S v Nkosi (A801/09) [2009] ZAGPPHC 163; 2010 (1) SACR 60 (GNP) (10 September 2009)

85 Reportability
Criminal Procedure

Brief Summary

Criminal Procedure — Right to legal representation — Withdrawal of attorney — Accused denied opportunity to secure new legal representation after attorney withdrew on ethical grounds — Proceedings vitiated by denial of fair trial rights — Conviction and sentence set aside. Accused 1, Mpienash Nkosi, was found guilty of attempted theft of gold ore at Consort Mine and sentenced to two years' imprisonment, one year suspended. The trial court denied him the opportunity to obtain new legal representation after his initial attorney withdrew, leading to questions about the fairness of the trial and whether the accused properly pleaded to the charge. The court held that the denial of legal representation and the uncertainty regarding the plea rendered the trial unfair, resulting in the setting aside of the conviction and sentence.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings were an automatic review in the High Court of South Africa (North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria) concerning the regularity and fairness of a criminal trial and sentence imposed on accused 1, Mr Mpienash Nkosi. The matter came before Legodi J (with Seriti J concurring in the order) in the review jurisdiction.


The parties were the State as prosecutor and Mpienash Nkosi as the reviewed accused (accused 1). Although Nkosi was initially jointly tried with a co-accused who remained legally represented, Nkosi became unrepresented after the Legal Aid attorney withdrew at the commencement of the hearing.


The procedural history reflected that Nkosi and a co-accused were tried in the lower court on a charge relating to the attempted theft of gold ore at Consort Mine, Barberton (with an alternative statutory charge). They were convicted, and Nkosi (unrepresented at that point) was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, with one year suspended on conditions. The case then served before the High Court on automatic review. The reviewing judge raised concerns with the Director of Public Prosecutions regarding (i) whether Nkosi properly pleaded, and (ii) whether Nkosi was unfairly denied legal representation, particularly access to further Legal Aid after the withdrawal.


The general subject-matter of the dispute on review was whether irregularities in the conduct of the trial, especially concerning the accused’s right to legal representation and the recording/clarity of the plea, rendered the proceedings unfair and required that the conviction and sentence be set aside.


2. Material Facts


Nkosi was charged with attempted theft of gold ore at Consort Mine, Barberton. He also faced an alternative charge alleging contravention of section 98 of the Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996, framed as unlawful entry into a mine/works/shaft/building where machinery had been erected.


It was common cause on the record that Nkosi initially had Legal Aid representation. The Legal Aid attorney, who initially represented both accused, withdrew as attorney for Nkosi at the start of the hearing, stating on record that Nkosi had given him one version during consultation but was presenting another version in court, and that the co-accused was “sticking” to the version previously provided.


After the withdrawal, Nkosi requested an opportunity to apply for another Legal Aid lawyer, explaining that he did not have money to privately instruct an attorney. The trial court refused, indicating to Nkosi that he would not get another Legal Aid lawyer and that he could not “pick and choose”, and compelled him to proceed without representation.


On the merits as they appeared from the review judgment, Nkosi’s version was that he had been seeking work; a person referred to as Andries informed him of a job at the mine; he went to the mine with Andries and others under the understanding they were going for lawful employment; and they were arrested by security officers at the mine. The reviewing court noted that the arresting security officers did not rebut this version, and considered that Nkosi should, on the merits, have been afforded the benefit of the doubt.


A further material feature was the state of the record concerning the plea. While the charge(s) were put, the review court found that there was nothing on record indicating that Nkosi ever pleaded, and the proceedings reflected confusion as to whether he pleaded guilty or not guilty, and at what stage. The trial court later attempted to explain that the initial plea was not interpreted and suggested that Nkosi had pleaded and provided a section 115 explanation, but the reviewing court held that this explanation deepened the confusion rather than resolving it.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether the proceedings were vitiated by procedural irregularities of such seriousness that the conviction and sentence could not stand, specifically whether Nkosi was denied a fair trial by (i) being refused the opportunity to obtain further Legal Aid representation after his attorney withdrew on ethical grounds, and (ii) uncertainty and inadequacy in the record regarding whether Nkosi properly pleaded to the charge(s).


The dispute primarily concerned the application of legal standards of trial fairness to the facts disclosed by the record, including whether the denial of legal representation and the plea irregularity constituted reviewable irregularities. It also involved an assessment of the record as a matter of fact (what occurred and what was recorded) and a legal evaluation of whether those defects went to the heart of a fair trial.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The reviewing court treated the issue of legal representation as fundamental. It accepted (in line with the view expressed by the Director of Public Prosecutions) that where a legal representative withdraws on ethical grounds, an accused is entitled to be afforded an opportunity to obtain another legal representative through the Legal Aid system. The reviewing court held that the trial court was incorrect to convey to Nkosi that Legal Aid would not provide another attorney and to refuse him that opportunity.


On the record, the reviewing court found that Nkosi was effectively denied his right to legal representation, with the trial court insisting that he either pay for a lawyer or proceed unrepresented, and rejecting the request for Legal Aid without properly accommodating the implications of the attorney’s ethical withdrawal. The reviewing court characterised this denial as striking at the core fairness of the trial and, on this basis alone, concluded that the proceedings ought to be set aside.


The reviewing court also addressed the position created by the attorney’s partial withdrawal. It expressed the view that the attorney who initially represented both accused should have withdrawn completely rather than continuing for the co-accused, because continuing created the untenable situation of potentially having to cross-examine a former client in a matter in which the attorney had previously acted.


Turning to the plea issue, the reviewing court held that it remained doubtful whether Nkosi ever pleaded. Although the charges were put, the record did not show a plea being entered. The trial court’s later explanation—asserting that Nkosi’s initial plea was not interpreted and that later exchanges amounted to a plea and a section 115 explanation—was not accepted as clarifying the record; rather, it demonstrated uncertainty as to whether the plea was guilty or not guilty and when it was made. The reviewing court regarded this as a further irregularity justifying the setting aside of proceedings. It noted that if the plea issue had been the only defect, the matter might have been referred to start de novo, but it was not the only problem.


Although the merits were not the decisive ground for setting aside the conviction, the reviewing court briefly evaluated Nkosi’s version (that he believed he was going to the mine for lawful work) and noted that it was not rebutted by the arresting security officers. This supported the view, at least in general terms, that Nkosi should have received the benefit of doubt on the merits, reinforcing the concern that the outcome in the lower court was unreliable.


5. Outcome and Relief


The High Court set aside the conviction and sentence imposed on accused 1, Mr Mpienash Nkosi.


It further ordered that Nkosi, if not already released, be immediately released from prison, unless he was being held on other charges.


No separate costs order was recorded in the judgment.


Cases Cited


No prior cases were cited in the judgment.


Legislation Cited


Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996, section 98.


Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 115.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The High Court held that the trial proceedings were vitiated by serious irregularities rendering the trial unfair, principally because the trial court denied the accused a proper opportunity to obtain legal representation through Legal Aid after his attorney withdrew on ethical grounds. The High Court also held that the record created significant doubt as to whether the accused properly pleaded to the charge, which further undermined the validity of the proceedings. The conviction and sentence were accordingly set aside, and the accused was ordered to be released unless held on other matters.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A criminal trial’s fairness is fundamentally compromised where an accused is denied the right to legal representation, particularly where the accused seeks continued representation through Legal Aid after an attorney withdraws for ethical reasons and the court refuses to afford that opportunity.


Where the record does not clearly reflect that an accused has entered a plea, or where there is material uncertainty as to whether the plea was guilty or not guilty and when it was made, this constitutes a serious irregularity that may justify the setting aside of proceedings on review.


An attorney’s continued participation for a co-accused after withdrawing from representing another accused in the same matter can create an untenable situation, particularly where the attorney may be required to cross-examine a former client, and such a scenario should be avoided to protect the integrity of the proceedings.

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[2009] ZAGPPHC 163
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S v Nkosi (A801/09) [2009] ZAGPPHC 163; 2010 (1) SACR 60 (GNP) (10 September 2009)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTH
GAUTENG HIGH, PRETORIA)
Case
no. 104/09
Date:
10/09/2009
In
the review matter:
STATE
v MPIENASH NKOSI
REVIEW
JUDGMENT
LEGODI
J,
This
matter was laid before me on automatic review in respect of accused 1
who was found guilty of attempted theft of Gold Ore at
Consort Mine,
Barberton. He appeared on this charge together with another accused
who was represented by an attorney from the Legal
Aid Board.
Initially
the attorney represented both the accused land the other accused, but
withdrew as attorney for accused 1 at the start
of the hearing of the
matter.
The
two accused were found guilty as charged on the main charge of theft
and subsequently the unrepresented accused 1 was sentenced
to two
years imprisonment, one of which was suspended on appropriate
conditions.
When
this matter was initially laid before me, I raised the issue as
follows with the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP).
'The
office
of the Director of Public Prosecutions is requested to comment on
whether the accused had properly pleaded to the charge
and if not,
whether such omission vitiated the proceedings?"
Whether
the accused was not entitled to another legal representative from the
Legal Aid Board after the first attorney withdrew
as his attorney?
And if so the accused was entitled to another legal representative,
whether failure to afford the accused the
opportunity to get another
legal representative did not render the trial unfair?
The
Director of Public Prosecutions is also requested to comment on the
merits of the case and the appropriateness of the sentence
imposed".
In
response to the issues raised, Senior State Advocate, A Coetzee, with
D F De Beer SC agreeing, held the view that, firstly, the
accused 1
should have been afforded the opportunity to get another Legal
Representative from the Legal Aid Board and that, failure
to do so
had vitiated the proceedings.
Secondly,
on whether the accused 1 pleaded to the charge or not, the view is
that it is doubtful whether the accused 1 had properly
pleaded to the
charge.
Lastly,
on merits, the view held is that the accused 1 's version might be
reasonably possible true that, he did not know that his
actions were
unlawful.
Starting
with the latter submission, the accused 1 was also charged with an
alternative charge of contravention of section 98 of
Act 29 of 1996,
Mine Health and Safety Act, the allegations being that, they
intentionally and unlawfully entered a mine or works
or any shaft or
place, or building where an alinery has been erected. The accused's
version was that, he had been looking for a
job for some times. He
approached one, Andries, that should he hear about any job, Andries
should inform the accused 1. Andries
who was apparently, one of the
four accused, told him about this job at the mine. He went to the
mine in question with Andries
and other accused on the understanding
that they were going for a lawful job. They were then arrested at the
mine by the Security
Officers. The arresting security officers were
in no way to rebut this version. Therefore just on merits alone, the
accused 1 should
have been given the benefit of doubt.
Coming
back to legal representation, the attorney who represented the
accused 1, placed on record, the following:
"Your
worship, accused 1, presently it is like we ore, the first time he
consulted with me, he told me another version, but
now he is actually
portraying another version before court but however accused 2
presently is sticking on that version, so I don't
know what to do. I
was applying so that I withdraw for accused 1 and continue for
accused 2".
Having
placed this on record, the proceedings then unfolded as follows:
"
COURT
:
Okay, let us just explain to accused I, your lawyer says that when
you consulted with you, you told him one story and now you
are
telling him another story. He wants to withdraw as your lawyer at
this time.
MR
NYATHELA
:
Thank you, Your Worship, for accused 2?
COURT:
No, I just want to know what is his story now, is he going to get
another lawyer which he is going to pay or he is going to continue
on
his own. This bloody state just never ends. You must remember that
the case had been finally remanded to today for plea and
trial.
ACCUSED
1
:
Your Worship, Lucas to be offered an opportunity to get, I am sorry,
to apply for another lawyer from the Legal Aid.
COURT
:
Sir, you know that, I know it seems like Christmas but it is not, if
you told the lawyer that you were appointed by the Legal
Aid Board
two stories and he wants to withdraw, you will not get another lawyer
from them. You cannot pick and choose, you get
it for free, you
understand, you are lying to your lawyer, that is what he says to
court, because you have two different versions,
so therefore he
cannot represent you otherwise he stands up and he makes a fool of
himself. You understand that?
PROSECUTOR
:
The state would also object, Your Worship, because what it comes down
to is that because Mr Nyathela has acted ethically, he is
now hoping
to get another attorney from Legal Aid, who is unethical. That is
what he is applying for, an unethical attorney.
COURT
:
Ja (inaudible) understands
ACCUSED
I
:
(Inaudible) admitted, your Worship, that yes indeed there was
(inaudible) but there was not a way that it was an offence, I was

just there because I was solely hired.
COURT
:
So what are you now saying, that you pleading guilty? Because if you
where hired to go into the mine, you are pleading guilty,
is that
correct?
ACCUSED
I
:
Yes, Your Worship, I do admit it that I was there because as I was
only hired, but I will say that I feel I am not guilty.
COURT
:
Okay, are you going to proceed without a legal advisor and pleading
not guilty?
ACCUSED
I
:
Your Worship, we are just asking that if there is another one that is
available to get his assistance.
COURT
:
No, there is no other person from the Legal Aid available, do you not
understand sir, that you cannot tell a lawyer two stories
and ask him
to stand up and make a fool of himself. They do not do that, they
have some sort of integrity that, ja, no, I do not
know. Make up your
mind quickly sir, you either get a lawyer of your own choice, which
you pay or you proceed without a lawyer.
That is your, you have had
your choice, you have blown that.
ACCUSED
1
:
Your Worship, I do not have money to get a services of an attorney.
COURT
:
Okay, are you going to proceed on your own? Mr Mulangeni, I do not
know how to explain it to him that he understands. Nou het
hy 'n
brief. He actually only needs to have paid I think. There had been a
bail application for him, ja. You are not going to get
bail sir,
period. There was a formal bail application.
ACCUSED
I
:
Your Worship, my people brought a duplicate copy of the identity
document.
COURT
:
That is not the duplicate of an ID document that he has there, what
is that, you know ...
PROSECUTOR
:
(Inaudible] irrelevant, at this stage that he has been asked if he
want to proceed, this is the trial.
COURT
:
And you see that he is trying to do to get out of it so that he can
get away. Sir, I want the answer now, are you going to do
your own
case, or are you going to get a lawyer that you are going to pay for
yourself? I think I must just go out and get a Valium
otherwise I
am...
ACCUSED
1
:
Your Worship, I did mention before that I do not have money to pay
attorney.
COURT
;
Okay, the alternative, are you going that way. You are pleading not
guilty and you are going on your own.
ACCUSED
1
:
Your worship, I wish you to have the services from the Legal Aid.
PROSECUTOR:
Your Worship, I think he has been blowing his right to that, because
it is an application for an unethical attorney, and there
is no such
thing in our law as an application for an unethical attorney, the
Legal Aid does not cater for people who lie. It is
a ridiculous
question beside he cannot afford an attorney, they ...I suggest the
Court instructs him to that he is going on his
own.
COURT
:
Okay, that is exactly what I am going to do"
Clear
from the record that the trial court denied the accused 1 of his
right to legal representation. He or she was also not correct
in
conveying to the accused 1 that the Legal Aid Board would not afford
him another attorney. As correctly indicated by the Director
of
Public Prosecutions, where legal representative withdraws on ethical
grounds, an accused would be entitled to another legal
representative
appointed by the Legal Aid Board. It is sensible to do so. The denial
by the trial court as reflected on record,
goes into the very heart
of the unfairness of the trial. On this alone, the proceedings ought
to be set aside. For this reason,
I have already ordered that the
accused 1 be released from prison.
Before
I conclude on this issue, I think indeed the attorney who initially
represented the two accused should have withdrawn completely
from the
case. He had to cross-examine his ex-client in a matter where he had
previously represented him. I find such a situation
to
be untenable and in my view it should have been avoided, even if
privilege information referred to by the trial court may not
be
disclosed.
I
now turn to deal with the issue whether the accused 1 had pleaded to
the charge. Despite attempts by the trial court to explain
what had
happened, it is still doubtful whether indeed the accused 1 had
pleaded to the charge.
Whilst
it is clear that the charges were put, nothing on record
Y
indicating that the accused ever pleaded. In the situation referred
to earlier in this judgment, at one stage the trial court suggested

that the accused pleaded not guilty. This does not appear from the
record. The trial court's response to the query goes like this.
"Reading
the transcription, I realized that accused No
7
's
initial plea was not interpreted. He actually pleaded guilty and the
interpreter immediately realized that he was not pleading
according
to his instructions to his lawyer. Mr Nyathela then spoke to him and
after that withdrawal as his lawyer. Later, when
I asked him if he
then pleaded guilty. He said, he was hired by Andries, which actually
was his plea explanation in terms of section
115 Act 51
of 1977. At
that time, there was no doubt that he indeed pleaded. It is therefore
my humble submission that he proceedings were
not vitiated by accused
no. I not pleading"
This
explanation by the trial court with greatest respect, only serves to
deepen the confusion and doubt whether indeed the accused
1 pleaded.
The fact that the initial plea was not interpreted, does not help to
resolve the problem. On the explanation by the
trial court it is not
even clear whether the accused 1 pleaded guilty or not guilty, and if
not guilty at what stage of the proceedings
did he do.
This
too, should justify the setting aside of the proceedings. But, had
this being the only problem, we would probably have decided
to refer
the matter to start de novo. But of course it is not the only
problem.
Consequently,
I would propose to make an order as follows:
Conviction
and sentence imposed on accused 1 are set aside.
The
accused 1, Mr Mpienash Nkosi, if not yet released yet, to be
immediately released from prison unless held on other charges.
MF
LEGODI
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
I,
agree it is so ORDERED
W
L SERITI
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT