About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
>>
2010
>>
[2010] ZAFSHC 52
|
|
Masekoane and Another v Letsemeng Plaaslike Minisipaliteit and Another (A138/2009) [2010] ZAFSHC 52 (18 March 2010)
FREE STATE HIGH
COURT, BLOEMFONTEIN
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Appeal
No.: A138/2009
In the
appeal between:
KADIMO
MASEKOANE
1
st
Appellant
(1
st
Respondent in the Court
a
quo)
DIE
XHARIEP DISTRIKS-
MUNISIPALITEIT
2
nd
Appellant
(2
nd
Respondent in the Court
a
quo)
and
DIE
LETSEMENG PLAASLIKE
MUNISIPALITEIT
1
st
Respondent
(1
st
Applicant in the Court
a
quo)
MUFI JERRY
MOLUSI
2
nd
Respondent
(2
nd
Applicant in the Court
a
quo)
_______________________________________________________
CORAM:
MUSI, JP
et
WRIGHT,
J
et
VAN ZYL, J
_______________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
BY:
H.M. MUSI, JP
et
WRIGHT, J
_______________________________________________________
HEARD
ON:
15
th
FEBRUARY 2010
_______________________________________________________
DELIVERED
ON:
18 MARCH 2010
_______________________________________________________
[1]
This
is an appeal against the granting of an interdict initially in the
form of a rule
nisi
but subsequently confirmed by the court
a
quo
.
[2] The
parties will be referred to as they were cited in the court
a
quo.
The
applicants there, the Letsemeng Local Municipality as first applicant
and Mufi Jerry Molusi as second applicant (the present
respondents),
brought the application against Kadimo Masekoane and the Xhariep
District Municipality as first and second respondents
respectively
(the present appellants). A third respondent was also cited but, he
(or she) did not oppose the application or play
any role in the
proceedings.
[3] The
relevant portion of the rule
nisi
(subsequently confirmed) reads as follows:
“
2. Die respondente opgeroep
word om redes, indien enige, voor die bogenoemde Agbare Hof aan te
voer om 09h30 op Donderdag 22 Januarie
2009, of so gou moontlik
daarna as wat die aansoek aangehoor kan word, waarom die volgende
bevel nie verleen sal word nie:
2.1 dat die raad van die tweede
respondent, hangende die finale beslissing van hierdie aansoek belet
word om enige raadsvergadering
te hou.
2.2 dat verklaar word dat die tweede
applikant ooreenkomstig die bepalings van artikel 23(1)(b) van die
Wet op Plaaslike Regering:
Munisipale Strukture, 117 van 1998 (die
Strukturewet) soos gelees met Bylae 2 daartoe, deur die raad van die
eerste applikant aangestel
is om die eerste applikant in die raad van
die tweede respondent te verteenwoordig.
2.3 dat die
respondente beveel word om die tweede applikant toe te laat om sy
regte en verpligtinge bedoel in Hoofstuk 3 van die
Strukture-Wet,
artikel 4 van die Wet op Plaaslike Regering: Munisipale Stelsels, 32
van 2000 soos gelees met Bylae 1 daartoe asook
sy regte en
verpligtinge bedoel in die “Standard Rules and Orders”
wat op 1 Desember 2000 ingevolge die bepalings van
artikel 148A van
die Ordonnansie op Plaaslike Bestuur, 8 van 1962 (VS) in die
Provinsiale Koerant gepubliseer is, uit te oefen
en na te kom.
2.4 dat die eerste en die tweede
respondente, gesamentlik en afsonderlik beveel word om die koste van
hierdie aansoek te betaal
en dat die derde respondent, indien hy die
aansoek bestry, gesamentlik en afsonderlik met die eerste en tweede
respondente beveel
word om die koste van hierdie aansoek te betaal.”
[
4] Sub-paragraph
2.1 of the above-mentioned is now irrelevant as the application was
finally determined in the court
a
quo
’s
judgment of the 26
th
February 2009. With regard to sub-paragraph 2.4 the Court ordered
second respondent to pay the costs of the application. With
regard
to sub-paragraphs 2.2 and 2.3 it is common cause that the second
applicant has since resigned as councillor of the first
applicant,
and therefore no longer represents first applicant on the council of
second respondent. The order therefore serves
no further purpose and
whatever decision may be given on appeal will have no practical
effect.
[5]
Section
21A(1) of the Supreme Court Act reads as follows:
“
(1) When at
the hearing of any civil appeal to the
Supreme
Court of Appeal or any Provincial or Local Division of the High Court
the issues are of such a nature that the judgment
or order sought
will have no practical effect or result, the appeal may be dismissed
on this ground alone.
Sub
-section
3 also reads as follows:
“
(3) Save under exceptional
circumstances, the question whether the judgment or order would have
no practical effect or result is
to be determined without reference
to consideration of costs.”
[6] The
applicants did not oppose the appeal perhaps
because it will not have any practical effect or perhaps because of
the provisions of section 45(1) of the Intergovernmental Relation
Framework Act, no 13 of 2005 (to which reference will be made again
later) or merely not to occasion further costs.
[7] At
the very start of Mr Wessels’s (appearing for the first and
second respondents, that is the appellants) heads of argument,
he
referred to this aspect and argued that the court should not dismiss
the appeal in view of section 21A(1). It was therefore
not necessary
to take the steps envisaged in section 21A(2) of the said Act.
[8] After
referring to various decisions with regard to section 21A of the
Supreme Court Act, Mpati DP (as he then was) stated the
following in
LAND
EN LANDBOUONTWIKKELINGS-BANK VAN SUID-AFRIKA v CONRADIE
2005 (4) SA 506
(SCA) at 511A:
“
It is
apparent from these decisions that this Court will not make
determinations on issues that are otherwise moot merely because
the
parties believe that, although the decision or order will have no
practical result between them, a practical result could be
achieved
in other aspects.”
[9] The
following paragraphs in
RADIO
PRETORIA v CHAIRMAN, ICASA
2005 (1) SA 47
(SCA) are of import in deciding the matter:
“
[39] In
National
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home
Affairs and Others
2000 (2) SA 1
(CC), Ackermann J said the following at para [21]
(footnote 18) with reference to
F
T Publishing (Pty) Ltd and Another v Minister of Safety and Security
and Others
[1996] ZACC 23
;
1997
(3) SA 514
(CC):
‘
A case is
moot and therefore not justiciable if it no longer presents an
existing or live controversy which should exist if the
Court is to
avoid giving advisory opinions on abstract propositions of law.’
[44]
In
the
Groblersdalse
Stadsraad
case,
supra
,
Olivier JA said the following at 1143A - C:
'Die bedoeling van
art 21A van die Wet op die Hooggeregshof is klaarblyklik om die
drukkende werklas van Howe van appèl te
verlig. Appèlle
behoort slegs vir beregting voorgelê te word as daar 'n
werklike, praktiese uitwerking of gevolg van
'n uitspraak van die Hof
van appèl sal wees. Praktisyns behoort dus deurgaans die doel
van art 21A voor oë te hou;
in die besonder by 'n aansoek om na
'n hoër Hof te appelleer en by die voortsetting, voorbereiding
en beredenering van die
appèl.'
[45] In the
Rotek
case,
supra
,
at 63H - I the following appears (at para [26]):
'The present case
is a good example of this Court's experience in the recent past,
including unreported cases, that there is a growing
misperception
that there has been a relaxation or dilution of the fundamental
principle spelt out in the
Groblerdalse
Stadsraad
case, above, namely that Courts will not make determinations that
will have no practical effect.'
These statements by
this Court continue to be ignored.”
[10] The
only reason given by Mr Wessels as to why the case should be heard
was that it would provide guidance to second respondent
(and perhaps
other municipalities) with regard to future conduct.
[11] The
only case Mr Wessels relied on in his heads was the matter of
QUEENSTOWN
GIRLS HIGH SCHOOL v MEC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, EASTERN CAPE AND
OTHERS
2009 (5) SA 183
(BHC). If the judgment in this case is considered it
appears that there were other considerations applicable (in spite of
the
Judge conceding that there was some merit in relying on section
21A) which appear especially from paragraphs 19 and 20 of the
judgment.
[12] To
consider Mr Wessels’s request that in spite of the matter being
academic, the Court should decide whether the rule
nisi
should have been discharged, it is necessary to refer to certain
other aspects of the matter.
[13] It
is common cause (or cannot be disputed) that the second applicant was
appointed as a replacement of one Mona in terms of
section 23 read
with
section 27(e)
of the
Local Government Municipal Structures Act,
no 117 of 1998
, and this was a unanimous decision (see annexures MW2
& MW3 to the Founding Affidavit). What is even more astounding
is that
the Xhariep District Municipality (2
nd
Respondent) replied to this decision as follows:
“
RE:
CONFIRMATION LETTER: WITHDRAWAL AND REPLACEMENT OF CLLR V.A. MONA AS
SECONDED
DELEGATE: LETSEMENG L M
1. This office herewith acknowledges
receipt of the letter from the Speaker of Letsemeng L.M. dated July
2008 as hereinafter referred.
2. The legislative
authority to nominate
a
councilor to represent that L M is vested in Council and is this
nomination thus valid.
3. I therefore confirm that Cllr M. J.
Molusi is the newly seconded representative as per Council resolution
of 16/07/2008 with
effect from the date of receipt of the attached
confirmation.
4. Cllr V. Mona is therefore
accordingly replaced.”
How
can the same district Municipality now argue that the rule nisi
should not have been granted? (For purposes of this judgment
it is
not necessary to enter into a discussion of the disputes with regard
to first respondent’s appointment as EXCO representative
as set
out in paragraph (1) of the opposing affidavit and disputed in
paragraph 4 and especially paragraph 6 of the replying affidavit.)
[14] It
is further necessary to point out that the respondents’ main
argument why Mona was not properly “replaced”
with second
applicant was based on the interpretation of
section 26
and
27
(e) of
Act 117 of 1998 (The Structures Act) and reads as follows in the
heads of Mr Wessels:
“
2.5 Die Hof
a
quo
het egter bevind dat die vervanging van
Mona
deur of met die tweede applikant kon geskied en regmatig was uit
hoofde van die bepalings van Artikel 27(e) van die Wet en wat
as volg
lees:
“’
n Raadslid ontruim
die amp gedurende ‘n ampstermyn indien daardie raadslid ‘n
verteenwoordiger van ‘n plaaslike
raad op ‘n distriksraad
is … deur die plaaslike raad vervang word as sy
verteenwoordiger op die distriksraad.”
2.6 Dit word egter aan die hand gedoen
dat die betrokke vervanging van ‘n raadslid waarna in Artikel
27(e) van die Wet verwys
word, verwys na en alleen kan geskied uit
hoofde of op grond van die omstandighede vermeld en voorsiening voor
gemaak in Artikel
26(1)(b) van die Wet.
2.7 Dit sou ook absurd wees indien ‘n
plaaslike munisipaliteit sy verteenwoordiger op ‘n
distriksmunisipaliteit se raad
kort-kort kon vervang.
3.
Dit word dus respekvol aan die hand
gedoen dat Artikel 27(e) van die Wet in konteks met Artikel 26
daarvan gelees moet word en dat
dit noodwendigerwys tot die
gevolgtrekking lei dat die tweede voorbehoudsbepaling van Artikel
27(e) verwys na of betrekking het
op die omstandighede waarvoor in
Artikel 26(1)(b) voorsiening gemaak word.
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN v CAPE BAR
COUNCIL
1986 (4) SA 903
(AA) TE 9121 I – 915 H”
When
it was pointed out to him that this argument was based on a
misreading of the
Act,
especially after the substitution thereof effected by section 9 of
Act no 55 of 2008, counsel withdrew this argument.
[15] After
this Mr Wessels was constrained to fall back on a further argument
also mentioned briefly in his heads. This was that
the procedure
used to appoint second applicant was incorrect, and that he should
have been “elected” even if he was
a replacement. In
considering this submission it should be borne in mind that section
23 of Act number 117 of 1998 refers to both
elections and
appointments, and the fact that Molusi was unanimously appointed by
first applicant’s councillors. Counsel
was therefore
constrained to argue that section 16 of Schedule 2 referred to both
original councillors and “replacement”
councillors who
were to represent their local municipality in the district
municipality. Why this Court should give an opinion
on this aspect
of the procedure in view of the prevailing facts, is difficult to
discern. There is no longer any live dispute
between the parties and
there is no indication that another case with similar facts may arise
in the future.
[16] The
whole question should also be decided in view of the background
provided by the Constitution to disputes of this kind and
whether
they should be taken to court by municipalities. Section 4(1)(h)(vi)
of the Constitution provides as follows:
“
All spheres of government and
all organs of state within each sphere must
co-operate with one another in mutual
trust and good faith by
…
(vi) avoiding legal proceedings
against each other.”
Section
45(1)
of the
Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act no 13 of 2005
,
sets out what steps should to be taken in the case of
intergovernmental disputes (which the providing of an “opinion”
by this court would amount to).
[17] The
conclusion to which the above seems to point is that the appeal
against the Court
a
quo
’s
judgment in this case was totally unnecessary (as the respondents
seem to have realized) and that the appeal is probably
meant to
obtain a costs order against first applicant. This is an appropriate
case where the provisions of section 21A of the
Supreme Court Act
should be applied. Nor do the interests of justice dictate otherwise
in view of the provisions of the Constitution
read with section 4(1)
of Act No. 13 of 2005 which discourage organs of State to litigate
against one another.
[18] The
appeal is therefore dismissed.
_
_____________
H. M. MUSI, JP
____
__________
G.
F. WRIGHT, J
I
concur.
____________
C. VAN ZYL, J
/em