Tshongweni and Others v S (A73/2009) [2009] ZAGPPHC 325 (3 August 2009)

80 Reportability
Criminal Law

Brief Summary

Criminal Law — Sentencing — Substantial and compelling circumstances — Appellants convicted of robbery with aggravating circumstances and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment — Appeal against sentence on grounds of failure to consider substantial and compelling factors — Court finds trial unfair due to lack of proper advice regarding sentencing implications and absence of pre-sentencing reports — Sentence set aside and substituted with 7 years' imprisonment, antedated to time served.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This was a criminal appeal to the High Court (North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria) against sentence only following a conviction in the Regional Magistrates’ Court, Heidelberg. The proceedings concerned the appropriate sentence for robbery with aggravating circumstances, in circumstances where the regional court imposed a lengthy term of direct imprisonment.


The appellants were Sipho Owen Tshongweni (first appellant) and Fikile Phile Mdakwende (second appellant). The respondent was the State. The appellants were legally represented at trial, pleaded not guilty, were convicted, and were sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment.


After sentence, the appellants petitioned the High Court for leave to appeal. Leave was granted in respect of sentence only, and the appeal was heard on that limited basis. The general subject matter of the dispute on appeal was whether the regional magistrate correctly dealt with the minimum sentencing regime and whether substantial and compelling circumstances existed warranting a lesser sentence than the prescribed minimum.


2. Material Facts


The court proceeded from the factual context of the offence as it emerged from the trial record, noting that the appeal was limited to sentence and not conviction. The incident occurred on 20 March 2004 at a tavern that was also the complainant’s home, where the complainant and others were playing pool.


On the State’s version, the two appellants entered the premises, left, and later returned. The first appellant, who was known to the complainant, was alleged to have been in possession of a firearm, and the second appellant to have been in possession of a knife. The second appellant allegedly restrained the complainant by the neck while the first appellant pointed a firearm at him. The complainant was robbed of his identity document, driver’s licence, and cellular phone. The second appellant then allegedly took an iron bar, broke the pool table, and removed coins from the slot, said to amount to approximately R600 to R800 accumulated over about three weeks. A shot was fired outside as the appellants fled. The complainant was not injured during the robbery. The complainant’s version was said to have been corroborated by a second witness, identified as T.M.


The appellants’ trial version differed in material respects. They testified that they were at the tavern playing pool and drinking liquor; that the second appellant broke a pool cue; that they were told the tavern had closed after the cue was broken; that they left with beers; and that they ran upon seeing police because they feared arrest for drinking in public. This version was presented as relating to what occurred inside the tavern.


For purposes of sentence, the High Court highlighted personal circumstances reflected in the record as relevant to mitigation. The appellants were first offenders, unemployed and unmarried, and did part-time jobs. The second appellant had a minor child to support. The appellants had also spent six months in custody awaiting trial. The High Court further regarded it as relevant that the complainant was not physically harmed, notwithstanding the seriousness of the offence and the use of weapons.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions concerned the lawfulness and appropriateness of the sentencing process and outcome, rather than the correctness of the conviction. The court was required to determine whether the regional magistrate properly applied the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 minimum sentencing provisions, including whether the appellants had been given adequate notice of the State’s intention to rely on that regime.


Closely linked to that was whether the magistrate properly considered whether substantial and compelling circumstances existed. This involved an application of legal principles to the facts, and also a sentencing value judgment concerning the cumulative weight of mitigating and aggravating factors.


A further issue was whether, given the way sentence was dealt with, the appellants’ sentencing proceedings were substantially unfair, and whether the sentence imposed was shockingly inappropriate on the record as it stood.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The High Court focused on the operation of the minimum sentencing regime and the requirements of a fair sentencing process where the State seeks reliance on the Act. The court accepted that legal representatives often advise accused persons about sentencing consequences, but emphasised that this does not displace the presiding officer’s responsibility to ensure that an accused is aware of the implications of the minimum sentencing legislation in relation to the charge. The court considered that this responsibility should “permeate” the proceedings.


A key factual feature in the High Court’s evaluation was that the charge sheet made no reference to the minimum sentencing legislation. Although the magistrate forewarned the parties after conviction about the Act’s implications, neither the defence nor the prosecution addressed the court on whether substantial and compelling circumstances existed. The magistrate nevertheless made a finding that none existed, without substantiating that finding with reasons, and proceeded to impose sentence accordingly. On the High Court’s reading of the record, it did not appear that the appellants were properly advised of the consequences of the Act in a manner sufficient to secure fairness in sentencing.


The court relied on the approach articulated in S v Ndlovu (with reference to S v Legoa) that a fair trial will generally require that the State’s intention to rely on the minimum sentencing regime be pertinently brought to the accused at the outset, whether on the charge sheet or in another form that allows the accused to appreciate in good time both the charge and the potential sentencing consequences. On this reasoning, inadequate notice may undermine the accused’s ability to conduct a proper defence, including in relation to sentence.


The High Court also addressed the scarcity of information placed before the sentencing court relevant to mitigation. It held that where there is scant information from which to determine the presence or absence of substantial and compelling circumstances, it is incumbent upon the presiding officer to engage with the legal representatives, including whether the accused was advised about testifying in mitigation and the consequences of not doing so. The court considered that, given the potential for a long term of imprisonment, the sentencing court could have requested pre-sentencing reports to obtain background information and other factors relevant to sentence.


On that basis, the High Court concluded that the sentencing stage of the trial was substantially unfair and that the sentence was shockingly inappropriate, warranting interference on appeal. Turning to the appropriate sentence, the court stated that substantial and compelling circumstances are assessed by considering the cumulative effect of mitigating factors and other relevant considerations.


While acknowledging the seriousness of the offence and the use of a firearm and knife, the High Court held that the magistrate did not take into account that the complainant was not injured. It also noted circumstances suggesting the offence was committed against a complainant known to the appellants, in a context where they frequented the premises. The court took into account the appellants’ status as first offenders, their personal circumstances including the second appellant’s child, and the period spent in custody awaiting trial. In dealing with awaiting-trial detention, the court referred to S v Brophy and Another, which treated such time as particularly weighty because it is served without remission and without the benefits typically available to sentenced prisoners.


Having weighed these considerations cumulatively, the court held that substantial and compelling circumstances were present and that a materially lesser sentence than 15 years was justified. The court also considered that the circumstances warranted consideration of a partially suspended sentence, but ultimately substituted a sentence of seven years’ imprisonment and antedated it to the date of the original sentence.


5. Outcome and Relief


The appeal against sentence was upheld. The sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment imposed by the regional court was set aside and replaced with a sentence of seven years’ imprisonment, antedated to 1 September 2004.


The judgment did not record any separate or special order as to costs.


Cases Cited


S v Ndlovu 2003 (1) SACR 331 (SCA)


S v Legoa 2003 (1) SACR 13 (SCA)


S v Abrahams 2002 (1) SACR 116 (SCA)


S v Brophy and Another 2007 (2) SACR 56 (W)


Legislation Cited


Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977


Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The High Court held that the sentencing proceedings were substantially unfair because the record did not show that the appellants were properly apprised, in a manner consistent with fairness, of the State’s reliance on the minimum sentencing regime, and because the magistrate found the absence of substantial and compelling circumstances without engaging with the parties or providing substantiated reasons.


The High Court held further that, on a cumulative assessment of relevant mitigating factors, substantial and compelling circumstances were present, including the appellants’ status as first offenders, personal circumstances, the absence of physical injury to the complainant, and the period spent in custody awaiting trial. The sentence was accordingly reduced and antedated.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A sentencing court applying the minimum sentencing regime under the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 must ensure that an accused has fair notice that the State intends to rely on that regime, ordinarily at the outset of the proceedings or in another timely manner that enables the accused to appreciate the sentencing consequences and conduct the defence properly.


The presiding officer bears an ongoing responsibility to ensure procedural fairness in sentencing, including ensuring that the parties address the question of substantial and compelling circumstances, and that any conclusion on that question is supported by reasons grounded in the material before the court.


Whether substantial and compelling circumstances exist requires a cumulative assessment of mitigating and other relevant factors; the enquiry is not confined to any single factor in isolation.


Time spent in custody as an awaiting-trial prisoner is a relevant mitigating consideration and may carry enhanced weight because it is served without remission and without access to certain benefits typically available to sentenced prisoners, as recognised in the authority cited by the court.


Where information relevant to sentence is scant and the likely sentence is severe, a sentencing court may require additional information, including by obtaining pre-sentencing reports, to ensure an informed and fair sentencing determination.

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[2009] ZAGPPHC 325
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Tshongweni and Others v S (A73/2009) [2009] ZAGPPHC 325 (3 August 2009)

SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTH
GAUTENG HIGH COURT PRETORIA)
CASE
NO: A73/2009
DATE:
03 AUGUST 2009
NOT
REPORTABLE
In
the matter between:
SIPHO
OWEN
TSHONGWENI                                                                   FIRST

APPELLANT
FIKILE
PHILE
MDAKWENDE                                                               SECOND

APPELLANT
AND
THE
STATE
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
TLHAPI,
AJ
[1]
The appellants appeared before the
Regional magistrate court sitting at Heidelberg on charges-of robbery
with aggravating circumstances,
read with Act 51/1977. The appellants
were legally represented. They pleaded not guilty and were convicted
and sentenced to15 years’
imprisonment. They petitioned the
High Court for leave to appeal their conviction and sentence and were
granted leave to appeal
against sentence only.
[2]
On the 20 March 2004, the complainant,
his friend Tebogo and others were playing pool at
a
tavern which also happened to be complainants home. It is alleged
that the two men whom complainant described as older men entered,

purchased cool drink, sat down to drink and left. They returned after
a while. The first appellant, who was known to the complainant
was in
possession of a fire arm and the second appellant in possession of a
knife. The latter held the complainant by the neck
while the first
pointed a firearm at him. The second appellant robbed him of his I.D.
document, drivers licence and cellular phone.
The second appellant
then took an iron bar, broke the pool table and removed the coins
that were in the slot. The coins collected
over a period of three
weeks would range between R600 and R800. The complainant was not hurt
during the robbery. Both appellants
fled the scene and a shot was
fired outside the premises. It was denied that the appellants had
bought beer that evening. The complainant’s
version was
corroborated by the second witness T.M.
[3]
The first appellant testified that he
was in the company of the second appellant and other friends at the
tavern playing pool and
drinking liquor. The second appellant broke a
pool cue and he denied that the pool table was broken. They were
informed that the
tavern was closed for business after the cue was
broken. They left the premises with their beers. The fled when they
saw a police
vehicle approaching them because they were afraid of
being arrested for drinking in public. The second appellant
corroborated the
first in as far as the version relating to the
incident inside the tavern was concerned.
[4]
It was submitted on behalf of the
appellants that the learned magistrate had erred in finding that no
substantial and compelling
circumstances were present.
After
conviction the magistrate forewarned the prosecution and defence of
the implications of Act 105 of 1997 ('the Act') with regard
to the
prescribed minimum sentences. Neither the defence or state addressed
the court on whether or not substantial and compelling
factors were
present. Without dealing with the matter further the magistrate in
sentencing made a finding that substantial and
compelling factors
were not present without substantiating such finding and proceeded to
impose sentence.
[5]
While it is assumed that the
legal representative would have advised the accused of the
implications of the Act, It is doubtful whether
they were advised because the charged sheet made no reference to the
Act. It is
my view that even where the appellants were legally
represented it remained the responsibility of the presiding officer
to ensure
that the accused persons appearing before him or her were
aware of the implications of the Act in relation to the offence they
were charged with. This responsibility should permeate the
proceedings. Where the legal representative and prosecutor failed to

address the court on whether or not substantial and compelling
factors were present, it was incumbent on the magistrate to take
the
matter up with them before pronouncing without giving any reasons
that there were none present. On reading the record it does
not
appear that the appellants were properly advised of the consequences.
In S v Ndlovu
2003 (1) SACR 331
(SCA) at para 12 Mpati JA said after
referring to the S v Legoa
2003 (1) SACR 13
(SCA):

.............The
enquiry, therefore, is whether, on a vigilant examination of the
relevant circumstances, it can be said that an
accused had had a fair
trial. And I think it is implicit in these observations that where
the State intends to rely upon the sentencing
regime created by the
Act a fair trial will generally demand that its intention pertinently
be bought to the accused at the outset
of the trail, if not on the
charge sheet then in some other form, so that the accused is placed
in a position to appreciate properly
in good time the charge that he
faces as well as the consequences Whether, or in what circumstances,
it might suffice if it is
brought to the attention of the accused
only during the course of the trial is no: necessary to decide in the
present case. It
is sufficient to say that what will at least be
required is that the accused is given sufficient notice of the
State’s intention
to enable him to conduct his defence
properly.”
[6]
Again it is my view that where there was scant information from the
evidence and from which it could be determined whether or
not
substantial and compelling circumstances were present or not, it was
the responsibility of the magistrate to enquire from the
legal
representative whether he or she advised the accused of the
advantages and disadvantages of testifying in mitigation. If
the
accused elected not to testify in mitigation, then in the legal
representative’s address in mitigation, the magistrate
should
draw the attention of both sides of the scarcity of factors from
which the court could draw information. In this instance
it cannot be
concluded that the appellants were aware of the Act in order to
enable them to give proper instructions to their legal

representative. The fact that the legal representative failed to
address the court makes me doubt whether she was aware of the

provisions of the Act and, that she gave proper advise to them
regarding the implications. Given the fact that the appellants were

first offenders and, in the absence of proper information available
to the court, pre-sentencing reports could have been requested
in
view of the long terms of imprisonment the appellants would be
subjected to. Pre-sentencing reports are meant to source additional

information about the accused, his background and other factors which
may assist the court in its consideration of sentence.
[7]
It is for this reason that I conclude that the
trial of the appellants in the sentencing stage was substantially
unfair and the
that the sentence imposed was shockingly inappropriate
and should be set aside.
In
considering substantial and compelling factors the court takes into
account the cumulative effect of those factors given in mitigation

and other factors. The offence was a very serious one in that a
firearm and knife were used. The court however aid not take into

account the fact that the complainant was not injured during the
attack. In S v Abrahams
2002 (1) SACR 116
(SCA) at 127c-f the court
considered the fact that the conduct of the appellant to have been
motivated by amateurish folly. In
this instance the appellants
attacked a complainant who was well known to them in that they
frequented his home which was also
a tavern where they used to drink.
The complainant knew the parental home of the first appellant which
he pointed out to the police.
The appellants were first offenders,
though unemployed and unmarried they did part time jobs. The second
appellant had a minor
child to support. All this factors cumulatively
constitute in my view substantial and compelling factors which should
have been
taken into account in considering a partially suspended
sentence Again, the appellants spent a period of six months in
prison,
awaiting trial. In S v Brophy and Another
2007 (2) SACR 56
(W) it was held that ‘time spent as an awaiting-trial prisoner
was ‘equivalent to time served without remission’
and
that the fact that they did not qualify for the many benefits enjoyed
by sentenced prisoners e.g. participation in rehabilitative

programmes. Time served as an awaiting-trial prisoner was ‘equal
to double the time served by a sentenced one'. All these
factors
cumulatively constitute in my view substantial and compelling factors
which should have been taken into account in considering
a partially
suspended sentence. The term of 15 years imprisonment should be set
aside. The appellants were sentenced on the 1 September
2004. To date
they have served a term of imprisonment of four years and eleven
months.
[8]
In the premises, I would make an order as follows:
1.
The appeal on sentence is upheld;
2.
The sentence of 15 years imprisonment is
substituted by the following:
(a)
Appellants are sentenced to seven years
imprisonment;
(b)
The seven years imprisonment is
antedated to the 1 September 2004;
V
V TLHAPI
(ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT)
I,
agree
M
F LEGODI
(JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT)
M
F LEGODI
(JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT)
JUDGMENT
RESERVED                           31

JULY 2009
JUDGMENT
HANDED DOWN

3 AUGUST 2009