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[2011] ZAECMHC 26
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Zongo v MEC of Education, Eastern Cape Province and Another (1894/2004) [2011] ZAECMHC 26 (29 December 2011)
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CAPE HIGH COURT: MTHATHA)
CASE NO: 1894/2004
In the matter between:
SOLOMON ZONGO
…....................................................................
PLAINTIFF
AND
THE HONOURABLE MEC FOR
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOME
EDUCATION AND ANOTHER
(Eastern Cape Province)
….........................................................
DEFENDANTS
JUDGMENT
DAWOOD J
The Plaintiff herein instituted action against the
First and Second Defendant wherein he sought relief for contractual
damages
arising out of breach of contract, alternatively for
enforcement of contract and a declaration of rights.
An order was granted in terms of Rule 33(4) separating
the issues of liability and quantum with the matter only proceeding
on
the issue of liability.
After extensive argument the application for a separate
determination of the legal points was refused on the basis that the
determination
of some of these issues would need oral evidence which
would overlap with the evidence to be led in the main trial and
accordingly
it would not be convenient to separate the legal points
from the merits of the matter.
The defendant denied:-
That the Plaintiff was appointed as Principal in that
:-
The letter, Annexure SZ1, is not a letter of
appointment but just a letter conveying an intention to appoint the
Plaintiff subject
to approval of the Education Department;
That no approval for his appointment had been obtained
by the Department of Education by reason of the impropriety in the
recommendations
of the School Governing Body, recommending the
appointment of the Plaintiff and accordingly the suspensive
condition had not
been fulfilled;
That the signatory to the said letter was not
authorized in law to appoint the Plaintiff;
That the Plaintiff’s appointment was based on
improper recommendation by the School Governing Body and accordingly
a withdrawal
letter was written after learning of the impropriety of
the Plaintiff’s recommendation by the School’s Governing
Body;
That the withdrawal constituted a breach of contract.
The Defendant pleaded in addition, that the Plaintiff
waived his rights to institute action because he accepted an
invitation
to participate in the subsequent interview. The Plaintiff
thereby abandoned, and/or waived the right to claim entitlement to
appointment to the post on the basis of the previous interviews and
recommendations and on the basis of his appointment in terms
of the
letter of appointment.
The Defendant pleaded in respect of breach of contract
with regard to failure to comply with the
audi alterum partem
rule, that the Plaintiff:-
Had not complied with section 7 of PAJA relating to
time periods for institution of proceedings and relating to external
and internal
remedies and of failing to comply with PAM, (Personnel
Administration Measures), Act issued in terms of the
Employment of
Educators Act 1998
.
The Defendant contended further that they offered the
Plaintiff a hearing and furnished him with reasons for the
withdrawal of
his appointment.
The Defendant submitted that the issues for
determination were the following:-
Whether or not the suspensive condition was fulfilled.
Whether or not the letter written was a letter of
appointment since the person who signed it had no authority to sign;
Whether or not the Plaintiff had waived his right to
rely on the letter or intention to appoint;
Does the Plaintiff’s reliance on the
audi
alterum
partem
rule create a new cause of action and has
it prescribed due to the fact that there was undue delay;
Was the decision one in terms of PAJA or common law;
If it was in terms of Common Law is the Plaintiff still
hit by PAJA;
Did the Defendant bear the onus of informing the
Plaintiff of any of his rights of recourse;
Whether the Plaintiff exhausted internal remedies;
Was the Plaintiff entitled to a hearing; and
Was he given such a hearing and did the Plaintiff, by
accepting the conditions to submit to fresh interviews waive such a
right.
Evidence led
The Plaintiff,
Mr Solomon Zongo,
testified as
follows:-
He was employed as a teacher in 1993 by the Department
of Education;
He applied for a post of Principal of Mzamo Junior
Secondary School in 2002;
He received an appointment letter after he had been
interviewed on the 12
th
of August 2002;
He was informed in person by the circuit manager Mr
Dweba on the 24
th
September 2002 of his appointment and
he thereafter got the appointment letter at another office.
The appointment letter reads as follows:-
“…
RE:
APPOINTMENT: YOURSELF
I
have pleasure to inform you that the Department has approved your
appointment
as a / an educator in accordance with the particulars
reflected hereunder:-
School:
Mzamo JSS
District:
Libode
Salary
Scale: 116310/157677
Salary
Notch: 116310
Date
of Appointment: 12/09/2002
Date
of appointment will be with effect from the date you assume
duties
provided it is after the approval by the Department
.
The
conditions of service and other fringe benefits such as pension,
housing, medical aid scheme, leave credits and service awards
as
contained in Act No. 78 of 1998 of
Employment of Educators Act read
with existing regulations also applies.” (my highlighting)
He thereafter went to Mzamo Junior Secondary School to
assume duties as principal on the 25
th
of September 2011
when he was met by the Circuit Manager who introduced him to the
Student Governing Body and to the School Staff.
There were no changes in his salary upon him assuming
his appointment at Mzamo Junior Secondary School.
He did not receive the new salary for a Principal
despite holding the position of Principal from the 25
th
of September until the 13
th
of November when he received
a call from the circuit manager who informed him that his
appointment was challenged by two other
applicants and he was
advised to return to his previous school until the matter was
resolved.
He indicated that he did attempt to resist but was
persuaded by his boss and told that if he did not comply with the
instructions
he was likely to lose his post and he accordingly did
as he was told and went back to his previous school.
He was embarrassed when he returned to his previous
School because the School and the School Governing Body was not
informed and
refused to accept him without something in writing
He then went back to the Circuit Manager who sent him
to a Ms Fubu who served him with the withdrawal letter on the
instruction
of the District Director, Dr Nuku. The letter, dated 12
November 2002 reads as follows:-
“
Dear
Sir
Re:
WITHDRAWAL OF APPOINTMENT AS PRINCIPAL OF MZAMO JUNIOR SECONDARY
SCHOOL NGQELENI.
It is
with regret I inform you that your appointment as principal of Mzamo
Junior Secondary School has been withdrawn.
This
decision was taken after the agreement made at the conciliation
meeting held on 31
st
October 2002. It has been discovered
that procedures for appointment of a principal at Mzamo were not
followed properly hence the
matter was taken up as a dispute with
Education Labour Relations Council.
The
department highly regrets the inconvenience that will be made by this
decision.
Yours
faithfully
District
Manager”
He went back to the Circuit Manager to request clarity
on the contents of the letter.
Mr Dweba convinced him that this was just a formality
as a document that he should submit to the school to enable the
Department
to hold a second round of interviews to resolve the
problem.
Mr Dweba assured him that despite the contents of the
letter the post was his and that he had to comply with the
instructions
if he is willing to get the post and he accordingly
complied because he was desperately in need of the post and he could
not
argue with his employer.
He was told that if he did comply it would make things
easier for them as a Department to re-instate him as Prinical.
He was not informed of the conciliation hearing that
preceded him receiving the letter of withdrawal nor was he
consulted. Nothing
was done before he got the withdrawal letter
except the telephonic information the previous day from the Circuit
Manager.
He gave the letter to the Student Governing Body and
waited for the next round of interviews as he had been persuaded by
the Circuit
Manager to attend those interviews if he really wanted
the post.
The second interviews were conducted on the 29
th
of January 2004 and he attended these interviews at the Department
Building and not at Mzamo JSS where the first interviews where
held.
He was told by Mr Dweba that he should comply with the
instructions if he was desperately in need of the post and if he did
not
attend he would lose the post, this was the reason he attended
the second interviews.
The Student Governing Body at Mzamo JSS was not
represented at the second round of interviews and there were now
nine contestants
whereas in the first interviews there had been only
five.
He was not told about the outcome of the second round
of interviews until he discovered that on the 24
th
March,
a new principal had been appointed.
The Circuit Manager did not answer him when he
questioned him about this and this prompted him to go to the Labour
Relations Office
were he consulted with Mr Ngedi and was given the
Education Labour Relations Council forms to fill in and he faxed it
to the
department and was told that they had seen it.
He waited until July 2004 for a response and when he
called, he was told that they knew nothing about the forms.
It was at that stage that he went to his attorney in
August 2004.
According to him he was told to attend the second set
of interviews and did not know nor did he intend to waive any rights
by
so doing and he was not given any information that his subsequent
attendance would have an adverse effect upon his rights.
Under cross-examination, it was put to him that he was
employed in terms of Employment of Educator’s Act, in terms of
the
letter of appointment.
It was put to him that the letter was signed by Mr
Mkentane and he indicated that he did not know but could not dispute
it. He
testified that he knew that Dr Nuku was the District Director
of Libode in 2002.
His evidence was that he had not known who, in the
Department of Education had the power to appoint an Educator.
It was put to him that in terms of
Section 6(1)
of the
Employment of Educator’s Act the only person who has the power
to appoint a person to a Provincial Department of
Education is the
Head of the Department and his response was initially that he did
not know who has got the power and he thereafter
conceded that this
rested in the hands of the Head of Department to appoint a
Principal.
The Head of Department of the Department of Education
is the Superintendent General and he conceded that the
Superintendent General
is the only person who can appoint unless he
has delegated that power.
It was put to him that Mr Mkentane was not the
Superintendent General and he did not have the power to appoint much
less sign
a letter conveying any appointment on behalf of the
Department.
He disputed that Mr Mkentane could not sign because he
could not be delegated to sign.
It was put to him that Mr Mkentane was never delegated
the power to appoint or sign a letter of appointment on behalf of
the Department
of Education.
He disputed this saying that a number of Principals
were appointed at the same time as him and Mr Mkentane signed the
appointment
letters. He however failed to give the names of such
individuals and none of them were called to testify in order to
confirm
this allegation.
It was put to him that evidence would be led to the
effect that Mr Mkentane when signing this letter acted outside the
scope of
any powers he may have had. His response was that he
disputed this. He testified that Mr Mkentane was the Chief Education
Specialist
and disputed that the Chief Education Specialist did not
have any powers to appoint a Principal and he based his dispute on
the
fact that the withdrawal letter which was issued by Dr Nuku
would not have been issued if he had not been issued with a letter
of appointment and the withdrawal letter made no mention of the
appointment letter being ineffective because the signatory did
not
have the power.
It was put to him that Mr Mkentane did not have the
power that is why the letter contained the condition that approval
had to
be forthcoming from the Department and this was confirmed by
the fact that he did not receive the salary of the Principal. He
disputed this.
He confirmed under cross-examination that he attended
the second interviews and that he fully participated in the second
set of
interviews.
He initially stated that the he was asked whether he
would accept the outcome of the second interviews and thereafter
denied this
and testified that he was never asked.
It was put to him that he ranked the lowest amongst all
the candidates in the first interview. His response was that he
ranked
third and there were five candidates.
He conceded that two candidates scored higher than him
and that the School Governing Body could recommend someone that was
not
ranked number one but he accepted that usually the appointment
would go to the person with the highest scores and that if they
chose a candidates ranked number three they would have to motivate
for the decision.
The Plaintiff conceded that when you go for interviews
there are no guarantees, but he had an assurance from Mr Dweba that
if
he went for the second interview he would get the post, but only
if he went to the second round.
He denied that this would be improper conduct because
it was the Department that had the problem and he had been
appointed.
He then went on to say that he was told that if he
wants to get the post then he must go for the second interview.
He did not consider it to be improper conduct if the
outcome was pre-determined because it was already the position he
was occupying
and he was desperate.
He disputed that he willingly waived his right to the
previous appointment by undergoing fresh interviews and exposing
himself
to a situation where he would compete with other candidates.
He indicated that he was unaware of what was contained
in the PAM, (Personnel Administration Measures), document and he was
not
aware that he could lodge a grievance.
It was put to him that Mr Mkentane was not authorized
to sign the letter of appointment in law or in fact and he stated
that he
did not agree.
It was also put to him that the letter was subject to a
suspensive card, that the Department had to approve his appointment
and
that the Department did not give such an approval. His response
was that he did not agree and that this was the letter confirming
the agreement with the Department.
It was put to him that the letter was not binding on
the Department and he responded that the letter was a binding
contract.
He disputed that he willingly subjected himself to
fresh interviews and thereby abandoned and waived his rights to rely
on the
appointment.
Under re-examination he indicated that he was employed
prior to the coming into effect of the PAM, (Personnel
Administration Measures),
document and he was not made aware of nor
was he told about the grievance procedure.
According to him Mr Mkentane was given the authority to
convey appointments by the person who had the right to employ.
The withdrawal letter was not signed by him but the
person who signed the withdrawal letter was aware of the
appointment.
This concluded the Plaintiff’s testimony.
The next witness called by the Plaintiff was
Jamanjile
Ncele
:-
He was the chairman of the School Governing Body from
2001 until 2004.
According to him he knew the Plaintiff well as he had
grown up in the village next to his and that the Plaintiff had
submitted
his application for the post of Headmaster.
Three persons were recommended and the Plaintiff was
the third person recommended.
The Student Governing Body rejected the first and
second person , the first person was not popular and regarded as
weak and the
second person was unknown to then and was coming from
afar therefore they rejected him whereas the Plaintiff grew up in
front
of them and they respected him and he respected them.
According to him they made a verbal recommendation and
not a written one.
According to him the Plaintiff arrived alone when they
announced that he had been appointed.
Their recommendation was not cancelled and nothing was
said to him.
He confirmed that he was present when interviews were
conducted in April 2003 but he was not part of the interviewing
panel and
that the Department had withdrawn the Student Governing
Body’s power to interview.
This concluded the Plaintiff’s case.
The Defendant thereafter commenced its case.
The Defendants’ called
Mr Mkentane
who is
the acting District Director of Libode employed by the Department
of Education as the first witness.
Mr Mkentane
testified that:-
In 2002 he was the Chief Education Specialist and
signed a letter appointing the Plaintiff as Principal.
In 2002 the District Director was Dr Nuku who had the
power to appoint, delegated to him by the Superintendent General in
writing.
According to him, if it is not in writing it has no
force or effect.
He confirmed that he signed the letter because he was
acting on behalf of Dr Nuku who was not in the District at the time.
Dr Nuku had telephonically requested him to act as
District Director and he was given the same powers as Dr Nuku and
could perform
the functions of Dr Nuku at the time.
According to him these powers should have been conveyed
in writing and accordingly had no effect.
Paragraph 6 of the letter of appointment co-notated the
fact that he would appoint, thereafter the Province or the
Department
must confirm the appointment and in the Plaintiff’s
case the Department did not confirm the appointment.
The Student Governing Body had given a written
motivation for recommending the Plaintiff despite him being number
three.
He wrote the letter based on the Student Governing
Body’s recommendation and made the decision as the Acting
District Director
to appoint him as the Principal, without being
aware that he did not have the authority to appoint.
That concluded his testimony.
Dr Nuku
thereafter testified as follows:-
In 2002 he was the District Director of Libode.
He was on leave at the relevant time when the letter of
appointment was written and he telephonically requested Mr Mkentane
to
act in his place.
He had the delegated powers from the Head of Department
but was unable to delegate what was delegated to him.
He further was required to in writing appoint someone
to act in his place setting out exactly what that person’s
duties
would be.
He was aware of the appointment letter when he returned
to work as a report had been made that it was necessary to withdraw
the
letter due to the flaws in the appointment and the issuing of
the letters.
The matter was referred to the Head Office and the
powers of the Student Governing Body were withdrawn and a panel was
appointed
to start the process afresh.
Under cross-examination he confirmed that the power to
make appointments was delegated to him personally as the person in
his
capacity as the District Director and not to the office of the
District Director.
He was named in the letter authorizing his delegation
and the Superintendent General delegated this to him specifically
and not
to the office of the District Director.
This power could not be further delegated.
He was aware that he had to appoint someone to fulfill
his functions in writing but due to ill health, he was in hospital
at the
time, he was unable to do so.
He became aware of the appointment in September but
wanted the conciliation process to be finalized prior to making a
decision
with regard to the appointment as the whole process was
flawed.
He confirmed that he did not specifically state in his
letter that the signatory to the letter was not authorized as he did
not
deem it appropriate to inform the appointee but merely stated
that the whole process was flawed.
He indicated that he does not have the power to appoint
as part of his job description and that these powers were delegated
to
him and he did not have the authority to further delegate the
powers to the appointment and dismissal of teachers.
According to him, Mr Dweba was requested to communicate
to the Plaintiff that the process was flawed and that Mr Mkentane
did
not have any powers to appoint.
He was unable to dispute that the Plaintiff was not
told about the lack of authority to sign the letter of appointment.
He confirmed that he had not gone to court to rectify
the appointment as he did not deem it necessary.
Under re-examination he confirmed that he could not
even have implicitly delegated powers that had been delegated to him
since
it was personally delegated to him.
He indicated that if the Plaintiff had approached him
he would have informed him of these irregularities.
That concluded the Defendant’s case.
EVALUATION
The Plaintiff despite his reluctance to readily make
concessions or answer questions under cross examination was a
reasonably
good witness and did not deviate from his evidence in
chief. It was evident from his testimony:-
That he considered the letter of appointment to have
given rise to a binding agreement;
That he was persuaded to attend the second interviews
in order to retain the position; and
That the withdrawal letter did not specifically make
mention of the lack of authority as the basis for withdrawing his
appointment.
He was however unable to satisfactorily explain why
there was a suspensive condition of obtaining approval inserted into
the letter
if his appointment was confirmed.
He was also unable to explain why he did not receive
the salary of a principal if he had been appointed by the Department
and
the letter was merely a confirmation of his appointment.
The Defendants’ witnesses were both found to be
honest and forthright and it was evident from both their testimonies
that
Mr Mkentane did not have the authority to appoint and neither
was this power delegated to him nor could it be delegated to him.
Even the functions that he performed were not reduced
to writing. Accordingly even if it was possible to sub-delegate,
which does
not appear to be the position here, this ought to have
been done in writing and could not be either explicitly or
implicitly
done verbally, having regard to the provisions of the Act
authorizing or sanctioning delegation.
It was also evident from Dr Nuku’s testimony that
Mr Dweba was merely requested to convey the decision to withdraw the
Plaintiff’s
appointment to the Plaintiff.
It is evident from this that the Plaintiff was not
consulted or heard prior to the decision being taken to withdraw his
appointment.
Dr Nuku was further not aware of whether or not the
lack of authority of Mr Mkentane was mentioned to the Plaintiff by
Mr Dweba
as grounds for the withdrawal.
Legal Position
Section 6(1)
of the Employment of Educators
Act 76 of 1998 (hereinafter referred to as the
Act
) reads
as follows:-
“
Subject
to the provisions of this section, the appointment of any persons or
the promotion or transfer of any educator:-
In
the service of the Department of Basic Education shall be made by
the Director General; or
In
the service of a Provincial Department of Education shall be made
by the Head of Department.”
It is trite law that the legislative and executive in
every sphere may exercise no power and perform no function beyond
that
conferred upon them by law.
In this case Mr Mkentane on his version had no power
nor did he have the authority to appoint and accordingly he could
not
appoint any individual.
It is also trite that a contract that is
ultra
vires
the enabling legislation is void
ab initio
and is
not enforceable.
In terms of
Section 7A (6)-7A (8)
of the
Public Service Act Proclamation 103 of 1994:-
“
The
Head of Department may delegate any power conferred upon him / her in
terms of any legislation. Any delegation by a head of
department
within the province and the district:-
shall
be in writing”
(my highlighting)
In this case it is evident that this authority was
delegated personally to Dr Nuku, in writing. There was no
delegation made
by the Head of Department to Mr Mkentane in
writing as required by the Act or even verbally.
Mr Mkentane accordingly had no authority or delegated
powers to appoint and any act taken by him was
ultra vires
the Act and of no force and effect.
In the case of “
delectus personae”
where the delegee appears to have been chosen for his or her
special abilities or qualifications, it is more likely that
the
sub delegation will not be allowed.
In
Minister of Trade and Industry vs Nieuwoudt
1985(2)
SA 1 CPD at page 10 D – E:-
“
In our law, where powers are conferred upon a subordinate
authority, the maxim delegatus delegare non potest prevents a
delegation
of such powers unless it is authorised either expressly or
by necessary implication (Attorney-General, OFS v Cyril Anderson
Investments
(Pty) Ltd
1965 (4) SA 628
(A) at 639 C – D)…”
At 11 and 12, the learned Judge stated circumstances
under which a delegation could be made at 12 H – 13 G it was
stated:-
“
(5)
Delegatus non potest
delegare is
"The general principle that certainly in matters involving
judicial powers, trust, the exercise of discretion, or where the
qualities of the delegate are material, a delegate must act himself
and may not, unless expressly authorized, delegate his functions
to
another. The principle does not extend to merely executive functions.
It applies also to administrative law." (Oxford Companion
to
Law, David M Walker, Regius Professor of Law, University of Glasgow,
at 344).
(6)
Delegation of authority by an officer of a private commercial
undertaking to his representative may be in order; but delegation
of
power by a public official is bad unless he has the right to delegate
(Jacobson and Woolf v Municipal Council of Johannesburg
1906 TH 99
at
101). Indeed, even in the private sphere a delegation is in general,
it seems, not permissible; J thus an agent may not delegate
his
functions to a sub-agent except with the consent of his principal or
where the employment of a sub-agent is necessary for
the
A
carrying out of the
mandate or is customary in the ordinary course of business (Belonje v
African Electric Co (Pty) Ltd
1949
(1) SA 592 (E)
at 599, citing Wille's
Principles ). It may be observed that the mere fact that it may be
convenient to appoint a sub-agent is not
enough: it must be necessary
or customary (ibid same page). This, for
B
what it is worth, militates against the argument of Mr
Viljoen that the inspectors would find it convenient to have
experienced
counsel to conduct interrogations for them.
(7) In the Companies Act ss 258 - 260 there is
plainly no express authority given to the inspectors to delegate
their C powers of
interrogation to anyone.
Does the Act contain an
implication that the inspectors may do so?
Baxter
Administrative Law at 435, dealing with "Unlawful abdication of
power", says:
"When may power be delegated?
Where there is no express authority to delegate
the delegatus D maxim has prima facie weight and the delegator must
show that he
enjoys an authority to delegate that is necessarily
implied by the empowering legislation. Such implication might depend
on a number
of interrelated factors, of which the following seem to
be the most significant:-
(i) the degree of devolution of the power;
(ii) the importance of the original
delegee;
(iii) the complexity and
breadth of discretion;
(iv) the impact of the power;
and
(v) practical
necessities."
In
regard to factor (i) Baxter - correctly, I think - states that the
permissibility of the delegation depends F partially upon
how much
power is handed over (see at 436).
"Where
there is a complete handover of power and responsibility, the Courts
are unlikely to approve. Conversely, where the
delegation is very
limited and the delegator retains full control over the final
decision, the delegation is likely to be intra
vires. In S v
Louterwater Landgoed (Edms) Bpk
1972
(2) SA 809
(C)
where
a Minister promulgated fire-control regulations on the basis of
advice furnished to him by various G committees, it was held
that
there had been no ultra vires delegation since, although the advice
had been influential, the Minister had at all times exercised
his own
discretion."
The real issue in this case is whether or not the
Defendants’ witness, Mr Mkentane, acted
ultra vires
when he signed the letter.
The Plaintiff was justifiably unable to gainsay the
evidence of both Dr Nuku and Mr Mkentane, that Mr Mkentane did not
have the
power or the authority to appoint as this power was
delegated to Dr Nuku personally as the District Manager and there is
no evidence
that he could or did delegate this power. The Act does
not make provision for Dr Nuku to delegate this power.
The testimony of both these witnesses clearly indicates
that Mr Mkentane did not have the power to appoint.
I accept that it was not a power that could be
expressly or implicitly delegated by Dr Nuku and most certainly not
verbally, since
Dr Nuku did not have the power or the authority to
delegate.
Accordingly the letter of appointment signed by Mr
Mkentane was
void ab initio
and no valid and binding
agreement came into existence.
The letter of appointment in the circumstances can be
regarded as
pro non scripto
.
The Plaintiff accordingly cannot rely upon the letter
as creating a valid and binding agreement between the parties in the
circumstances.
The Plaintiff accordingly has failed to discharge the
onus resting upon him to establish that the Defendant had breached
an agreement
since no agreement came into existence between the two
parties as a result of the lack of authority of Mr Mkentane.
No rights or obligations accordingly flowed from the
letter and the determination of this issue is decisive of the
matter.
The decision on the other points will not change the
outcome and accordingly I do not propose dealing with any of the
other issues
raised by the parties.
It is evident that the lack of authority was not
specifically mentioned in the letter of withdrawal. Perhaps if this
was done
the Plaintiff may not have instituted legal proceedings
against the Defendants. Accordingly in the exercise of my
discretion,
no cost order will be made against the Plaintiff despite
the Defendants’ been the successful parties.
ORDER
I accordingly make the following order:-
1.) The Action is dismissed
2.) No order as to costs.
________________________
DAWOOD J
(JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT)
DATE HEARD: 14
SEPTEMBER 2011
(DATE JUDGEMENT RESERVED)
DATE DELIVERED: 29 DECEMBER 2011
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: MR TSHIKI
TSHIKI & SONS INC
18 SPRIGG STR
MTHATHA
REF: M. TSHIKI
FOR THE DEFENDANT: ADV DA SILVA
MESSRS VELILE -
TINTO & NGUMILE
FLAT 4,
NETTLETON COURT
STANFORD TERRACE
MTHATHA
REF: VT/ND/SA/859.05