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[2011] ZAECELLC 15
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Haynes v Rheeder and Others (EL 886/2008, ECD 2186/2008) [2011] ZAECELLC 15 (25 March 2011)
REPORTABLE
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EAST
LONDON CIRCUIT LOCAL DIVISION)
CASE
NO: EL 886/2008
ECD
2186/2008
In
the matter between:
BRYAN
HAYNES
…......................................................................................
APPLICANT
and
KIM RHEEDER
….........................................................................
FIRST
RESPONDENT
THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS EASTERN CAPE
S
....................
ECOND RESPONDENT
GRAVETT, SCHOEMAN, VAN RENSBURG &
MOODLEY INC
…..........................................................................
THIRD
RESPONDENT
COASTAL HUBBS CC
…..........................................................
FOURTH
RESPONDENT
EAST COAST RETAILERS CC
….................................................
FIFTH
RESPONDENT
ALJAZZ LIQUORS CC
…..............................................................
SIXTH
RESPONDENT
UMGAZANA TRADING CC
…................................................
SEVENTH
RESPONDENT
COASTAL DIY CC
…..................................................................
EIGHTH
RESPONDENT
THE REGISTRAR OF CLOSE CORPORATIONS
…....................
NINTH
RESPONDENT
HOMENET RETAIL ESTATE
…...................................................
TENTH
RESPONDENT
MARK WILLIAMS
….............................................................
ELEVENTH
RESPONDENT
CRAIG LINDHORST
…...........................................................
TWELFTH
RESPONDENT
PLATINUM MILE INVESTMENTS 207 (PTY)
LTD t/a CROSSWAYS SPAR
….......................................
THIRTEENTH
RESPONDENT
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MAGEZA AJ:
Background
[1] Applicant brought this application
on an urgent basis before Pillay J on the 7
th
November
2008 whereupon a
rule nisi
was granted with a return date of
the 25 November 2008.
The terms of the Order are the
following:-
“
1. That a
Rule
Nisi
do issue calling upon
the Respondent to show cause on or before the 25
th
(day) of November 2008 at 09h30 or so soon thereafter as counsel may
be heard why an Order in the following terms should not issue.
1.1 That the Respondent be and is
hereby interdicted and restrained from passing transfer of the
following properties:
1.1.1 the immovable property situate
at Coastal Hubbs East London described as ‘Remainder of Portion
2 of Farm 742, Division
of East London, the Province of the Eastern
Cape’ and held under deed of transfer T121/2004.
1.1.2 Erf 111 Sunrise-on Sea, East
London and held under deed of transfer T513/2008.
pending the finalisation of an action
to be instituted for the dissolution of the partnership between the
Applicant and the First
Respondent.
1.2 That the First Respondent be and
is hereby interdicted and restrained from selling or disposing of or
dealing in any way with
the following assets.
1.2.1 All assets held by Coastal Hubbs
CC, East Coast Retailers CC, Aljazz Liquors CC, Umgazana Trading CC
and Coastal DIY CC including
a Kia light delivery motor vehicle,
computer and office furniture previously used in the business trading
as Crossways Kwikspar
and a Toyota Forklift.
1.2.2 The member’s interest of
Coastal Hubbs CC, East Coast Retailers CC, Aljazz Liquors CC, Coastal
DIY CC and Umgazana Trading
CC,
pending the finalisation of an action
to be instituted for the dissolution of the partnership between the
Applicant and the First
Respondent.
1.3 That the Third Respondent be and
is hereby interdicted and restrained from making any payments to
anyone whatsoever from the
monies held in trust arising out of the
sale of the business owned by Coastal Hubbs CC and Aljazz Liquors CC
and the property owned
by Umgazana Trading CC, save for those
payments agreed upon in writing by the Applicant, pending the
finalisation of an action
to be instituted for the dissolution of the
partnership between the Applicant and the First Respondent.
[2] That the action for the
dissolution of the partnership between the Applicant and the First
Respondent referred to in paragraphs
1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 be instituted
by the Applicant within 21 days of the determination of the
application, failing which the interdict
and
Rule Nisi
will
lapse….”
The
Rule Nisi
has since been
extended on at least 9 (nine) occasions and the matter stagnated
until the 25
th
of September 2009 when First Respondent
filed opposing papers.
It is important to note that at the
time of the granting of this
Rule Nisi
, same was unopposed.
The action referred to in the
Rule
Nisi
has since been instituted and the parties anticipate that a
trial date will be finalised and inevitably the matter will go to
trial.
Pending the outcome of this action, Applicant asserts that the
Order will assist to properly preserve the partnership assets.
Applicant’s case
Applicant’s case as set out in
the papers is that:-
[3] The First Respondent worked as his
secretary from the 1990’s and, according to the Applicant, due
to her administrative
and business skills, as well as her competence
in sorting out the numerous complexities in his various business
affairs, the First
Respondent, on his invitation, became involved in
his business activities and a partnership was formed between them in
November
2001. He avers ‘she brought with her administrative
expertise whilst I had capital to purchase assets and investments as
the partnership progressed’ (at paragraph 19 of Applicant’s
papers). In tandem with the aforegoing, the parties also
formed an
intimate relationship.
[4] The first property bought by them
as a partnership, was an immovable property in Mthatha in the name of
Umgazana Trading CC,
the Seventh Respondent. They each shared a 50%
members interest in it.
[5] Thereafter they bought properties
and businesses in the proximity of East London in the name of other
Close Corporations which
include the Fifth, Sixth and Eighth
Respondents. First Respondent does not dispute that Applicant is a
50% interest owner in these
Close Corporations.
[6] The Fourth Respondent owns the
prized assets – Coastal Hubbs farm property situate just
outside of East London, the ownership
of which underpins the central
dispute between the Applicant and First Respondent who vehemently
asserts that she is a 100% owner
of the members interest in the
Fourth Respondent.
[7] The Third Respondent is a firm of
attorneys holding in trust, monies belonging to Fourth Respondent.
[8] The Tenth Respondent is the estate
agency employed by the First Respondent to sell the very valuable
property owned by the Fourth
Respondent.
[9] Applicant’s anxiety arose
primarily out of the First Respondent’s attempts to place the
Coastal Hubbs property on
the market for a price of R10.6 million
without Applicant’s approval and agreement. Applicant avers in
his papers that
First Respondent was attempting to dispose of
partnership property without his knowledge and consent.
[10] In the process of the aforegoing
and having secured the
rule nisi
, Applicant came upon
information which led him to believe that Ixolo Trading CC (“Ixolo”)
was a tenant of the Fourth
Respondent (“Coastal Hubbs”),
and he brought an application to join Ixolo and the Twelfth
Respondent. Upon learning
that Ixolo was no longer a tenant, the
Applicant withdrew the application and brought an application to join
Craig Lindhorst and
Kwikspar (later discovered to be Platinum Mile
Investments 207 (Pty) Ltd, trading as Crossways Kwikspar), as the
Twelfth and Thirteenth
Respondents respectively. This application has
since been abandoned but Applicant now seeks an Order that the costs
thereof be
paid by First Respondent.
Respondent’s case
[11] Respondent denies that there
exists any partnership, at least, it would appear from a reading of
the papers, in so far as the
ownership of Fourth Respondent is
concerned. She is of the firm belief that she is the sole owner of
the assets and that she should
thus be unencumbered in the manner in
which she deals therewith. She gives a background relating to how
negotiations first took
place with the previous owner of Crossways
Kwikspar, one Christopher Shaw, for the acquisition thereof and how
the sale became
conditional on the simultaneous purchase of the farm
property Coastal Hubbs. She states that a Deed of Sale was signed
between
herself and Applicant on the one part and Christopher Shaw on
the other. Subsequent to this and in the process of raising the
requisite
funding, Applicant had to resign as member of the acquiring
entity due to an adverse credit record. She also alludes to
Applicant’s
tax related difficulties with the authorities.
[12] Furthermore, First Respondent
posits that:-
12.1 to her knowledge, stemming from a
bad history with one Mr Deutschmann, a partner who died resulting in
interminable difficulties
attendant on the dissolution of that
partnership, Applicant abhorred partnerships.
12.2 that there is no documentation,
minute or correspondence evidencing the existence of a partnership
between herself and the
Applicant.
12.3 she sets out a background
relating to the lead up to the setting up of Coastal Hubbs CC (Fourth
Respondent) and the Applicant’s
resignation as a member of the
Fourth Respondent prior to the acquisition of the Coastal Hubbs
property and the Kwikspar.
12.4 she admits that Applicant has
remained a 50% holder of the members interests in Fifth, Sixth and
Eighth Respondents.
The Main Application
[13] The relief sought by the
Applicant in its papers is for the preservation of assets pending the
finalisation of the action for
the dissolution of the alleged
partnership which action, it is common cause, has been instituted and
is before this Court. It is
not certain when the matter will be heard
but safe to say that the parties are desirous of and will ensure that
it is attended
with urgency.
[14] The fundamental concern of the
Applicant in launching the application was precipitated by a belief
that the Respondent had
not only sold certain assets of the Fifth and
Sixth Respondents of which he is an admitted member, but that First
Respondent was
dealing with the assets of Fourth Respondent in a
manner that was detrimental to his rights. The most salient of the
First Respondent’s
acts in this regard was the advertising for
sale of the Farm property in Coastal Hubbs CC and the acquisition of
Sunrise –on
Sea using in part, the proceeds of the sale
of the businesses of Fifth and Sixth Respondents.
[15] Applicant sets out in his papers
that he is a partner in Coastal Hubbs CC and that any sale or
disposal of,
inter alia
, the said property would cause him
irreparable harm in light of his interest therein as alluded to.
[16] On the papers before me, there is
much to be said regarding the First Respondent’s answer to
Applicant’s assertion
that a partnership exists in Fourth
Respondent, whatever its form may be, given the interwoven network of
entities to some of which
First Respondent concedes Applicant’s
unchallenged interest.
[17] From a broad assessment of the
detail of the papers, there is a great deal to be said about how the
First Respondent traversed
a life from being a secretary to that of
the evidently highly successful businesswoman she is and the role
Applicant played therein.
From a perusal of their commercial history,
it is not difficult to come to the common sense view that without
Applicant, there
would not be accumulated over time the assets making
up this formidable balance sheet built through the medium of diverse
business
entities. It is also not yet explained on the papers as to
how Applicant could have put in train all this accumulated result if
he was not to be, at least, a part owner thereof.
[18] Applicant arranged for the
financing of the first property Umgazana CC; invested funds in the
acquisition of Coastal Hubbs
and Kwikspar; is the admitted 50% owner
of 3 (three) Respondent entities. There is no suggestion that First
Respondent contributed
her own funds in these acquisitions, save for
the loan funding associated with Coastal Hubbs. First Respondent,
whilst denying
that Applicant is a partner, on her own version states
the following at paragraph 54.4 of her replying papers
“
I deny that the Applicant and I
thereafter purchased properties in any capacity together. On the
contrary, Coastal Hubbs CC, with
me as the sole member, purchased
Portion 2 of Farm 742 in 2003.
The
Applicant played no role in this purchase whatsoever.
On the contrary, Coastal Hubbs CC, with me as sole member ended up as
the Purchaser of Portion 2 of Farm 742 in 2003.
Although
the Applicant could not play a role in obtaining bank financing, by
virtue of the indivisible nature of the two transactions
namely the
purchase of the business and the purchase of the property, certain
funds made available by the BACA TRUST (a Trust controlled
by the
Applicant) were applied for the purchase of the property and duly
credited in the books of accounting of Coastal Hubbs CC
as a credit
loan account in favour of BACA TRUST.”
(my underlining)
It is patent from the aforegoing that
First Respondent seeks to play ‘fast and loose’ with
regard to Applicant’s
role in the acquisition of the Coastal
Hubbs property. For purposes of my findings I need do no more than
point out that these
are precisely the matters a trial Court is
better positioned to deal with.
[19] It is also possible in a Close
Corporation to hold one’s interest through a nominee and the
fact that one is not a registered
member does not of itself exclude
the possibility that some other form of indirect right of ownership
exists.
[20] The affidavit filed by Margaret
Kuil, the Chartered Accountant casts further doubt on the version
deposed to by First Respondent
regarding the circumstances pertaining
to Applicant’s resignation from Coastal Hubbs CC. It is most
uncertain how Applicant
could give up his interest without, at the
very least, selling the same to First Respondent.
All the aforegoing are questions that
can best be elicited through oral evidence and cross examination and
the view I take of the
matter is that I simply need determine whether
Applicant had made out a case for Interim Relief pending the action
and no more,
bearing in mind that an Application for an Interdict may
be interim in form but final in nature.
[21] In L F Boshoff Investments (Pty)
Ltd v Cape Town Municipality
1969 (2) SA 256
(C) at 267A-F, Corbett
J, as he then was, articulated these requirements as follows:
“
Briefly these requisites are
that the Applicant for such temporary relief must show-
(a) that the right which is the
subject matter of the main action and which he seeks to protect by
means of interim relief is clear
or, if not clear, is prima facie
established, though open to some doubt;
(b) that, if the right is only prima
facie established, there is a well grounded apprehension of
irreparable harm to the Applicant
if the interim relief is not
granted and he ultimately succeeds in establishing his right;
(c) that the balance of convenience
favours the granting of interim relief; and
(d) that the Applicant has no other
remedy”.
[22] Once an Applicant has shown a
prima facie
right, and an apprehension that such right is
threatened, the consideration as to balance of convenience becomes
decisive. See:
S A Motor Racing v Peri Urban Areas Health Board
1955 (1) SA 334
(T).
[23] The Applicant for an
interlocutory interdict must show a right which is being infringed or
which he apprehends will be infringed.
– See Albert v Windsor
Hotel (East London) (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation)
1963 (2) SA 237
(E) at
241 C.
[24] In ‘The Law and Practice of
Interdicts’ by Prest at p 50 it is said, “Where the right
asserted by the Applicant
is, in the terminology of Innes JA
(Setlogelo v Setlogelo
1914 AD 221)
, ‘
prima facie
established … (though) open to some doubt’, the
Applicant may be granted an interim interdict if the continuance of
the thing against which an interdict is sought would cause
irreparable harm”. In this regard it becomes necessary for the
Court to take account of the balance of convenience. The Court must
then consider the nature of the injury to Applicant if the
interdict
is not granted, as opposed to the injury to Respondent if the
interdict is granted.
[25] I am of the view that in this
matter Applicant has made out a
prima facie
case and the
balance of convenience favours the Applicant and a refusal to confirm
this Interdict pending the action will militate
detrimentally against
Applicant’s interests. First Respondent continues to conduct
the business of Fourth Respondent and
no prejudice is to be suffered
by her. Indeed she was happy to have the Interim Order of Pillay J
postponed on some 9 (nine) instances
without filing opposing papers
and having the matter set down for argument.
Contempt of Court
[26] Apart from another Application
for joinder of two other Respondents, the Applicant also seeks an
order that the First Respondent
be held in Contempt of Court, because
she (so he argued) in breach of the
rule nisi
, concluded a new
lease agreement with Ixolo and the last two Respondents to be joined,
in respect of the property at Coastal Hubbs.
In addition that she
deals with the rental as she pleases and to the detriment of the
business.
[27] The Applicant in regard to
Contempt of Court, seeks final relief against the First Respondent
and, in those circumstances it
is clear that the matter must be
decided on the facts as stated by the Respondent, together with those
facts stated by the Applicant
which the Respondent does not deny. –
See Plascon Evans Paints Ltd. V Riebeek Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984
(3) SA (AD) at 634.
[28] The Applicant’s application
for contempt of Court is based entirely on the Order granted by His
Lordship Mr Justice Pillay
on the 7
th
of November 2008,
and in particular paragraph 1.2 thereof.
[29] Paragraph 1.2 of the Order reads:
“
1.2 That the First
Respondent be and is hereby interdicted and restrained from selling
or disposing of or dealing in any way with
the following assets:
1.2.1 all assets held by
(Close Corporations itemized), including a Kia light delivery motor
vehicle, computer and office furniture
. . .
1.2.2 the members
interest of Coastal Hubbs CC, etc,”
[30] In the present matter, the words
are “
selling of or dealing in any way with
” the
following assets. It is important not to lose sight of the fact that
the basis of the main Application related to an
Interdict against the
selling or disposal of partnership property.
[32] According to Principles of Legal
Interpretation by E A Kellaway at 148:
“
the rule of
construction, concisely stated, is that where “particular
words” are followed by “general words”,
the latter
must be construed as
ejusdem
generis
with
the former, that is to say, the general words should be confined to
things of the same kind as those specified.”
[33] In
Director of Education
(Transvaal) v McCagie
1918 AD 616
at 623, Innes CJ said:
“
Where general
words have a wide meaning their interpretation must be affected by
what precedes them; general words following upon
and connected with
specific words are more restricted in their operation than if they
stood alone . . . They are coloured
by their context; and
their meaning is cut down so as to comprehend only things of the same
kind as those designated by the specific
words – unless there
is something to show that a wider sense was intended.”
[34] The contention made by the
Applicant that ‘selling of or dealing in any way with’
includes a curtailment relating
to entering into rental agreements,
collection of rentals and what I would refer to as the general
running of the businesses and
so forth is not a construction that can
easily be made bearing in mind also that First Respondent is the
Managing member. Moreover
to rely on such an interpretation to
provide a basis for committal for Contempt of Court would be
difficult in light of the onus
on Applicant to make out a case for
such drastic action.
[35] A brief summary of the
authorities in this regard can be set out as follows:
In
S v Beyers
1968 (3) SA 70
(A) Steyn CJ at para 81 E stated:
“
Dat die gesag en
aansien van ons Howe doeltreffend beskerm moet word, is onontbeerlik
vir regsordelike verkeer en ‘n saak
van hoë Staatsbelang.
Dit is nie sonder rede dat ons skrywers minagting van Hof onder
atroces
injuriae
tel
nie… Na my mening besit hy wel die bevoegdheid om ook vir
siviele minagting te vervolg”
[36] Contempt of court as an offence
is fundamental to the administration of justice and the rule of law.
It
“
requires that the
dignity and authority of the courts, as well as their capacity to
carry out their functions, should always be
maintained”
Per Sachs J in
Coetzee v Government
of the Republic of South Africa; Matiso v Commanding Officer, Port
Elizabeth Prison
[1995] ZACC 7
;
1995 (4) SA 631
(CC).
[37] Furthermore,
“
It permits a
private litigant who has obtained a court order requiring an opponent
to do or not do something
(ad
factum praestandum)
,
to approach the court again, in the event of non compliance, for
a further order declaring the non compliant party in
contempt of
court, and imposing a sanction.”
See:
Fakie NO v CCII Systems (Pty)
Ltd
[2006] ZASCA 52
;
2006 (4) SA 326
(SCA) at page 332 para C-D per Cameron JA (as
he then was).
[38] The test for when disobedience of
a civil order constitutes Contempt has come to be stated as whether
the breach was committed
‘deliberately and
mala fide
’.
See:
Frankel Max Pollak Vinderine Inc v Menell Jack Hyman
Rosenberg Co Inc
[1996] ZASCA 21
;
1996 (3) SA 355.
[39] In
Fakie NO
(above) the
court at p 333 para C-E, went on to state:
“
A deliberate
disregard is not enough, since the non complier may genuinely,
albeit mistakenly, believe him or herself entitled
to act in the way
claimed to constitute the contempt. In such a case, good faith avoids
the infraction. Even a refusal to comply
that is objectively
unreasonable may be
bona
fide
(though
unreasonableness could evidence lack of good faith).
These requirements- that
the refusal to obey should be both willful and
mala fide
, and
that unreasonable non compliance, provided it is
bona fide
,
does not constitute contempt – accord with the broader
definition of the crime, of which non compliance with civil
orders is a manifestation. They show that the offence is committed
not by mere disregard of a court order, but by the deliberate
and
intentional violation of the court’s dignity, repute or
authority that this evinces. Honest belief that non compliance
is justified or proper is incompatible with that intent.”
[40] As regards the standard of proof
required, the decision of Pickering J in
Uncedo Taxi Service
Association v Maninjwa & Others
1998 (3) SA 417
(ECD) at page
428 para A to the effect:
“
In my view,
therefore, insofar as the summary procedure by way of notice of
motion places an
onus
upon
the offender and requires proof of guilt only upon a balance of
probabilities, it is in conflict with the Constitution and
such
conflict is neither reasonable nor justifiable in terms of s 36. I am
in the circumstances satisfied that in motion proceedings
the guilt
of the offender must be proved beyond reasonable doubt…”
[41] This position has been confirmed
by the full bench of this court in
Burchell v Burchell
[2006]
JOL 16722
(E). There the court found (a) that ‘civil contempt’
remains a criminal offence and that a Respondent is an accused
person, (b) that whilst the Applicant has to prove the elements of
civil contempt beyond reasonable doubt, the application procedure
is
constitutionally competent to accommodate the altered onus.
In the result Applicant was not able
to support the contention that First Respondent knew that the Order
covered interdicting her
from entering into rental agreements. Indeed
such a wide interpretation of the Order is not justified by the
wording and the context
of all relevant considerations including
Applicant’s own failure to apply for such rental relief before
the Honourable Pillay
J.
The Interlocutory re Joinder and
costs thereof
[42] Some 9 (nine) months after the
Interim Order was granted, Applicant sought to join Ixolo Trading to
extend the relief set out
in the original Order to include an
interdict against First Respondent receiving rentals from the new
Lessee. On the papers there
is nothing to indicate that any efforts
were made to enquire from First Respondent who the actual Lessee was
in order to ensure
that the correct party was joined.
[3] First Respondent opposed the
Application primarily because the wrong party had been joined.
Equally importantly however, the
relief sought (rental interdict) had
been omitted in the main application brought before this Court with
which I have dealt above.
Applicant on becoming aware that he was
seeking the joinder of a wrong party withdrew the application.
[44] He now seeks an order that First
Respondent pay the costs of the joinder application.
I am unable to make such a finding in
light of the fact that if the rentals were a consideration at the
outset, then any Lessee
sought to be joined should have been joined
at the time. Not only was this not done by Applicant as
dominus
litis
but no Order relating to the rent was sought before the
Honourable Pillay J.
In the result I made the following
Order:
Having heard Advocate Rowan SC for
Applicant and Advocate Cole for First Respondent, Court makes the
following Order:
1. That the
rule nisi
granted
on the 7 November 2008, in terms of which the following interdicts as
reflected in paragraphs 1.1, 1.2 and 1.4 hereunder
has been extended
pending the finalisation of the action instituted under Case No EL
716/09 and ECD 2616/09:
1.1 That the Respondents are
interdicted and restrained from passing transfer of the following
properties:
1.1.1 the immovable property situate
at Coastal Hubbs, East London described as ‘Remainder of
Portion 2 of Farm 742, Division
of East London, the Province of The
Eastern Cape’ and held under deed of transfer T121/2004;
1.1.2 Erf 111 Sunrise on Sea,
East London and held under deed of transfer T513/2008.
1.2 That the First Respondent be
interdicted and restrained from selling or disposing of or dealing in
any way with the following
assets pending the finalisation of the
action instituted under Case No: EL 716/09 and also referred to as
ECD 2616/09.
1.2.1 All assets held by the Coastal
Hubbs CC, East Coast Retailers CC, Aljazz Liquors CC, Umgazana
Trading CC and Costal DIY CC
including a Kia light delivery motor
vehicle, computer and office furniture previously used in the
business trading as Crossways
Kwikspar and a Toyota Forklift;
1.2.3 The member’s interest of
Coastal Hubbs CC, East Coast Retailers CC, Aljazz Liquors CC, Coastal
DIY CC and Umgazana Trading
CC;
1.3 The First Respondent in managing
the letting out and the rental of the assets in 1.2.1 and 1.2.2
heretofore, pending the conclusion
of the action in Case No EL 716/09
and ECD 2616/09, is ordered to do so only in a manner consonant with
the ordinary scope of the
business of letting and must to that end,
maintain standard books of account;
1.4 That the Third Respondent be and
is hereby interdicted and restrained from making any payments to
anyone whatsoever from the
monies held in trust arising out of the
sale of the business owned by Coastal Hubbs CC and Aljazz Liquors CC
and the property owned
by Umgazana Trading CC, save for those
payments agreed upon in writing by the Applicant, pending the
finalisation of an action
to be instituted for the dissolution of the
partnership between the Applicant and the First Respondent;
1.5 That the First Respondent be and
is hereby interdicted and restrained from drawing any funds against
Mortgage Bonds over the
properties mentioned in paragraphs 1.1.1 and
1.1.2 above or from extending any existing bonds or taking any
further bonds over
the said properties for any purpose whatsoever,
unless agreed to by the Applicant and the First Respondent in
writing.
2. That the Contempt of Court
Application instituted under the second further Interlocutory
Application is dismissed;
3. That the Application relating to an
Order to Compel the First Respondent to pay the costs of the
interlocutory Application is
dismissed;
4. That the costs of the main
Application hereunder stand over for decision by the court hearing
the action instituted under Case
No: EL 716/09 also referred to as
ECD 2616/09;
5. That the costs of the First and
Second Interlocutory Applications, to wit, the Joinder and Contempt
of Court applications be
paid by the Applicant.
-------------------
PT MAGEZA
MATTER HEARD ON : 23 FEBRUARY 2010
ORDER MADE ON : 01 MARCH 2010
REASONS DELIVERED : 25 MARCH 2010
COUNSEL FOR APPLICANT : ADV ROWAN
SC
ATTORNEYS FOR APPLICANT : COX YEATS
ATTORNEYS
c/o DRAKE FLEMMER &
ORSMOND INC.
22 St James Road,
Southernwood
East London.
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT : ADV COLE
ATTORNEYS FOR RESPONDENTS
: GRAVETT SCHOEMAN INC
4 Derby Road,
Berea
East London.