answered a call on
his cellular phone outside Zock’s Tavern when he was
approached
by the accused who demanded his cellular phone. The deceased refused
to give it to him. The accused produced a firearm
and shot the
deceased once in the abdomen. The deceased fell down and the accused
took the deceased’s cellular phone. The
deceased died as a re
sult of the gunshot wound to his abdomen.
[4
] Section 51(1), read
with subsection 51(3)(a) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of
1997 (“the Act”) and with Part
I of Schedule 2 to the
Act, prescribes imprisonment for life where a person is convicted of
murder when the death of the victim
was caused by the accused in
committing or attempting to commit or after having committed or
attempted to commit robbery with aggravating
circumstances as defined
in
section 1
of the
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
, and
section
51(2)(a)(i)
, read with subsection 51(3)(a) of the Act and with Part
II of Schedule 2 to the Act, prescribes a minimum sentence of 15
years
imprisonment for a first offender convicted of robbery when
there are aggravating circumstances, unless ‘substantial and
compelling circumstances exist justifying the imposition of a lesser
sentence’. The wielding of a firearm or the infliction
of
grievous bodily harm constitutes such defined aggravating
circumstances in relation to robbery or attempted robbery.
[5] In considering whether or not substantial and compelling
circumstances exist which would justify the imposition of lesser
sentences than those prescribed, the traditional objectives of
punishment, namely prevention, retribution, deterrence and
rehabilitation,
still apply, and I am enjoined to weigh the personal
circumstances of the accused against the seriousness of the crimes
committed
by him and the interests of society.
[6] The murder and robbery crimes committed by the
accused in this matter are very serious. The death of the deceased
was caused
by the accused in committing robbery with aggravating
circumstances. The deceased’s life was taken simply because he
refused
to comply with the accused’s demand for his cellular
phone. The accused has shown no remorse for his actions. Our
country
at present suffers an unacceptable and distressing incidence
of violence and the community demands that courts deal seriously and
severely with such offenders and for appropriately severe punishments
to be imposed for such crimes as the ones the accused committed.
[7] The personal circumstances of the accused appear from the
probation officer’s report and, as I have mentioned, Adv
Stransham-Ford also placed certain facts on record on behalf of the
accused. I do not intend to repeat all such facts and circumstances
herein, but I have duly considered and taken them into account in the
determination of appropriate sentences for the accused.
[8] The accused is a first offender. He testified at the trial that
he was born on 21 January 1978. He was accordingly 29 years
of age
at the time of the commission of the offences of which he was
convicted. He also testified at the trial that he had consumed
a
considerable volume of alcohol on the evening in question. I found
his evidence about the level of his sobriety improbable in
the light
of the volume of alcohol he claimed to have consumed during the
course of the evening in question. I accept in his favour
that
alcohol had played a role in the commission of the offences. The
accused has been in custody awaiting the finalization of
his criminal
trial for about 1 year and 10 months.
[9] The personal circumstances of the accused, the role that alcohol
played in the commission of the offences, the fact that he
is a first
offender, and the time spent in custody awaiting the finalization of
these proceedings cumulatively do not, in my judgment,
amount to
substantial and compelling circumstances which would justify the
imposition of lesser sentences than the minimum prescribed
ones when
balanced against the seriousness and senselessness of the murder, the
seriousness of the robbery, and the public interest
in appropriately
severe punishments being imposed for such crimes. I arrive at this
conclusion in full recognition that life imprisonment
is the heaviest
sentence a person can legally be obliged to serve. A consideration
of all the circumstances of this particular
case satisfies me that
the imposition of the minimum sentences prescribed by the Act would
not be unjust. Such sentences would
not be disproportionate to the
crimes, the criminal and the legitimate interests of society in the
case of the accused.
[10] In the result the accused is sentenced to:
1. Imprisonment for life pursuant to his conviction on count 1
(murder);
Imprisonment for a term of fifteen years pursuant to his conviction
on count 2 (robbery with aggravating circumstances);
Imprisonment for a term of three years pursuant to his conviction on
count 3 (unlawful possession of a firearm); and
Imprisonment for a term of 1 year pursuant to his conviction on
count 4 (unlawful possession of ammunition).
B. The sentences of fifteen years imprisonment, three years
imprisonment, and 1 year imprisonment run concurrently with the
sentence
of imprisonment for life for the murder conviction.
P.A.
MEYER
JUDGE OF
THE HIGH COURT
27 March
2009