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[2010] ZAFSHC 124
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Poltek Manufacturing and Sales BK v Regent Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk (A303/2009) [2010] ZAFSHC 124 (16 September 2010)
FREE
STATE HIGH COURT, BLOEMFONTEIN
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Case No. : A303/2009
In
the case between:-
POLTEK
MANUFACTURING & SALES BK
….............................
Appellant
(Plaintiff in the court
a
quo
)
and
REGENT
VERSEKERINGSMAATSKAPPY BEPERK
….........
Respondent
(Defendant
in the court
a quo)
_______________________________________________________
CORAM:
H.M. MUSI, JP
et
MOCUMIE, J
et
JORDAAN, J
_______________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
BY:
JORDAAN, J
_______________________________________________________
HEARD
ON:
6 SEPTEMBER 2010
_______________________________________________________
DELIVERED
ON:
16 SEPTEMBER 2010
______________________________________________________
[1] The appellant
(plaintiff in the court
a quo
) sued the respondent (defendant
in the court
a quo
) for payment of an amount of R135 000,00 as
an indemnification for damages to a vehicle allegedly insured by the
defendant at the
behest of plaintiff in terms of an alleged written
insurance policy. The claim was initially based solely on a written
policy of
insurance but, by amendment, the plaintiff also introduced
an alternative claim based on an alleged oral agreement of insurance.
At the trial, at the close of the plaintiff’s case, defendant
applied for absolution from the instance and, though it does
not
appear clearly from the record, it is common cause that the
application was refused with costs and the trial duly proceeded.
[2] For the sake of
clarity the appellant will be referred to as plaintiff and the
respondent as defendant in this judgment.
[3] The trial court
eventually granted judgment in favour of plaintiff in the amount
claimed (which amount was agreed upon by the
parties) but refused to
grant an order for interest on that amount and also ordered that each
party should pay its own costs. The
trial court granted leave to
appeal to plaintiff against the refusal of interest and the costs
order and also granted leave to
appeal to the defendant against the
order as to costs in the application for absolution as well as
against the final award in favour
of the plaintiff and the order as
to costs.
[4] In terms of its main
claim the plaintiff relied on a written insurance policy issued by
the defendant on the 7
th
of June 2004 indemnifying the
plaintiff against loss or damage to
inter alia
a Mercedes Benz
truck. Although the policy was only issued on the 7
th
of
June 2004, its inception date was, according to the policy, the 10
th
of May 2004. It was common cause that the said truck was damaged on
the 27
th
May of that year after the inception date but
before the issue of the policy. The defendant’s defence to that
claim was based
on the allegation that the damage to the vehicle
before issuing of the policy was a material fact pertaining to the
risk insured,
which should have been but was not communicated to
defendant prior to the issue of the policy and that defendant
therefore was
entitled to avoid the policy and liability under the
policy, which it lawfully did. In regard to this claim it was
recorded in
the Rule 37 minutes as follows:
“
Eiser erken
dat indien eiser nie aan verweerder voor uitreiking van die
versekeringsooreenkoms die betrokke ongeluk rapporteer het
nie, eiser
nie behoort te slaag met eiser se eerste skuldoorsaak nie.”
[5] As far as the
alternative claim is concerned it was the plaintiff’s case that
the plaintiff duly represented by Joan Claassens
Brokers and the
defendant duly represented by an employee of Aon South Africa (Pty)
Ltd, a brokerage company, entered into an oral
agreement of insurance
during May 2004, a so-called “time-on-risk” agreement, in
terms of which the defendant undertook
to insure plaintiff’s
vehicles from the 10
th
of May 2004 until a formal and
written policy of insurance was issued. Defendant denied that such an
agreement was entered into
and denied that Aon South Africa (Pty) Ltd
had authority to enter into oral insurance agreements on behalf of
defendant. In the
alternative the defendant pleaded that if it is
found that Aon had such authority and entered into such agreement,
the agreement
would only come into effect and become binding once an
insurance premium was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant, which
did
not happen before the aforesaid truck was damaged.
[6] On behalf of the
plaintiff the evidence of Mrs Visser was tendered. The only part of
her evidence that might be relevant to
the issues presently to be
decided was that both she and her husband had signing power to sign
financial documents such as debit
orders on behalf of the plaintiff.
The only other witness called by plaintiff was Mrs Joan Jackson
(formerly Claassens) the proprietor
of Joan Claassens Brokers. She
testified that she for some time acted as short-term insurance broker
for plaintiff. The short term
insurance of plaintiff was previously
placed with Santam Insurance but that policy was cancelled because of
the fact that premiums
remained unpaid. She acted as a sub-agent and
broker for,
inter alia
, Aon Brokers through whom the previous
policy was also effected. As such, Aon was well aware of plaintiff’s
previous insurance
history, including the fact that the previous
policy had been cancelled due to non-payment of premiums. After the
policy with Santam
was cancelled she was approached by Mr Visser on
behalf of plaintiff and requested to obtain quotes from insurance
companies to
place plaintiff’s short-term insurance. For that
purpose she contacted Mr Leon Kruger of Aon, who was well aware of
plaintiff’s
short-term insurance history, to obtain the
necessary quotes. She requested a quote for insuring the plaintiff’s
vehicles
as well as a quote for insuring any loads that might be
transported by plaintiff on such trucks, also known as “goods
in
transit” insurance. In relation to the insurance of the
vehicles she received a quote dated the 5
th
of March 2004
from the said Kruger on behalf of Aon and also a quote for goods in
transit dated the 23
rd
March 2004. The quote in regard to
the insurance of the vehicles was not acceptable to Mr Visser of
plaintiff and not accepted.
(Copies of the aforesaid quotations
formed part of the exhibits in the trial).
[7] On the 10
th
of May 2004 Mr Visser on behalf of plaintiff called her and requested
her to arrange immediate cover for his vehicles and goods
in transit.
She thereupon contacted Leon Kruger of Aon who confirmed that the
previous quote would still be applicable whereupon
she called the
aforesaid Visser who intimated that the quote is acceptable and that
she must please arrange for immediate cover
which she thereupon did
by calling Leon Kruger and made the necessary arrangements. At that
stage Mr Visser of plaintiff was not
available so as to be able to
pay the initial premium, sign the necessary debit order authorisation
or to fill in and sign the
usual application for insurance form. She
conveyed those circumstances to Kruger who agreed to waive the
type-written conditions
on the quote, confirmed that cover will take
effect immediately with effect from the 10
th
of May 2004,
but that the deposit premium and signed debit order authorisation
should be forwarded as soon as possible thereafter.
On the 28
th
of May 2004 she met with Visser during which consultation the formal
application for insurance form was completed and signed, the
debit
order authorisation was signed by Mrs Visser and she arranged with
Visser to pay the initial premium directly into the account
of Aon.
During the afternoon of the 28
th
Visser called her and
informed her that the aforesaid truck was damaged in an accident on
the 27
th
. She arranged to have the necessary claim forms
forwarded to plaintiff to be completed by plaintiff. She called
Kruger of Aon on
the 31
st
of May and informed him about
the accident and the claim resulting therefrom. She conceded that
interim insurance or “holding
cover” is not the normal
way of obtaining a new insurance policy.
[8] On behalf of the
defendant the evidence of one W D Jacobs was tendered as an expert
witness. He duly qualified himself as an
expert in short-term
insurance. At the time he was the co-director of Paradigm Risk
Consultants Underwriting Agency who acted as
underwriter for the
defendant company. According to him no insurance cover could be given
on new insurance policies before at least
a premium in regard thereto
has been paid. In particular, the defendant did not have a product
for such cover in the case of new
insurance business before a policy
is issued. In the case of existing policies “hold cover”
can be arranged when an
existing client would like to add a new
vehicle to the insurance policy, in which case the insured would have
immediate cover notwithstanding
the fact that the revised premium
would only be recovered later. According to him Aon did not have any
authority to extend hold
cover without an existing policy being in
place. If a prospective new client might require interim insurance or
hold cover before
a new policy is issued, the broker is obliged to
refer the request to the insurance company for written authority
before that can
be granted. As an intermediary or broker Aon was not
authorised to waive any conditions regarding a policy or quotation.
Aon never
requested permission to grant cover or to deviate from the
conditions of the quotation in regard to the plaintiff. In regard to
new policies an insurance company first has to accept the proposal
and the first premium has to be paid before any cover can take
effect. Finally he confirmed that the credit intermediaries agreement
that form part of the exhibits contained the terms and conditions
of
the relationship between the defendant and Aon as credit intermediary
or broker.
[9] Mr Leon Kruger then
testified on behalf of the defendant. He has been employed in the
short-term insurance industry since 1985.
According to him he was not
entitled to alter or waive any conditions of an insurance policy nor
entitled to enter into any oral
insurance agreements on behalf of
defendant. He has never granted interim cover without an existing
policy being in place. Neither
he nor Aon was entitled to give
interim cover and he never applied for such permission from the
defendant. He denied Mrs Jackson’s
evidence as to the alleged
telephonic conversations on the 10
th
May 2004. According
to him one Kaylene Victor in the employ of Joan Claassens Brokers
approached him in his office on the 10
th
of May 2004 and
asked him whether the quotation of the 5
th
of March 2004
would still be applicable as it is. He told her that, if there were
no altered circumstances since then, the premium
will remain the
same. She asked him whether the insurance company could go on risk
regarding that quote whereupon he told her that
it can be done only
if a deposit premium as well as a signed debit order and fully
completed proposal form have been obtained.
At that stage Mrs Victor
had a partially completed proposal form with her and informed him
that she was sent by Mrs Jackson who
intimated that the client will
accept the quote and wanted cover as soon as possible. He told her
that the specific client had
previous unpaid premium payments, that
the quotation was given on behalf of a new insurance company and that
risk can only be accepted
once the first premium was paid, a debit
order authorisation obtained and the proposal form handed in. Victor
then intimated that
they were busy processing the necessary forms and
will send it over as soon as possible. At the time he made notes on
the written
quotation in his own handwriting. Although the notes were
done by means of abbreviations, it can be translated as follows:
“
On risk with
effect from 10/5/04, deposit and debit order to follow.”
According to him, if he
received the required items that same afternoon, he could arrange
with the defendant to go on risk immediately.
At the time he also
gave Mrs Victor a document containing Aon’s banking information
as well as a note of the amount of the
premiums in the amount of
R8344,38 required.
[10] According to him Mrs
Annette Havenga, another employee of Aon, sent an e-mail to Joan
Claassens Brokers on the 17
th
May 2004, which e-mail also
forms part of the exhibits and reads as follows:
“
Ons kan
ongelukkig nie bogenoemde polis uitreik alvorens ons in die besit is
van getekende debiet order & deposito premie nie.
U dringende
berigte word afgewag.”
According to Kruger the
signed and completed proposal form, proof of the deposit and the
signed debit order authorisation was received
on the 31
st
of May 2004. On the proposal form the date 10 May 2004 was filled in
as the required inception date of the policy.
[11] Kruger denied being
informed of the accident by Mrs Jackson at any stage before the
policy was issued. He was not aware of
the accident at all.
[12] In her judgment, the
learned trial judge relied heavily on the notes made by Kruger on the
quotation of the 5
th
of March 2004 as follows:
“
In applying
the basic rule of interpretation that words must be given there
ordinary grammatical meaning, one can come to no other
conclusion
than that the word ‘on risk’ means precisely what it
says, i.e. that the plaintiff was covered with immediate
effect from
10
th
May 2004. It was Mrs Jackson’s testimony that her understanding
was precisely this.”
She went on to find:
“
I find that
the probabilities of this case favour the plaintiff’s version
that Kruger agreed to hold the plaintiff covered
for a period from 10
May 2004 until the premiums were paid and the proposal form and other
documents completed when the written
policy of insurance would be
issued.
Kruger’s evidence supported by
the defendant’s expert witness Jacobs that he had no mandate
and no authority to assume
interim risk on behalf of the defendant
and that such interim cover was not provided by the defendant in
respect of new policies
but only existing ones, flies in the face of
his own agreement with the defendant, known as the credit
intermediary agreement (annexure
“B1” to the papers),
which specifically provides in broad non-specific and general terms
for the provision of interim
cover for the period between the due
date of the premium and 15 days after the end of the month in which
the due date occurs. In
the case of new policies, whether monthly or
annual policies, the due date is the inception date of the policy.”
[13] The learned judge
accepted the testimony of Mrs Jackson “unreservedly” and
found that the plaintiff has discharged
the onus it carries of
proving on a balance of probabilities that the defendant assumed the
risk in respect of the said vehicle.
The trial court also found that
the fact that the plaintiff failed to disclose the fact of the
accident on the 27
th
May 2004 is irrelevant and does not
affect the plaintiff’s right to claim damages from the
defendant as the plaintiff was
covered by the defendant in the
interim period between the 10
th
of May 2005 to the 31
st
of May 2005. The learned judge went on to state that she does not
approve of the conduct of the plaintiff in concealing the true
state
of affairs from the defendant. She found that the plaintiff’s
non-disclosure borders on dishonesty, is morally reprehensible
and is
to be visited with a suitable penal order relating to the plaintiff’s
claim for interest and costs. On that basis
she refused the claim for
interest and ordered that each party should pay its own costs.
[14] In finding that the
probabilities favour the plaintiff the trial court unfortunately did
not elaborate on those probabilities.
I will revert to the
probabilities later. The unreserved acceptance of Mrs Jackson’s
evidence sounds somewhat strange in
view of the fact that other
findings made by the learned judge are directly the opposite of what
Mrs Jackson testified. The court
found that the oral agreement was
entered into by Mrs Kaylene Victor on behalf of Joan Claassens
Brokers, which is contrary to
the evidence of Mrs Jackson. The penal
orders as to interest and costs were also based on the acceptance
that the fact of the accident
and resultant damages were concealed
from defendant, contrary to what Mrs Jackson testified and in
accordance with the evidence
of Kruger.
[15] In view of the trial
court’s finding that the fact of the accident was concealed and
not made known to the defendant
or Aon before the issue of the
policy, a finding with which I agree, plaintiff could not succeed on
the main claim, as conceded
in the Rule 37 minutes referred to above.
There is no documentary evidence, as would have been expected, to
show that the accident
was reported to either Aon or the defendant
before the issue of the policy. From the exhibits it appear that the
claim form duly
completed and supporting documents were only sent
through by plaintiff to Joan Claassens Brokers on the 8
th
of June 2004, after the policy had been issued. The only issue in
regard to the merits of the matter that has to be decided is
therefore the question whether the plaintiff succeeded in proving the
alleged oral agreement of insurance. Before dealing with
that it is
necessary to deal with the cross-appeal aimed at the refusal of the
application for absolution from the instance and
the resultant costs
order.
[16] As referred to
above, the record does not contain any reasons for the refusal of the
application for absolution. The basis
for the refusal is therefore
unknown at this stage. However, the evidence of Mrs Jackson on its
own and even taking into account
that some portions of her evidence
were contradictory was, to my mind, sufficient to justify a finding
in favour of plaintiff.
The notes made by Kruger on the quotation do
have the potential to be interpreted in a fashion that corroborates
her evidence.
I have no doubt that the application for absolution
from the instance was correctly refused and that the order as to
costs following
upon that was therefore correctly made.
[17] The issue regarding
the deprivation of interest and costs to plaintiff depends on whether
the cross-appeal against the order
granting the capital amount to
plaintiff succeeds or not. I will first deal with the cross-appeal in
that regard.
[18] The trial court did
not make adverse findings as to the demeanour of any of the
witnesses. The findings were almost exclusively
based on the court’s
view of the probabilities and the interpretation of documentary
evidence.
In regard to the
probabilities, due regard is to be had of the contractual
relationship between Aon and the defendant as well as
the factual
background pertaining to the dealings between the parties.
[19] In terms of the
defendant’s credit intermediaries agreement that applied to the
relationship between the defendant and
Aon, Aon is by virtue of
clause 1.1 thereof mandated to introduce business to defendant.
Clause 1.6 reads as follows:
“
Except where
agreed to by the company in writing, the intermediary may not:
commit the company in any way
...
1.6.4 alter any policy, endorsement or
receipt,…”
It is common cause that
the proposed policy would have been a monthly policy and in terms of
the definitions of the aforesaid agreement
the due date in relation
to monthly policies and relating to the payment of premiums is
described as:
“
In respect
of the inception, subsequent continuance and endorsement of a policy,
the date on which the premium in terms of the policy
is due for
collection.”
Clause 2.2. provides:
“
In the event
of premiums not being received on due date, no cover will be provided
and the policy will, insofar as same is necessary
and applicable in
the circumstances, become terminated.”
Insofar as “hold
covered” in respect to monthly policies is concerned, the
agreement states the following:
“
In the event
of the company at its sole discretion, agreeing to provide cover to
the insured for a period of time (the hold covered
period) during
which the intermediary has not yet received the premium from the
insured, the following clauses shall become operative:
cover will be provided by the
company between the due date and the last day of the month in
which the due date occurred.
the provisions of clause 2.4.1
shall only be of application in respect of the first month in
which the policy shall become
operative and/or renewed.”
[20] The factual
circumstances were that the plaintiff, after the quotation of the 5
th
of March 2004, decided not to accept that quotation. His previous
policy was already cancelled due to non-payment of premiums of
which
Kruger on behalf of Aon was aware. Apparently the plaintiff was
content with the fact that his vehicles were not insured
between the
5
th
of March 2004 and the 10
th
of May 2004.
According to the plaintiff’s case, for some or other unknown
reason he suddenly decided that he needed immediate
cover on the 10
th
of May 2004. The reason why he could not attend to immediate payment
of the premiums, signing of a debit order and completing a
proposal
form was his alleged absence from his office and the fact that he
could not be reached. However, his wife, Mrs Visser
had the necessary
authority to effect payment and sign debit orders. There was no
evidence that she was also unavailable. Mrs Jackson,
herself,
conceded that granting cover on a proposed new policy before the
issue of the policy is not the normal way of transacting
new
business.
[21] Kruger was an
experienced broker as far as short-term insurance was concerned. He
knew that in terms of the intermediate agreement
with defendant, he
was not allowed to commit the company in any way or to alter any
policy, endorsement or receipt. It must also
be accepted that he knew
that as far as the hold cover is concerned, it may only be provided
if the insurance company in its sole
discretion agrees to provide
such cover. Aon had a long standing relationship with defendant which
could be jeopardised by Aon
committing the company to an unusual form
of going on risk. In addition to that Kruger knew that the
plaintiff’s previous
insurance history was clouded by the fact
that the previous policy was cancelled due to non-payment of the
premiums. All the above
militate strongly against the probabilities
that he would grant such cover orally.
[22] It is true that the
notes made by Kruger on the quotation tend to show that immediate
risk or cover was contemplated. The plaintiff’s
case to the
effect that those notes were meant to be the only conditions and to
constitute a waiver of the type-written conditions
on the same quote
appears to be opportunistic. Firstly, the plaintiff never relied on a
partly written and partly oral agreement
but only an oral agreement.
Secondly, the notes by the appearance thereof appears to be
abbreviated notes made by Kruger and not
meant to be a full recordal
of the terms and conditions relied upon. If the latter was the case
it is unexplained why the type-written
conditions, in as far as they
are contrary to the handwritten notes, have not been deleted.
[23] The finding of the
trial court to the effect that Kruger and Jacobs’ evidence that
Aon was not mandated and did not have
the authority to assume risk on
behalf of the defendant was contrary to the terms of the intermediary
agreement is simply not correct.
That agreement expressly provides
that the broker, namely Aon, was not authorised to commit the
defendant in any respect, not authorised
to alter or amend the
conditions of policies of insurance and could only give hold cover in
the event of the defendant in its sole
discretion agreeing thereto.
[24] The trial court,
however, was correct in that the said intermediary agreement does
provide for instances where a hold cover
can be allowed on new
business. Jacobs’ evidence however, did not contradict that. In
that regard his evidence reads as follows:
“
Let me put
it differently, did Aon as a credit intermediary have the authority
to give hold cover or temporary cover without an
existing policy?
…
.. No.
Who had that authority? …
.
It had to be referred to the underwriter or Regent and we
would have given that authority in writing.
There had to be a request? ….
Yes there had to be a request, sorry.”
[25] Kruger’s
evidence also did not go as far as denying that it was possible, with
the consent of the defendant, to grant
such cover. When he was asked
whether he was authorised on behalf of Aon to give such cover his
answer was:
“
I was not
allowed to give such cover without consent from the company.”
[26] The letter written
by Annette Havenga on behalf of Aon to Joan Claassens Brokers dated
the 17
th
of May 2004 corroborates Kruger’s version
that he at least required a signed debit order and deposit of the
first premium
before he could arrange cover. Although the letter
refers to the issuing of a policy after receipt of the debit order
and premium,
it was common cause that at that stage no proposal form
was received and a formal policy could therefore not have been
issued.
The letter could only refer to the arrangement of cover as
soon as possible and the two requisites for that purpose.
[27] It is so that the
formal policy was eventually issued with inception date being the
10
th
of May 2004. On behalf of the plaintiff it was argued
that that is a clear indication of the fact that cover was granted
from that
date since, otherwise, it would have been totally uncalled
for to have an inception date that far back. It must, however, be
remembered
that the proposal form asked for an inception date being
the 10
th
of May 2004 and the issuing of the policy,
according to the evidence, is done by another department on the
strength of that proposal
form, not necessarily knowing the reason
for that.
[28] It is true, as
argued on behalf of the plaintiff, that the case law shows that there
are instances in which a broker is regarded
as having at least
implied authority to grant interim cover. That is usually the case
where an insurance company provides an agent
with cover notes to
issue on its behalf. There is, however, no evidence to that effect in
the present circumstances. In the Law
of South Africa (first
re-issue) Volume 12, para 506 it is correctly concluded as follows:
“
From the
above exposition it is clear that only in exceptional circumstances
will a canvassing agent have authority to conclude
a contract on
behalf of the insurer.”
[29] To add to that I am
of the opinion that it will much more readily be inferred that a
broker has such authority when granting
interim cover on an existing
policy as opposed to new business. In a case of an existing policy
the insurance company already approved
of the risk profile of the
client and has already issued an insurance policy showing that the
client’s risk profile is acceptable.
To add another vehicle or
similar item to an existing policy in those circumstances will in the
ordinary course of events not alter
the risk at all. The position is
quite different in the case of a proposed new policy where the
insurance company did not even
have the opportunity of assessing the
proposed clients’ risk profile.
[30] Even if the trial
court was correct in finding that Kruger did enter into an agreement
with the plaintiff represented as aforesaid
and did purport to grant
interim cover, the plaintiff still had to prove that he was
authorised either explicitly, ostensibly or
impliedly by the
respondent to grant such cover. See
DICKS v SA MUTUAL FIRE AND
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
1963 (4) SA 501
(NPD). In
this regard it was argued on behalf of the plaintiff that the
plaintiff was not in a position to gather evidence of the
internal
requisites and dealings between Aon and the defendant. Plaintiff
submitted that the question of authority in that regard
is something
within the exclusive knowledge of the defendant and that in those
circumstances, authorisation will more readily be
inferred although
the plaintiff produced only secondary or scant evidence to that
effect. The answer to this is simply that Aon,
being a broker and not
an insurance company, in itself was just as available to the
plaintiff as Joan Claassens Brokers was available
to testify.
Moreover nothing stopped the plaintiff from obtaining the necessary
documents and files by means of proper request
for discovery from the
defendant. There is no indication that that avenue has been followed
and that discovery was refused or not
fully done.
[31] In view of the
aforesaid I am convinced that the trial court erred in finding that
the plaintiff discharged the onus of, at
least, proving that Kruger
and/or Aon had the necessary authority to enter into such oral
insurance agreement. That finding makes
it unnecessary to deal with
the other grounds of appeal raised by the plaintiff, except for
remarking that the defendant conceded
that, if judgment was correctly
granted in favour of the plaintiff, the plaintiff should have been
granted interest on the capital
amount as well. Moreover, as far as
the costs order is concerned, if the plaintiff succeeded in an
alternative claim, there was
no compelling reason for disallowing it
its costs.
[32] In conclusion I am
of opinion that the following orders should be granted:
1. The appeal is
dismissed with costs.
2. The cross-appeal
relating to the order of costs pertaining to the application for
absolution from the instance is dismissed with
costs.
3. The cross-appeal in
relation to the final order granted by the trial court is upheld with
costs.
4. The final order of the
court
a quo
is set aside and substituted with the following:
“
Plaintiff’s
claim is dismissed with costs.”
_______________
A. F. JORDAAN, J
I
agree.
__________________
B. C. MOCUMIE, J
I agree and it is so
ordered.
________________
H. M. MUSI, JP
On behalf of the
appellant: Adv. P. C. F. Van Rooyen SC
Instructed by:
Symington & De Kok
BLOEMFONTEIN
On behalf of the
respondent: Adv. G. Ackerman
Instructed by:
Honey Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
/EB