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[2009] ZAGPPHC 1
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Ex parte Bouwer and similar applications (56240/08) [2009] ZAGPPHC 1 (3 March 2009)
IN THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
/ES
(
TRANSVAAL
PROVINCIAL DIVISION
)
DATE:
3/3/2009
REPORTABLE
IN
THE
EX PARTE
APPLICATIONS OF:
NAME
CASE
NUMBER
L
BOUWER 56240/08
B
G KHANYILE 56241/08
M
J SPEELMAN 56249/08
W
VERHAGEN 56264/08
A
J B MARKS 56392/08
W
TROLLIP 56468/08
P
PUCCI 56469/08
J
J SEKGAPHU 56474/08
K
L PATHER 56476/08
L
A PATHER 56477/08
B
SMITH 56478/08
B
K SMITH 56479/08
R
HARTZENBERG 56462/08
J
DU PLESSIS 56482/08
H
F C DU PLESSIS 56483/08
N
JOUBERT 56484/08
D
DU PLOOY 56485/08
S
D SEROKE 56486/08
S
S B SEROKE 56487/08
C
A NHLAPO 56652/08
H
GROBELAAR 56718/08
H
CROUS 56860/08
L
MAY 57028/08
P
L TALJAARD 57332/08
W
T PRICE 57333/08
JUDGMENT
MAKGOKA,
AJ
[1] "
The
administration of insolvent estates has over the years developed into
a very lucrative and therefore very competitive profession.
The
pressure has therefore increased to identify debtors whose
sequestration or liquidation may render a lucrative return to
lawyers, trustees, liquidators, valuators and auctioneers.
Advertisements in the media canvassing debtors who are desirous of
ridding themselves of their financial burdens have become
commonplace. This has increased the risks for debtors and creditors
alike. Debtors who might be able to meet their obligations if they
were given the opportunity to properly arrange their affairs,
are
pressurised into opting for insolvency proceedings instead, often if
not always losing their homes and motor vehicles as a
result thereof,
suffering the consequences of a bad credit record for many years
thereafter.
0n the other hand, insolvency
practitioners are tempted to present a rosy picture of the debtor's
affairs that bears little semblance
to reality, resulting in an
estate being declared insolvent that renders little or no dividend
for creditors once the fees of the
various participants in voluntary
surrender proceedings have been deducted and the administration costs
have been paid.
Such abuses of the process
have led the courts to insist ever more stringently on exact
information regarding the debtor's affairs
being placed before them
and to demand a realistic calculation of the potential dividend.
"
Bertelsmann
et al
:
Mars:
Law of
Insolvency in South Africa
,
9
th
ed,
p63.
[2] The above encapsulates the
essence of this judgment. There are different applications for
voluntary surrender of the applicants'
estates in terms of the
Insolvency Act, 24 of 1936 ("the Act"). The
applications all came before me in the unopposed
motion court. I had
certain reservations about one or the other aspect in each of them.
However, common to all the concerns I had,
were the following:
the reasons for insolvency were inadequate and tersely stated; the
applicants all alleged they owned no moveable
assets; no particulars
of income and expenditure were furnished; inadequate evidence in
valuation reports.
[3] The requirements which must
be observed before the court may accept the surrender of the debtor's
estate, are procedural and
substantive. The procedural requirements
are set out in section 4 of the Act, which makes provision for
publication of notice
of surrender in a newspaper circulating in the
district in which the debtor resides, as well as in the
Government
Gazette
.
Furthermore, the section requires the applicant to give notice to
creditors, trade unions and employees, if applicable. Lastly
the
applicant is required to lodge a statement of his/her affairs at the
office of the Master and/or the magistrate, as the case
may be. This
statement of affairs must indicate, among others, the debtor's
property, both moveable and immovable, as well as
a detailed
statement of cause of the debtor's insolvency.
[4] The substantive requirements
are set out in section 6(1) of the Act. I will revert to this
aspect later in the judgment.
[5] A trend has developed in
this Division, in terms of which applicants for surrender of estates
provide the court with the barest
of detail in their applications.
The attitude of the applicants seems to be, that once the formal
requirements have been complied
with, the court should grant the
application if the applicant's liabilities appear to exceed their
assets. I do not agree
with this approach. The court is not a
rubber stamp. The court still has a discretion which must be
exercised judiciously. In order
to enable the court to do so,
the applicant must be candid. See
Ex parte
Hayes
1970 4 SA 94
(N) at 96A C.
[6] The fact that these
applications are brought
ex parte
,
is reason enough for the applicants to disclose all material facts
which might affect a court in coming to a decision. See
Schlesinger
v Schlesinger
1979 4
SA 342
(W) at 349A.
[7] With regard to
non-disclosure of income, it suffices to state the obvious.
Surrender of an estate involves, among others, a
financial enquiry.
In my view, for the court to determine whether the acceptance of
surrender of an estate would be to the
advantage of creditors, regard
should be had to various factors, among which the current income of
the applicant. In
Fesi
and Another v Absa Bank Ltd
2000 1 SA 499
(C), the following was stated at 502H I:
"
The
applicants did not disclose their present salaries …
(M)r Botha argued that salaries were not assets and that there
was no duty on applicants to disclose them. There can be no merit in
Mr Botha's argument. It disregards the 'good faith'
expected of applicants in ex parte applications …
"
[8] At 504J and 505A LUSU, J
continued:
"
I
do not accept that a dividend of R0.13 in the rand is to the
advantage of creditors in circumstances where I am not told
what
the applicants earn and how it is consumed in paying for their other
responsibilities. In Ex parte Van den Berg
1950 1 SA 816
(W) at 818 RAMSBOTTOM, J went as far as to suggest that the
benefit to creditors could even arise from the earnings themselves
…
"
[9] As indicated above, no
moveable assets or income (where applicable) were furnished by any of
the applicants. In each application,
the applicants inserted
"nil" or zero in the statement of affairs where provision
is made for details of moveable assets.
Apart from that, the reasons
for insolvency have been stated in very sketchy and bald terms,
providing the barest of detail.
Examples thereof are: "due to
the current economic climate, I am insolvent"; "my
income has been halved";
"ek het 'n besigheid wat nie
gewerk het nie". In my view such statements can hardly be
regarded as detailed.
[10] With regard to moveables, I
am not persuaded that all the applicants do not own some realizable
household effects and furniture.
Granted, there might be instances
where moveable property had been attached in execution. Under those
circumstances one would
expect the applicants to set out such
particulars in their affidavits. In the absence of such
explanation, the court is left
to speculate.
[11] At this point, I am
satisfied that each of the applicants in these applications, has
failed to disclose:
(i) the detailed reasons for
their insolvency;
(ii) their moveable assets; and
(iii) their income and
expenditure.
0n this basis, I would dismiss
the applications.
[12] Contemplative that I might
be wrong in the conclusion I have arrived at, I turn now to
consider the substantive requirements.
These requirements are set
out in section 6(1) of the Act as follows:
"
If
the court is satisfied that the provisions of section four have been
complied with, that the estate of the debtor in question
is
insolvent, that he owns realizable property of sufficient value to
defray all costs of the sequestration which will in terms
of this Act
be payable out of the free residue of his estate and that it will be
to the advantage of the creditors of the debtor
if his estate is
sequestrated, it may accept the surrender of the debtor's estate and
may make an order sequestrating that estate.
"
[13] It becomes apparent then
that the key consideration is the advantage to creditors. The
concept "advantage to creditors"
in this context means that
there is a reasonable prospect that sequestration will result in some
pecuniary benefit to the creditors.
See
London
Estates (Pty) Ltd v Nair
1957 3 SA 591
(D) at 591G and
Epstein
v Epstein
1987 4 SA
606
(C) at 609D E, as well as
Ex
parte Kelly
2008 4 SA
615
(T) at 617B C.
[14] In instances where the
applicant owns property, as is the case in the present applications,
the applicant has to establish
a forced sale value of such property.
[15]
The
applications of Trollip, Sekgaphu, Pucci, Pather K L,
Pather L H, Smith B, Smith B K,
Du Plessis J,
Du Plessis H F C, Joubert,
Du Plooy, Marks, Hartzenberg, Seroke S D, Seroke S S B
and Grobelaar
and another.
Each of the present applications
is accompanied by a valuation certificate prepared by an estate
agent, Ms Lorindi van Dyk.
All the valuation certificates, save
for the erf numbers and owners, are for all intents and purposes,
identical. They are all
confirmed by an affidavit, wherein Ms Van
Dyk describes herself as "an expert in the field of valuing
moveable as
well as immovable assets".
[16] She further states that she
attends auctions on a weekly basis and has thorough knowledge of
market trends. She specifically
works with insolvency auctions and
she attends same on a weekly basis for the last three years.
[17] As regards the specific
properties in the respective applications, Ms Van Dyk mentions
the following:
"
This
particular property, being (description of the property) is being
valued at RXXX which is consistent with a FORCED SALE VALUE
in this
particular area. When arriving at the above amount, I have also
taken into consideration the higher interest rate
of 14.5% as
increased recently by all commercial banks.
The building is sturdy with
no visible cracks or leaks. The inside floor and wall covering is
neat. Security in the house is above
average which adds to the
valuation. The garden is neat and well-kept. The property is
situated near amenities such as shops
and churches.
"
[18] The valuation statement is
standard for all applications. As is apparent from the quoted
portion, Ms Van Dyk does not
lay a basis for the amounts
ascribed for valuation on each property, nor does she state how she
arrives at such an amount. No
mention is made of prices paid for
comparable prices in the same areas at forced sales during or about
the same period. In my
view the valuation certificates in these
applications are bald assertion of values. The fact that they are
almost
verbatim
the same, creates doubt whether the properties were indeed inspected
individually. A proper approach to valuations was stated
in
Nell v Lubbe
1999 3 SA 109
(W) by LEVESON, J at 112A B as follows:
"
(T)he
proper approach is for the expert to furnish in evidence the detailed
facts upon which the opinion is based and the reasons
for forming the
opinion expressed.
It is not for me to lay down
every facet of the evidence which must necessarily be adduced.
Always relevant will be the prices
for comparable properties in the
same area at similar forced sales held at or about the same time.
Also material is the fact
that the valuator has attended such sales and has personal knowledge
of the prices fetched. If not
able to do that, he should at
least be in a position to depose to the fact that he has made an
inspection of relevant title deeds
in the Deeds 0ffice and has
recorded therefrom the prices fetched for similar properties under
similar circumstances. Naturally,
appropriate descriptions of the
improvements will have to be furnished so that the value can be
assessed on a comparable basis.
All that material should be recorded
in an affidavit …
"
[19] In my view, the valuation
certificates in the present applications fail to meet the minimum
requirements set out above. As a
result, the dividends which
the applicants allege would accrue to the creditors, are as
unreliable as the valuations upon which
they are based. The court is
therefor unable to determine whether there would be advantage to
creditors. In my view therefore
the applications should be
refused.
[20]
The
applications of L Bouwer, B G Khanyile, M J Speelman,
W Verhagen and C A Nhlapo
In these applications, the
valuation certificates were prepared by Ms Melanie Botha. The
valuation reports are identical save
for property description and
ownership. In the application of Bouwer, for example, Ms Botha
states the following:
"
3.
Ek bevestig dat die inhoud
van my waardasie korrek is en wil die volgende eerbiediglik aan die
Agbare Hof voorhou:
4.
Ek het reeds verskeie
veilings van eiendomme in die omgewing van Claremont (Pta) bygewoon.
Die prys behaal vir die gemelde eiendom
val derhalwe binne my
persoonlike kennis en wete.
5.
Ek het opdrag ontvang van
David Traub Prokureurs om die eiendom geleë te gedeelte 5 van
Erf 128, Claremont (Pta), Registrasie
Afdeling: JR, City of Tshwane
Metropolitaanse Munisipaliteit, Gauteng, beter bekend as Marketstraat
1054, Claremont te evalueer
en waardeer welke bedrag op 'n
geforseerde grondslag moet geskied.
6.
Ter verduideliking van my
waardasie in die onderhewige saak wens ek eerbiediglik die volgende
aan die Agbare Hof voor te hou:
METODE VAN WAARDASIE:
6.1 Die waardasie is
uitgevoer op 13/11/2008.
Die opemarkwaarde van die
onderhawige eiendom beloop R990 000,00. 0p 'n veiling sal die
eiendom minder behaal as wat die werklike
opemarkwaarde is.
Ek het die onderhawige
eiendom dus op 'n baie konserwatiewe basis waardeer vir 'n bedrag van
R900 000,00 (geforseerde waarde)
hoewel ek van mening is dat 'n
hoër prys behaal kan word.
6.2
GC
69 Metode:
Ter wille van volledigheid
word voorgenoemde waarde ook getoets deur van 'n GC 69 metode gebruik
te maak. Dit is ook bekend as
die Stapelmetode waar 'n individuele
waarde aan elke afsonderlike item geheg word, byvoorbeeld, Woonhuis,
Swembad, Heinings en
grondwaarde afsonderlik. Sowat 99% van alle
residensiële waardasies vir verband doeleindes vir finansiële
instellings
word ook op hierdie basis gedoen.
6.3
Versekeringswaarde:
'n Versekeringswaarde word
ook in die verslag getoon om die vervangingswaarde op datum van
waardasie aan te toon. Die versekeringswaarde
vermeld in die
verslag, is op dieselfde basis gedoen as wat finansiële
instellings vir versekerings doeleindes verlang.
Geforseerde
waarde:
Ek bevestig hiermee dat die
waardasiebedrag soos weergegee in waardasie 12378 'n geforseerde mark
waarde het. Ek baseer my opinie
van die waardasiebedrag op
bogenoemde eiendom op my sowel as my mentor se ondervinding en
kwalifikasies soos bo uiteengesit.
"
[21] Attached to the affidavit
of Ms Botha, is the confirmatory affidavit of Ms Botha's
mentor, Mr Paul Johann de
Villiers, as well as a document titled
"Win Xfer – Deeds 0ffice Transfers", showing
transfer details of various
properties in Claremont, Pretoria,
between 30 September to 24 0ctober 2008. No reference
is made in the affidavit
of Ms Botha as to the relevance of
these transfers to the present application. It is not clear
whether the document
has been attached to prove transfer of the
properties under similar situations. As a result, I am
unable to attach any
evidential value to the said document.
[22] The above method of
valuation was, with respect, correctly criticised in
Ex parte
Mattysen Et Uxor
2003
2 SA 308
(T). Incidentally, in the said matter, the same valuation
entity, CVM Valuations, was involved. Commenting on the similar
method of valuation, SOUTHWOOD, J stated the following at 314D F
in respect of almost identical valuation report prepared
then by
Ms Combrink:
"
She
does not give any reasons why the applicants' fixed property would
fetch more than R85 000,00. That is simply a bald statement.
Her reference to the GC 69 method of valuation and insurance
value is irrelevant. Ultimately, her valuation of R85 000,00
is
a bald statement which is not supported by any facts or reasons.
Standing on its own it proves nothing …
"
I need not say more on this aspect.
[23]
Applications
of May and Price
In both these applications, as
in the previous ones, no mention was made of moveable assets, no
details of income were disclosed,
and the reasons for insolvency were
skimpy. Subsequent to the hearing, I received a supplementary
affidavit in May's application,
wherein the applicant stated that he
did not own any moveable assets. All the property he uses, belonged
to a Trust, of which
he is a founder and a trustee, together with his
wife, presumably.
[24] That did not change my view
about full disclosure. It could well be that all his moveable
property was donated to the Trust.
He does not say so. As a result,
the filing of the supplementary affidavit does not take the matter
further.
[25] In the application of
Price, the applicant is a joint owner of 50% of seven immovable
properties, the other half belonging
to his wife, to whom he is
married out of community of property. Half of the mortgage bonds for
his half-share totals R2 379 548,48.
He also owns two
luxury vehicles, which he values at R520 000,00. He alleges
that he does not own any moveable assets.
I simply find it hard
to accept that under the circumstances, the applicant does not own
any moveable assets.
[26] In both these applications,
the valuation certificates were prepared by Mr Gregory Cahi, a
sworn appraiser. His certificates
reflect the title deed particulars
of the properties, improvements, "general information" and
method of valuation. Under
method of valuation, Mr Cahi states
the following:
"
The
method of valuation used is the comparable method whereby recently
sold properties in the area are compared.
"
[27] In respect of May's
property he concludes as follows:
"
Before
coming to my final appraisal and after careful investigation and
discussion with the local property consultants and comparing
apples
with apples and the current prices, in my humble opinion I feel that
R1 300 000,00 (ONE MILLION THREE THOUSAND
RAND) represents
the true and current force (sic) sale value for the abovementioned
property.
"
[28] The affidavit purporting to
confirm his valuation certificate, is not signed and commissioned by
a Commissioner of 0aths.
[29] In respect of Price's seven
immovable properties he concludes:
"
After
careful research and consideration, to the best of my skill and
knowledge and the current economic climate, it is my humble
opinion
that RXXX represents the true and current forced sale value.
"
[30] Clearly, Cahi's opinion is
not based on any facts from which his conclusions can be made. His
evidence is far worse, and falls
short of the guidelines laid down in
Nell v Lubbe
and
Ex parte Mattysen,
supra
. As a result,
I would refuse surrender of these estates.
[31]
Application
of Taljaard
The applicant in this matter
states the reasons for his insolvency as follows:
"
7.1 Ek
was 'n bouer en het gebou.
7.2 Weens die ekonomiese
omstandighede bou ek nie meer nie en het ek nie meer 'n inkomste nie.
7.3 Ek kan nie meer my laste
betaal nie.
"
[32] However, in paragraph 1 of
his affidavit, he describes himself as follows:
"
Ek
is tans werksaam as 'n besigheidsman vir my eie rekening …
"
[33] He further alleges that he
has no property, either immovable or moveable. His liabilities are
R100 000,00 owed to First
National Bank and ABSA Bank in amounts
of R34 000,00 and R66 000,00, respectively. He paid an
amount of R21 000,00
into his attorney's account, for purposes
of this application. He states that this amount was lent to him by a
friend. That amount
has not been factored in as a debt in his
estate. He calculates dividend to the creditors in the amount of
R0,11 after deduction
of all costs. If the amount of R21 000,00
were to be added as a debt, there would certainly be nothing left for
his
creditors.
[34] In my view the applicant in
this matter has not been candid with the court and his sequestration
would not yield any advantage
to his creditors. I would thus
similarly refuse the application for those reasons.
[35] Regard being had to all the
factors in these applications, I am of the view that the
surrender of the applicants' estates
be refused. Because of the
importance and implications of this judgment for insolvency
practitioners and other role players mentioned
in paragraph 1
hereof, I have given this judgment careful and considered
attention.
[36] I therefore make the
following order:
36.1 The following applications
are refused:
1.
Ex
Parte
L BOUWER case
no 56240/08
2.
Ex
Parte
B G
KHANYILE case no 56241/08
3.
Ex
Parte
M J
SPEELMAN case no 56249/08
4.
Ex
Parte
W
VERHAGEN case no 56264/08
5.
Ex
Parte
A J B
MARKS case no 56392/08
6.
Ex
Parte
W TROLLIP case
no 56468/08
7.
Ex
Parte
P PUCCI case
no 56469/08
8.
Ex
Parte
J J
SEKGAPHU case no 56474/08
9.
Ex
Parte
K L
PATHER case no 56476/08
10.
Ex
Parte
L A
PATHER case no 56477/08
11.
Ex
Parte
B SMITH case
no 56478/08
12.
Ex
Parte
B K SMITH case
no 56479/08
13.
Ex
Parte
R
HARTZENBERG case no 56462/08
14.
Ex
Parte
J DU
PLESSIS case no 56482/08
15.
Ex
Parte
H F C DU
PLESSIS case no 56483/08
16.
Ex
Parte
N JOUBERT case
no 56484/08
17.
Ex
Parte
D DU
PLOOY case no 56485/08
18.
Ex
Parte
S D
SEROKE case no 56486/08
19.
Ex
Parte
S S B
SEROKE case no 56487/08
20.
Ex
Parte
C A
NHLAPO case no 56652/08
21.
Ex
Parte
H
GROBELAAR case no 56718/08
22.
Ex
Parte
H CROUS case
no 56860/08
23.
Ex
Parte
L MAY case no
57028/08
24.
Ex
Parte
P L
TALJAARD case no 57332/08
25.
Ex
Parte
W T PRICE case
no 57333/08
T
M MAKGOKA
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
56468-2008
REPORTABLE:
EX PARTE APPLICATIONS:
1. L BOUWER CASE
56240/08 HEARD ON 12/12/2008
ADV: J P F DE KLERK
ATT: DAVID TRAUB
ATTORNEYS, PRETORIA
2. B G KHANYILE CASE
56241/08 HEARD ON: 12/12/2008
ADV: J P F DE KLERK
ATT: DAVID TRAUB
ATTORNEYS, PRETORIA
3. M J SPEELMAN CASE
56249/08 HEARD ON: 12/12/2008
ADV: J P F DE KLERK
ATT: DAVID TRAUB
ATTORNEYS, PRETORIA
4. W VERHAGEN CASE
56264/08 HEARD ON: 12/12/2008
ADV J P F DE KLERK
ATT: DAVID TRAUB
ATTORNEYS, PRETORIA
5. A J B MARKS CASE
56392/08 HEARD ON: 10/12/2008
ADV R RAUBENHEIMER
ATT: FRANCOIS UYS &
ASS, PRETORIA
6. W TROLLIP CASE
56468/08 HEARD ON: 12/12/2008
ADV R RAUBENHEIMER
ATT: FRANCOIS UYS &
ASS, PRETORIA
7. P PUCCI CASE
56469/08 HEARD ON: 10/12/2008
ADV R RAUBENHEIMER
ATT: FRANCOIS UYS &
ASS, PRETORIA
8. J J SEKGAPHU CASE
56474/08 HEARD ON: 12/12/2008
ADV R RAUBENHEIMER
ATT: FRANCOIS UYS &
ASS, PRETORIA
9. K L PATHER CASE
56476/08 HEARD ON: 12/12/2008
ADV R RAUBENHEIMER
ATT: FRANCOIS UYS &
ASS, PRETORIA
10. L A PATHER CASE
56477/08 HEARD ON: 12/12/2008
ADV R RAUBENHEIMER
ATT: FRANCOIS UYS &
ASS, PRETORIA
11. B SMITH CASE
56478/08 HEARD ON: 12/12/2008
ADV R RAUBENHEIMER
ATT: FRANCOIS UYS &
ASS, PRETORIA
12. B K SMITH CASE
56479/08 HEARD ON: 12/12/08
ADV R RAUBENHEIMER
ATT: FRANCOIS UYS &
ASS, PRETORIA
13. R HARTZENBERG CASE
56462/08 HEARD ON: 10/12/2008
ADV R RAUBENHEIMER
ATT: FRANCOIS UYS &
ASS, PRETORIA
14. J DU PLESSIS CASE
56482/08 HEARD ON: 12/12/2008
ADV R RAUBENHEIMER
ATT: FRANCOIS UYS &
ASS, PRETORIA
15. H F C DU
PLESSIS CASE 56483/08 HEARD ON: 12/12/2008
ADV R RAUBENHEIMER
ATT: FRANCOIS UYS &
ASS, PRETORIA
16. N JOUBERT CASE
56484/08 HEARD ON: 12/12/2008
ADV R RAUBENHEIMER
ATT: FRANCOIS UYS &
ASS, PRETORIA
17. D DU PLOOY CASE
56485/08 HEARD ON: 12/12/2008
ADV R RAUBENHEIMER
ATT: FRANCOIS UYS &
ASS, PRETORIA
18. S D SEROKE CASE
56486/08 HEARD ON: 12/12/2008
ADV R RAUBENHEIMER
ATT: FRANCOIS UYS &
ASS, PRETORIA
19. S S B SEROKE CASE
56487/08 HEARD ON: 12/12/2008
ADV R RAUBENHEIMER
ATT: FRANCOIS UYS &
ASS, PRETORIA
20. C A NHLAPO CASE
56652/08 HEARD ON: 12/12/2008
ADV J P F DE KLERK
ATT: DAVID TRAUB
ATTORNEYS, PRETORIA
21. H GROBELAAR CASE
56718/08 HEARD ON: 12/12/2008
ADV R RAUBENHEIMER
ATT: FRANCOIS UYS &
ASS, PRETORIA
22. H CROUS CASE
56860/08 HEARD ON: 12/12/2008
ADV P GILLISEN
ATT: P J KLEYNHANS,
PRETORIA
23. L MAY CASE
57028/08 HEARD ON: 10/12/2008
ADV I S FERREIRA
ATT: VAN GREUNEN &
ACKHURST INC
C/O DU PLESSIS &
MUNDT ATTORNEYS, PRETORIA
24. P L TALJAARD CASE
57332/08 HEARD ON: 12/12/2008
ADV R BRUINS
ATT: PIERRE KRYNOUW
ATTORNEYS, PRETORIA
25. W T PRICE CASE
57333/08 HEARD ON: 12/12/2008
ADV G JACOBS
ATT: DE JAGER
ATTORNEYS, PRETORIA