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[2010] ZAFSHC 134
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Steyn NO and Others v Blockpave (Pty) Ltd (2959/2010) [2010] ZAFSHC 134 (12 October 2010)
FREE STATE HIGH
COURT, BLOEMFONTEIN
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
Case No. : 2959/2010
In the matter between:-
ANDREAS JACOBUS
STEYN N.O.
….............................
First
Appellant
CARL PETRUS
PRETORIUS N.O.
…..........................
Second
Appellant
MARGARETHA
ELIZABETH MOOLMAN N.O.
…..........
Third
Appellant
and
BLOCKPAVE (PTY) LTD
…..................................................
Respondent
_____________________________________________________
HEARD
ON:
16 SEPTEMBER 2010
_____________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
BY:
RAMPAI, J
_____________________________________________________
DELIVERED
ON:
21 OCTOBER 2010
_____________________________________________________
[1] The matter came
before me by way of motion proceedings. September 16, 2010 was the
further extended return date of the rule
nisi
which was
granted on June 17
th
2010 by my brother Jordaan J. The
trust claims that the respondent owes it the sum of R1 057 806,64 in
respect of rent arrears
and ancillary relief. The applicant trust
seeks to have its tacit hypothec over such assets confirmed. The
respondent company resists
the confirmation of the rule
nisi
.
[2] There are facts which
are common cause or not seriously disputed. This preliminary judgment
concerns certain points raised
in limine
at the commencement
of the argument before me. Therefore I shall confine myself to the
summary of the facts relating to such points
and not the merits. In
what follows hereafter I shall refer to the applicants as the trust
and to the individual applicants specifically
wherever necessary. The
applicants act in these proceedings in their representative
capacities as the trustees of the Dries Steyn
Trust (annexure “A”
from the affidavit). The founding affidavit was deposed to by the
first applicant. The second applicant
confirmed the averments
contained therein.
[3] The third applicant,
Ms M.E. Moolman, is the biological daughter to the first applicant.
The first applicant is also the father
to the respondent’s
deponent, Mr. Petrus Steyn. In addition, the first applicant is also
a director of the first respondent.
The other directors of the first
respondent are: Mr. Andreas Jacobus Steyn Jnr, Mr. Petrus Steyn and
Mr. Johan Steyn. They are
all the first applicant’s sons. It
will therefore be readily appreciated that this case is a classical
family feud.
[4] The Dries Steyn Trust
owns certain immovable properties situated in Piet Human Street,
Hamilton, Bloemfontein in the Free State
Province. The properties are
commonly known as 2 to 8 as well as 3 and 5 Piet Human Street. The
respondent carries on its operations
from the aforesaid premises of
the trust. Its movable assets are kept on the same premises. The
relationship between the trust
and the respondent is one of landlord
and tenant. The first applicant is no longer supposed to be involved
in the business affairs
of the respondent. Apart from this particular
trust and company the first applicant and his children are also
involved in other
business’s enterprises and trusts. Since
January 2009 the respondent has paid no rent to the trust.
[5] On the 19
th
November 2009 Rossouws Attorneys, on behalf of the trust, addressed a
letter of demand to the directors of the respondent (save
for Steyn
Snr) in respect of the rent arrears which the respondent, as alleged,
had not paid for ten months. On the 30
th
November 2009
Neuhoff Attorneys, on behalf of the respondent, repudiated the demand
of the trust. The attitude of the respondent
was that it owned no
rent to the trust.
[6] The following
allegations were, among others, in dispute. Whether there was a valid
lease agreement (annexure “D”
founding affidavit) between
the trust and the respondent; whether the trust had undertaken to
forgo rent due by the respondent
to the trust; whether the first
applicant, in collaboration with his first son, A.J. Steyn Jnr, was
trying to take over the control
of the respondent from his middle son
and current managing director, Petrus Steyn; whether the current
application was supported
by all the trustees, in particular the
third applicant, as the first applicant alleged and whether the
respondent’s deponent
was properly authorised to oppose the
current application.
[7] The issue in the case
is a narrow one. The first crucial question is whether the trust was
properly before the court. This was
the first preliminary question I
am called upon to adjudicate. Mr. Fischer, counsel for the
respondent, submitted that the answer
was in the negative. Mr.
Snellenburg, counsel for the applicants, submitted that the question
has to be answered in the affirmative.
This was the first preliminary
point raised by the respondent. I propose to deal with this first. If
needs be, I shall then deal
with the point
in limine
raised by
the trust, namely that the respondent’s deponent was not
authorised to oppose the current application.
[8] The general principle
of the law of trust is that a trust functions through its appointed
trustees. The legal personality of
a trust requires that all trustees
act together for and on behalf of the trust.
[9] The decision-making
of the trust is regulated by clause 3 of the trust deed. Sub clause
3.1 thereof reads as follows:
“
3.1 All
decisions of the Trustees, shall, save as otherwise provided be
determined by majority vote.
It is specifically provided that,
notwithstanding any other provisions contained herein, all decisions
whereby capital and/or income
is to be distributed shall only be
valid and binding if:
all the positions of Trustees are
filled; (i.e. a minimum number of three not taking into account any
additional trustees appointed
in terms of 2.4)
a quorum shall be all the Trustees in
office; and
should the number of Trustees be more
than three there is not more than one dissenting vote of all the
Trustees but a unanimous
decision if there are only three Trustees.”
Sub clause 3.3 of the
trust deed reads as follows:
“
3.3 A
written resolution signed by all the Trustees shall have the same
force and effect as if a resolution has been passed at a
meeting of
Trustees convened for that purpose, the date of the resolution being
the date of the last signature to the resolution.”
[10] The founding
affidavit was singed in Bloemfontein on the 17
th
June
2010. The respondent challenged the authority of the first applicant
to act on behalf of the other two trustees. In the answering
affidavit the respondent’s deponent asserted that the first
applicant was not authorised to depose to the founding affidavit
for
and on behalf of his fellow trustees and in particular the third
applicant. The essence of the respondent’s point
in limine
was that no proper decision was ever taken by the trust to sue the
respondent.
[11] In its replying
affidavit the trust persisted that a proper decision was taken to sue
the respondent. To this effect the trust
attached annexure “R9”.
The annexure was a document in which were recorded minutes of the
meeting of the trustees of
Dries Steyn Trust held at Bloemfontein on
the 14
th
January 2010. There were six items on the agenda.
Apparently four points were discussed under item 4. Precisely what
was discussed
under item 4.1 and 4.2 does not appear. Similarly item
5.1 was also blank. These lacunae were never explained and the
original
source was never exhibited.
[12] I deem it necessary
to quote item 4.5 since it relates specifically to the respondent. A
heading thereof is:
“
Besluit
insake agterstallige huurgelde”. The item reads:
“
4.5.1 Kennis
word geneem van verskeie skrywes tussen Mnr A J Steyn (Snr) namens
Trust en Mnr P Steyn namens Blockpave (Pty) Ltd.
Dit word dan ook bevestig dat die
Trust voorsitter die nodige erns gemaak het om namens die Trust die
vordering van agterstallige
huurgeld te probeer vorder het. Die
verhuurder bevestig dat hy hom hou by kontrak asook die
hernuwingsvereistes.”
Aanbevole oorwegings hoe om
huurgeld te betaal deur huurder. Daar is in die korrespondensie
gevra in skrywe van 05/01/10 via
Prokureurs Rossouws om voor
31/01/10 aanbevelings te maak hoe om huur verskuldig op datum te
bring. (paragraaf 2)
[13] It is very clear
from the aforegoing passage in particular or extract in general: that
the meeting relied upon was held some
five months before this
proceedings were launched on the 17
th
June 2010; that the
third applicant did not attend such meeting; that no concrete
decision was taken to sue the respondent and
that no written
resolution in terms of clause 3.3 was ever passed and signed by all
three trustees.
[14] The trust decisions
(annexure “R9”) in this instance have to be supported by
a minimum of two trustees to be internally
valid and binding on the
body of three. The trustees meeting of the 14
th
January
2010 was seemingly quorid because only one trustee was absent.
(Clause 3.1 annexure “R10”) The first and the
second
applicants attended the meeting. The two could theoretically have
taken the decision to sue the respondent on behalf of
the trust
provided the third applicant was consulted in advance about such
matter. Whether she was for or against such a decision
would not have
been an important matter, if only she was properly consulted but
outvoted by two to one ration of the trust body
with three (3).
[15] The decision to sue
the respondent, in such circumstances, would have been competently
taken. The majority vote prevails in
the running of the business
affairs of the trust – clause 3.1. However, it was never done.
It does not appear that she was
ever consulted or participated by a
proxy or otherwise in those proceedings. The record of the meeting
leaves one with the cold
feeling that the third applicant was not
consulted about the agenda or the meeting itself. There was no
apology or comment about
her absence at all.
[16] It was not
compulsory for her to attend any meeting of the trustees. (Clause
3.1) However, it is and it has always been fundamentally
imperative
for the majority trustees to keep the minority trustees informed
about the meetings to be held, the agenda and the decision
taken at
such meetings. This is important for a variety of reasons. For
instance, a trustee who cannot personally attend a meeting
may want
to send a proxy or make her input telephonically or otherwise. If she
was aware of a meeting she could even have indirectly
exercised her
vote. An uninformed trustee, I should imagine, would not easily sign
a decision taken in her absence to validate
it as a written
resolution as envisaged in clause 3.3.
[17] The first applicant
had this to say about the participation or non-participation of the
third applicant in the decision-making
process pertaining to the
affairs of the trust in general. At paragraph 24.6 of the replying
affidavit he says the following:
“
24.6 Die
Derde Applikant was ten alle relevante tye bewus van die
agterstallige huurgeld en die trust se voorneme om dit te vorder.”
At paragraph 24.7 of the
replying affidavit the first applicant again says the following:
“
24.7 Hoe dit
ook al sy, verwys ek die Hof na bylaag “
R9”
synde
‘n notule van
14
Januarie 2010
waar
die agterstallige huurgeld bespreek is en dat die nodige erns geneem
sal word met die invordering van huurgeld.
Die
Hof sal merk dat die Derde Applikant nie die vergadering bygewoon het
nie, wat niks ongewoon was nie, omdat haar teenwoordigheid
nie
noodsaaklik was vir die neem van meeste besluite nie, omdat Mnr.
Pretorius daar was en vanweë die afstande wat ons van
mekaar
woon. Sy woon in Middelburg, Kaapprovinsie.
”
[18 The aforegoing
comments by the first applicant concerning the exclusion of the first
applicant in decision making processes
relating to the affairs of the
trust, were disturbingly astonishing. Although her physical presence
at the meetings is not required
at all times, her participation and
input in the making of all the decisions is essential. The trust
requires the full and complete
participation of all its trustees in
order to function legally. The participation of its full complement
cannot be dispensed with
on account of the physical distances between
the trustees.
[19] The comments of the
first applicant show lack of understanding of the juristic nature and
functioning of the trust. The trustees
have to decide, participate
and act together as one in dealing with the affairs of the trust,
even if they were not all agreed
or even if they are not altogether
in a meeting under the same roof. This means that internal dissent
among the trustees on a particular
point, has to be buried once the
majority has spoken through the vote. Externally all the trustees
have to present a united front
notwithstanding earlier internal
dissention. Such unity of purpose and function is publicly manifested
by a written resolution
signed by all the trustees.
[20] In the absence of
any proof in this instance, I cannot find otherwise than that it was
never resolved in terms of clause 3.3
to sue the respondent. The
minutes (annexure “R9”) evidenced no decision by the
quorum to sue the respondent. Instead,
the respondent was asked to
say how it proposed to bring its account up to date. This is the one
thing.
[21] The authority of the
first applicant to make the founding affidavit in these proceedings
should be ascertained from the written
resolution and not an extract
of minutes of the meeting of trustees. This is the second point. In
this instance, I have already
demonstrated that the extract relied
upon, does not assist the case of the trust at all. The failure of
the first applicant to
attach the confirmatory affidavit by the third
applicant fortifies my conclusion that no proper decision, let alone
proper resolution,
was ever taken to launch these proceedings.
[22] The second point
in
limine
raised by the respondent was that no proper resolution was
ever adopted or for that matter a decision taken by the trust to
instruct
Rossouws Attorneys to initiate these proceedings. In the
replying affidavit the first applicant also persisted that the trust
properly
took a decision whereby it properly instructed Rossouws
Attorneys to initiate these proceedings. To that effect the document
with
the heading “Volmag om te litigeer” was served and
filed on the 10
th
September 2010, some nine weeks after
the launch of the application. Once again the document was only
signed by the first applicant.
Nowhere in the document is the
respondents’ name specified. Instead there is repeated
reference to an unnamed company. In
my view, these are serious
defects. They strengthen the contention of the respondent that the
first applicant was not duly authorised
by his fellow trustees to
instruct attorneys to bring this current application.
[23] The author, Erasmus:
The Superior Court Practice
, B1-59, comments as follows about
Rule 7(1):
“
The type of
authority contemplated by this rule means the special type of power
which is given by a client to his or her attorney
to authorise him or
her to institute or defend legal proceedings on the client’s
behalf; it does not contemplate a general
authority by one person to
another to represent him or her in legal proceedings. If an attorney
acting for a party is authorised
so to act, there is no need for any
other person, whether he or she be a witness or someone who becomes
involved, to be additionally
authorised.”
[24] It follows from all
this that the instructions which Rossouws Attorneys received from the
first applicant to institute these
proceedings against the respondent
were irregular. This is so because such special power of attorney did
not enjoy the backing
of all the trustees. The document in question
is dated 9 September 2010. This strengthens the respondent’s
contention that
when these proceedings were initiated eleven weeks
earlier, the attorneys had nothing resembling a special power of
attorney to
launch these proceedings.
[25] On 10 September 2010
yet another document was served and filed on behalf of the
applicants. The document reads:
“
UITTREKSEL
UIT DIE NOTULE VAN ‘N VERGADERING VAN DRIES STEYN TRUST
___________________________________________________
BESLUIT DAT:
1.1 DIE DRIES STEYN TRUST (“die
Trust”) aan ANDREAS JACOBUS STEYN magtiging verleen om alle
stappe te doen wat nodig
is om die huurgeld wat deur Blockpave (Edms)
Bpk aan die Trust verskuldig is, in te vorder, met inbegrip van maar
nie beperk tot
die neem van stappe om sekuriteit te vestig.
1.2 Vir soverre dit nodig mag wees,
word alle stappe wat deur een of meerdere Trustees in die verlede
gedoen is hiermee geratifiseer,
met inbegrip van die huurkontrak wat
met Blockpave (Edms) beperk gesluit is gedurende Maart 2001, en enige
hernuwings daarvan.
1.3
ANDREAS JACOBUS STEYN
, in
sy hoedanigheid as Trustee gemagtig word om alle dokumente wat nodig
mag wees ten einde hieraan gevolg te gee, namens die Trust
op te stel
of te laat opstel en te teken op sidanige terme en voorwaardes as wat
hy in sy diskresie mag besluit en in die algemeen
alles te doen wat
nodig mag wees ten einde gevolg te gee aan hierdie besluit.
GESERTIFISEER AS ‘N WARE
UITTREKSEL UIT DIE NOTULE
A J STEYN
_______________________
1e Trustee se Naam 1E Trustee se
Handtekening
C P PRETORIUS _______________________
2e Trustee se Naam 2e Trustee se
Handtekening
(
Alle Trustees on te teken
)”
[26] The aforesaid
document purports to be an extract from the minutes of the meeting of
the trustees of Dries Steyn Trust. Precisely
when and where such
meeting was held, does not appear
ex facie
the document. The
minutes are undated. Where and when and by whom the document was
extracted from such minutes, cannot be ascertained.
Once again the
document is not signed by the three trustees in office. Once again it
is an extract from the minutes and not a proper
resolution. There is
only one legally regular and permissible way in which a trust
communicates with the world and that is through
its resolutions. I am
persuaded by Mr. Fischer’s submission that the document was
apparently created after 3 September 2010,
a day on which the
respondent’s answering affidavit was served. These then are
some of the difficulties I have with the decision
to ratify the
irregular actions of the first applicant and the second applicant.
Through this attempt to have things ratified,
the first two
applicants tacitly acknowledged that they have failed to run the
affairs of the Dries Steyn Trust in accordance with
the letter of the
law.
[27] Mr. Snellenburg
urged me to strike out details of the telephone conversation which
Mr. Petrus Steyn alleged he had with his
sister, Ms Margaretha
Moolman, on 28 July 2010. Indeed the alleged contents of the
conversation was hearsay since it was not confirmed
by way of a sworn
statement. That much the respondent’s deponent himself
admitted. However, the first applicant chose to
comment on such
hearsay allegations instead of keeping his silence or declining the
invitation to deal with them in the replying
affidavit.
[28] In commenting on
such hearsay attributed to the third applicant’s stance, the
first replied that the third applicant
had resigned as a trustee of
the Dries Steyn Trust subsequent to the institution of these
proceedings and that the remaining trustees,
in order words, the
first applicant and the second applicant, had since nominated the
first applicant’s elder son, Mr. Andreas
Jacobus Steyn Jnr, for
appointment by the Master of the High Court as a substitute to the
third applicant. The founding affidavit
was signed on 17 June 2010
and the answering affidavit on 10 September 2010. It follows,
therefore, that the third applicant must
have resigned somewhere
between those two dates. Mr. Fischer hinted from the bar that her
resignation took place during August
2010 and Mr. Snellenburg tacitly
agreed.
[29] It will be recalled
that in June 2010 the third applicant did not make any confirmatory
affidavit in support of the legal steps
taken against the respondent.
Unlike the second applicant she adopted a neutral stance. The
founding affidavit was served on her
brother, the managing director
of the respondent, on 22 June 2010. She and her brother allegedly
discussed this case according
to the respondent’s answering
affidavit. Subsequent to the alleged discussion she resigned in
August 2010. Again the replying
affidavit, just like the founding
affidavit, was not supported by the trustees
en bloc
. The
third applicant resigned her office as a trustee before the replying
affidavit was signed. What emerges from the conduct of
the third
applicant is that she did not want to be involved in this family
dispute. She was apparently not prepared to side with
her father
against her brother. Instead she decided to resign.
[30] Her conduct
objectively enhanced the probative value of the hearsay allegations
attributed to her by her brother. Moreover,
the first applicant’s
reply and disclosures in connection with the third applicant also
gave some credence to such hearsay.
In the light of all this
prevailing circumstances, I am moved by dictates of justice to take
into account the averments contained
in paragraph 4.1.2 of the
respondent’s answering affidavit as admissible evidence even
though they were not verified by the
third applicant’s
confirmatory affidavit. Her behaviour silently tells a story that is
remarkably consistent with the version
of the respondent. She did not
want to be involved and to risk being caught in the crossfire between
her father and brother.
[31] What then was the
legal impact of Ms Moolman’s resignation on the trust itself?
Her previous fellow trustees reckoned
that the problem created by
such resignation could be overcome by nominating someone else to
replace her. They then approached
Mr. A.J. Steyn Jnr to become the
third trustee in accordance with the trust deed. They further
reckoned that, although the nominee
trustee had not yet been
appointed by the Master of the High Court, there were already three
de facto
trustees in office and that the majority of two, in
other words, the first and the second applicant, was competent to
continue
with these proceedings. The replying affidavit was thus
delivered against such backdrop.
[32] The whole argument
was fallacious. The resignation of Ms Moolman had profound impact on
these proceedings. It fundamentally
crippled the capacity of the
trust to operate. It functionally paralysed the trust. The functional
incapacity occasioned by her
resignation could not be immediately
remedied by the subsequent appointment of her brother, Mr. A.J. Steyn
Jnr in terms of the
trust deed by the remaining two trustees. Section
6(1) Trust Property Act No. 57 of 1988 provides that a person whose
appointment
as a trustee was made in terms of a trust instrument,
shall act in that capacity only if subsequently authorised in writing
by
the Master. Therefore, it is the statutory appointment and not the
instrumental appointment which will legally cure the ailing trust.
Until such time as the proposed or preferred substitute is authorised
to occupy such office, the minimum complement essential for
the
lawful operation of the Dries Steyn Trust will remain lacking.
Therefore, it is temporarily dysfunctional and so it was at
the time
the replying affidavit was delivered.
[33] It would appear, on
the first applicant’s own version, that the Dries Steyn Trust
has been suffering from the incapacity
to function on account of the
frequent, if not perpetual, albeit, irregular marginalisation of Ms
Moolman by her two male co-trustees
in the running of its affairs.
The fact that she was accustomed to be excluded was not, is not and
will never be a valid excuse
to regularise a wrong practice which is
intrinsic and systematic.
[34]
It was contended by the applicants that notwithstanding the lady’s
resignation, the remaining two trustees still constituted
a majority
envisaged in the trust instrument and thus, competent to represent
and to act on behalf of the trust estate. Since Steyn
Jnr was not yet
in office when the matter was argued before me, there were only two
trustees in office instead of three. The notion
that two can be the
majority of two is mathematically absurd. The plain truth is simply
that there was no majority to talk about.
There were only two
trustees. The true character of the trust we are here dealing with is
three faced. The trust body with a full
complement of three trustees
as envisaged in the trust deed was not in existence and the trust
estate was not capable to operate.
The Dries Steyn Trust, in my view,
did not
de iure
exist
and operate in a way a trust has to operate in law.
LAND
AND AGRICULTURAL BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA v
PARKER
AND OTHERS
2005 (2) SA 77
(SCA).
[35] Cameron JA
eloquently said the following about the numerical strength of a trust
estate:
“
[11] It
follows that a provision requiring that a specified minimum number of
trustees must hold office is a capacity-defining condition.
It lays
down a prerequisite that must be fulfilled before the trust estate
can be bound. When fewer trustees than the number specified
are in
office, the trust suffers from an incapacity that precludes action on
its behalf.”
PARKER’S
-case,
supra
, page 84, par. 11.
[36] At paragraph [17]
thereof Cameron JA had this to say about the decision-making and the
majority power:
“
[17] The
bank contended that since the Parkers were a majority of the trustees
in office, and since they could form a
quorum
at
trust meetings, they could bind the trust acting together. But this
is to confuse power to act with its due exercise. The deed
empowered
the majority of the trustees to meet and to make decisions. To this
extent the joint action requirement was abrogated
- but the majority
remained part of a three-trustee complement, and it had to exercise
its will in relation to that complement.
The bank does not suggest
that any meeting or consultation of the trustees was convened, or
that any vote took place in which the
majority will was exercised. On
the contrary, on the evidence which it has chosen not to challenge no
such meeting, consultation
or majority decision ever occurred. In
these circumstances the Parkers on their own were not entitled to
bind the trust. Again,
conduct of this sort may give rise to an
inference concerning the abuse of the trust form; but, again, this
was not the case the
bank sought to make.”
[37] I wish to add and I
do this at the risk of repeating myself. A trust operates on two
different spheres. Internally, trustees
may differ. A matter on the
agenda may be debated. If the trustees are not unanimous, a matter
must be put to a vote. The majority
vote then prevails as the
decision of the trustees. The dissenting trustee has to subject
himself to the democratic vote of the
majority.
[38] Externally, trustees
cannot differ. The split internal decision becomes the resolution of
the trust in its dealing with the
world at large. The dissenting
trustee is just as bound by the resolution as those who had supported
it all along during the debate
on the internal sphere. On the
external sphere the trust functions by virtue of its resolutions
which have to be supported by its
full complement of the trust body.
A quorid meeting of trustees may perfectly take a valid decision on
the internal front. However,
such a decision will remain only a
decision and not a valid resolution unless it also enjoys the support
of an absent trustee(s)
in whose absent it was taken.
[39] A majority of
trustees in office may form a quorum internally at a trust meeting,
but can still not externally bind a trust
by acting together. These
are two features of the decision that are instructive. It is not the
majority vote, but rather the resolution
by the entire complement
which binds a trust estate. A trust operates on resolutions and not
votes.
[40] In the circumstances
I have come to the conclusion that the Dries Steyn Trust was not
properly before me. Firstly, there was
no proper resolution taken by
the entire complement of the trust body to launch these proceedings.
Secondly, there was no proper
special power of attorney given to the
attorneys concerned to act for or on behalf of the Dries Steyn Trust.
Therefore the points
in limine
were well taken by the
respondent.
[41] In view of the
conclusion I have reached in connection with the respondent’s
preliminary points, it becomes unnecessary
to deal with the points
in
limine
raised by the applicants or the trust.
[42] Accordingly I make
the following order:
42.1 The respondent’s
points
in limine
are upheld.
42.2 The rule
nisi
is discharged.
42.3 The first and second
applicants, the trustees who launched these proceedings without
proper authority, are directed to pay
the costs thereof out of their
own pockets jointly and severally and not from the coffers of the
trust.
______________
M.H. RAMPAI, J
On behalf of applicants:
Adv. N. Snellenburg Instructed by:
Rossouws Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
On behalf of respondent:
Adv. P.U. Fischer
Instructed by:
Lovius Block Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
/sp